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END OF UNITY

THE PSP and the SSP have united and divided on so many occasions before that few could take seriously their latest merger, though its architects sought to make the rebirth of the Socialist Party a historic occasion by synchronising it with the anniversary of the August "revolution". Neither the commitment of the SSP nor the policy vacuum of the PSP had helped them in the last mid-term poll; both were reduced to a non-force. The electoral debacle forced on the reluctant leaders of the two parties the thought of a merger, though they were contemptuous of one another—the PSP because of the SSP's participation in the not-so-Grand Alliance and the SSP because of the PSP's undeclared electoral understanding with the Congress (R). But the leaders had to stow away their personal feelings, for the existence of their parties was at stake. They were united in their hatred of the communists, and what stood in the way of a merger was the absence of a common hostility for both the Congress parties. The merger formula was based on a give-and-take—the SSP agreeing to part company with the Congress (O) and the PSP pledging to spurn the crumbs from the everful plate of the Congress (R).

It is natural that the merger should have been resented more by the PSP members than those of the SSP. The Grand Alliance has gone into liquidation, its constituents having decided to go their separate ways in future. The SSP had, therefore, nothing to lose from the agreement; it merely promised to sever itself from an alliance which had already crumbled. The predicament of the PSP was different. It was in the good company of the CPI and the DMK and could look forward to shining in the reflected glory of the Congress (R), like the CPI. By the grace of the Congress (R) it was already sharing power in some States, and it could hope to get into office in a similar manner in some other States after next year's elections. The merger has dashed all these hopes. For the sake of a unity of dubious electoral value the party has been called upon to forgo a highly profitable alliance. No wonder at their party conference some PSP leaders described the agreement as total surrender to the SSP.

The SSP units in Kerala and Bihar were the first to split. Resentment against the merger was the strongest in these two States, for it enjoined on the party units there to vacate office immediately. The

beneficiaries of office defied the merger decision, and the party fell apart when the national leadership attempted to discipline them. A similar situation had threatened to develop in West Bengal, but the problem was resolved with the imposition of President's rule. The PSP units in some other States also have split, the latest being that of Orissa. In fact, what has happened in Orissa is not a split but a virtual revolt against the merger as it precludes the State unit from joining hands with the Congress (R) to bring down the ruling coalition. Orissa is the only State where a non-Congress (R) ministry is functioning; in all other States the

Congress (R) has succeeded in installing its own or puppet ministries or introducing President's rule. The Congress (R) is now poised for a final assault on this remaining threat to Indian democracy, and the State PSP wants to ensure its place in the next coalition by assisting the Congress (R) to win its battle against reaction. With elections to the majority of the State Assemblies barely six months away, PSP units in some other States also may develop dissidence and opt for electoral understanding with the Congress (R). The newest Socialist Party bids fair to be as short-lived as its predecessors.

the police might have no handicap either in equipment or manpower while tackling violence. A Home Ministry official is reported to have said that a scheme was approved a week ago by the Government to increase the number of police stations and outposts in troubled areas. A decision has also been taken to equip the police with 'sufficient' fire-arms. A special cell is being set up at the Centre, which will be led by the Additional Union Home Secretary, to tackle law and order in West Bengal.

The police learnt truly, during Mr Dhavan's regime, that power comes out of the barrel of a gun. Naxalites—some thousands of them—have been shot at, bomb-hurlers as they were. Mr Dias has taken up the thread where Mr Dhavan left it. Communists, for their dear life, should take the hint. Nixon may talk with Mao, Jyoti Basu may dine with Dharma Vira; for the rank and file, in Calcutta lanes and byelanes, the movement of the stars may not have much influence. And not for the communists alone. West Bengal is today what Nagaland was yesterday; the line between the hostiles and the loyal is thin indeed. The frontiers are shrinking.

Shrinking Frontiers

After the disappearance of the mini-charisma that was Santi Swarup Dhavan we have on the dais Anthony Lancelot Dias. Mr Dias has not brought much of romance with him, true, but it seemed he was going to introduce some resoluteness. To start with, he did not sanction leave in Writers' Buildings when Wadekar gave the writers a cause. He was steady. Like Indian cricketers, however, he fumbled with his next move. He mistimed the bouncer that came with the bandh; his threatening gesture did not yield any runs. Few came, even within the irksome three-mile radius, to report on the bandh day. Surely, Mr Dias took some time to get his West Bengal leg; the pitch here, though not dangerous, is tricky somewhat.

The people of West Bengal however should be wary. The Centre has proved itself more a marionette player than a ventriloquist. It is more important to watch what the Governor is made to do than what he is made to speak. Mr Dhavan, who some people thought to be the wisest fool on the line of James I, gave generous counsel to Marxists in West Bengal left and right and was a relief after the diabolic Dharma Vira. But Mr Dhavan, who compared Lenin with Arjuna, unveiled

Lenin's statue and quoted the Gita, left, befittingly, after supervising the holocaust at Baranagar-Cossipore.

Mr Dias has brought a new philosophy of life and violence. He does not think that the law and order problem in the State can be solved at the political level. He is reported to have directed the Government to tackle the problem administratively. He has given directions to streamline the entire machinery so that

The West Berlin Deal

The Four-Power draft agreement of convenience on Berlin has been hailed as the most historic development in postwar Europe, but the accord is significant because it presages understanding on the remaining thorny issues of the cold war rather than solving problems of a city which could be beleaguered by Pankov anytime it liked. The Soviet Union on the one side and the United States, Britain and France on the other would be avoiding the uncomfortable issue whether the agreement was the best that could be reached; both the sides were under compulsions to compromise on their negotiating positions. While the Kremlin

knew that the Bundestag would not be ratifying the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw without an agreement on Berlin, the three Western Powers were not agreed on how far they should go in Bonn's aid. Finding that time was running out, Herr Willy Brandt was not averse to making certain concessions which in any case was taking some risk. The possibility of the Christian Democratic Opposition calling the agreement a sellout of the communists has increased owing to the battle for succession to Dr Kiesinger's office. Mr Abrasimov could draw comfort from the fact that the agreement is sort of formal ratification of the way

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Europe has been divided since 1945 and recognition of West Berlin as a separate political entity vindicated the "existence" of a third German State. The Soviet consulate in West Berlin will be accredited to the Western Powers, but Bonn's fear is that it may always try to deal directly with the city's Senate. The links between Bonn and West Berlin have been recognized to the extent that they ensure the viability of the city; but the election of West German Presidents and plenary sessions of the Bundestag which irritate Pankow will no longer take place in West Berlin. Russia has accepted only partial responsibility for free access overland between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, but it is not immediately clear how easy will be the movement between the two halves of the divided city. East Germany will be only too unwilling to give up its role of controlling traffic to and from West Berlin considering the importance of the lever in its relations with Bonn. But the Kremlin finds Pankow more pliable under Herr Erich Honecker. West Germans have scored on the representation of West Berlin's interests abroad—as Switzerland does in the case of Liechtenstein.

The East Europeans have always entertained the idea that sanctification of the status quo in Europe and Russia's confrontation with China will somehow result in some freedom for them. Mr Denis Healey had also been arguing on the same lines when he said that the Russians would not be unwilling to give their European allies some amount of poli-

tical freedom of action once they were relieved of the feeling of military insecurity. But manoeuvres on the Rumanian border, applying pressure on Bucharest for right of passage for Russian troops through Rumania, further manoeuvres in Bulgaria, integrating the East European economies still more closely with Russia and the blunt warning that neutrality toward China will not be tolerated in a communist ally of Russia—all these show that the Kremlin is in no mood to relax control over Eastern Europe. Russia feels uncomfortable if any nationalist forces struggling against the imperialistic designs of the United States and the Soviet Union get China's support. Today an overstretched America is seriously thinking of reducing its commitments in Europe and what Russia wants is that West European countries should make no effort to fill up that vacuum. Moscow would not have championed Herr Brandt's Ostpolitik if it did not divert the West Germans from the political unification of Western Europe. As the enlargement of the ECM is now almost an accepted fact, Russia's diplomatic activities are directed toward ensuring that an economic fraternity does not turn into an active political union. The developing ties between Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania are being anxiously watched by the Kremlin; and Mr Brezhnev's proposed Belgrade visit would provide an occasion to mend fences with Yugoslavia. Russia's bid to establish contacts with nationalist and military groups when preparations are being made for Tito's retirement can only irritate the Yugoslav Government. It has found the Russian policy of demonstrative military manoeuvres clearly directed to serve as pressure on this or that Balkan country. The dialecticians in the Kremlin fail to see that while the pressure tactics are meant to frighten the Balkan States they only encourage independent Balkan consciousness. Russia wants a quiet Europe so that it could concentrate on its border with China.

Small Units

Nowhere is the ineffective nature of the Centre's Plan to revive West Bengal's sagging economy more apparent than in the small industries sector which occupies a prime position in the State's economy. Not only does it account for a significant portion of the industrial output of the State, it is also the largest absorber of the State's labour force. But since the past two decades, and particularly after the recession in the mid-sixties this vital sector has been allowed to slide downward for diverse reasons. Statistical figures to support the observation are not lacking. While the small units mushroomed at the rate of 17000 units per year during 1967-70 for the country as a whole, in West Bengal the growth rate has actually taken a sharp dip and 3000 or more units have stopped functioning.

