

# frontier

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## A FAMOUS VICTORY

THE West Pakistani army in East Bengal has put up a miserable performance so far. The vast distance from the west, disruption of supplies and the demoralisation that comes from the fact that it has almost no support among the Bengalis whom it gave a terrible time are the principal reasons for the debacle. These would have taken time to mature and contribute to the defeat. The Indian army, acting with clocklike precision in collaboration with the Mukti Bahini, has hastened the process—and complicated it. It is the beginning, not the end of a chapter.

A military defeat of such magnitude involving directly some 70,000 troops whose families are far away and fretting will have major repercussions in West Pakistan, even if the war on that front ends in a stalemate. It would have brought about the collapse of the regime if the political opposition there were strong—had it been strong enough, Pakistan would have continued to exist. What is more likely is a tremendous hardening of attitude over the dismemberment of Pakistan—the grievance over Kashmir is nothing compared to the loss of East Bengal—and the creation of a revengeful, Israeli-type army with massive foreign aid, preparing and ever ready for a lightning war on one front. In the east also, since there is no chance of a major detente with China, the Indian army will continue to have an uneasy time, despite the Russian umbrella.

On the political front, will all be quiet in East Bengal after the fall of Dacca and the installation of the Bangladesh Government? There will be middle-class bitterness over the distribution of spoils. There is contradiction between those who fought and those who had an easy time in exile; between those who fled the country and those who had the guts to stay on and fight; between those civilians, with Indian super-officers who are preparing to take over this rich land and those who could not leave the government but helped the local fighters; between Indian capitalists with their formidable resources and the indigenous entrepreneurs. There is also the politico-military front. Not all those who took up arms will hand them over to the government or the Indian army. They have tasted, in a limited way, the power that comes out of the barrel of a gun. And there are armed people who do not look upon the Indians as liberators.

A period of imbalance on this sub-continent has started, even if one

leaves out the implications of immediate manoeuvres to help Pakistan. The fact that despite the official announcement that all Pakistani planes in the east have been accounted for, the total blackout in large areas of West Bengal will continue is symbolical of the uncertainty, anxiety and unease that will dog the authorities even after a famous victory in East Bengal.

## Wires And Poles

Whenever India tries to look up, economically and spiritually, foreign forces try to pull her down. This is the impression of Mrs Gandhi as expressed in her mass address in Delhi last Sunday. At the terrible speed with which we are moving, we can suffer from optical delusion as people do when they look at telegraph wires and poles from a speeding train. The poles of course hold the wires instead of pulling them down. The wires of economy in our country would fall apart if the super-powers choose to take away the poles they have erected throughout the country. Russia and America have adjusted themselves in erecting these poles and if America appears to be pulling down the wires which Russia at the other end is holding aloft, the phenomenon must be temporary. It will pass. The present war will stop when India attains her objective. It cannot go for long.

If contradicting Mrs Gandhi's various statements is an offence in wartime, the Union Minister for Finance, Mr K. R. Ganesh, in all fairness should have been hauled up. He admitted in the Lok Sabha that there was indeed a price rise but the rise was not entirely due to developments in Bangladesh. Prices had been rising before fighting broke out in Bangladesh and elsewhere. From June 1970 to May 1971 there was a 5.5 per cent rise. By September this year the index figure stood at 192.5 (Base 1962-100). The rise has not been matched by rising production and so cannot be comfor-

tably explained away. And during this period the super-powers have got themselves unobtrusively in. Indian planning gets a jolt when these make a motion to vary the aid.

There would not be, Mr Ganesh assured his countrymen, any more deterioration in the position (deterioration at the moment, therefore, should be taken henceforth as the base deterioration) because industrial production has revived. Which is doubtful. A slight rise in this enterprise or that is no guarantee of general economic revival just as two or three arrests here and there of profiteers is no guarantee that profiteering has stopped. The crimes of private capital are being compounded with the crimes of bureaucratic capital. The State has been taking over sick, unproductive and even liquidated industries. The Indian State being what it is, State capital would not halt the price rise. There are people who are worrying that when Bokaro goes into operation, steel prices would sharply rise to match the enormous cost of Bokaro steel. This apprehension is related to all State sectors. It remains to be seen how more deeply the foreign poles have to be dug in and how many more to steady the indigenous wires.

