

frontier

Vol. 4: No. 19

AUGUST 21, 1971

PRICE: 35 PAISE

On Other Pages

COMMENTS	2
<i>View From Delhi</i>	
FROM RUSSIA WITH PITY	
FROM A POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT	4
<i>Letter From America</i>	
THE SINO-AMERICAN MOVES	
ROBI CHAKRAVORTI	5
THE BUTCHER BECOMES BUDDHIST	
K. R. SHARMA	7
DOLLAR IN THE DOLDRUMS—I	
A. K. ESSACK	9
<i>Andhra Pradesh</i>	
WRITERS' ARREST	
FROM A CORRESPONDENT	10
<i>Book Review</i>	
THE EMERGENCE OF INDIAN NATIONALISM	
ARJUN BANDYOPADHYAY	11
SHOCK CORRIDOR	
MRIGANKAR SEKHAR RAY	14
<i>Clippings</i>	
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS	15
LETTERS	16

Editor : Samar Sen

PRINTED AT MODERN INDIA PRESS,
7, RAJA SUBODH MULLICK SQUARE,
CALCUTTA-13 AND PUBLISHED WEEKLY
FOR GERMINAL PUBLICATIONS (P) LTD.
BY SAMAR SEN FROM 61, MOTT LANE,
CALCUTTA-13
TELEPHONE: 243202

SHADES OF INDONESIA

THERE has been quite a lot of silent killing in West Bengal. At Barasat, at Noapara and elsewhere. The police have killed groups of people publicly—at Beliaghata and elsewhere. They have, in collaboration with thugs, driven out CPM members and sympathisers from particular areas. Their jail record is gory. But a new monster was born in this country on August 12-13 in the Cossipore-Baranagar area.

Following the murder of a Congress(R) worker (who killed him—Naxal or some agent?) a mob, consisting of 1,000 men, went on a rampage over a two-square-mile area for about 17 hours, dragging out Naxalites or often their relations from their houses and hide-outs and killing them, ransacking and burning the shops of those suspected of hiding the extremists. There can be little doubt that the operation was pre-planned. Many of the Naxalites fleeing towards the river were caught and killed and their bodies thrown into the sacred waters of the Ganga. Push-carts were used elsewhere to remove the bodies. Official figures speak of 17 or 19 deaths, but unofficial reports put them at 100 or so. There are persistent allegations that some CPM supporters joined in the killing spree.

The police did nothing for almost 17 hours. Why should they? This was perhaps the first experiment in large-scale operation by resistance groups formed by the administration to restore law and order. It was a most successful operation (in an area where an all-party committee had been formed against lawlessness) on which some parties would draw for methodology and encouragement. Haven't mass-leaders often said that if the police stand by, the anti-social elements could be brought to book in no time?

New alignments are coming into sharp relief in West Bengal. There is much better understanding between the left parties and the administration, thanks to the efforts of two enlightened barristers-in-law. One of them, Mr Siddhartha Ray, asked by a reporter why the police could not protect peaceful citizens, said it was to be found out whether those killed were peace loving and pointed out that "a large number of people in the affected areas expressed a sense of relief after the incidents as they could now safely come out for their normal vocations of life." The other barrister, Mr Jyoti Basu, was confabulating with the ex-Chief Secretary, Mr R. Gupta—

a man for all seasons—at the Calcutta Club on Friday evening. The administration, American-inspired, has shown some degree of maturity in playing off one opponent against another. As for the warning that any party undertaking a non-violent, radical programme of action would have to face the police music some day, it may be assumed that no parliamentary party will overstep the point of no return to risk mass murder.

What about those who do not believe in any caution, tactical or otherwise, for survival, rethinking and consolidation? They seem undaunted. What is particularly worrying the police, says one report, in tackling the extremists in the districts is an almost automatic filling up of their ranks, after the temporary vacuum created by arrests and detentions (the killing is left out) of the known figures of the groups. There is also the phenomenon of the growing number of teenagers in the ranks.

These youngsters would heed no advice. They have been told that this is the time to go on the offensive; they have been offered an *Anandamath*-style mystique of laying down their lives and enriching the soil with

their blood; they are urged to keep on annihilating class-enemies. And they are doing all this without any thought of the consequences. Public response to their liquidation, however, is usually limited and no mass sympathy is seen, in view perhaps of their killing of individuals. Also, the social-democratic slander campaign against them is sustained, resourceful and crafty. It is also a fact that agents have infiltrated their unco-ordinated squads, justifying some of the slander and also fatally exposing their underground structure. Most of the better cadres are already dead or in jail. It has not yet dawned on those still living and at large—though the price paid has been terrible—that greater Calcutta is no ideal ground for guerrilla action. Even if the police and the CRP were incompetent and cowardly, some people are always there to see that the extremists infringing on their bases are liquidated.

The period of silent killing and trying to explain away the bodies found here and there is drawing to an end. There will no longer be the problem of transporting them in dairy vans before break of dawn. They can now be carried in push-carts in daylight.

Broking For Soviets

If there was any lurking doubt about the motivation behind the Indo-Soviet treaty—hypocritically described as a Treaty of Peace against War—it should have been dispelled by the Indian External Affairs Minister's banquet speech in Jakarta. He said India was prepared to help the countries of South-East Asia in maintaining their "security, sovereignty and independence". That he should have chosen to announce this offer in a country notoriously anti-China is quite significant. He did not want to leave any haze over who the aggressor might be. As guest of a regime installed in office by the CIA, he was certainly not referring to threats of aggression or subversion by the U.S.

especially when he expressed India's desire to benefit from Indonesia's "experience and advice" on matters affecting the region. The Suharto regime's recipe for stability cannot be anything other than a posture of confrontation with China, and Mr Swaran Singh has made it clear that India will be a willing partner in the new power game that is likely to flow from the possible American withdrawal from the region.

There has been no new development in South-East Asia recently that calls for an Indian alarm over the security of the countries of the region. If the Nixon visit to Peking ends American presence in South-East Asia, non-aligned India should

rejoice. That will be in conformity with past professions also, for it has always been India's case that the presence of an alien power like the U.S. was generating conflict and tension in the area. China's presence is geographical, it cannot be wished away. In a sense, Chinese presence in the region is more relevant than Indian presence, and the smaller countries of the region will have to learn to live with a powerful China if they want to grow in independence and not remain vassals of one super-power or another. The Indian move is to block this healthy development. As long as the U.S. held the South-East Asian countries under tutelage India was unworried over their security. In spite of the professed opposition to the American policy of containment of China, the Government of India was happy with the power balance. Now that the possibility of that balance being upset cannot be ruled out, it has cast itself in the role of a busybody. Behind India's simulated concern is the intention to resurrect the Dullesian theory of containment; the only difference proposed is to have a series of bilateral security arrangements instead of the multilateral pacts sponsored by the late Mr Dulles.

Bilateral security arrangements between countries of South-East Asia to contain China cannot be taken seriously unless they are underwritten by a super-power. Militarily, all these countries, India not excluded, are non-powers; they are ciphers which are of no value unless they have a digit on the left. The Soviet Union is that digit. The Indo-Soviet treaty is the first link in a chain of projected bilateral treaties to throw a ring round China. The Soviet intention is to replace the U.S. in this region, to prevent the vacuum to be created in the event of an American withdrawal from being filled by the South-East Asian countries themselves in cooperation with China. Despite the high-falutin declaration of faith in the maintenance of peace and the loosening of tension in the Indo-Soviet treaty, the Soviet Union is trying to

perpetuate tension in the region and taking advance steps to undo the good effects of a Sino-American detente. By signing the treaty India has agreed to act as a broker for the Soviet Union, a purveyor of a theory of a new bi-polar division of the region. All this may be a part of the super-power game; maybe the U.S. is withdrawing so that the Soviet Union may step in and achieve with the help of the so-called non-aligned countries

what it had failed to secure with the committed countries. The virtual absence of any American criticism of the treaty may be a pointer that the move has the blessing of the U.S. also. Non-alignment is not a sacred cow, and it is debatable whether India has been really non-aligned. But there is no doubt that never in the past had India touted openly for a super-power. Denials from no quarters can alter this fact; they only proclaim the Government's dishonesty.

city of Kataragama in South Ceylon, the abode of the Hindu deity God Skanda (Murugan). Three Army officers are being tried for this murder in the civil courts. Although similar cases of torture and illegal executions occurred in almost every police station on the island, the Kataragama case has become notorious because of the desecration of the holy city, because the victim had been the beauty queen of the area last year, and because the Army unit concerned was under a businessman volunteer, Lieutenant Alfie Wijesekera, who had boastfully recounted the incident in the bars and clubs of Colombo.

Uncertain Calm In Ceylon

A correspondent writes :

Many people in Ceylon today speak of the "calm before the storm". Some say that the movement launched in April by the young insurgents of the People's Liberation Front (JVP) was the first wave of revolutionary upsurge and guerilla warfare in Ceylon. Others say that the JVP has been effectively crushed and claim that the military will now try to take full control or will try to push the government in a rightward direction, which will result in the exclusion of the two left parties (Trotskyist LSSP and pro-Moscow CP) from the United Front government of Mrs Bandaranaike. In either case Ceylon will be in for a period of political turbulence. Few expect things to ever go back to the democratic norm of parliamentary cabinet government, the two-party system and regular elections.