The reasons are many, ranging from non-availability of funds to lack of adequate demand to keep them up. That the Centre is not unaware of them is evident from the plan handed out by them to cheer up the small and medium producers. As if to atone for its past sin of neglecting West Bengal the Centre has proposed, in the plan, to consider its raw material needs with "special sympathy". For that purpose a raw material bank is to be opened under the aegis of the State wing of the Small-scale Industrial Development Corporation; even import restrictions are to be relaxed if need be. Close vigil will also be maintained on problems of productivity and industrial relations. Again the SSIDC is to be revitalised to finance the small units. All the forces, in short, are to be mobilised to revive this dying sector so that a handsome growth rate of 2000 units per year is attained in no time.

But regarding demand, or rather the lack of it, which has been the largest single factor behind the eclipse of the smaller units the Centre's stance is vague, if not dubious. At a meeting at the India Exchange, FASSI—the small producers organisation—is said to have asked for the

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relaxation of the Monopolies Act for West Bengal as a special case. For, according to FASSI, such relaxation will generate the much needed demand for the smaller producer by encouraging the big business houses to set up new units in large sectors. But the ruling Congress, tied to the goal of a socialistic society, is unwilling to give further rope to the monopolists, at least in the private sec-

tor. The antidote has been the proposal to transfer railway orders to West Bengal.

But such a transfer of railway orders can only have a secondary effect on the smaller units. Only a massive dose of investment in the public sector can create an economic climate in which smaller producers can survive and prosper. But des-

pite the tall promises and the proposals for the underground railway and a new bridge across the Ganga, the plan does not indicate any real change of attitude on the part of the Centre towards the problems of West Bengal. In fact, there have been veiled attempts to pass on the responsibility to private hands so that, if the plan miscarries, they can be blamed for the bungling.

View from Delhi

War Clouds

FROM A POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT

THOSE who asserted that the Indo-Soviet treaty was signed to deter Pakistan from any military adventure against India are trying to wriggle out of their discomfiture by reinterpreting the treaty. The new thesis is that the treaty was meant to deter China from intervening in an Indo-Pakistani conflict and the Soviet Union need not and will not take sides in such a conflict. The Soviet Union's repeated clarifications in Islamabad that the treaty was not aimed against Pakistan fit in with this thesis.

It is widely believed that no political solution to the Bangladesh problem is possible, though Iran, enjoying the confidence of the United States and Pakistan, is peddling a formula and vague feelers about a confederation or a loose federation of the two wings have been thrown about. There is also an element of subtle blackmail in the suggestions from Washington that it would be difficult to guarantee the safety of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman unless the Bangladesh leadership settles for a compromise solution. It is possible that General Yahya Khan and the military junta cannot afford to lose Bangladesh without a war and everything therefore points to a military confrontation at Pakistan's choosing. September-October will be crucial months.

Mrs Indira Gandhi's alert to her Cabinet colleagues to stick around the capital until August 25 touched off speculation about a major policy decision on Bangladesh. Mr D. P. Dhar's mysterious disappearance for a week, the summons to our man in Peking to come home for consultations, the Prime Minister's round of discussions with her colleagues added to the suspense on the eve of the ruling party's Working Committee meeting on August 24. But nothing happened and the wise ones who had predicted big things that never happened are busy thinking of bigger things. One was almost made to believe that recognition of Bangladesh was round the corner. But a few days ago the entire Bangladesh cabinet was in New Delhi and returned without much hope. If and when the recognition comes, it would follow a flare-up and is not likely to precede it.

Meantime, the Foreign Office is bending over backwards to prove that the Indo-Soviet treaty has not cramped its style and that the country's foreign policy has acquired new manoeuvrability. The stale story of Mrs Gandhi's letter to Mr Chou En-lai (part of routine because such letters were addressed to 23 other heads of government) was dug up and publicised to definite purpose. The official spokesman of the Exter-

nal Affairs Ministry could neither confirm nor deny that the letter was sent but all that one had to do was to look into the answers to questions during the budget session of Parliament. It was suggested that any question about the reported letter should be addressed to the Prime Minister's Secretariat and not to the External Affairs Ministry.

There is a comic touch to the "ping pong" story. The profound observation made by a correspondent close to the Foreign Office is that a serious policy review would precede any decision to let a ping pong team go to Peking. It would be well to recall that a few months before the 1962 border war an Indian trade union delegation was invited to some celebrations in Peking and the Government's reply made amazing reading: since China continued to be in illegal occupation of Indian territory it would not be possible to let any Indian relegation go to Peking. Mr Ivor Montague might be able to tell us why an Indian table tennis team was not allowed to go to Peking in 1961 and under whose pressure.

The improvement in Sino-Yugoslav relations might have its impact on Indo-Yugoslav relations. Though President Tito is visiting India in October the rupee trade arrangement between the two countries is coming

to an end and there is obvious Yugoslav annoyance at the Indo-Soviet treaty. The *Tanjug* news agency has suggested that Indian's non-alignment is dead and both Yugoslavia and Rumania are known to have made known to India that the treaty would mean hardening of the Chinese attitude to India. So New Delhi's next gambit in relations with China has to be awaited with interest. The Soviet leaders have been trying to queer the pitch for Mr D. P. Dhar with strident attacks on China and wild charges of attempts to subvert Mrs Gandhi's leadership in India and Mrs Banadaranaiké's in Ceylon.

Curbing The Press?

The bona fides of the Government's proclaimed resolve to curb the monopoly press are suspect. The reason: what is being bandied about as the draft bill to achieve the objective was sneakily released to a small group of Government's bully boys among journalists, with the Minister of State for Company Law presiding over the mystique. The Secretary of the Information and Broadcasting Ministry was in attendance to offer clarifications. The next day, when a correspondent confronted the official about the draft bill published in the morning's papers, the latter made it clear that the Government would not own up the draft.

The Law Ministry has had no occasion to approve the draft and the Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting managed to be away when the historic leak took place. One cannot help the feeling that the draft bill is a dummy manoeuvre aimed at forcing the press barons to buy their peace with the powers that be. When it suits the Government, the draft bill in the form in which it has been put into circulation could be disowned and an innocuous bill introduced later as a sop for public opinion. The "committed" Trotskyite-CPI leadership of the IFWJ has been playing the Government's game with gusto. The Government has had no gumption to fight the monopolies and has to feign it is fighting the press monopolies. Why

does not the Government take over just three industries—sugar, jute and cement—and see how many press monopolies are broken up in the process? It dare not.

It is significant that a certain "progressive" daily whose claimed circulation is perilously closed to the 50,000 limit has not found it necessary to welcome the proposed bill and a "radical" proprietorial tabloid which monopolises the newsprint allocation for its category has used a superannuated working journalist leader to plea for exempting journals of this genre from the purview of the bill.

Any measure aimed at curbing monopolistic trends in the newspaper industry should aim at newspapers of all categories irrespective of their political commitment. But there is hectic lobbying here to secure exemption for the "committed" press owned by radical proprietors or their *benamidars*.

By all accounts, the war against press monopolies appears a phoney one. How else does one explain the complicated geneology of the draft bill and the Government's cold feet when it comes to owning it up? Are the newspaper editors to be called for a conference and bullied into discovering a "commitment" in favour of the Prime Minister and her party and in return let the proprietors keep the newspapers? The rising star in the Prime Minister's firmament, Mrs Nandini Satpaty has been trying to set the style for brainwashing New Delhi journalists in the name of "discussions in depth" and the process has begun with the chiefs of news bureaus. It will extend to the editors shortly, one presumes.

Unless the Government comes out with a clear statement of its plans for curbing the press monopolies, the promiscuous draft bill can only be viewed as a crude gambit in a phoney war.

August 29, 1971

The Treaty

S. Roy

ON 9th August 1971, a new link was forged in the chain of neo-colonialism that enslaves India.

The thirties saw, on the one hand, crises-ridden imperialism assuming its ugly fascist form, and on the other, there was the upsurge of anti-imperialist struggles all over the colonial world. A class of loyal compradors and bureaucrats had been, by that time, assiduously developed by the British in India. The house of Tatas, Birlas, Thapars, Mafatlals were all established then, as were such bureaucrats as Bajpai, B. N. Rau, Viswanathan and B. B. Ghosh. So the British framed the Government of India Act of 1935, which would allow them to sink their colonial fangs into a "freed" Indian Dominion run by their meticulously trained lackeys and puppets.

Crises outran their plans and the Second World War followed. By the end of the war British imperialism stood ravaged and helpless in the coils of indebtedness to American imperialism; unprecedentedly fierce storms of national liberation raged over the colonies, supported by socialist Russia led by Stalin; and British imperialism was forced to avert its inevitable end by allying itself—as a junior partner—with U.S. imperialism and giving it a share in colonial plunder. In India, the British used the Hindu-Muslim contradiction (fostered systematically and continuously) and divided the sub-continent. Bharat and Pakistan—semi-colonies—came into being—Bharat and Pakistan, whose production and distribution, wealth and defence lay in the hands of the imperialists. The Act of 1935 was amended to admit the U.S. vulture into the Indian skies. This was our Constitution.

By siding with the U.S. in Korea, massacring peasants in Telengana and Kakhwip and outlawing the Communist Party, Nehru—that shrewd agent

of imperialism—proved his loyalty to his masters.

In 1953 Stalin died and the revisionists seized power in Russia. It was then that the Indian compradors siddled up to Russia. Co-existence with Khrushchev (unlike co-existence with Stalin or Mao), instead of being dangerous, might prove profitable in bargaining with the U.S. and British masters. And bargaining has an overpowering attraction for the Indian bania.

The changes in the world scene, since then, have been stupendous:

British imperialism has faded out as a world power.

Soviet revisionism has used social-fascist methods to entrench itself in power and by thought, word and deed revealed itself as malignant.