## Portuguese Guinea

Amilcar Cabral, the secretary general of PAIGC, has shown himself to be an able theoretician of the anti-colonial struggle in Africa, particularly in the Portuguese colonies in the western and southern parts of the continent. While struggles in other Portuguese territories have been stuck in endless squabbles among the insurgents, Cabral has effectively mixed diplomacy with military victories to deal with the colonists.

On the battlefield the PAIGC fighting force has made impressive gains. Commenting on PAIGC's military capabilities Cabral, during his last London visit, said that PAIGC now controls two-thirds of Guinea's countryside and, if necessary, can destroy

the towns. That this claim was not just vain, the recent incidents in Guinea have proved. Last month PAIGC forces mounted their heaviest ever attack on the towns in a bid to dislodge the colonists from their urban redoubts. Confirmation of the raid came from the Portuguese themselves.

Such a military feat has not occurred in a vacuum. It was preceded by years of patient political campaigning by PAIGC cadres who have worked hard to solve the problems of a primitive economy under years of colonial oppression and torn by tribal feuds. And the success in battles has been followed by laying the basis of future political organisations, an education system and, even, simple placements in the liberated zones. It is said that these zones have local and national assemblies where the Guineans would have a hand in political decision-making for the first time.

Portugal is unwilling to give up her territory. Her reluctance is evident in the massing of more than 25,000 troops in this tiny colony. And she wants to induct more. Any retreat here might lead to increasing pressure in the other two colonies, Angola and Mozambique, where too fighting is on.

But how could a country which is still in the feudal stage of development and lives on external aid finance an expensive colonial war? How could a regime that does not produce even simple consumer goods bring in sophisticated weapons to fight the rebels? Defence now eats up more than 50 per cent of Portugal's national budget and only liberal grants from her Western allies, particularly West Germany and Italy, have been able to sustain her sinking economy. She also does useful business with Britain. The aim behind the visits of Cabral and his men to the capitals of Western countries is to probe the possibilities of establishing friendly ties and to persuade these powers to refuse help to Lisbon's colonial venture. Though it is more than unlikely that the attempts will be heeded by the neo-colonists

who are in league with Portugal, Cabral's mission has won over the peoples of these countries and this is bound to strengthen PAIGC's hand in the fight for freedom.

## Middle East

As an experienced UN hand has put it, President Anwar Sadat has one thing in common with his predecessor, that of hanging himself on a hook and then pleading with the major powers to help him off. Some days back when Sadat, in military uniform, was haranguing his front-line troops at the Suez Canal that the hour for battle had come because he had severed all contacts with America and there was now no hope of recovering the lost territories by peaceful means, few took him seriously. Like his numerous earlier threats, this one must have also been ignored by the people against whom it was directed. What is Sadat up to? In spite of Russian supply of arms, the balance of power in the region has not tilted in the Arabs' favour; the only explanation for America's withholding the supply of a fleet of F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers is that Israel continues to enjoy overwhelming military superiority. The Egyptian Chief of Staff has claimed that the members of the Arab Defence Council have expressed "full desire to participate in the battle against Israel" and a joint plan of action has been agreed upon. But now King Hussein of Jordan says that the Arab States are not prepared for war. Sadat can count on little help from Syria. Token gestures from a few Arab States will not enable the Egyptian Army to take on the Israeli forces. Even if Sadat wants war, he will not get the clearance from Moscow, for the Kremlin cannot risk anything which may queer the pitch for a Russo-American summitry.