The Government is faced with a political and economic crisis. A key problem is how to win back the confidence of the masses who have turned against it because of the widespread police brutality against innocent people. It has the added problem of how to win back the young people of Ceylon who mainly support or sympathise with the JVP. It has another problem of what to do with 15,000 young prisoners (including 500 women) who are in prisons and detention camps. The economic crisis is acute, with a sudden increase in the cost of living, and in unemploy-

ment and a sharp decline in foreign exchange.

The Government is trying to win popular confidence and face the economic crisis by a "package deal" of land reform, and ceiling on incomes, along with a cut in health and education expenditure and a reduction of the government subsidy on rice.

Meanwhile emergency laws which give the police full powers of arrest, detention and disposal of bodies, continue to be in force along with the stringent censorship of the Press. The police and army repression has subsided, but arrests for alleged JVP activities continue. Several well-known student leaders have been detained for questioning and the LSSP youth leader, Vasudeva Nanayakkara, who is also a Member of Parliament, remains in prison. Some army officers and the Government Agent of Polonnaruwa (a senior bureaucrat in charge of the province) have been arrested, and even a nephew of Mrs Bandaranaike, Mr Susil Siriwardena, a senior official in the Ministry of Agriculture, and Director of the U.N. sponsored Agrarian Research Institute, is under arrest.

In order to pacify public opinion the Government has also started a few show trials of army and police officers alleged to have committed excesses. The most sensational case, which the whole of Ceylon is talking about, is the public shooting of a girl (by the Army) at the famous sacred

In spite of these trials an atmosphere of fear and tension still prevails, even among intellectuals. Recently an attempt was made to organise a petition from writers, artists and University teachers calling upon the government merely to (a) repeal the emergency law empowering the police to bury or cremate dead bodies without the usual medical and judicial formalities and (b) to issue a list of all persons in custody. However, while everyone agreed on the need for such a statement, no one was willing to sign such a document and thereby perhaps run the risk of having his dead body disposed of without formality. For it is widely known that even lawyers appearing for alleged insurgents are having their names noted down by the police. Perhaps the intellectuals are aware of the fate of their counterparts in East Bengal and fear any sudden change in the political situation.

There is uncertainty about what will happen next. There are fears about whether the next move will be to the left or the right. There is anxiety about whether the CIA is hovering around trying to fish in troubled waters. There is concern about the real intentions of the British, Americans, Russians, Chinese and Indians, who are all playing for high stakes in the region and who would each one be willing to write off either the Bandaranaike government or the JVP-led revolution, if national interests so dictated.

From Russia With Pity

FROM A POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT

MR D. P. Dhar's dash to Moscow and the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty in New Delhi immediately on his return is indeed a parody of last month's Kissinger operation. New Delhi desperately needed the treaty right now but the decision to send Mr Gromyko was taken in Moscow after Mr Dhar had completed his mission and did not know who from the Soviet side would be signing the treaty and when. New Delhi expected Mr Kosygin to come over for the ritual and Mr Swaran Singh found himself embarrassed because he had already fixed the dates for his visit to Jakarta. New Delhi did not have the slightest inkling that things would be handled at the Foreign Ministers' level.

The timing of the treaty is something. Official spokesmen have laboured the explanation that it had been discussed off and on for about two years now. That is not saying anything. For this column had reported shortly after Brezhnev had mooted the collective security plan that Mr Kosygin, during his brief stop-over in New Delhi in September 1969 (on his way back from Pakistan) had tried to sell the treaty. (cf. *View from Delhi*, September 20, 1969). It also maintained that the treaty had nothing to do with the Sino-United States thaw or the present Bangladesh situation. Yet it could not have been timed better. Until mid-July the Soviet Union had equated India and Pakistan and the joint communique issued from New Delhi does not indicate any shift in the Soviet stand since Mr Podgorny's appeal to General Yahya Khan on April 2. But the Government managed to build the image of the Soviet Union as India's only ally notwithstanding the fact that Soviet economic aid to Pakistan has not stopped. Official New Delhi

has all along believed that the Chinese would not intervene militarily in the event of an Indo-Pak conflict. Yet the story was manufactured in Washington and fobbed off on opposition leaders and the Press that Dr Kissinger got the impression in Peking that China might intervene militarily in an Indo-Pakistan conflict.

The psychologically fatigued and overextended political opinion in the country was thus neutralised over the implications of the treaty and it had no opposition. But there is something hypocritical to the support. The Soviet lobby has been growing powerful during the last eight weeks but Indian servility acquired a new dimension last week. Anti-communists who opposed non-alignment in the past welcome the treaty on the score that it breaks with non-alignment and that India has aligned herself with a super-power at last. The periphery of the U.S. lobby has now gone over to the Soviet lobby openly and the treaty provided the occasion for the historic cross-over. The charlatans of both the lobbies are coming into their own in a changed context.

The treaty was a diplomatic checkmate on the new level of Sino-United States relations. Official circles are trying to put all the gloss on the treaty when confronted with the question of India-China relations. They say the treaty does not and would not inhibit our approach to China. But can India really think of normalising relations with China until the Soviet Union has done it? Does it not preempt us in one form or the other? Mr Swaran Singh spoke vaguely about the Soviet assurance on maps. Has the Soviet Union clearly accepted all our claims on the Sino-Indian border? Officials argue that the Sino-Indian dispute is qualitatively different from

the Indo-Pakistani dispute. Pakistan has no claims to Kashmir and is in illegal occupation of parts of Kashmir, whereas the issue between India and China relate to the borders on which both have advanced claims. This explanation hardly satisfies one because New Delhi seems to have imposed on itself the unspecified condition that it would not negotiate with China. This is the logical consequence of India's support to the Soviet Union in its border dispute with China.

Secondly, the treaty has in practice meant a slide-back on the Bangladesh issue. The Soviet Union is not prepared to alienate Pakistan whose goodwill has been assiduously built up since Tashkent. The joint communique shocked everyone into this realisation because it talks of a *political solution* as distinct from a *political settlement* and one acceptable to the entire people of Pakistan. Which means the Soviet Union wants a settlement within the framework of the present Pakistani set-up and the one-ness of Pakistan is recognised by Moscow. Mrs Gandhi had said in the Rajya Sabha in July that a political settlement was becoming difficult with every passing day and if the big powers had acted in time it might have been possible. Any settlement can only be a political settlement in the ultimate sense but if she meant the total obviating of armed struggle by the Mukti Bahini or anyone else when she meant political settlement, she does not really believe it is possible. The joint communique however harps on this, which means Mrs Gandhi has renewed faith in the political solution of a kind the Soviet Union has always advocated.

No Recognition Now

It might be comforting to think

AUGUST 21, 1971

that the Indo-Soviet treaty would deter Pakistan from military adventure. But then India has also been successfully deterred from conferring recognition on Bangladesh immediately. One of Mr Dhar's tasks in Moscow was to check whether Soviet recognition would follow in reasonable time if India recognised Bangladesh. New Delhi was ga-ga over the "imminent recognition" to be announced at the mammoth rally (this is the height of naivete because no such policy decision can be announced from the maidan when Parliament is in session!) but nobody talks of Bangladesh now. The treaty is everything, to be toasted with duty-free Scotch (vodka is not popular with the Lobby!) and poor Bangladesh can take care of itself.

The latest theory put into circulation is that by mid-September the Mukti Bahini would be able to liberate substantial territory in north Bangladesh and India would recognise it. The moronic talk of the treaty creating the "infrastructure" (a debased term) for Bangladesh liberation is necessary to make it look that the Soviet Union wants independent Bangladesh when in fact it does not. If Bangladesh becomes a reality, the Soviet Union might recognise it but the old position, that a free Bangladesh would not be in India's interest continues.

Mr D. P. Dhar needs a little rest after all the to-do over the treaty. The mystery man in the Foreign Office is supposed to be working on sorting out the Bangladesh problems in their international ramifications, according to the lobby. He and another Kashmiri close to the Prime Minister, Mr P. N. Haksar, are on the "collision course." Mr Haksar's supporters say Mr Dhar is busy looking into the China papers. The impression sought to be conveyed is that Mrs Gandhi is planning diplomatic initiative on the dormant China issue. Peking's silence over the treaty has intrigued New Delhi because it means Peking takes a very serious view of it. Absence of immediate reaction could only mean this. Suppose the Chinese make

a dramatic gesture to India and India is inhibited about normalising relations with her, it would stand exposed to ridicule. Mrs Gandhi would find it hard to convince public opinion that the treaty is not an anti-China detente.