Socialist China, led by the CPC and Chairman Mao, has gone from strength to strength and has become the base area and inspiration of world revolution.

Defeated in innumerable aggressive wars, which drained its blood and gold, a tottering U.S. imperialism has realised it can no longer police the world alone; and hence

In spite of their contradictions in the field of markets, investments and profits, U.S. imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism collaborated to save themselves in this, the era of the final destruction of imperialism.

U.S. imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism have two overriding common interests—to contain, encircle and destroy China and to suppress revolutionary wars of liberation. Revolution is the main trend in the world today; the unity of interests of the imperialists merely acknowledges this fact.

It is this overriding unity of purpose which transformed our State from a semi-colony into a neo-colony. By militarily provoking China in 1962, the Indian lackeys and puppets signified this qualitative change in their sell-out of the country. They received instant reward in the form of arms and cash.

As crises mounted so did the oppression of the Indian people. In

two years—1963-65—an *additional* burden of indirect tax amounting to Rs 1,000 crores was thrust upon the bent backs of the Indian people. Oppression bred resistance which led to further repression. Revolt gathered momentum and broke out in Naxalbari, Srikakulam, Gopiballabhpur, Birbhumi.

In order to sharpen the contradiction in the imperialist camp, China established friendship with Pakistan which lay in the intermediate zone between imperialist and socialist countries. This sat ill upon imperialist minds, and so their Indian and Pakistani lackeys were goaded into war.

The aims of this adventure were: to sabotage Sino-Pak relations by forcing Pakistan to rush off to seek imperialist aid; to increase Sino-Indian hostility; to divert the revolutionary tendencies of the peoples of both countries into the nasty ditch of Hindu-Muslim hostility—a corollary of Indo-Pak enmity; and as a side effect, gain opportunities of investing more capital and selling more arms.

Methods

The methods used by Soviet social-imperialism to penetrate the Indian State are:

It very cunningly deployed about Rs 1,000 crores of capital to get a stranglehold upon Indian bureaucratic capital. Their investments are eye-catching, concentrated and selective, whereas the Rs 7,000 crores of the U.S. is scattered.

By virtue of their power over bureaucratic capital, Russia has a firm grip on the Indian economy. For it is bureaucratic capital which controls nearly all import and export trade, banking and insurance. Through loans and investments, the Government has gained 51% indirect control over the private sector. It is bureaucratic capital that is propping up the Indian comprador.

The Soviet social-imperialists are the chief if not monopoly armouries of the ruling classes of India. Eighty per cent of India's recent arms purchases were from Russia, some Rs 800 crores worth.

The social-imperialists have a fifth and a sixth column working inside the country. There is the CPI and the Soviet financed "left" papers—nakedly servile and sycophantic in their praise of the Great White Father. And then there is—a refinement—the CPI(M). Marking the Russians as revisionists, they hail their investments as "socialist aid". The march of bureaucratic capital spells the "advance of socialism" to them. Indira is a "progressive". India's wars are hailed—at the time of fighting—by Kautskyite shouts of "Motherland Uber Alles". Both agents have waxed fatly eloquent about the benign influence of the Indo-Soviet Treaty.

The social-imperialists have used well the built-in animosity in Indo-Pak, Hindu-Muslim relations. They have claimed a common Aryan heritage with the Indian Hindus, helped India hold Kashmir, sold arms to both (Pakistan has, to date received 12 IL-28 bombers, about 100 MIG-19s and MIG-21s, 150-200 T54 and T55 tanks, 200 130-mm guns, helicopters, radar and a 1000 transmitter *plus* Rs 90 to 110 crores invested in 31 projects), instigated war and then at Tashkent, played the peacemaker. One remembers the British in 1948, led by Mountbatten, playing the same role, with less finesse.

The social-imperialists have effectively encircled India. Both from the landward side:

Afghanistan
100% of Air force
20 helicopters
Tanks, missiles and military training for the army *plus* Rs 900 crores as "Aid".

Nepal
Rs 12 crores invested out of total foreign investment of about 120 crores,

and from the seaward side :
Social-imperialism : In and around the Indian Ocean—

Egypt—at the lip of Suez :
entire arms supply+Aswan Dam+
economic aid+military training+
Russian troops.

Yemen—at the ocean end of Suez:

Same as above.

Sudan and Somalia—Along the African Coast

Same as above.

Syria and Iraq
Aeroplanes, tanks (700)
Indonesia

Initially 100% of Air force and Navy supply has been resumed to Suharto's murderous CIA regime.

Ceylon
Entire air force.
Singapore
Mauritius

Andaman and Nicobar Islands
Berthing rights for Russian naval ships.

Vishakhapatnam
Repair facilities for the Russian Navy.
They have, in addition, erected four floating supply buoys on the Indian Ocean to serve their imperialist naval designs.

(As a matter of record the Chinese aid differs radically from the Russian. China does *not* charge interest. Does *not* trade in arms but gives them free. It buys raw material at prices *higher* than the world market price (e.g. Ceylon's rubber), pays in necessities or *gold*. Chinese technicians live the life of ordinary people of their host countries. The Russians charge interest, have an enormously profitable arms trade, forces India to sell sugar at 40 p. per kg. and pays in rupees thereby forcing India to buy Russian goods. And in order to maintain each Soviet technician (presumably in the style he is accustomed to) India has to spend Rs 35,000 per month.)

The two super-powers have gathered to divide the world. The SALT talks are more a flaunting of nuclear arrogance than a fluttering of peaceable intention. But China's irresistible progress gave them notice that the world would no longer tolerate such division.

Riddled militarily, politically, economically and culturally, the U.S. imperialists have (as an effort at temporary respite) bowed low to come to an understanding with China. "In the dialectic pattern of his thought Mao has often said that good can come out of bad and that bad people

can be made good by experience and teaching". (Edgar Snow in *Life*, 30-7-71). This is precisely what has happened. The U.S. has had, to swallow, however temporarily, the bitter pill.

Poison for Russia

But the pill is poison for the Soviet social-imperialists. For a long time they have raved about the "regression" and 'anarchy' in China, have pulled down and besmirched Chairman Mao.

To accept China as an equal, to acknowledge China's progress under the banner of Mao Tse-tung Thought would be suicidal for them.

On the USSR border with China is ranged a force of 10,00,000 men—the largest single aggressive combat force assembled anywhere in the world today. The war drums of the social-imperialists constantly beat a tattoo of hatred against China. A chant that aims to divert the Russian people. Russia occupies a great deal of Chinese territory, territory which Lenin and Stalin had pledged to return.

To accept China would also ruin social-imperialism's chances of leading astray the liberation movements of the world's peoples. Arms and gold have till now served as barely disguised baits to trap these movements into the "Russian Way" as opposed to the Chinese path.

Thus, like Hitler and Tojo—the economically weaker imperialist powers of yesterday, Brezhnev rushes in where Nixon (like Chamberlain and Daladier) fears to tread.

Thus: Nixon announced his "Doctrine" in 1969: Americans will not fight any more land wars in Asia. Asians must fight Asians. Brezhnev rushed with *his* doctrine: a mutual security pact for Asian nations to go on opposing China. The Russian Army awaits the clarion call!

The Indo-Soviet treaty was drawn up in 1969, as a part of the "Brezhnev Doctrine". The split within the Congress and Indira's resultant weakness demanded postponement. Now there is no such bother. Rather, the war build-up, the refugee problem,

the "Bangladesh" hysteria, the dirty gossip of 'Sino-U.S. entente' prepared the ground for the treaty. The march of world revolution and of China, the successes of the Indian revolution have made the treaty an urgent necessity. Hence: 9th August 1971.

This treaty has given Russia the right, at will, to descend upon India, with arms (Article 9). To say that the opposite is also true would be insane. This treaty gives Russia the right of veto over India's foreign policy. (Articles 8 and 10). This treaty, by its commitment to the "security" of Asia, promises to maintain the status quo of injustice and butchery. By declaring "cooperation" to be the method for "solving contradictions" it peddles the Khrushchevite thesis of co-existence of the exploited with the exploiters. By its determination to "maintain peace" in Asia, this treaty explicitly vows to betray the wars of national liberation which are on the point of sweeping imperialism out of Asia.

This treaty plants its spearhead against China. India, bound by the treaty, cannot make peace with China, i.e. cannot do a "Nixon". Tied to the chariot wheels of Soviet social-imperialism, India will be dragged into abetting Russia's aggressive designs on China. While one attacks across the Ussuri, the other will presumably be asked to probe in strength all over the Ladakh-NEFA front. Russia and India are the only countries who have consistently refused to settle their borders with China. This treaty (Article 5) by committing itself to the "territorial integrity" of Russia and India, freezes the frontier and lights a permanent flame of conflict with China.

The Soviet social-imperialists might also be expected to use the high emotions generated by the East Pakistan situation. A direct confrontation between India and Pakistan would force the U.S. to choose between the two. Siding with Pakistan would make it lose India. If it chose India, bang would go all its hopes of a temporary understanding with China.

Above all, this treaty aims to con-

tain, attack and destroy the Indian revolution. Social-imperialist bullets are already shedding Indian blood all over Bihar, Andhra and West Bengal. The "peace and security" of India, of Indira Gandhi and J. R. D. Tata have now the guarantee of not only arms but also Russian troops.