Sadat came to power by promising different things to different people—he promised peace to the civilian population and recovery of Israel-annexed territories to the Army. He

said that the time to fight had come but no date was given. His Foreign Minister, Mr Mahmoud Riad, said in a recent interview that whatever the President may say, Egypt does not want war. Has Egypt said that there will be no more discussion at the United Nations or that the Security Council Resolution 242 is no longer valid? Sadat is merely aiming at breaking the stalemate on the diplo-

matic front. He has said as much that negotiations with Israel can be resumed if it replies positively to the Jarring memorandum of February. The Golda Meir Cabinet may not be opposed to the reactivation of the Jarring mission. The OAU is reportedly in favour of a return to the Jarring peace initiative. So there may be yet another round of diplomatic flurry in the Middle East.

## View from Delhi

# How Long To Dacca ?

FROM A POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT

A third nation in the sub-continent is a cynical climax to British imperialism's two-nation theory. When recognition of Bangladesh was announced in Parliament, the entire Opposition found itself swept off its feet, believing recognition by India was the same thing as national liberation for the 75 million people. The Defence of India Rules had already come into effect and there was no question of deviating from the path of conformism. (Come to think of it, between October 1962 and December 1971, we have been free from emergency for just 35 months!) The Prime Minister was compared to anything from Durga to Joan of Arc. Outside, the stock markets became buoyant in no time, shedding their nervousness. After all, the world's seventh largest State means a big consumer goods market and there is jute and tea industry to be revived. The facade of British reasonableness over Bangladesh (its stance in the United Nations) has a lot to do with their investment interests in tea gardens and jute.

The voting pattern at the United Nations no doubt spread consternation in New Delhi. For one thing, no Afro-Asian country (if Outer Mongolia is not counted as one) voted in India's favour, not even Ceylon where Indian helicopters par-

ticipated in the counter-insurgency operations. The facile explanation was that the countries did not have time to understand the full implications of the draft hurriedly pushed through the General Assembly. In no time, a reservist-diplomat, Mr G. Parthasarathy, was called to reinforce the Indian delegation which Mr Swaran Singh decided to head personally, anticipating a ceasefire move. The elusive Mr D. P. Dhar left for Moscow and Mr Kuznetsov flew in for consultations.

The Soviet Union would not recognise Bangladesh so soon. The feeler will be tried through smaller countries. East Germany is already in touch with Mujibnagar and one presumes GDR would recognise Bangladesh and India GDR even if it is claimed that no significant correlation obtains in such a situation. Hungry has offered a 200-bed hospital to the Bangladesh government as a prelude to recognition.

There is a lot of talk about doing without aid. At the same time, experts are busy piecing statistical evidence together to prove to the country that the aid prospect is not so bleak. One is reminded of the late Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri's fine oratory about going it alone. Elaborate exercises were undertaken about import substitution to go with belt-tight-

ening and within months Mrs Gandhi was in Washington to plead against the suspension of United States aid. In Parliament, Mr Swaran Singh expressed "surprise" that the United States should have suspended arms sales to India and there was more anguish than anger in his statement.

The whole economy has been aid-oriented and the impact of the aid squeeze and the burden of a war-heated economy will be felt next year. The refugees would have gone and the ad hoc levies would have been withdrawn, one hopes. But a long-drawn-out war, as this one promises to be, will take its toll of the already shrinking growth rate. Article 6 and 9 of the Indo-Soviet Treaty are not going to bail the government out of the economic crisis.

One factor common from Colombo to New Delhi and Dacca will be the left-of-centre politics made respectable by the ideologues in New Delhi as a corollary to the thesis of national democracy perfected in Moscow. The birth of a nation means yet another potential case of peaceful transition to socialism via national democracy and the patriotic bourgeoisie (if any) of Bangladesh is the class to be depended upon to scotch anything approximating the Che Guevara uprising in Ceylon. But the advance towards Dacca has appeared rather slow to many Indians who thought it would all be over by the weekend. At the time of writing this, even the Soviet Union is surprised at the slow pace of the operation because it was expected to be over before the United Nations is seized of the cease-fire problem once again.