It would be well to record what an authoritative Soviet commentator wrote a few weeks before the Brezhnev plan was mooted. In fact this is clearer than what Mr Brezhnev himself said in June 1969. The Soviet writer, V. Matveyev said 1. China's leaders had not given up their aim to establish an anti-Soviet Third World Bloc; 2. China was so anxious to discredit Soviet policies in the Third World that it was prepared to engage in discussions with the United States to divide up the "spheres of influ-

ence." Collective security was therefore explained as offering Soviet support for the efforts of South-East Asian nations individually or collectively to liquidate their foreign bases and stand ready to "repel any intrigues of the forces of imperialism and expansionism."

For years now, Soviet pleadings for naval bases have been heard with great sympathy in New Delhi's parlours. The Soviet Indian Ocean fleet has been far too active in India's vicinity. After the March 25 Bangladesh developments, Indian missions have gone to the Soviet Union with formidable shopping lists of military hardware. Some collective security indeed.

August 15, 1971

Letter From America

The Sino-American Moves

ROBI CHAKRAVORTI

THE game between Washington and Peking is intriguing, complex and bizarre. And, for newspaper readers and writers alike, it is controversial.

Little is known about what transpired between Kissinger and Chou in Peking. The conversation between the two, however, has been recorded in detail. As the *Life* magazine's White House correspondent revealed, "There is a volume of more than 100 single-spaced pages containing every word spoken by Kissinger, Chou and others. There is a separate 40-page, single-spaced account of those 20 hours that details every nuance and impression Kissinger gained, from how Chou's complexion looks to how his mind works."

The content of these notes is secret. It was reported that only three persons in the Administration knew of the details of Kissinger's flight to Peking—the President, the Secretary of State and Dr Kissinger. It is as-

sumed that others were brought into the discussion, following Kissinger's return. The group involved in making overtures to Peking is still small. The content of the Peking conference between Kissinger and Chou, thus, continues to be a closely-guarded secret. This is a fact; the rest is speculation.

Separating facts from speculation is a methodological problem. And, since this problem has not been satisfactorily solved, we are confronted with abstract theories, guesswork, fanciful mountain-building from little molehills of news which, inspected closely, turn out to be items of gossip. The problem is made worse by the fact of political partisanship. If you happen to be an admirer of Mao Tse-tung, you either moan over a fallen idol or pray to him for grace and light. If you are, on the other hand, a lover of Western-style democracy, you wear an I-told-you-so smirk.

We can however, be cautious and make an analysis which keeps as close to the facts as possible and which attempts to make some sense out of them. Admittedly, speculation will figure in this kind of analysis too, but such speculation will correspond to the reality a little more than wild guesswork or theatrical prognostications.

A simple fact that has emerged since the news of the visit of the U.S. ping-pong team to China is that both Washington and Peking have been sending messages to each other for quite some time. Who initiated the first move in this game of ping-pong diplomacy is not definitely known. One view is that China had been eager to talk with the U.S. President since 1964. An expert said, in course of an article in *Washington Post*, that Chou had sent messages to President Johnson asking for a direct conference. Johnson, however, chose the path of escalation in Vietnam. Chou's offer was turned down.

Edgar Snow said, however, that Mao formed a different opinion about Nixon in 1970 because the experience of Vietnam and other political events, he thought, had changed Nixon and that, therefore, it was possible for him to think of sitting down with the President ripe for such a meeting. The world situation altered five years later, and opened the possibility of a meeting with the U.S. President.

No matter what is the reasoning, either in Washington or Peking, the fact is that Kissinger and Chou eventually met in Peking. It does not matter whether Nixon has changed and in what direction; the fact is that the Chinese communists have invited for a state visit the leader of what they consider to be the leading "imperialistic" country in the world.

The question that raises its ugly head at this stage of the analysis is whether this move by Peking advances the cause of revolution that it outspokenly espouses. If Maoists counter by saying that revolution is an indigenous affair and cannot be ex-

ported, it may be pointed out that this statement ignores facts. In analysing the possibilities of revolution in the world today, it is unrealistic to turn a blind eye to the role played by foreign powers. Revolutionaries can act as the proverbial one-eyed deer only at peril to their cause and even to their lives.

The role foreign powers have deemed fit to play in relation to revolution has taken two forms—intervention or assistance. The U.S. role of intervention in various countries to thwart revolution is too well known to require elaboration. The almost divine right to intervention is tacitly acknowledged by policy-makers in Washington; the modes, character and timing of intervention are, however, operational problems on which there may be disagreement in the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House staff. This is the simple message of the Pentagon Papers published by the *New York Times*.

The USSR, likewise, would not hesitate to "intervene" to thwart revolution if it is seen as a threat to its national interest. Hungary and Czechoslovakia are primary examples of the Russian belief in the right to intervention. The Brezhnev doctrine is a theoretical justification of this right.

China also has, "intervened" in other countries. It has assisted North Korea and Vietnam to the hilt, and it is questionable whether, in spite of the magnificent fighting abilities of the Communists in Vietnam, they could have withstood the awesome power of the U.S. intervention without the moral, physical, economic and technological support of China and the USSR. Old-style indigenous revolutions seem unlikely to succeed in the modern world, and those who decry the idea of exporting revolution are merely indulging in semantics. Foreign "intervention", either to thwart or assist revolutions, has been a fact of life in the world today, and it would be unrealistic to ignore it. For revolutionaries, it may also be personally dangerous.

It strains one's sense of realism to accept the thesis that the Chinese overtures to the U.S. will advance the cause of revolution. One has to go through intricate reasoning to arrive at the conclusion that Peking's gestures to Washington will help the spread of revolution in other countries. I assume that Maoists are in the process of evolving this reasoning to salve their hurt feelings.

The problem becomes simple if we view Mao Tse-tung as the head of the Chinese political system, which, in its dealings with the outside world, tends to behave as all sovereign nation-states do. The way the Chinese communists arrived at the seats of power may win our praise or hatred, depending on our ideological bias; but, once they are in power, they act little different from leaders of other political units, called nation-states. Mao is not merely the ideological fountainhead of a particular brand of revolution, he is, also, the supreme leader of the Chinese state. In the former capacity, he is likely to continue preaching what he had practised; in the latter capacity, however, he would behave in terms of the principle of balance of power. And, —this is the important point—if his two roles conflict, his role as the preserver of the Chinese nation-state will predominate.

The accounts and interpretations given both by Edgar Snow, an avowed admirer of Mao Tse-tung and others, who do not have much love for Chinese Communism, seem to agree on this point. There is a convergence of interpretations here, which should not be missed in the heat of discussions of the ideological implications of Kissinger's flight. The points at issue between Peking and Washington are not ideological; they involve purely national interests seen in the perspective of the doctrine of balance of power on which revolutionary China and conservative U.S. seem curiously to agree.

This is not meant to be a criticism of Mao Tse-tung or, for that matter, of Nixon. The criticism, if there is any, is aimed at those who are camp-

followers of one or the other, and their rather pathetic process of justifying the actions of their idols. Nixon arrived at power through a process different from the way Mao achieved power. Their ideologies and operational rhetoric are also different. What is, however, interesting for a student of international politics is the common principle of behaviour that promises to bring them together.

Both Nixon and Mao will perhaps say that a sense of realism is driving them in the direction of a compromise. Compromise on what? Why compromise?

The answer to the second question would probably be that both Nixon and Mao have turned out to be half-winners and half-losers. Nixon could not win the war in Vietnam; Mao could not take over Taiwan. The U.S. could not destroy China; China could not foresee the possibility of a revolutionary wildfire that would singe the citadel of "imperialism", the United States. Both seem to have realised their own limitations. The old-fashioned ideological rhetoric, however, continues to thunder and pontificate.

The compromises that may be reached would be done at the cost of the professed ideologies of both countries. The ideology of freedom that the U.S. espouses has been exposed to be phoney a long time ago; the U.S. Administration's support of Pakistan has merely brought home the cruel reality to Indian liberals. Likewise, China's support of Mrs Bandaranaike and Yahya indicates the same end of ideology.

This does not mean that Chinese Communists would not like to see communists, their brand that is, overthrowing existing governments. The most charitable explanation of the Chinese behaviour is that they do not foresee the success of communist revolutions in the near future, and therefore, they are ready to settle for something considerably less. Since revolution, without "intervention", benevolent or malevolent, is unlikely to spread in the world today, the talk of coexistence and peace between

States can mean only one thing—a lowering, if not the abandonment, of the hope of world revolution.

Edgar Snow himself seems to have discerned this in the behaviour of the Chinese leaders. But he is so much of an admirer of the Chinese leaders that he does not acknowledge the implications of the Chinese move for compromise with the United States. "A world without change by revolutions—a world in which China's closest friends would not be revolutionary states," Snow wrote in the *Life* magazine, "is inconceivable to Peking.

But a world of relative peace between states is necessary to China as to America. To hope for more is to court disenchantment."

But there are other countries, and what is necessary for America and China may not be conducive to the interests of people in other countries. What is good for the U.S. and China may not be good for other peoples and other countries any more than what is good for General Motors is necessarily good for the United States.

San Francisco, August 8.