This treaty will inevitably affect the political and economic structure of India, for the master must shape the servant in his image. The "democratic" cabaret of sycophantic political parties (imported from London and Washington) will now be replaced by the horror of single-party dictatorship. The right of private property (the only right ever guaranteed by the Constitution) is no longer sacred. The need has passed. The Anglo-American monopolists needed it (more as an article of faith than any strident necessity, since they too enjoyed the use of bureaucratic capital of India). The social-imperialists have no such silly faiths. Hence the 24th Amendment. The road is opened for faster advance down the "Socialist Garibi Hatao Path" for bureaucratic capital—the most noxious, tyrannous, moribund, impotent form of capital.

The 18 million people of North Vietnam have taught the U.S. imperialists a deep and terrible lesson. This the social-imperialists have chosen to ignore. So it is the duty of 550 million Indians to each them. We must shatter here on Indian soil their dreams to rule the world. American imperialism has long been established and accepted as an enemy of the Indian people. We must not forget them. We must see the social-imperialist vulture that darkens our skies side by side with the Americans. Our shackles shall surely be broken. Both the demons have with outspread hands and splayed out fingers taken on far more than they can carry. This treaty is surely a new noose round the neck of Soviet social-imperialism.

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Festival Of The Ten Per Cent

RANJAN SENGUPTA

INDIA today is a grand festival for 10 per cent of her population, while the remaining 90 per cent serve and wait on them and barely survive on the thrown-off crumbs.

More than half of the agricultural land belongs to one-tenth of the rural households whose grip on the entire village-India is firm.

Occasional ups and downs apart, industry is "booming." But for whom does the industry produce? Who are its main customers? The National Sample Survey (NSS) reports provide the answer.

The NSS Report of the 15th round (July 1959-June 1960) has data on how much a family in a certain expenditure group spends on various items of consumption. It is then possible to identify the "industrial" goods,* and find out the proportion

of total expenditure on these goods in particular. The NSS Report of the 16th round (July 1960-June 1961), on the other hand, gives the data on per capita annual consumption expenditure of various sections of the population. It is now a matter of simple arithmetic to calculate the amounts of industrial goods consumed by different sections respectively. The results of such a calculation are presented in the table below.

As the table shows, the poorest 10 per cent of the rural people, for example, spent only Rs 88 each in 1960-61, which amounts to Rs 7.33 per month, that is, less than 25 paise per day per head. Together they consumed Rs 98.7 crores of industrial goods. Correspondingly, in the urban areas the poorest 10 per cent

Section of population	RURAL			URBAN	
	Per capita expenditure (Rs)	Consumption of industrial goods (Rs Crores)	Per capita expenditure (Rs)	Consumption of industrial goods (Rs Crores)	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
0-10	88.0	98.7	112.9	34.7	
10-20	124.2	159.6	156.1	50.0	
20-30	150.1	182.9	191.0	68.5	
30-40	174.4	228.1	223.8	83.9	
40-50	198.0	266.4	256.6	96.2	
50-60	227.0	340.4	295.8	115.6	
60-70	258.5	404.6	342.5	136.3	
70-80	303.1	501.5	421.3	185.6	
80-90	382.5	685.0	553.5	262.2	
90-95	493.3	627.0	753.4	195.3	
95-100	870.6	1097.4	1268.8	375.5	
TOTAL	258.8	4591.6	356.4	1603.8	

*The following are taken to be industrial goods: edible oil, sugar, salt, three-fourths of "other food", clothing, fuel and light, and "miscellaneous" that includes furniture, domestic utensils, footwear and other durable and semi-durable goods, services, conveyance etc.

consumed Rs 112.9 each, i.e. Rs 9.40 per month, or about 31 paise per day per head. Between themselves they consumed Rs 34.7 crores of industrial goods.

Remember that the rural population is roughly four times the urban population.

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As one moves up along the scale of per capita annual consumer expenditure in this table (columns 2 and 4), one finds that, for both rural and urban, the figures goes up very sharply and suddenly when it comes to the richest 10 per cent of the population. Even within this top 10 per cent, the richer half is way above the other half in terms of per capita consumption (see sections 90-95 and 95-100 in cols. 2 and 4).

Now consider columns 3 and 5. The rural market for industrial consumer goods in 1960-61 was of the order of Rs 4,592 crores; whereas the urban market was only Rs 1,604 crores. The richest 10 per cent of the rural people consumed industrial goods of Rs 1,724 crores. In other words, *the richest 10 per cent of the rural people alone provide a much bigger market for industrial consumer goods than do all the urban people put together.* Of course, these are the people who also own more than 50 per cent of the agricultural land. No wonder, the big industrialists have found their best friends in the big landlords.

The richest 10 per cent of the rural population claimed 37.6 per cent of the entire rural market of industrial consumer goods; the richest 10 per cent of the urban population similarly accounted for 35.5 per cent of the urban market. Accordingly, these two groups together consumed 37 per cent of the total supply of industrial consumer goods in India in 1960-61.

Since then a decade has passed, and there are reasons to believe that these top 10 per cent have, if anything, increased their consumption of industrial consumer goods. In any case, their share is definitely not much below 40 per cent, if not well above it by now.

These top 10 per cent are a closely well-knit group; they are an exclusive club. Perhaps the same families have remained for a long time in this stratum; and, if necessary, they fight to the finish for staying here.

The entire industrial structure in India is geared primarily for serving

this elite group. And the agrarian relations are its supporting pillar.

India now is a country for this 10

per cent, while the remaining 90 per cent of its population is but a colony, only to be exploited with impunity.

Students And Society

N. DAS GUPTA

THE educationists of West Bengal are now cursing the dismal state of education here. The sanctity of the temples of learning has been violated by unruly students, who care a damn for *guru-bhakti*, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice and many other ideals which were a monopoly of India. The most lamentable thing is that examinations have been reduced to an ignoble farce through mass and free-style copying by students. Do not ask the doyens of higher education to invigilate in the examination halls and set a glorious example of heroic resistance. That would be sacrilegious. The common teachers must carry out their orders and bear the brunt of the job.

But is not the present state of education in West Bengal the inevitable and logical outcome of its colonial origin? This hotchpotch of bookish learning, a left-over from the garbage of British imperialism, was introduced for the middle class during the British rule. The Bengali *bhadralok* used it as a passport to white-collar jobs. Divorced from the socio-economic realities of the country, it helped to foster a slavish mentality and alienate us from the people. We inherited all the vices of the British bureaucracy minus its efficiency,—as every other autonomous institution in this country did. We know how the University of Calcutta was used as family property and how corruption and nepotism were rampant for a pretty long time. It never strove to inculcate the spirit of a national liberation movement and was comprador in every respect. With the sharpening of the economic crisis, this main prop of our middle class existence was badly shaken.

Has this picture fundamentally changed since independence? Why

should it? We have faithfully preserved the whole bureaucratic frame of administration as a glorious heritage. When Calcutta newspapers published the story of a Vice-Chancellor's son getting high marks in the matriculation examination (which he did not deserve) through utterly dishonest manipulation by some venerable professors, some foolish persons fondly hoped that those gentlemen along with the V.C. would be suitably dealt with. But ignoring all the barking with cool and calm composure, the authorities allowed them, of course with some minor adjustments, to remain. But they kicked out Dhirendraprasanna Sen, a clerk, from his job because he had helped to unearth that murky business and taken part in union activities. He fought against his dismissal for several years, but justice was denied to him. He died prematurely, a broken-hearted man. No educationists felt any qualms over that gross injustice.

The system of examining and marking answer papers is not only extremely sloppy, it is full of malpractices. In the past these were committed by a particular family or a few people. Now they have become widespread. But why should the high priests of learning bother about it? They have only to toe the line of the establishment, preach high ideals, flatter and serve the deities who wield power and move their pawns correctly in the game of self-aggrandizement. The sweet warmth of success will bridge the gulf between profession and practice, however sordid and mean. Yes, if you have been able to earn the favour of the establishment, you can indulge in anything with impunity.

And of course, to earn the favour

of the establishment, you must not raise any questions but watch the saturnalia of looting by the higher echelons of society with servile innocence and mute admiration. You must not ask why after the completion of the three five-year plans for building a "socialistic pattern of society" a fantastic amount of unproductive, black money has piled up in the hands of a few. You must not ask why, after 24 years of independence, the State has miserably failed to provide any security in respect of the bare necessities of life such as employment and medical treatment.

Everyone knows that our system of education is unproductive. But in the broader perspective of public welfare, what can be termed productive here? Society has become a stagnant, putrefying pool where only corruption and debauchery thrive. Is not the present chaotic state of education symptomatic of this society?

The students are now paying back their elders and teachers in their own coin, much to their horror. We want to overlook the fact that our society has been singularly successful in the democratisation of corruption. Why should not the students have their own quota of it? Born and bred in a totally debased society, they cannot lag behind in learning the rules of the holy game of success. They are only to procure degrees, no matter by what means. Recalling his experience of invigilation a few years ago, a friend, a college teacher, said that when he reprimanded an examinee (none will dare do so in these days of mass cribbing) for copying, he asked what else he could do since the society was rotten to the core. Well, he and his friends could have revolted against it. But that would have been sheer madness. Participation in the corruption of a debased society is easy and comfortable. The students and their guardians know that the rags of paper, euphemistically called diplomas, cannot fetch employment, but the craze for them is on the increase. Though badly mauled by the growing economic crisis, the ethos of the middle class still lingers. After all, are not

the degrees of higher education the ethnic sign of the bhadralok, the distinguishing mark which sets them apart from the illiterate toiling masses?