In the western sector, it has been a thrust-and-parry game with the exception of the Chhamb operations. Nevertheless, it might be a protracted land war because Pakistan's two armoured divisions are intact just as the Indian armour is. Once the Indian operation is over in Bangladesh the cease-fire issue undergoes a qualitative change and India would insist that any ceasefire in Bangladesh should be negotiated between the regime in Dacca and the Pakistani Government

while in the western sector, cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of troops from the border would suffice to facilitate a ceasefire. There is likely to be a long military stalemate after

the Bangladesh operations unless Pakistan chooses to throw in its armour against India in sheer desperation and escalates the operations.

December 12, 1971

## Whose War ?

R. P. MULLICK

**D**ESPITE pompous assertions of patriotic aims of preserving the national interests of their country, by the rulers of India and Pakistan alike, it should not escape the attention of any observer that the declaration of a "state of war" by the Pakistan Government closely followed the (i) openly publicised stoppage of all military sales supplies by the U.S. to India, and (ii) the completion of arrangements by the USA for an assured supply channel of war material through Turkey and Iran. Besides, the "silk trade" route linking Pakistan-occupied Kashmir with Sinkiang was closed to public view with an air of pregnant mystery by Pakistan only recently, to bring politico-diplomatic pressure on the USA—the super-power and "dependable ally" whose value lies in the international sphere for playing the needful "constructive role" and for containing the USSR in its committed efforts to help India. After the miserable failure and discomfiture that the USA suffered in its attempts to get the Indo-Pakistani confrontation of bourgeois interests projected on the international level into a Sino-Soviet clash, desirably conflagration, there was but this last throw left for the pragmatists of international diplomacy of the Kissinger brand, to play Pakistan off against India and draw the resultant benefit of an "independent" Bangladesh whose government could be weaned away from Soviet tutelage to USA's. Now that massive logistical support has already been extended by Soviet Russia to India Pakistan can hope to counter the Russian move by soliciting and secu-

ring help from China. The latter has left a question mark, however, so far as the immediacy of military aid is concerned. The Chinese attitude to the present problem between India and Pakistan has been made abundantly clear from its very genesis. It can be summed up thus:

(i) China will not countenance the spread of "supremacy-politics" of the super-powers to the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and the Indian Ocean;

(ii) hence, it will exert all its force and power to prevent the subserving of strategic interests in this region of either Soviet Russia by India, or of the U.S.A. by Pakistan, in however subtle way such subservience might be clothed;

(iii) and, so far as the struggle of the people of Bangladesh for the fulfilment of their right of self-determination is concerned, it will await the development of a genuine movement for liberation, preventing at the same time the ascendancy of neo-colonialism and expansionist mentor-State hegemony over this crucial geopolitical area, masquerading as aid-givers to "liberation" war by foreign based leaders who have now lost free initiative.

In this context, it would be relevant to remember what the Pakistan People's Party leader, Z. A. Bhutto—the only politician in entire Pakistan who had the guts to challenge and bring about the downfall of dictator Ayub—said after returning from his diplomatic mission to Peking and before the outbreak of hostilities. "War is there, according to what our government says... Any measure of support that we need, China will give. It depends

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on what we ask... India should have no illusions on this".

It is a fact, however, that illusions die hard, both in the governmental circles in Islamabad and in Delhi. While the top-notch bureaucratic-industrial elite of policy-makers in the former are still maintaining a stance of stand-offishness from China, and close-knit collaboration with the USA (with whose government they have, in all likelihood, an undisclosed defence-committed agreement), the ruling party coterie in the latter have continued to nurse wishful interpretations of Peking's policy. In this context the profound wisdom of one of the mouthpieces of the ruling class of India can be cited. "The Chinese delegate's statement (in the U.N) does not eliminate the possibility of improving ties with this country, though it is a reminder that the process will be long drawn out. (*Times of India*, "Chinese aims", 23 Nov. 1971). If the statement of the Chinese delegate to the UN, in the context of that country's established policy of supporting the Pakistani people against foreign aggression and foreign interference in the internal matters of Pakistan, is put in proper perspective, it is difficult to see how, and why at all, any "long drawn out process" is warranted to deflect China from such policy—one of the cardinal principles of Bandung and Panchsheel, to which India had contributed once. Possibly, in the furor of New Delhi's present engagements, the basic structure of Nehruan foreign policy and of India's international attitude, has been forgotten. The Third World, of which nonaligned India had once been supposed to have been the harbinger, if not the vanguard, slips gradually into the sphere of moral and spiritual leadership of the have-not Afro-Asia-Latin American States, China, and international socialism.