The Butcher Becomes Buddhist

K. R. SHARMA

AT the invitation of Chou En-lai, President Nixon would be visiting China some time before May next year. The reason prompting the U.S. foreign policy-makers for this volte face is the subject matter of discussion among China-watchers. Is it political opportunism on the part of China? Or is it that an arch imperialist has suddenly become an *arhant*? What would be its repercussions on world politics? What added significance would it have for our South Block?

When China's cultural revolution was on there was a joke about the whole thing going the round in the White House and the Pentagon. The readers would recollect that when China went communist in October 1949 a debate started in America as to who "lost" China. McCarthy, the famous China-baiter, concluded that China was "lost" partly because of the conspiracy in the U.S. State Department and partly because of the Kremlin's plotting. This time, the Pentagon joked, the debate would begin in Moscow as to who lost China. This was the Pentagon's understanding of China's cultural revolution. It was a civil war, they believed, and the country was heading for disintegration and break-up. Of course, China did not oblige the U.S. foreign

policy 'experts'. On the contrary, the U.S. is now compelled to recognise the fact of China's emerging power and progress.

After the publication of the secret Pentagon papers the allegation by America that China is the main mischief-maker in Indochina falls flat. Even a cursory reading of the documents brings home the fact of the U.S. politics of murder, coup, provocation, intrigue and imperialism. It is a testament and a confession of the U.S. escalation of war on the innocent peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. These secret documents may speak volumes about U.S. "democracy" but they create a crisis of credibility.

Nixon's proposed visit must be read in this context. He has used his last trump card to silence the critics of his foreign policy. He is attempting to tell his critics how honest he is in seeking peace with China. Did he not come to power on the promise that he would bring his boys home from Vietnam?

The U.S. has a long catalogue of crimes to its credit as far as its China policy is concerned. This catalogue does not begin from 1949 when it adopted a pronounced policy of 'containment' of communism. It was a decision not only to 'contain' com-

munism but if possible to roll back its mudtide. China had to bear the main burden of this policy.

The wrongs which America has done to China began with the Treaty of Wanghia in the 1840s when, like other Western colonialists, the U.S. wrested economic concessions. It also compelled China to sign unequal treaties and carved out a 'sphere of influence' for itself in China, thus undermining her territorial integrity and sovereignty. This was the 'open doorism' of John Hay. There was one big difference, however. While all the other colonial powers in China acquired all these rights after the fight (in fact it was a mock fight), the U.S. acquired all these concessions without firing a single shot. It gave all moral and material support in suppressing the Taiping rebellion of 1850-52 which was a peasant war for land. The USA again intervened in the Boxer uprising of 1900 which was China's first national liberation war.

Towards the Chinese communists, the U.S. hostility was well known. In China's civil war 1946-49, the U.S. openly and heavily aided Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. After 1949, who does not know that it was the U.S. and her South Korean puppets who crossed the Yalu river in 1950? It is the U.S. which has propped up the KMT regime in Taiwan and blocked China's entry into the U.N. The USA has gheraoed China with its bases in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan.

Would there be a halt in this po-

For Frontier contact

People's Book House

Meher House,

Cowasji Patel Street,

Fort, Bombay

licy of aggression and intimidation? I believe not, unless the nature of imperialism is changed. Would the U.S. tycoons, the Pentagon and the CIA permit it? The fate of John Kennedy is before Nixon.

CPI Reaction

The reaction of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of India is very much on expected lines. The CPI has called it China's opportunism. In its opinion, this action of China would help imperialism by dividing and splitting the world communist system. Bhupesh Gupta expressed his "shock" in the Rajya Sabha.

If it is political opportunism then what was Khrushchev's Camp David? Hasn't the CPSU been prettifying the face of U.S. imperialism since the 20th Congress in 1956? The Moscow "creative Marxists" argue that peaceful coexistence with U.S. imperialism is the highest form of class struggle. It does not lie in the mouth of the Soviet Union, which split the world communist movement long ago, to say that China is pro-U.S. Moscow's contention is that China, by collaboration with the USA, wants to encircle it. In 1959-60 when the USSR tore up all agreements with China, including the ones on defence and nuclear know-how, China was most vulnerable to U.S. attack. The camera deliberations of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee reveal that on several occasions the USA had seriously considered attacking China. Russia had almost plainly told China that she could not depend for her defence on Moscow. In fact during the last decade, the irrational behaviour of China on several occasions was the result of the feeling that she was living very much under the shadow of war. Chinese leaders were convinced that Soviet leaders would either connive at such a situation or keep quiet. The belief was not without foundation.

Nixon's visit to China and the realization of the futility of U.S. policies

would be a great victory of Chinese diplomacy. One may say that it would mellow the revolutionary elan of the Chinese leaders. But the guarantee that it would not lies in the cultural revolution and its 'mass line' style of leadership. What is wrong with USSR was not its attempts to mend fences with America but its whole understanding of world politics. Revisionism is the main sin of the Russian leaders. China's cultural revolution is a guarantee against the possible emergence of revisionism. So far as dialogue with the USA is concerned China has acquired the habit of looking at negotiations dialectically. The Chinese communists were in united front with Chiang Kai-shek from 1937 to 1945 but even for a day they did not forget the struggle against him. This is what the CPM leaders do not understand when they hint that it might be another "Camp David". One should not imagine that once Nixon and Mao shake hands and exchange smiles, all the outstanding irritants in Sino-U.S. relations would wither away.

The wise course for India would be to adjust to the realities of the situation and improve her relations with China. We must get over our obsessions and must look into the coming decades. Unfortunately what is preventing our foreign policy makers from realizing these realities is the Soviet Union.

For FRONTIER contact

S. P. CHATTERJEE

Statesman Office

Steel Market

Durgapur-4

NOTICE

Articles cannot be returned unless accompanied by return postage.

Business Manager
Frontier

AUGUST 21, 1971

Dollar In The Doldrums—I

A. K. ESSACK

TWO factors are responsible for the parlous state of the dollar. Taken together they reveal the more fundamental crisis of capitalism as a whole. The first factor (the second—militarisation of the U.S. economy—will be dealt with later) which has struck at the dollar in the United States is the U.S. dollar overseas, particularly in Western Europe. The export of capital from the USA which means really export of the dollar, has reached staggering proportions as the figures below will show:

Table I

TOTAL DIRECT PRIVATE U.S. INVESTMENTS ABROAD

	Figures in 000 million U.S. dollars		
	1950	1960	1968
Total	11.7	32.7	64.7
W. Europe	1.7	6.6	19.3
F. R. Germany	.2	1.0	3.7
Britain	.8	3.2	6.7
Canada	3.5	11.1	19.4

In 1967 the amount invested in Latin America was 11.9 thousand million dollars, Asia 4.3 and Africa 2.3 thousand million dollars.

The 1969 figures indicate that Western Europe absorbed as much as 30% of the total invested abroad. Concretely this meant that the U.S. had control of large sectors of the economy of Western Europe. These were also strategic sectors. Thus in Western Europe as a whole, the U.S. controlled 80% of the electronic computers, 50% of the transistors, and 95% of integrated circuits. In West Germany 40% of the automobiles and 50% of oil refining were in its hands. In France 20% of the output of cars was U.S. In Britain 50% of automobiles, 35% of tractors, 75% electronic computers, and 70% cash registers were in American hands. In Italy it is estimated that 41 out of 70 of the largest firms are American.

The export of capital from the U.S. takes place because U.S. capitalism, now in its super monopoly stage of giant multi-national corporations, is faced with the diminishing returns on the home market and has to look abroad for better returns. That is, the U.S. has to export its capital where it is possible for it to intensify its rate of exploitation. Just where it has been able to do that can be seen in the following Table.

Table II

INFLOW OF AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN VARIOUS WORLD REGIONS AND PROFITS: PERIOD 1950-1965.

Regions:	Figures in 000 million U.S. dollars		
	W. Europe	Latin America and Africa	Asia and Africa
Investments	8.1	3.8	5.2
Profits	5.5	11.3	14.3
Balance in Favour of U.S.	-2.6	+7.5	+9.1

These figures show that the largest returns on investment come from Latin America, Asia and Africa. It is precisely at the draining away of this wealth that there is a revolt on the part of the oppressed and exploited masses in these territories and continents. But these large profits wrung from the sweating workers and peasants have not solved the crisis for the U.S. They have only cushioned the shocks for a while. The dollar drain has not stopped, nor has the outflow of the dollar been reversed. The recent trade figures also reveal that although in the volume of trade the U.S. is still the first, it has lost leadership in terms of export growth. The volume of trade as at 1969 showed the following:

Figures in million U.S. dollars	
U.S.	37,000
W. Germany	28,000
Britain	17,000

On the other hand in terms of expansion of export growth, taking 1963 as the starting index we see the following:

	1963	1967
Japan	100	300
W. Germany	100	200
America	100	160
Britain	100	150

While the rate of exports did not rise in relation to the other countries, imports rose. These, together with the export of capital and some other factors, e.g. militarisation of the economy, have had an adverse effect on the balance of trade payments. In 1968, the organ of the American monopolists *Fortune* stated that the U.S. deficit had reached a record deficit of 12,500 million dollars. What this meant was that there was a catastrophic decline in the gold reserves in the U.S. After World War II so strong was the U.S. position economically—which reflected itself in the holding of gold, that it was said that the dollar was as good as gold. In 1948 the U.S. gold reserve was 24,000 million dollars. But in 1968 the position was as follows:

Figures in million U.S. dollars	
U.S.	15,700
W. Germany	9,900
Italy	5,300
France	4,200
Britain	2,400

The U.S. tried to circumvent this by creating through the International Monetary Fund the Special Drawing Rights (S.D.R.) which would not require any degree of gold reserve holding. This has not saved it and the U.S. gold reserve today has dipped to a record low level of 10,900 million dollars. The U.S. Secretary of Treasury the other day stated that the future was gloomy, for now besides the socialist bloc, it has to con-

AUGUST 21, 1971

tend with the European Economic Community and Japan as potential rivals. All that Mr Connolly asked the countries of the Third World is that they open their doors for a more intensified exploitation of their people in order that the U.S. recovers from monetary disaster.