Book Review

BANGLA DESH : A STRUGGLE FOR NATIONHOOD. Mohammed Ayoob, Anirudha Gupta, Rahamatullah Khan, G. P. Deshpande, R. Narayanan, Sisir Gupta, *Vikas Publications, Delhi. Rs 20.*

THIS book is 'a result of the spontaneous reaction' of half a dozen scholars who sat down to write objectively about Bangla Desh when others were steeped in the shock and bewilderment of the war. The impulse behind this deviation from the normal outburst of sentimentality was the realization on the part of the authors "that the struggle for Bangla Desh is a milestone in the process of secularization and radicalization of politics in the subcontinent" and that "it epitomizes the forces at work in the entire third world".

The essays incorporated in the book were conceived in the first week of April, 1971 when events just began to unfold. In the context of time, the publication, therefore, appears premature. Handicapped by the human incapacity to foresee the future, the authors, writing as they did at the earliest stage of events, had to be speculative. It is true, as the authors say, that "the future of this subcontinent depends upon the right responses at the right time." To facilitate the right responses at the right time, the authors stepped forward at the wrong moment to catch an enraged bull by the horn.

The book consists of six essays. It is apparent from the title that it has addressed itself to upholding the brief of a struggling nationhood. To that end it is welcome. The authors have adopted the simple technique of looking at their problem from twin viewpoints, national and international. Two essays, 'Background

and Developments', 'Forms of Struggle', scrutinize the problem on a national level. Three others, 'Legal Aspects', 'Soviet and Chinese Stakes', 'American Response', have projected the problem in an international perspective. There is a third essay ('Issues and Prospects') which looks at the problem from both these viewpoints. Hence it is the final essay of the book.

The essays of the first group have no integration. The first essay (Backgrounds and Developments: Md. Ayoob) looks into the genesis of the present crisis. It has no pretension to go deep into the socio-economic problems. It concerns itself with the shifts and turns within the superstructure of Pakistan's body-politic. The equation between the executive and the representative institutions, the political relation between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan, the character of the anti-Ayub agitation and the regime's response to it, the attempt made by the military regime under Yahya Khan to stabilize the situation and its results—these are some of the questions which the author seeks to explain. There is no reference to history and tradition which account for the antithetical ways of two societies within the same oecumenical community of Islam. There is a faint attempt to uphold the traditional concepts of economic disparity between the two wings. But its spirit is lost in a maze of sophisticated calculations. The author speaks of the irrecocilability of the aspirations of the Bengali middle class who clamoured for participation in power and the combination of the Urdu-speaking zamindari elite and the professional middle class who monopolized power. But how this comes about is nowhere explained. Since the author has not explained the production relations in the ruffled society of Pakistan, his tract is little more than a catalogue of the political antecedents to the present crisis.

The second essay (Forms of Struggle: Anirudha Gupta) discusses the prospects of the movement. Its range is vast, from actual happenings

to anticipations about the future. The author analyses four sets of problems: (i) the Civil Disobedience Movement of Sheikh Mujib. Under this head he sums up the experiences of the movement prior to the military crack-down; (ii) Spontaneous revolt. The title shows that the author follows the massive reaction of the people once the coercive power of the state descended upon them. (iii) Protracted war. At this point the author embarks upon speculation about the course of the war (iv) Issues and Alternatives. Under this heading the author gives his own generalisations. This is a postscript to the author's study of the actual and prospective development in Pakistan.

The essay stands on an internal paradox. The author admits at the beginning that there was 'complete blackout of news' about Pakistan. About his first problem he writes: "To put these questions in their proper setting it is necessary to review the sequence of events from 3 March. Quite obviously one's focus should be on the personality of Mujibur Rahman and, secondly, on the structure of the Awami League as a political party. Unfortunately, on neither we have sufficient data". Again about his third problem he says: "Here again the problem is one of obtaining true facts. As we have noted, no source of information can be given absolute credence: the Pakistan radio blacked out all news about the resistance, the freedom fighters claimed unbelievable victories, the Indian press and radio seized on every thing as news which originated from rumour or gossip."

Thus, equipped with no means to bridge the 'credibility gaps' in source materials, the article goes in for premature speculation about a massive revolution.

Given what it is, the essay still has its sanity. Writing at a time when there was a dangerous explosion of mass sentiment, the author did not lose his reason. Some questions he posed [for example (i) Can a spontaneous resistance last long? (ii) How did the Awami League

leaders prepare the people for an eventuality which in Sheikh Mujib's own words meant 'fighting to the last man'? (iii) Why did Mujib adopt an attitude which pushed his men to an open confrontation with the martial law administration?] were radical if one thinks of the time when they were raised, a time when sentiments reigned supreme. In spite of its failures this essay deserves credit because it did not fall in line with those massive products of unreason and sentiment with which we are so familiar.

'Not Civil Strife'

The second group of essays have greater integration. The first essay (Legal Aspects: Rahamatullah Khan) deals with a number of international law concepts that have been put to test over the struggle for national liberation of Bangla Desh. The author has pinned down the opinions of jurists and legalists, from Oppenheim to Hall and Lauterpacht, on questions of recognition, civil strife (i.e. what we call 'internal affair'), intervention and finally the competence of the U.N. So many people have said so much about them that there is no scope for originality. True, where international experts speak, learners have to be silent. Mr Khan is judicious enough not to pass his own judgment over the issues. Nevertheless he deserves praise because he has provided us with a short-cut to the classical authors. That apart, the entire essay holds brief for those who raised the cry for recognition. Written about the beginning of April, it shows that the mind of the author was not free from the contagion of mass sentiments about Bangla Desh. He systematically fought the notion that the present crisis is a civil strife (i.e. an internal affair of Pakistan). His emphatic assertion is that "the situation in Bangla Desh cannot be considered as one of civil strife under international law." From this his logical next step is to prove that it is a war of national liberation. He writes: "Having argued that the situation in Bangla Desh cannot be pi-

geon-holed into the traditional concept of a civil strife under international law, how do we identify it? The nearest approximation... is to the newly developed institution of wars of national liberation." The syllogism will be incomplete if from this he could not conclude that "Bangla Desh qua state fulfils the elementary criteria required under international law for recognition." Thus the author, writing as he did at the opening of events when evidence was not sufficient (as Mr Anirudha Gupta said) to build up a brief for any claim, has amply served the sentiment of the Indian people. With his partisan attitude he stands isolated from the company of his friends who carefully maintained their objectivity and detachment.

The two other essays of the second group (Soviet and Chinese Stakes: G. P. Deshpande and American Response: R. Narayanan) are complementary to each other. The authors have tried to foresee the prospective pattern of tripartite response of the three super-powers to this addition to the existing complex of Asian problems. The subject is a material one and of great moment. The authors have tried to look at things before the curtain was fully lifted. Consequently their venture is rebuffed by the absence of clarity and soundness of facts. They have their own method of inference but in the absence of facts it is little more than a logic of speculation.

Mr Deshpande writes at the beginning that "For the first time the peasant of this sub-continent is being involved in an armed struggle for independence". This is wishful. Until recently no attempt was made to arm the peasants. The rate at which people fled and died is evidence that in the absence of armed preparedness they were in the passive position of self-defence leaving the more dynamic initiative of offence to the enemy. The idea that the entire people would be drawn into the struggle and transformed into a fighting militia over a short span of time without previous training and organisation (a fact up-

held by Anirudha Gupta) must be called a pipe-dream.

Of the Chinese stand, he says: "China's formulations about the international situation revolve round US imperialism and Soviet social imperialism'. . . In plain terms, it means that China views the world situation primarily in terms of a duopoly of super powers in today's world. China has been kept out of the world system mainly because she refuses to accept this duopoly." Such an observation is much too sweeping. To view the world situation in terms of a duopoly of super-powers is to negate the revolutionary role of the suffering but progressive masses all over the globe. The concept of dual management of world affairs, so common with the bourgeois intellectuals of the West like Morgenthau, Hartmann, Organsky and the like, has no meaning for China. This is proved by the ping-pong diplomacy and the recent developments in Sino-American relations. China views the world situation by one and only one criterion, namely the struggle between revolution and reaction. In his famous speech of May 20, 1970, Mao Tse-tung said: "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs". He reminded us that "revolution is the main trend in the world today". (*Peking Review*, January 1, 1971). The January 1, 1971 editorial in *Renmin Ribao*, *Hongqi* and *Jiefangjun Bao* said the revolutionary situation is developing faster than was expected. The further sharpening of the basic contradictions in the contemporary world and the aggression, oppression and control of the people of various countries by U.S. imperialism and social imperialism are impelling hundreds of millions of people to rise in revolution. As we have seen, the revolutionary struggles of the people of various countries against foreign aggression are merging with their revolutionary struggles against domestic reactionaries. The national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America are co-ordinating with the revolutionary mass mo-

vements in Europe, North America and Oceania." "We will persistently fulfil out proletarian internationalist obligations, firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries and learn from them, and together with them we will fight to the finish to defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs and oppose modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism at its centre and the reactionaries of all countries."

This is the avowed stand of China in world politics, but it has been misunderstood by Mr Deshpande. He seems to be familiar with Chinese thinking and their ideas. That makes it all the more bizarre that he should have thought that China has confounded in her stand over Pakistan.