In very quick succession events have moved, indicating the who's who and what's what of the super-powers in this business of exploiting the basic contradictions of the ruling classes

of India and Pakistan. The irreconcilable antagonism inherent in the newly-awakened neo-imperialistic and neo-colonial interests of the Indian and Pakistani bourgeoisie has made the present conflict inevitable. But behind, the manipulation of the USA and USSR—the super-Powers who are at once mutual rivals and collaborators—are transforming the situation into one which would permit no return to the status quo ante. India would be sadly mistaken if it thinks that its interests as the bigger Power, camouflaged as "security-interests" only, will be preserved by foisting a particular type of government in East Bengal and by bottling up the incipient movement there towards left resurgence of the people. China is, understandably, an obsession with the ruling circles of India. But the future Bangladesh is quite another matter, and the possibilities of a real People's

Republic emerging, based on genuine socialist ideology, are many.

Similarly, the Pakistani militarist regime is harbouring illusions of installing puppets above people's representatives. History, however, has its inexorable ways. If, as is possible in the near future, the prospect of an impending military defeat compels the present rulers of Pakistan to yield to a metamorphosed section of the Awami League leadership, or even to the radical revolutionaries now working nearest to the people in East Bengal, what would happen to the pet dreams of New Delhi? There is a distinct possibility of Pakistan's dictatorial clique resorting to some political astuteness and flexibility. If Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is not a transformed statesman by then, he will be a "dead" leader, spiritually if not physically. Will new factors in Islamabad assert themselves?

## This War

MSP

**T**HE massive incursion of Indian armed forces into Bangladesh will disturb even those who are in favour of the emergence of a free, democratic peoples' republic of Bangladesh. India is playing the role of a 'great power' in Asia in arrogating to herself the responsibility to make Bangladesh safe for Democracy, Secularism and Socialism—Indira Gandhi style. The incursion of Indian troops also detracts from the stories that the Mukti Bahini was scoring success after success against the Pakistani enemy, who was invariably depicted as being always on the run. While one certainly supports the movement for an independent Bangladesh, free from the yoke of West Pakistani imperialism, asking the Indian armed forces to step in is hardly the way to make way for the emergence of a genuine people's republic of Bangladesh. Evidently, the Mukti Bahini, consisting as it does mostly of elements of the Awami League, and its fol-

lowers, was hardly equipped to fight a protracted people's war. Such a war can never be fought by proxy, certainly not by 'friends' who in this case can hardly be said to be motivated by any altruistic principles in extending their help to the Mukti Bahini.

It is now clear that India is determined to establish a government of her choice in Bangladesh, a government which she hopes will be forever indebted to her for helping its installation. But while it is likely that India might succeed in her immediate objectives, it is by no means certain that she is going to earn the goodwill of the people of Bangladesh in the long run. The Indian armed forces which have moved in cannot obviously withdraw in a matter of days or months; perhaps not even in years. It is quite on the cards that a defence pact with the 'Government of Bangladesh' is going to be entered into, making it possible for the liberating

forces to continue to remain indefinitely as defending forces; and the ordinary citizen of Bangladesh may, as time goes on, fail to make a distinction between a West Pakistani occupation force and an Indian occupation force. Moreover, sharing as these two forces do a similar 'martial' tradition, the Indian army too may be tempted to conduct itself in a manner befitting an occupation army.