When the warnings were flashed during early 1968, President Johnson imposed restraints on capital exports and overseas travel by U.S. citizens; urged the U.S. allies to assist it in payment of the costs of U.S. troops; and urged increase of exports.

But to restrain the export of capital meant going against the very fundamental law of capitalist development—how can super-monopolies be restrained from investing in areas where they would be able to get the largest percentage of profits? Anyway it did not work. When Nixon decided to reduce the interest rate in the U.S., dollars in their millions just descended on the capitals of Western Europe, particularly Western Germany, Switzerland, and Holland. In fact some commentators described this flow as an avalanche. And it was this that brought about the dollar crisis. The dollar was quoted at less than its value as laid down in the Bretton Woods Agreement, while gold rose from the statutory price of 35 dollars an ounce to over 41 dollars. This was another way of saying that the dollar was heading for devaluation.

When the Johnson measures did little to halt the deteriorating position, a drastic measure, bound to be unpopular with the mass of the people was introduced—increased taxation. The monopolists of the Giant Corporations, the big banks, the industrialists, and the reformist trade unions all supported it. It was euphemistically called a surtax but in reality it was war tax.

But these were palliatives and patchwork measures. Nixon also came out with more such patchwork and in the year ending 1970 the deficit rose to a record level of 9,900 million U.S. dollars. It was clear that the ailing U.S. economy did not require an in-

jection here or there, but a major surgical operation. The longer the delay the more drastic will be the extent of the operation. Palliatives have not worked and will not work

Andhra Pradesh

Writers' Arrest

FROM A CORRESPONDENT

THE Andhra Pradesh police on August 2 arrested three prominent revolutionary writers in Hyderabad for crossing the "limits of freedom of expression". The writers are Mr Jwalamukhi, Mr Nikhileswar—both office-bearers—and Mr Cherabanda Raju, executive member, of the Revolutionary Writers' Association (RWA) of Andhra Pradesh, of which 'Mahakavi' Sri Sri is the President.

Several prominent organisations, groups and individuals from different walks of life have condemned the arrests. There were angry protests in the State Legislature when the Home Minister, though first denying any knowledge of the arrests, admitted on August 4 that the three writers were held under the Internal Security Ordinance. There are, the Minister said, certain 'limits' to expression of views or ideas and the revolutionary writers, he said, had violated these limits.

In a joint statement, 11 legislators of different parties and groups condemned the Government's move. Writers, big and small, all over the State, and some from outside, registered their strong resentment. The Osmania University Socialist Forum expressed its shock. These, and many other literary, cultural, professional and social organisations demanded immediate release of the writers.

The Government, in fact, had started harassing these poets right from the inception of the RWA. It banned *Jhanjha*—an anthology published by the RWA. The book was so popular that first edition copies were sold out in a few days; and a second

any more. The fear haunting not only the U.S. but the whole capitalist world is whether another 1929 is round the corner.

(To be concluded)

edition was to come out. Another book, *March*—a collection of poems and equally popular—was also banned. The writer-publisher of the book, Mr P. Kishan Rao, an executive member of the RWA, was held under police custody for several days, after which he was released on bail. A case is, it seems, being got up against him.

Some time ago, this year, the police raided the houses of the now-arrested writers and of Mr M.T. Khan, an Urdu poet, took away many ordinary as well as the banned books and interrogated the poets with scant respect for democratic values. The CID is always shadowing important members of the RWA. All this could not deter them from writing about the cause of the people. The present arrests and persecution are desperate acts of repression within the general framework of curbing revolutionary thought.

The Andhra Pradesh Government boasts of having put down, with a firm hand, the Naxalite movement in the State. 'Firm hand' means killing the captives under the convenient mask of 'encounters'. Andhra Pradesh in this respect is considered a model for other States. Now it has one more achievement to its credit—it is the first State to harass and arrest writers, under the Internal Security Ordinance, for going beyond 'bounds' of freedom of expression in their revolutionary writings. Other States should not lose time to emulate the Andhra Pradesh example in curtailing the freedom of expression in the world's biggest democratic country.

AUGUST 21, 1971

The Emergence Of Indian Nationalism

ARJUN BANDYOPADHYAY

INDIAN nationalism has so far been studied by historians in a simplified way. In their hands India takes an abstract form, as if there was no difference and unevenness between the regions, no complexities in Indian society. To these writers the Indian national movement was an uncurved response to national sentiments against the alien rule, every region, and every stratum of society stood unitedly and at a time. But gradually it is becoming apparent that Indian nationalism was a very complex phenomenon. Different regions (for their uneven development) and various classes, castes and religions responded to the nationalist movement and aspirations at different times and in different ways. There were internal conflicts among themselves: at deeper levels the political mobilizations of India were related to a growing rate of social change which bore unevenly on different parts of the country and which sharpened the rivalries between its inhabitants. These mobilisations were not always against imperialism; there were partnerships between them. These partnerships made the clients of the British Raj numerous and it became impossible for them to please everybody. This stultification was matched by the stultification of the Congress and the Muslim League. Awareness of the complexities of Indian nationalism gives a new dimension to the picture of our national movement: the whole panorama is going to take a new shape. Anil Seal's *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism** is an important study in

*The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century

Anil Seal

Cambridge University Press, price 70s.

this respect. It is the first in a series of five volumes in which the author and John Gallagher "will examine the history of political change in South Asia from the 1870s and to the 1940s", though the chief task of the first volume, according to Anil Seal, has been to study the emergence of national political organisation in India. He has concentrated on Indians educated in the Western mode; for the same reason the stress has fallen upon the political experiments taking place within the three Presidencies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras during the viceroynalties of Lytton, Ripon and Dufferin.

According to Anil Seal, in formal constitutional analysis British India was ruled autocratically. But in reality the administration had serious checks to its authority. Besides the division of power between London and Calcutta and financial difficulties, the power relations between the British rulers and Indian subjects were very important factors here. In a colonial system the alien governments have to rely on the support of certain sections of their subjects and the passivity of the majority. The British Government also had some broad groups of allies in the decades after 1857.

The great chiefs and the landlords had become the collaborators. But the British required collaboration from a large body of native bureaucrats; the learned Hindu castes were the most important element—yesterday's scholars of Persian now became enthusiasts for English—first in presidency capitals, and later up in the country. Calculations of material benefit provided the incentive for the learning of the ways of the new ruler. India in the 19th century was not merely an agglomeration of regions in uneven stages of development, it was also a league of submerged nations, a

chaos of overlapping castes, a cockpit of rival religions. Naturally education, as a means to office, was a ladder for improving or conserving status. Consequently much of the eagerness for learning came from the Indians' desire to suppress other Indians. These Indians collaborated so long as working with the government seemed to benefit their religion, caste or community aspirations. But once the benefit lessened, they became the critics of the Raj: neither friendship for nor the hostility of the British government was a static relation. The history of any colonial system is a series of permutations between the government and different sets of allies and enemies. During the last decades of the 19th century a gap began to open up between the Raj and some of its educated subjects. Their criticism, expressed through the political associations based in the presidency capitals, grew louder. This was an important step, for through them the Western educated moved to proto-politics. But they had no monopoly of it. As the competition grew sharper between castes and communities, many of these groups in hope of self-betterment took to this new technique. The proliferation of caste associations indicates the passion for organisation. An educated man continued to belong to a caste and community and hence tended to belong to organisations of both kinds, one based on common kingship and religious persuasion and another based on common education and political persuasion. Only the educated could play two roles. So education was one of the chief determinants of politics and those schooled in Western methods emerged in the three residencies most conspicuously.

The highly uneven nature of development in India has been reflected in highly uneven speeds of political

mobilisation. According to Anil Seal, the nationalism of India might be defined as a process by which different parts of the country have been drawn into politics at different times and for different reasons. The Western-educated Indians in the three presidencies were the first group who entered the politics of association and used it to move up to an all-India level.

Key Concepts

This is the main outline of the approach of Anil Seal towards Indian nationalism in the last quarter of the 19th century. Collaboration, competition, unevenness of development, education, elites, castes etc. are the key concepts around which he has spun his arguments. In the three presidencies the upper caste men had taken the largest share of education—in Bengal the Brahmins, Kayasthas and Vaidyas, in Bombay the Brahmins of Maharashtra and Parsis of the city and in Madras the Brahmins.