Mr Narayanan too, studying American response, falls short of expectations. He analyzes the reactions of the press, the elite and the government to the present crisis. Massive facts have been marshalled in this tract but the conclusions are mild and ineffectual. The author is happy that the press and the elite of America proved responsive but he is careless as to what they were sensitive to and what they upheld. All of them talked about the aspirations of the Bengalis, their sufferings and coercion. Some raised a faint voice against the American softness for Pakistan. But none of them drove home the fact that the people of this sub-continent have been subject to tyranny for long and that they are now united for violent seizure of power. As S.R. said in his analysis of the role of the Indian and foreign press in *Frontier* of July 26: "Why call these papers and journals reactionary? Because they have played upon the communal sentiments of the people, harping on their religious and regional differences; because they have failed to drive home the fact that the current strife in East Bengal is the result of the exploitation of one class by another, of the people by the feudal landlords and comprador bourgeoisie backed by their imperialist superiors. . . ." (P. 11).

If we remember this we cannot go

into raptures over the role of the American press or of the elite. However, one point may be said in favour of the present author. He has provided us with indisputable evidence about the growing public opinion in America against her imperialistic role in world politics. "The world people's struggle against U.S. imperialism is linked with the struggle of the American people against Nixon's reactionary rule" (1971 New Year's Day Editorial quoted above). Unwittingly the author has brought to light much evidence in support of this view.

The last article (Issues and Prospects: Sisir Gupta) is a typical evidence of premature writing. It discusses four problems: (i) the strength of the people's movement and its prospective orientations; (ii) prospective repercussions of the recent movement on the political-economic structure of West Pakistan; (iii) reactions of world communities; (iv) India's official reactions.

Considering the time of publication one will wonder why the author chose these topics as his subject. Any such study at that time had to be speculative. In the absence of first-hand information any attempt to resolve these problems could not but yield mediocre, common-place observations. The very title of the essay shows its speculative character and the very first sentence shows its limitations. "It is too early to analyze all the implications of the emergence of Bangla Desh as a sovereign independent state". Yet Mr Gupta foresees "four important variables" that will shape developments in Bangla Desh and thereupon he proceeds "to analyze some of the possible developments in all these four areas". Political scientists must be concerned with realities; the right of passing judgment over possible developments had better be left to seers. Moreover, some of the problems posed overlap with those presented earlier.

It is surprising that a treatise, which the book is, on an emerging nationhood should have ignored some of the fundamental aspects, namely

the nature of society and the system of production that led to this crisis, the character of the leadership and its role in the movement, participation of the people in the conflict and the place of the present movement in the story of modern revolutions. No attempt has been made to analyze the sentiments of the Indian people who are falling victims to the influence of corrupt mass media, and the official attitude of our Government on which depends our ultimate fate. Yet the book is valuable because it gives an insight on how Indian intellectuals look at 'the whole process of nation-building... in most parts of Asia and Africa'.

R.S.

Clippings

Rene Dumont On Ceylon

ISLAND of splendour, ancient civilisation, smiling people, non-violent Buddhists: these are all, from now on, past images. Ceylon, "independent" in 1948, inherited a colonial export economy; first tea, then rubber and coconut. Her British-type democracy is only a caricature of the original. For the past twenty-three years the power has alternated between two powerful families: Senanayake, father and son for the right; Bandaranaike, the husband and then the widow, after the former was assassinated, for the "left".

The inverted commas here are indispensable. At the end of May 1970, Mrs Bandaranaike's party, the Sinhalese version of the Labour Party, won the elections in alliance with the pro-Soviet communists and "Trotskyists"—whom I would rather refer to as tropical social democrats. These are the "Brown Sahibs", brown masters who have put on the boots of the "White Sahibs", white masters who in every case do the governing. The particularly parasitic and privileged bourgeoisie of the establishment

has its sumptuary character clearly shown up by the extravagant weddings held in Colombo's big hotels.

The 1940 to 1945 wartime rice rationing was carried forward as either a subsidised or free ration, of one or two measures per week according to the period. It was by promising "two measures" that Mrs Bandaranaike returned to power in 1970, the ration having been reduced to one measure by her rivals in 1966.

Free education, but three-fourths of the students who hardly know English enter the Faculty of Arts, and these degrees take them straight to unemployment: there are already more than 10,000 unemployed.

Free Rice, even for the rice cultivator; thereby discouraging production. Nevertheless, two-thirds of Ceylon's rice consumption is produced locally against half, twelve years ago. This is thanks to the selected types of rice grown during the "Green Revolution". Self-sufficiency in rice is expected by 1976, but because of the present policy this realisation will have to wait till 1980.

Free Water for irrigation, but in the dry East zone irrigation network, the settlers from the very wet south-west region, refuse any sort of irrigation discipline, using three times more water than is necessary.

Free Medical Services, this has accelerated the population explosion, without the all important development measures to meet this.

...This is neither socialism nor democracy because it ends up by having 600,000 unemployed people, and as many semi-unemployed who are very under-employed, in an active population of 4.3 million. The employed working class is represented by trade unions, which are affiliated to various left parties. Up to now, the unemployed, the students with no prospects, the unemployed graduates, the peasants of the oppressed castes, or those on the lands monopolized as tea plantations, have had no representatives.

A young Sinhalese medical student, Rohan Wijeweera, on his return from Lumumba University, Moscow,

joined the pro-Chinese communist party; but in 1965, together with other young communists who had left the pro-Soviet party, he founded the JVP, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, or People's Liberation Front. From this time on many of the left youth became disappointed with the old customary attitude. Many were from the rural middle class, already quite poor; a secondary, if not higher education, led them into unemployment (the majority are between the ages of fifteen and twenty and are mostly rural youths). Till 1970, the Front won its followers from the mass of students and Sinhala Buddhist peasants, by glorifying the past, protesting against the invasion of Western culture and dependence on imperialism, and by calling themselves "Marxist patriots".

From 1969, the pro-Soviet communists branded this secret organisation of youth, trained in guerilla warfare, by declaring in their daily paper the "Attha" that it was organised and financed by the C.I.A. The pro-Chinese on the other hand criticised the theses of Guevara and Debray whom the JVP hold in esteem. However, this movement recruited militants from amongst both the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese parties. At the beginning of 1970, the rightist government began its repression against these "terrorists"; their leader Rohan Wijeweera was arrested in April. In the days that immediately followed, pamphlets and posters demanding his release were found all over the country, revealing to an amazed general public the strength of the JVP.

The JVP, however, supported the traditional left which won the elections in May 1970. This "left" soon got busy and gave all the available jobs to their election agents. They disbanded the "land army" of 10,000 who were employed on jungle clearing, simply because they had been recruited by the former government. This sacking added 10,000 more to the unemployed. Vast plans are being drawn up to give fresh employment, by the top-heavy British-

inherited bureaucracy cannot give any real impulse to development. Discontentment grows all around, the JVP organises meetings which attract crowds of 10,000 to 15,000 attentive listeners.

On the 27th February, 1971, at a meeting at Hyde Park, Colombo, which was extremely well attended, Wijeweera declared his politics: With one hand we helped to bring this government into power which calls itself socialist. With both hands we helped to bring this government into power which calls itself socialist. With both hands we are willing to help it in its march to socialism. With the same hands we shall strangle it, if it refuses socialism. If we are illegalised we shall start the revolution." The government's reply was to accentuate its repressive measures. On the 16th March, 1971, a state of emergency was declared. Under the emergency the police, usually brutal, were given powers to arrest anybody, detain him for fifteen days without producing him before a magistrate, to burn, to bury or to dispose of the body (thus to kill) without showing the corpse to a doctor.

A short time afterwards, an explosion at the Peradeniya University revealed the extent of the military preparations; thousands of hand bombs, Molotov cocktails, and the documents found led to many more arrests. Decapitated and decimated sections of the JVP decided to go into attack sooner than foreseen. Perhaps they were pushed into it by the CIA who undoubtedly urged the government to repression. Others say that they were encouraged by the Russians who were afraid that pro-Chinese elements may one day come to power in Ceylon. On the night of the 5th to the 6th April, the JVP militants attacked twenty-five police stations all over the island. They seized arms and took control of important zones. Frantic, the government tightened the repression. The police took advantage of this to decimate the youth of all the left move-

ments, including that which supports the government.

From the Victoria Bridge, I saw corpses floating down the river which flows through the north of the capital, with hundreds of immobile on-lookers. This was on the 13th April. The police who had killed these people, let the bodies float with the current, in order to terrorize the people. The "Trotskyist" and pro-Soviet communists, if they really had a revolutionary policy, could have condemned the repression, come

much earlier to an agreement with the JVP youth, and the movement would have taken a completely different form. But instead they have become the "good managers of the bourgeois State". An alliance between the leftists in the government, the "Trotskyists" and the communists with these young people on a common programme could have changed the face of things...

(Rene Dumont in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Paris).

Theatre Of Purpose

BY A DRAMA CRITIC

IN Utpal Dutt's *Thikana* the curtain rises on the carnage-ridden town of Manickganj in East Bengal during the fateful days of April when Yahya Khan's military junta unleashed a reign of terror. The upper-class leaders are on the run but the people's guerillas have taken over and a new chapter in the war of liberation has begun. The authorities try to gloss over their cowardice by making a case of sabotage out of an ordinary suicide by a weak-minded Baluch lieutenant and hold six innocent citizens as hostages, who are to be shot if the real culprit does not surrender within three days. Among these people is Rashida Khatun who acts as liaison between different guerilla groups and she has a vital address to be handed over to the local resistance workers. Ultimately she succeeds in doing so and at the end, as the prisoners face the firing squad, the freedom fighters blow up a military train.