For any one familiar with the conduct of a protracted people's war fought by guerillas in this century—the most notable of course being the one that is being fought by the Vietnamese—it should be evident that there are no short cuts to victory in a people's war. The guerilla has one profound advantage over his conventional enemy—time is always on his side. The Vietnamese have been fighting for decades, have endured unimaginable sufferings, and the goal of national independence and unity is yet to be realized. But they have not asked others to fight their war, and yet, can anybody deny that they have won great victories, and that final victory will certainly be theirs? The Vietnamese had to fight the kind of imperialism represented by such powerful countries as France and the United States, and yet they are winning. Compared to the kind of odds the Vietnamese had to fight against, the Bengali guerilla had only the West Pakistani war machine to tackle. Fighting the West Pakistani war machine (which would have been denied even the moral support that China is giving now, if India had not involved herself) with his own resources was certainly not beyond the capacity of the Bengali guerilla; and if India had not intervened, a nucleus of hardened peasant guerillas would certainly have emerged, to provide the necessary political and military leadership and ideology to the Bengali masses. The Indian intervention of course was specifically designed against the emergence of such a guerilla nucleus, and in this, the interests of the Indian ruling classes and the Awami League coincided. The support of the Soviet Union to the Awami League of course

is understandable, considering the fact that the present Soviet leadership has been quite consistent in its support to Mrs Gandhi.

The only plausible rationalization offered in support of Indian intervention is that only by helping the establishment of a popular government in Bangladesh can the refugees here be induced to return to their homes. But, will the bulk of the refugees, particularly the Hindu old and infirm who have lost their children, return, and will a government in Bangladesh, under Awami League leadership, despite all protestations that are being made now by its leaders, going

to be 'less Islamic' than its predecessor?

One final thought: We have been always pleading that the Bangladesh issue is an issue between the elected representatives of East Bengal and the military authorities of West Pakistan. We have also consistently called for the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and have urged Yahya Khan to start talking to him. It would be interesting to see the Indian reaction if Yahya does release Sheikh Mujib, and induce him to issue a statement condemning Indian intervention. No doubt we would have new rationalizations to offer.

## Lessons Of Birbhum

PRABIR BASU

**B**IRBHUM is now quiet from the law and order point of view. The only news available are of police actions against the Naxalites. But there are no reports about Naxalite activities or actions. The army jawans who only a month back were visible almost anywhere in the district have gone back to their barracks. The mobile police vans fill up this vacuum, although indiscriminate police rampage is now only occasional. Plain clothes and police informers are plentiful and everyone tends to treat the other with mistrust. Local sharks, swindlers and bullies have reappeared in those towns and villages where, frightened by Naxalites, they were so long conspicuously invisible.

Not that there is no killing in Birbhum; in fact a daily average of three to four is higher than the average during the peak period of the Naxalite movement. Today certainly class enemies are being killed, but killing itself has changed its class character. Now the Naxalites are not killers, they are being killed or murdered by the police or their agents. The news of the killing of Naxals does not get much place in newspapers. Murders at public places in the town areas became news in a fourth-page corner

of most newspapers, under the caption "Naxalite killed in action". But news of police murders of Naxalites does not reach even the parents of the victims; murderers bury the boys with their obituary.

There are resistance groups ('Pratirodh Bahini' is the popular name) organised by the district administration. The subdivisional police officers have recently held meetings in all the 'troubled areas' in collaboration with the local roughs, and apolitical or political mastans. During the whole of August and September these officers conducted raids, tortures and indiscriminate arrests in their areas in order to force people to make a choice in favour of the police against the Naxalites. Panic among the people was at that time so high that no one could stay at home at night, no young man could think of not being implicated in cases of arson and murder to be instituted by the police, no middle-aged man could avoid severe beating up in course of interrogations in a police lock-up. A young man, Bhudhar Dalui of Bhubandanga under Bolpur P.S., who had to vomit blood as a result of police beating and had returned from the door of death by sheer luck, is now a

'captain' of eight resistance groups consisting of mostly poor shopkeepers, apolitical students, some Congress(R) people, some day labourers, poorest employees of governmental or semi-governmental establishments and local roughs, and bullies. Local big traders, renowned blackmarketeers, Government contractors and some upper middle-class guys having no ostensible sources of their high income bear the burden of financing the 'resistance groups' daily performance. There is one 'General' in a police station, and all the area 'captains' work under his direction. The district has a body of 'Generals'. They have to be influential members of the Yuba Congress, if not of the Congress(R). If an alleged 'extremist' is arrested by the resistance group or the police, the relevant 'General' decides whether that extremist should be spared, or imprisoned or murdered. Particularly in middle-class areas a few such so-called 'extremists' are now working with vigour for resistance activities, and others have either been sent to prison or to a place nobody knows.