Between one presidency and another there were also great dissimilarities in their relations with the most of the society. In Bengal proper the *bhadralok* were united by common religion and language as well as by the social dominance they enjoyed, though differences of caste and regional origin, the disunity of interest between the big zamindars and others was there. Their education and upper caste position isolated them from the rest of the society. Their sophisticated language and profit from land divorced them from the masses and tillers of the soil. In western India there was little cohesiveness among the graduates, in Maharashtra Brahmins had to come to terms with men from other castes, communities and religions: moreover, absence of a sophisticated version of language, no landlord tenant splits and same religious aspirations made the Brahmins somewhat integrated with the society, though the non-Brahmin castes of Maharashtra had their own traditions and aspirations. In Madras the intelligentsia's unity was based on caste status; in the case of the Tamil Brahmins common race and language also united

them. But as they had to share educational facilities with other regions and castes, division appeared. In South India the gulfs between Brahmins and the rest were wide. There were glaring differences between the east, west and south. Only possessing the unity of a common education, they could be brought together to think in national terms by similar ambitions and resentments within the framework of the Raj. The hopes and fears of the educated were concerned with the chances of gaining employment at what they thought was the right level. Due to the social and colonial set-up only public services and professions were open. Here also the educated community were debarred from covenanted service and even in uncovenanted service promotional payment went so far and no further. Moreover, only less than two thousand jobs were available in uncovenanted executive and judicial branches in Bengal, Bombay and Madras. With lack of opportunities came disillusionment and anger. The confidence of the early decades was no more. (Among the educated men, the lawyers, forming an independent status group, became the most important section. Since government servants were dependent on the good will of the employer, it was the lawyers who became the spokesmen for the educated).

The notions and politics of the British were of crucial importance at this time as Indian attitudes were still reactions to official measures rather than independent initiatives. It was the policy of the British government in India which united the educated Indians and made them determined. Lytton, Ripon and Dufferin tried to protect the Raj against the onslaught of change. In their different ways Lytton, Ripon and Dufferin recognised that the problems confronting them in India needed political solutions. Common to their thinking was a growing awareness of the political potential of the Indians they had educated. Yet the aspirations of these Indians were hard to satisfy without clashing with the interests of

other clients of the Raj. Its collaborators were drawn from many groups and from many parts of the country. Many of the inflexibilities of the British Indian Government came from the impossibility of pleasing all of the clients all of the time: they were too numerous and their demands were so various that grievances sprouted from every concession. The Congress and the Muslim League were also riddled with the same weakness. On the other hand the critics of the Raj and their programmes depended on the existence of that very imperialism of which they were both the inveterate castigators and conspicuous beneficiaries." Practically the hesitation of the government helped the educated Indians' movement which the sword could not cut down. The government could not use guns against these elements as they did during the sepoy uprising of 1857-59.

In two separate chapters on the Politics of Association and the Politics of Union Anil Seal sketches the history of the Associations. These two chapters are historical as well as structural analyses. Associations brought 19th century India across the threshold of modern politics. The new associations were not the result of religious zeal or caste solidarity but of secular interest. Common education, common aspirations and resentments held them together—here also Anil Seal sees the differences, the clashes of interests, the tension between castes. The politics of association culminated in the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885. One delegate in four was a graduate. Over half of the delegates at the first Congress were lawyers and for decades to come more than a third of the delegates at every Congress belonged to that profession. Journalists, doctors and teachers were also there. There was an "entire absence of the old aristocracy" Regarding the programme, it is interesting to note that there was no popular plan to rally the peasants. From the very beginning the Congress faced difficulties owing to the uneven levels of political organisation in different

provinces and uneven levels of educational attainment. This was most clearly seen on the question of simultaneous examinations. Most of the witnesses of Northern India before the public service commission rejected the principle in fear that Bengal would get the utmost privilege and they would fail. But the more serious threat was from Muslims.

Muslim Breakaway

In a chapter on the Muslim Breakaway Anil Seal rejects all the current theories regarding the rift, because theories start from the wrong assumption that the Islamic community in India can be referred to as a block of people having the same conditions, the same interests and solidarity. Unevenness of development in India produced disparities in the Muslim community also. There were the differences between different provinces and between the Muslims of the same province. As competitiveness in upper India spread between the Muslims and the Hindus, the Muslims concentrated to defend their own position. In eastern India there was not much in common between Muslim zamindars and Muslim tenants. Indeed when Sayed Ahmed Khan and Amir Ali claimed to be spokesmen of the Muslims in India, their claim was as hollow as that of the Congress leaders to represent all Indians or that of the Government to be the trustee of all Indians. In so shapeless, so jumbled a bundle of societies, there were not two nations; there was not one nation, there was no nation at all. Anil Seal asks: what was India? a graveyard of old nationalities and the mother of a new nationalism struggling to be born.

No doubt, Anil Seal's study of Indian nationalism in the last quarter of the 19th century is exceptionally illuminating, particularly when we remember other stereotyped historical dissertations on the national movement and nationalism in India. His volume is a political study in the social context; he always thinks of social structure, caste, community and of the material interest of these castes

and communities. Anil Seal has a definite method which reminds one of Lewis Namier. He has also the conservatism of Namier who wanted ideas to be banished. Though we cannot agree with this method it may be useful for a certain period, as the time of the accession of George III in England in the case of Namier. Anil Seal's awareness of the unevenness of development of India or cross-currents of interests and aspirations of different castes and communities, and his approach give flesh and blood to the anaemic and abstract picture depicted in most of the treatises on Indian nationalism. Moreover, despite his regional emphasis he is always conscious of the Indian perspectives; he can transcend the limitations of the regional studies. When he describes the educated Indian as the "inveterate castigators and conspicuous beneficiaries" of British imperialism, he shows the relevance of his approach and repeats the Marxist thesis of the twofold character of the origin of the Congress (*India Today*: R. P. Dutt, PPH, 1947, p 247-263). Besides these bright features Anil Seal must be congratulated for the lucidity of his arguments and his elegant prose which is exceptional in our historical writings.

Bias

A few questions may arise regarding some assumptions of the author. The scope of his study is very limited: it is in a sense a socio-political study of the educated Indians in three presidencies during the time of Lytton, Ripon and Dufferin (1876-1888). This limited scope debar the author from examining other relevant issues of the period. Moreover, biases and conservatism cause some serious damage.

He is always eager to contradict the fact that there were any economic factors behind the emergence of Indian nationalism. "The emergence of these groups was not a direct result of economic change." (p-110) "So it will not do to read into this claim an economic interpretation" of the emergence of the group (p-216).

"Those groups which felt a similarity of interest were themselves more the product of bureaucratic initiative than economic change," (p-314). But almost contradictorily he mentions the fact, "here (in the three presidencies) there were districts and cities undergoing much more rapid economic and social change than any parts of the Hindustan proper," (p-8). Why? Was there no connection between this economic change and the emergence of the Western-educated Indians in these presidencies? Actually the rapid expansion of English education there proceeded immediately from economic change and economic motive. The increase in the population and progressive fragmentation of land were forcing the once respectable class of proprietors to increasing dependence on education as means of livelihood. (*The Indian Middle Class*: Misra: 1961 (p 348). Anil Seal himself is not unaware of the fact. At least in Bengal the spread of education was closely linked with the British. In the evidence before the Hunter Commission Rajendralal Mitra and Mahendralal Sarkar asserted that the richer classes were quite unlikely to be keen about educating their children in the Western mode. English education was looked for as a means of livelihood. An extended landed property tended to dampen the desire for taking English education (*Nineteenth Century Bengal*: Sinha 1965, pp 41-42). So the whole economic structure including land relations was involved here. Economic stagnation and a colonial land policy were behind the spread of English education. It should also be remembered that there were differences among the educated section itself owing to inflation and dilution of Western education in India. There were tensions between the urban graduates of upper class who obtained jobs and the rural graduates who did not get proper jobs. Moreover, legislation against land alienation and the enhancement of rent affected the class from which most of the educated young men came. Buying control over land as well as investment in

education became less profitable. (*The Phases of Indian Nationalism*: Rothermund, 1970; pp 145-47). So there cannot be the slightest doubt that economic factors were very much responsible for the emergence of educated sections. It is true that there was no radical technological or economic progress, but "economic change" does not always mean economic progress though according to a section of writers (like Moris D. Moris), there was economic development during the British rule. In reality the educated Indians' main grievances around which they wanted to rally the people, were economic: the drain of wealth, the biased tariff policy etc. (*The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India*: Bipan Chandra, 1966: pp 736-59).