After the introduction of the locale and characters is over, the play tends to operate on two levels. On one level, there is the documentary portrayal of the liberation movement done with a simple and direct approach, and on the other, there is a more intricate picture, a clinical examination of the mental condition of six prisoners awaiting death. They

are from different walks of life: an industrialist, a psychoanalyst, an actor, an ordinary clerk, an unaffected child and last but not the least the garrulous Rashida Bibi, each having his or her own peculiar characteristics and complexes. The industrialist cannot reconcile himself to his fate and fails to rise above his class prejudice; the actor is not able to make an adjustment between the realities in and outside theatre and tries to live up to his theatrical roles even in his daily life; the clerk has a guilt on his conscience; Rashida Bibi refuses to submit to the destined doom and cheers them all with funny tales; the child looks at all these with wide-eyed innocence and the psychoanalyst acts as the detached observer and records his experiences. Some of these background stories are told in flashbacks. The director has attempted to fuse these two parts into an organic whole, but his interesting experiments have not always been effective, although there are flashes of brilliance, as in the first interrogation sequence when the characters come trotting on the stage and face the spotlight while a faceless voice asks the routine questions and the grinding horror of the dictatorship at once becomes apparent. There are also a few moments of tension between the characters inside the pri-

son cell where the director's deep insight into the psychological issues is also evident. The lighting and the decor help to create the atmosphere without calling for the usual stage gimmicks. The artistes are generally competent, specially Samir Majumder as the industrialist with his mock courage and Satya Banerjee as the sedate psychologist. Utpal Dutt's Pakistani Colonel is a kind of mellowed-down Rattray, but it is Sova Sen who tops them all by her astounding performance as Rashida Bibi.

In *Tiner Talaraw*, Utpal Dutt goes back to the 19th century theatre-world and recreates the past with fascinating embellishments. We meet the mad people, the incandescent people, the people living in the unreal world behind the footlights, dishing out melodrama, soap-opera and turgid farce catering to the decadent Baboo culture. They survive on illusions and live by manipulations, bluffs and often by plain cheating. They are a sad lot, a bunch of lovable scoundrels. Captain Babu is one such stage producer who is at a loss to find a heroine because the leading lady has been ruled away by another group. He finds Moyna, a pick-up from the gutter, and trains her to be a fine actress. One almost suspects the Pygmalion touch or the familiar breed of the Hollywood success story, but luckily the analogy is not stretched further. From this point, the play acquires a new dimension. In this enclosed world, the outside vibrations cause a flutter and the people start looking beyond their immediate surroundings. Priyonath Mallik, young fellow drunk with the revolutionary ideas of the Bengal renaissance, comes into the theatre and all the people get contaminated by his zeal. His is the idea of a new type of theatre, a theatre harnessed to people's cause, a theatre disseminating nationalistic ideals. Moyna falls in love with Priyonath and together they map out a life of their own. But destiny decrees otherwise. The lecherous theatre-owner takes Moyna as mistress and Captain Babu sacrifices the girl in lieu of a transfer of owner-

ship. Priyonath leaves the stage and the production of *Titumir* with its patriotic theme is banned. Captain Babu suffers a serious crisis of conscience, but recovers himself heroically on the stage when suddenly by a stroke of magic he changes himself from Nimchand to Titumir. The whole crew is electrified into action and as the choral singers appear on the stage invoking the spirit of freedom, the hour of Captain Babu's final redemption is near. The elevating finale has the effect of a holy absolution.

The play is free from the usual banalities of situation and stock one-dimensional characterisation which vitiate Utpal Dutt's dramatic writings (of course, one should be fair

enough to admit that all these deficiencies are generally more than made up by the excellence of his productions), and its austere pattern is its beauty. The technical gadgets, mainly the revolving stage, are put to the most creative use. The characters emerge logically out of their environments and the period reconstruction is highly revocative. The acting style is a fine specimen of comic stylisation and all the artistes have the gusto and the fervour required to bring alive the larger-than-life entity of a theatricalised existence. All kudos, of course, for Utpal Dutt for his magnificent direction and his powerful rendering of the character of Captain Babu, remarkable for the fine blending of broad comedy with subtle emotional patches.

Letters

What Is Public Response ?

Your comment (August 21) that "public response to their (Naxals) liquidation... is usually limited and no mass sympathy is seen, in view perhaps of their killing of individuals", seems to be the typical reaction of a lonely good man to whom sometimes appearance is reality. May I know who constitute your 'public', what machinery you have to feel their 'response' to a certain event and what kind of 'response' do you expect? How you think should be 'mass sympathy' ventilated or exercised?

As an editor, you have to your credit a good number of years' editorial experience. Not to talk of Naxalite activities, have you analysed the so-called 'public response' to the steady spiralling of prices for the entire present decade or the tremendous volume of retrenchment and lay-offs every now and then or growing poverty and bankruptcy of the rural people as a result of increasing exploitation in the wake of economic crisis?

Middle-class politician-cum-swindlers arrange massive demonstrations

or organise 'bandhs' but with what result? The agents of vested interests are successful in putting up their 'elected representatives' to cheat the people or to pose as the most popular people of the country. When the Naxals started to expose the utter falsity of this parliamentary drama, the Government with its entire arsenal of repression replied with a programme of calculated murder of the Naxalite cadres. All other parties including the CPM acted as political cohorts against those heroic people. Under such circumstances, public response to liquidation of Naxalites can express itself only in more people entering their ranks. Whether this has been taking place, I do not know. Only we know that more than twelve thousand cadres of the CPI (ML) are in jail or dead. The party has not yet suspended its work. It is still operating throughout West Bengal. May I know from you, which party in India indulging in 'mass demonstrations' and having a so-called 'mass base' has twelve thousand cadres dedicating their lives in this way? Do

you think that the people of our country are blind, they do not understand the significance of these sacrifices? You, the lonely good intellectual, always believe in appearance—in television, not in starvation in the countryside. You believe that there should have been Mujibar-planned mass-suicide against the Pakistan army on the 25th March—something massive to satisfy the middle-class image of revolution. Unfortunately for you people, they (Naxals) promised no middle-class revolution although in their ranks there are many middle-class youths. You can also find out from amongst middle-class people how many are their supporters who cannot express sympathy with their cause and actions because the whole State machinery of repression is there to beat up, maim or arrest them.

For example, though I extend moral support to their cause, I do nothing except get agitated and feel hateful to every worm of this rotten society while doing everything with an air of conformity. Everyday I learn of their death, read the news of their murder by the political and other hired henchmen of the Establishment. Everyday we hear monumental lies against the Naxals spread by all the political swindlers from Indira to Jyoti Basu. My blood boils when these scoundrels talk of the people, of the East Bengal people, and shed crocodile tears for them while at the same time encouraging planned extermination of Bengali youths dedicating their lives for a revolutionary cause. What, sir, is the dictionary meaning of genocide?

I do not know whether you know people like me. I do not know whether you see our hearts bleeding and crying for vengeance against the police-CRP-CPM-Congress slaughter of the finest sons of Bengal—the Naxals.

A SUPPORTER OF THE CPI(ML)
Calcutta

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China And Pakistan

Mr Phani Bhusan Ghosh's letter "China And Pakistan" (August 21) demands a rejoinder. His accusation against your journal of maintaining "a calculated and mysterious silence about the tragedy that has overtaken millions... who have had to take shelter in India (where butchering of revolutionaries inside and outside is an everyday phenomenon in piecetime —An.) to avoid being butchered..."; is baseless because your paper has published many an *objective* (not manufactured) and analytical reportage about the subject. But will Mr Ghosh kindly explain why millions of peasants, artisans, shopkeepers and workers are fleeing, instead of carrying both the gun and the plough, from a country for whose right to self-determination they themselves voted? What kind of people's awrr is this and who are responsible for this sorry state of affairs? While sharing the emotion of Mr Ghosh, I must point out that in global policy matters, one should be guided not by emotion but by cold scientific logic. A popular struggle in any part of the world, however just, must be analysed in the perspective of the world anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle in order to foresee the future. If by the standard of judgment, the partial struggle contradicts the anti-imperialist cause in its totality that means that the struggle is premature. Moreover, irrespective of justness and unjustness, no socialist country should poke its nose into internal struggles in other countries with which it has normal state and relations. This is one of the basic five principles of Leninist peaceful co-existence. All such interference smacks of neo-colonialism (and social-imperialism). Look at the military assistance given to the Ceylon Government by Kremlin, New Delhi, Washington and London, to suppress the armed people's struggle for real liberation from poverty. Does this assistance conform to the *Pancha Sheel*? As for tears which Mr Ghosh wants *Frontier* to shed has it not been flowing more than enough from precisely the enemy camp—from the U.S.

marauders in Vietnam, the British colonialists fighting a colonial war in the British Kalimantan, the Bonn neo-fascists, all the factions of our good old Congress in conjunction with the Swatantra, Jana Sangh and the RSS of Guru Golwalkar? What is the use of dropping some more *genuine* tear drops in this ocean of crocodile tears? The weeping U.S. has already sent eight shiploads of lethals to Yahya egging him to launch another adventure against Kashmir. And who armed Islamabad with the bombers, cannons, tanks, rocket-launchers (Russian) gunboats, napalm etc. which are still being used in East Bengal. No, Mr Ghosh it was not China. The obsolete-arms-traders were U.S. neo-colonialism, Kremlin Social-imperialism and British imperialism. China does not trade in arms but gives it to countries fighting against imperialism and its puppets in other countries, as in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia etc.