#### Reality

Not that all the areas of the district have such resistance groups. But it is also true that not all areas were infested with Naxalite activities. The three important towns—Suri, Rampurhat and Bolpur—of the district had seen a brief spell of Naxalite activities, and some villages near them were reported to be their dens. Now the activities of the police and resistance groups are high only in these towns and villages. The villages in the interior are seemingly peaceful and no extremist influence or counter-extremist perversity has as yet touch-

ed reportedly 70 per cent of the villages of the district.

If anybody discovers a close resemblance between the anti-Naxal resistance groups of north Calcutta, Baranagar, etc. and those of Birbhum, he will be seriously mistaken. In contrast to Calcutta groups the groups in the district have no dynamism of their own. At least every fourth member of any group—in Bolpur or Suri or Rampurhat is subject to various court cases on common charges of arson, gun-snatching, and murder or on charges of stealing, looting and dacoity. Such a member believes that he will be honourably acquitted of the charges if he serves the resistance group well. A poor old meat-vendor was beaten-in Rampurhat police station because a portion of his mud-walled hut allowed a family containing some alleged extremist elements to stay. A well-built washerman of Bolpur Dhopapatti was twice interrogated by the police on the charge that some suspected extremist boys had come to his humble cottage for shelter at night. But the meat-vendor and the poor washerman now serve the resistance group. On Bolpur School Bagan compound a meeting of the local residents was held under the chairmanship of the District Magistrate. The subdivisional police officer warned the people publicly, "we have our men all around. You are well aware that some boys of your locality are renowned for anti-social work. If you do not help us to trace them out, you know the consequences. We know that you are tired of police harassment. We certainly share your feelings. But we must bring the culprits to book and in this task you can be of great help. If you help, you live in peace; if you do not cooperate, we shall not be responsible for your peace. The police will take their own measures." The meeting was followed by the formation of resistance groups in the locality. To the common middle-class people the police are a terror to be reckoned with and to avoid that terror, they have to form resistance groups.

The morale of resistance groups

has however been steadily sagging. Every night the number of absentees from duties increases if for no other reason than the growing severity of winter. The poor people have no winter clothes and the police personnel rarely visit the localities where groups are keeping night vigil. It is a matter of time when these resistance groups would cease to function—the time necessary to overcome the shock of severe police beating of the past few months.

#### Why the Naxalite setback?

It is not known whether the present lull in Naxalite activities is treated by the CPI(ML) cadres as a setback. But to all who saw their almost sudden upheaval in the district from January to September of the year, the Naxalite movement has certainly suffered a setback. About whether the programme of the party was correct or the programme was implemented properly in the light of their field experiences, nobody except the serious activists of the party can say anything positive.

But if you approach an honest middle-class fellow who personally knew X and Y of Naxalite activists, his emotion is likely to overflow if he takes you in confidence.

"I knew X and Y from early days. They were so innocent and sober that you could distinguish them from among a thousand boys of my school. They belonged to my district in East Bengal. I doubt whether they had read anything of Mao Tse-tung's works or know to which district Naxalbari belongs... Fine boys they were. They were of a loving nature and possibly could not hate others before they became Naxals..."—This is the reaction of a middle-aged headmaster of a school on hearing of the death of one Naxalite in a 'police encounter'. He was almost in tears when he narrated how in his brief spell of illness, one of them came to see him at midnight ignoring the risk involved and he turned him out of the house immediately because of his anger over the arson on the school compound only a few days back.

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"I shall get back the bricks of the school wall, but shall not meet him again."