Secondly, one of the main theses of Anil Seal's discussion is unevenness in the development of India: there were differences between the regions, between the communities, between the different strata of the same community. Anil Seal agrees that different regions responded to the politics of association at different times. But he has not taken these differences with a correct awareness: according to him the starting point in all the three presidencies was the 1870s. At least in the case of Bengal it was not so. The disillusionment of the educated sections which, according to Anil Seal, was at the root of their political activities, set in much earlier in Bengal. The controversy over westernization in the 1830s sharpened polarization among the educated men. One section of them, the Indian "slavophiles", lost confidence in the British government. The Dharma Sabha became the earliest organized group and the earliest proto-nationalist movement in modern India. (*British Orientalisms and the Bengal Renaissance*: Kopf, 1969, p 271). Besides this, the indigo disturbances—the Blue Mutiny—must be considered seriously in the study of nationalism in the 19th century, at least in the case of Bengal. At the time of the Blue Mutiny the pre-

cursor of all modern Indian political campaigns was launched in Calcutta to support a popular uprising against economic injustice. This helped to shape the character of Indian nationalism. After the indigo disturbances the government became conscious of the need of peasant welfare because during this time the Calcutta intelligentsia began to support the peasantry—an interesting fact. Before 1905 the educated classes had opposed the extension of tenancy rights. The last decades of the 19th century witnessed the growing competition between the government and the Indian urban elite for leadership of the rural masses. (*The Blue Mutiny*, Kling, pp 222-23). It should also be remembered that the British government relied on the upper classes in the countryside and in this way alienated the commercial and professional classes, the Indian bourgeoisie which was developing slowly during the 19th century. Barrington Moore aptly remarks, "by splitting the landed upper classes from the weak and rising urban leaders, the English presence prevented the formation of the characteristic reactionary coalition on the German or Japanese model."

Class Divisions

Thirdly, according to Anil Seal, "there were keen internal rivalries, but these were between caste and caste, community and community, not between class and class" (p. 341), though he knows that there was not much in common between the Muslim zamindars and Muslim tenants (p 339). This was surely not caste difference, but class division. Indeed Anil Seal here is the victim of the misconceptions of some social anthropologists who see Indian society as a caste society. He does not understand that this over-emphasis on caste was the result of not considering the dynamics of real life. Even in traditional India control over property was not always dependent on caste. According to E.R. Leach "...groups within a single caste have the nature of social classes rather than of castes." Moreover, during the 19th century

the competition between castes which arose, in the opinion of Anil Seal, from the impact of British rule, was itself evidence that the foundations of caste society were being shaken. According to anthropologists, caste is a system in which the relations between groups is non-competitive and from which antagonism and conflict are in principle excluded. Wherever castes are seen to be acting as corporations in competition against like groups of different castes, they are acting in defiance of caste principles. Not only that, there are also the questions of antagonistic and non-antagonistic conflict between castes. Practically antagonistic conflict between castes emerges only when conflict is present. Otherwise the conflict, in principle and practice, is not very significant. Moreover, the educated Indians in the 19th century were mostly men of upper castes no doubt, but at the same time they were landed proprietors who opposed tenancy legislation, who despite their support of Indian industry were no friends of industrial workers. As a consequence of the occupational mobilization many of the *kulins* or members of high castes, including the Brahmins, developed interest in trade and industry. It led to a close relationship between the intellectuals and plutocrats. In 1895 as many as 437 members of the commercial class attended the Poona session of the Congress. So to explain the emergence of nationalism in terms of only caste response to the British rule and caste conflict is a distortion of facts. Indeed, Anil Seal's bias against the significance of economic factors in 19th century Indian nationalism and over-emphasis on caste has reduced the value of his otherwise admirable study.

FRONTIER is available from
DURGAPADA DAS
Basirhat R. N. Road
24-Parganas

AUGUST 21, 1971

Shock Corridor

MRIGANKA SEKHAR RAY

AS the white dot engine headlight rushes forward piercing the darkness, the mystery in *Kuheli* is spelt in bold capitals. Sumita Sanyal gets down at Nijhumgarh (with its tinge of romanticised mystery it seems a proper venue for the sinister drama) and sets out for her adventures in bleak mansion haunted by the spectres of past crimes. She is there as a governess for the daughter of Biswajit, the master of the house, suspected of having killed his wife. He pleads his innocence to Sumita and while she completely believes him, she is worried by some weird happenings and queer characters and ultimately she decides to play a bit of an amateur sleuth. Some red herrings are thrown in creaks and screeches there are plenty and finally the villain is exposed (naturally he is the least suspected one) and our young Miss Marple explains everything and goes back to Calcutta; Biswajit also has his redemption and a rather mundane but more solid reward. The treatment of the film is exudely shock-based and there is no attempt to create tension on a psychological level. The camera is busy in creating the meaningless *chivoscuros* on rustling curtains and the soundtrack is a mere jumble of bellowing winds. The real criminal is not unmasked before the final scene, but many of the devices are just old bag, including the common deception of a singing apparition and the quite predictable twin-trick. The bridge between the motive and opportunity is a tottering one and the credibility gap is a little too much. Mercifully, we are relieved of two other obvious elements, a case and an affair between Sumita and Biswajit. Otherwise, this film is vintage Bombay.

For FRONTIER contact

SANYAL BROS.

26, Main Road, Jamshedpur-1.

AUGUST 21, 1971

Clippings

Sino-Soviet Relations

...The surface tranquillity of Sino-Soviet relations and the relative silence of both parties over their quarrels conceal what well-informed circles say is, in reality, a dangerously tense situation between the two countries.

Having been subjected to threatening military pressure from the Soviet Union for the last two years or more, China has gradually come round to accept the possibility of improved relations with the United States. At the height of the Sino-Soviet crisis, when fierce border clashes were flaring up between Chinese and Soviet troops, Peking believed that war with the Soviet Union was imminent.

China's main fear was that the Russians might launch a surprise attack on its vital strategic centres in an attempt to destroy its industrial infrastructure, and above all to wipe out its nuclear installations. Peking's immediate reaction was to prepare for a popular war of resistance.

...The crisis culminated in the famous meeting between the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, and the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, at Peking airport on September 11, 1969, when the Chinese leader made his successful last-minute attempt to head off an open break.

The relative detente which this created led to resumption of negotiations on the border dispute and increased bilateral commercial activity. But it did nothing to improve relations at party level, and these are still at a very low ebb. China maintains close party-to-party ties only with countries which more or less share its views on Marxism-Leninism and the international proletarian movement. Consequently it encourages other Communist parties to act independently of Moscow and resist what Peking calls the Soviet Union's "great-power chauvinism." North Korea, Vietnam, Albania, and Ru-

mania fall into this category.

The Soviet Union, for its part, deeply resents being placed in the same category as capitalist or anti-Moscow Communist countries. Its relations with China are based only on Government-to-Government contacts and the principles of peace-contacts and the principles of peaceful coexistence, that is to say, without inter-party links.

However, it is difficult for such relations to be good when the ideological differences at the party level are steadily worsening, and the distinction between the two kinds of relations is becoming somewhat academic. Yet not only have talks on the border crisis been marking time, but Peking has failed to obtain an unequivocal undertaking from Moscow to relax military pressure on China to enable it to negotiate free of intimidation. China, in fact, has had to watch Soviet forces being continually strengthened and deployed along the border, a fact which, the Chinese say, raises serious doubts about Soviet intentions. These developments have led the Chinese leaders to take all the defensive measures throughout the country which might prove necessary to protect its people and industry in case of war.

At the same time China's diplomatic and political offensive is developing in Eastern and Central Europe in an attempt to outflank the Soviet Union from the rear. This policy has already produced some notable results. Six months ago Peking and Belgrade normalised their relations, and similar moves between Yugoslavia and its Albanian and Greek neighbours then followed.

Contacts and visits have increased between Yugoslavia and Rumania, the two East European countries which follow an independent line in their foreign policy. Finally, the head of the Rumanian Communist Party, Nicolai Ceausescu, recently went to Peking for talks with the Chinese leaders. All these moves are obviously designed to loosen the Soviet Union's grip on its East European satellites.

(Robert Guillain in *Le Monde*, Paris)

ALL OF US
MAY NOT REMEMBER ...

*the years of struggle,
the sacrifice and dedication
that led to Independence,
24 years ago today.*

*That spirit is still within us.
Let us, in the same spirit,
rededicate ourselves to the task of
building a peaceful and
prosperous future for our Nation.*



Unreported

Mr Saroj Datta, an important leader of the CPI(ML) was arrested on Wednesday (August 4) night from somewhere in Calcutta. But as yet the news has not been reported. This sinister silence on the part of the police makes us suspicious. We shall be obliged if you publish this news in some form or other in your paper, if possible.

A CPI(ML) CADRE
of Calcutta

The news appeared in *Amrita Bazar Patrika* on 8.8.71—Editor

Terrorism And Marxism

The article "Individual Terrorism and Marxism" (August 7) is an effort to idealise the Naxalites when the hollowness of their politics can no more be clouded by distortion of facts and out-of-context quotations. Mr Dutta slightly said, "What did Ranadive, Jyoti Basu, Promode Das Gupta and Konar do in the exciting days of 1966? They came out of jail, threatened those comrades persisting in the general strike slogan with expulsion, and sat down to work-out election strategy and tactics". Mr Dutta should know the facts. After the general strike and hartal on 10th March 1966, Mr Jyoti Basu was released from jail. Immediately he presided over a meeting of all parties and trade unions in which, despite opposition from the CPI, the decision was taken for a general strike and hartal on 6th April. Following his general strike and hartal Mr Promode Das Gupta and Mr Konar were released. Again in September a general strike and hartal was observed throughout West Bengal.