China will not officially, I repeat officially, utter any adverse comment against Islamabad as long as there are normal friendly relations on State level as the Soviet Government did not officially attack the Hitlerite atrocities in Germany during the Non-Aggression Pact period. China will and must do everything to foil the imperialist (of all shades) plot of completely encircling China. It is clear from the very beginning, from the Awami League leadership's open appeal for intervention addressed to the imperialist governments of the West and the semi-colonial dual satellite Government of India, that it fears more a popular struggle for liberation than imperialism. Their aim has been to wrest, by pressure politics substantial power from the semi-colonial ruling West. Pakistan bourgeoisie for the Bengali bourgeoisie of the eastern wing—itsself a colony of the semi-colony, the latter having as its prompter, imperialism. But even then winning of autonomy by the Eastern wing will surely be a step forward towards liberation. Here lies another reason for China's silence. The struggle as conducted by the Awami League leadership does

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not and cannot have any anti-imperialist content. Rather the contrary. It cannot, because in this third stage of world capitalist crisis (the dollar crisis is the first symptom) the bourgeoisie will never lead any real anti-imperialist liberation struggle because they know that success of such struggles would inevitably lead not to bourgeois rule but People's Democracy. This truth was reflected in Stalin's brief speech at the 19th Congress of the CPSU. He observed: "Formerly the bourgeoisie was considered the head of the nation, it championed the rights and independence of the nation, placing them 'above everything'. Now not a trace remains of the 'national principle'... Now the bourgeoisie sells the rights and independence of the nation for dollars. The banner of national independence and national sovereignty has been thrown overboard..."

The Awami League leadership is no exception.

China's willingness to negotiate with America, her avowed enemy, to normalise mutual relations is certainly guided by "self-interest" (i.e. defence) but it is not "narrow". Did not the Soviet Government agree to negotiate with Roosevelt in 1933 at an initiative from Roosevelt himself? Did not Lenin sign the ignoble Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with avowed enemies? Did not the Soviet Government negotiate the Non-Aggression Pact with its most avowed enemy the German Nazi Government? China has agreed to negotiate on her own terms—complete U.S. military evacuation from Indochina and Taiwan and recognition of the PRC only. The Roosevelt-Kalinin-Molotov conference took place when the second economic crisis of world capitalism shook the USA and the recognition by the USA of the USSR saved the USA from the crisis. Today Nixon does not see any way out of the third crisis other than recognition of China and doing brisk trade with her. And China too wants to take this opportunity to split the Kremlin-Washington-New Delhi bloc which will mean a respite for China, peace in Asia and relaxation of world

tension. As for the self-interest of the huge socialist country, this interest (defence) coincides with that of the toilers of the whole world. Does Mr Ghosh want China to be vulnerable and defeated?

Mr Ghosh should know that nations and nationalism arose along with the emergence of the bourgeoisie just as the state as the organ of suppression of one class by another was born along with the splitting of society into mutually antagonistic classes. Today when the bourgeoisie is heading for total collapse, its companion—nationalism—too has to give way to internationalism.

ANALYST

Will They Return ?

Mr Ashim Mukhopadhyay's "Will They Return?" (July 31) contains a number of gross factual errors and misleading interpretation of economic trends leading to dubious political theorizing.

1. "...more than 36% of the agricultural population is landless". The true figure is less than half, i.e. 17.2%, according to the 1961 Population Census. No later information is available for East Pakistan (EP) as a whole.

(1, vol. II, table 51).

2. Ashim Mukhopadhyay (AM) writes, "In EP there are 6.5 million holdings of which 80% families own less than 3 acres" on page 6 and "of those who possess land 80% have less than 3 acres" on page 7.

(a) AM should not have used interchangeably "own" and "possess" as these two words have quite different meanings;

(b) According to the Agricultural Census of 1960 just 54% of *all rural families* possessed 2.3 acres of land or less. The next size group, each holding 2.51 to 5 acres of land per family, constituted another 25%. Hence 80% of rural families held 5 acres or less. (2). Under EP condition the difference between 3 and 5 acres is not a minor one.

3. Between 1965-60 and 1968

"yield per acre of rice declined from 12.1 maunds to 11.3 maunds". The reverse is true; the yield actually rose from 10.1 to 12.1 maunds over the period. [3, pp. 1960-9].

4. AM is wrong in trying to show a continuous fall in per capita availability of foodgrains in EP. His figure for 1965-66 is incorrect; the true one is 16 oz/day [7] which is higher than AM's figure of 15.82 oz/day in 1948. So far no clear-cut trend over time can be discerned.

5. Jute yield did fall to the extent indicated by AM; but he should not have passed over in silence that acreage rose by nearly 60% and production by 14%. [3, pp 1968-9] Is it possible that the yield fell due to the cultivation of jute in less suitable areas?

6. AM writes on page 7: "The combined effects of intensive use of fertilisers, improved seeds and expansion of tubewell irrigation brought about by Government support and incentive since early 1967, have transformed West Pakistan from a deficit to a surplus region in terms of foodgrains".

(a) Does it imply since early 1967 W. Pakistan has a foodgrains surplus? If so, AM is wrong. In the fiscal year July 1967 to June 1968 W. Pakistan was a net importer of foodgrains to the extent of Rs 25.2 crores while EP's net imports amounted to Rs 21.5 crores. Our figures take into account the interwinding trade as well. On a per capita basis WP imported much more than EP. [5].

(b) If our interpretation of the passage above is wrong, may we have an alternative with some supporting evidence?

7. By a misleading selection of years and crops AM gives a grossly exaggerated picture of agricultural progress in WP at annual rates varying from 8% in some to 40% in other cases. If we are to trust official statistics, average annual growth-rate of WP agriculture was 3.8% in the first half and 5.5% in the second half of the last decade; the corresponding rates were 3% and 3.1% for EP.

[6]. These figures are, however, contested by thoughtful economists in Pakistan and abroad; according to another highly reliable estimate, the annual growth rates of agricultural products between 1960-61 and 1967-68 were 4.6% for WP and 2.1% for EP. While the difference is substantial, it is not as spectacular as AM represents it.

8. The rapid fall in the share of agriculture in the GNP of EP from 50.3% in 1956-60 to 45.8% in 1968 was rightly noted by AM. But his interpretation is questionable. As such the fall in agriculture's share is generally welcomed by all economists, bourgeois or socialist. Indeed, the decline in EP was caused not so much by the poor performance of agriculture as by the higher tempo of industrial development, specially in the latter half of the 1960s; during these years the growth rates in manufacturing were 9.5% in EP against 5.8% in WP [6]. Between 1948 and 1966 factory employment in the two wings increased respectively by 200% and 166% [4]. From this it would be wrong again to conclude that the WP rulers were of late doing their utmost to industrialize EP.

It would be tedious to go on with further examples of statistical errors and logical flaws in AM's position. I would not have gone into these at all had I not entertained certain basic misgivings about the implicit politico-economic reasoning of AM and a host of other well-meaning critics of the Yahya regime. The revolt in EP was not born out of sheer desperation with their stomachs getting emptier each passing year. Conversely, by overplaying the economic "miracle" in WP without mentioning the stagnant, if not worsening, living standards of the vast majority of workers, petty traders, urban lower middle classes,

the rural proletariat and small farmers, AM and his like unwittingly echo the false propaganda of the Ayub-Yahya regimes. More importantly, their analyses point to a *national contradiction* between the peoples of EP and WP; in reality the common people are almost equally exploited in the two wings for the benefit of the WP ruling classes, their imperialist overlords in the USA, etc and their henchmen in EP.

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C. N.
Calcutta

Striking Power

The striking power of the Indian Air Force has, it is said, increased by 30% after introduction of the latest scientific techniques of maintenance (*The Statesman*, August 4 1971). The following day the *Times of India* (Bombay) virtually rejected the tall claim.

The claim can possibly have three grounds: Recent Americanisation of the air force uniform; that the Air Force chief has recently received the 'Legion of Merit' from the U.S. Government; and it has gained active experience in anti-guerilla helicopter operations in Ceylon.

Since the 1965 Indo-Pak war the Indian Armed Forces have endowed themselves with an aura. Khemkaren has been painted as the 'grave yard of Pattons'. But how many know that Chowinda was the 'grave yard of Indian tanks'? From the authoritative Institute of Strategic Studies (London) annual publication in 1966 we know: the Pakistan Army's casualties were "3000—5000 men" and "over 250 tanks"; whereas India's

were "4000—6000 men" and "up to 300 tanks".

Our Gnats were nicknamed 'Sabre-killer' and even a commemorative stamp was issued. But the crux of the issue is whether the Indian Air Force attained air superiority or not. ISS (London) reports that Pakistan lost 'up to 50 aircraft' and India 'about 50 aircraft'. Numerically India lost more planes than Pakistan. India's loses were mostly on ground. This conclusively proves that the Indian Air Force failed to achieve and exercise air superiority even over Indian airspace, not to talk of Pakistan airspace.

If another war breaks out, it is the people who will suffer. Today we bear the cost of maintenance of refugees. Tomorrow it will be cost of maintenance of more refugees + cost of the war.

ALO KAR
Calcutta

Instant Result

A week before the announcement of the Central Budget all brands of baby food had vanished from Jiaganj, in Murshidabad district. A few shops where they were still available had been charging exorbitantly high prices for them. Then one morning a few posters appeared in the marketplace: "Black-marketeers of baby food are enemies of the people. Hence their only punishment is DEATH—CPI(ML)". Within a day or two, all the brands reappeared and were sold at normal prices. The result, which could not be attained by the 'socialistic' speeches of our 'great' Prime-Minister, or by the threats of the 'progressive' police authorities, was achieved by a few posters.

D.C.
Jiaganj

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think !

By talking of Bandhs
Are we helping Bangla Desh evacuees?
Are we helping vigilance on the borders?
Is this not exactly what
the enemy would like us to do?

think