Even if this is taken as an error of Mr Dutta due to ignorance, the lengthy quotations from Lenin, being so very out of context, help in no way to prop up the argument he advances. Can any one draw a parallel between the situation in Russia in 1905 and the

situation now in India? Individual terrorism, divorced from mass movement, seen in Europe during the 19th century and in Russia during the early part of the 20th century, at a time when Marxism was being developed in practice, cannot be compared with terrorism today, after the experience of so many successful revolutions. In the Indian situation a tremendous scope is opening up not only in West Bengal and Kerala but in all the States to develop mass movement, more effective and broad-based, on a scale not witnessed before.

During half a century in India we have seen the activities of terrorists; they showed their mettle in devotion, idealism, self-sacrifice and heroism drawing admiration and applause of the educated people but they could not arouse the masses or build up revolutionary bases. The stuff of the Naxalites is much inferior even though they profess to follow a superior ideology. In fact they are nowhere nearer the ideology they claim to follow. They professed rejection of the parliamentary path and gave the 'boycott election' call but in practice they joined hands with the CPI, Congress(O) and Congress(R) to defeat the CPI(M) in the elections. People who have seen these Naxalites moving with anti-CPI(M) parties during the elections in Durgapur, Batanagar, Behala, Jorasanko, Dum Dum, Jadavpur, Tollygunj and other places need no elaboration. If elections are a forbidden path how could the Naxalites do what they did? And how could Mr Dutta show his reliance on elections where he said, "the Congress debacle in West Bengal in the 1967 elections, the minority left CPI victory in Kerala and West Bengal, (were) sure signs that the mass movement had reached the point of armed struggle". If the fundamental premise is wrong, one mistake leads to successive mistakes. "Boycott of elections" is a wrong slogan and it will be equally wrong to rely on the election results as an indication of the maturity of the revolutionary situation.

Naxalites do not understand in what situation Lenin formulated "boy-

cott of election" as a correct policy and in what situation he advised participation in the Duma elections. For the same misconception (I do not like to use stronger words) the advance of the struggling people in West Bengal and Kerala is taken as a surer sign of the maturity of the revolutionary situation for the whole of India. This misconception (I do not want to add any motive) is due to a mechanical approach to try to repeat the experiences of other countries in India without having any consideration for the peculiarities of the Indian situation. Naxalites claim to follow the Chinese path but in actual practice they have even perverted the Chinese formulation. The essence of Lin Piao's thesis is to organise the masses to organise guerilla warfare but the Naxalites controverted it as "organise guerilla warfare to organise the masses". What logical explanation can Mr Dutta offer for these deliberate deviations?

Mechanical application of the experience of China or Russia cannot bring salvation to the Indian people. Even China developed her own line according to Chinese conditions despite the overriding influence and contrary views of the Communist Party of the USSR under Stalin. It is in this background that a serious and sincere effort is necessary to find out and develop the line of struggle most suitable in the Indian situation—with so many nationalities and languages, uneven development and predominating influence of religion and centuries-old civilisation. This creative task, unavoidable for fruition of revolutionary struggles, cannot be fulfilled either by slandering the CPI(M) or by attempting to prop up the Naxalites.

CHANDRANATH CHAKRABORTY
Behala, Calcutta

Sino-U.S. Relations

The recent development in Sino-U.S. relations has led people to think ill of China's present role, of her "deviation" from her basic strategy.

These self-styled pundits should find out China's attitude to the U.S. eleven years ago; when China declared that there should be no Sino-U.S. negotiation until Washington withdrew its army from Taiwan and Vietnam, and recognised Peking as the only Chinese Government. There is no indication that China has compromised these strategic conditions.

To make adverse comment against China at this pre-negotiation stage is like commenting on a play without any regard to its middle and the end.

MONOTOSH DAS GUPTA
Barrackpore

Who Gained ?

The Small Tools Mfg. Co. of Narkeldanga which had been closed for the past eleven months started working again a few days ago. A friend of mine, an employee of the concern, has given me some interesting facts.

The company would not give more than 4% yearly bonus, while the workers' demand was 20%. No wages would be given for the past eleven months. Instead, a few weeks' pay (ranging from three to five weeks) has been granted on a selective basis.

The workers had to sign a bond promising non-participation in any similar action in future. The owners were kind enough to assure the workers of a good canteen.

On the basis of these facts, I wish to put a few questions before the CPI(M) which controls the union. Without doubting their genuine sympathy for the workers, one would like to know whose purpose is served by this sort of "struggle"? That of the workers or the bonorgeoisie?

How far is the oft-made claim of elevation of economic struggle to the political level justified by facts?

What is the justification of the nomenclature "STRUGGLE" being attached to this sort of Gandhian non-violent non-cooperation?

My point is not that the workers have fought and lost; it is that they have not fought and yet lost.

It is high time to realise the

futility of this sort of classical class-struggle today. A revolutionary party should understand this—if, of course, it is revolutionary and not reformist.

A READER
Calcutta

China And Pakistan

You write everything under the sun and have made it a point to criticise everything that is done and said by a bourgeois government. This is what you should because you believe in an ideology which, when translated into action, has proved its effectiveness in solving many a problem affecting the lives of people living in capitalist countries. Your concern for the underdog is worth appreciating. But when you maintain a calculated and mysterious silence about the tragedy that has overtaken millions of men, women and children who have had to take shelter in India to avoid being mercilessly butchered by the Pakistani troops, armed to the teeth by China and America, it is difficult to be convinced of the genuineness of your feelings.

Whatever the ideological interpretation to back China's wholehearted support to the ruling clique of Islamabad, it is really very painful to note that China is the only major country of the world that has not uttered a single word of sympathy for the untold sufferings of Bangladesh refugees. Is it because these people are class enemies whose blood can be shed with impunity? Or is it because these poor people supported a political party that wanted, not secession or independence, but only autonomy to develop Bangladesh not in conformity with the Marxist principles as interpreted by revolutionary China? If this is what is sought to be done in the name of communism or revolution, then God save the world.

I respect and admire the Chinese leaders who made herculean efforts to bring new hope of light to the Chinese masses, denied before the revolution, even the most elementary rights

of the civilised existence but China's image as a revolutionary power appears to have received a setback as a result of her policy towards Bangladesh vis-a-vis the West Pakistan Government. China's willingness to negotiate with America, her avowed enemy, to normalise mutual relations as evidenced by the announcement has shown quite clearly that her foreign policy is guided more by narrow self-interest than the idealism she frequently professes.

PHANI BHUSHAN GHOSH
Ashokenagar

Politics And Auroville

Reports suggest (The Statesman, August 4) that the administrative authorities in Pondichery are not according help to the Aurobindo Ashram people in their endeavour to procure land for the dream city—Auroville. The so-called votaries of Sri Aurobindo, a revolutionary turned recluse who led a life of austerity, on the specious plea of international friendship etc intend to build a dream city with all the facilities and amenities of ultra-modern living for themselves and their cohorts while the country as a whole reels under the burdens of hunger, mass deprivation and unemployment. People in and around the Ashram, and all over the Pondichery area are not very sympathetic to the votaries of Sri Aurobindo because they are highbrow and because of their desire to remain aloof from the common rut of people. That the ulterior motive of this bunch of rich people who have profited from the deeds of Sri Aurobindo is to wield more political power and economic stranglehold has never been in doubt in the minds of the State administration of Pondicherry and the people in general there. While everyone has the right to practise and preach his religion according to the dictates of his conscience, the freedom should not be misused for the benefit of self-seekers. We welcome the attitude of the State authorities of Pondichery.

N. V. NATASSAM
C. R. PARSURAM
Madras

The AUTUMN NUMBER of

Frontier

Will be Published in the Third Week of September

Contributors include :

Joan Robinson, Benoy Ghose, Dick Krooth, Ashok Rudra, Amiya

Bagchi, Mrinal Sen, M. S. Prabhakar and others.

Order Your Copies Early

Before you have another child

think

wouldn't you first
like to give this child
all the care she needs?



Life-giving milk. Nourishing food. The clothes, the toys, the books...the little things you want to make sure she gets. But if another child should come along too soon, this may not be easy. Wouldn't you prefer to avoid this?

Millions of couples all over the world are doing just that. They put off having another child till they are ready for it. You too can do this with NIRODH. It's the world's most popular rubber contraceptive for men. Remember, NIRODH is the safest, simplest method of family planning and has been used successfully for generations. So why don't you too use NIRODH.

Available everywhere at only 15 paise for 3 because it is subsidised by the Government.



Until you want another child, use

NIRODH ▼

the rubber contraceptive millions choose

Sold by: General Merchants, Chemists and Druggists,
Provision Stores, Pan Shops, Etc.

devp 7/1/1111