This is however an emotional outpouring on personal relationships. But the average middle-class attitude towards the Naxalite movement was never without criticism based on personal difficulties and conveniences. The main reason for this criticism may be that the Naxalites demanded a stern revolutionary attitude and self-sacrifice from this class which the class was not psychologically or circumstantially prepared for and may never be so except in the final days of the revolution.

Again, the first group of revolutionaries necessarily comes from the middle class—this is the historical fact of any successful revolution the world has hitherto known. Therefore nobody should blame the Naxalites for their class origins. That in Birbhum, almost ninety per cent of the cadres of the CPI(ML) in the towns and adjoining areas belonged to the mainly low middle class section of the population should not be a point of criticism against the Naxalites. Real revolutionaries by themselves do constitute a class of socially awakened proletarians. But the main task of the revolution lies in creating revolutionary leadership among the economically proletarian masses. Precisely over this task the CPI(ML) activists did not make an all-out effort.

This is however not to belittle the role the middle class as a class is likely to play in a people's democratic revolution. Indeed, the intensity of the socio-economic crisis is so acute amongst the middle class population, the discontent is such phenomenal

even in cities and towns, that the Naxalites—themselves having middle class background—overestimated the capacity of the frustrated middle class for creating the forces of revolutionary consolidation. Not only that, the Naxalite movement itself was blown off its chartered track by the gusty wind of amoral middle class discontents. School-burning is a case in point. School-burning might contain elements of a revolutionary moral, indeed a challenge to the rotten educational farce practised in this country, but such acts did not by themselves ensure revolutionary consolidation of middle-class youths. On the contrary, the middle class as a whole reacted unfavourably against its own youths. The need for neutralising the middle class vis-a-vis the Naxalites was seriously impaired by these acts of school-burning or statue-breaking of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary youths. The same was to some extent true of the nature of class-annihilations in towns or cities. In many areas, the annihilation programme was not conducted from a revolutionary proletarian standpoint; a petty-bourgeois outlook reared its ugly head in many acts of annihilation. The other serious error in the Naxalite movement in towns or cities was almost indiscriminate recruitment of middle-class youths. A revolutionary zeal should not have been the only criterion of recruitment, the qualities of wisdom, tenacity and revolutionary outlook should have been tested again and again in a cadre's practice in the workers' or peasants' base. This was seriously ignored in many areas. On the other hand in many areas of even Birbhum, some romantic petty-bourgeois youths or opportunistic *mastans* made their easy way to the party ranks.

All these errors—deadly errors one should say—crept into the movement as such *not because* the Naxalites made some movement in the middle-class areas, *but because* the cadres could not substantially give up their petty-bourgeois outlook and pay heed to the instructions reportedly sent by their leadership and party organs. In

other words, a fair number of actions with a petty-bourgeois outlook had so far taken place both in towns and villages although it was feasible for the revolutionaries to stay in towns as much in villages with a set of actions judiciously conducted from the standpoint of proletarian outlook. It is no doubt true that there is a difference between towns and villages at least in a district like Birbhum where towns lack any production base and townspeople enjoy a kind of parasitic existence on the production base of the villages. Therefore, it is absolutely essential and urgent for cadres of middle-class origin or town origin to develop a set of revolutionaries in the villages from amongst the most exploited sections of the village community tied to the district's production base. Thus, while the main tactical norm required the village to be the base of Naxalite activities, the town acting as the rear, the CPI(ML) movement in Birbhum just did the opposite—opposite to the tactical norm accepted in the party programme. In the case of Calcutta and Howrah, the revolutionaries, penetration into the working class could have been the focal point of their activities and the middle class could act as the rear, but in practice the opposite took place. Hence the setbacks, both in Calcutta and Birbhum.

#### A Necessary Evil

Every setback is costly for a party of revolutionaries. The overall setback of the Naxalite movement in terms of loss of lives is incalculable, particularly when we remember their dedication. Every revolutionary is a potential martyr. Every Naxalite martyr loved life more than it deserved, everyone defied death more than his life demanded.

But again, no revolutionary movement in any country to date has made a steady headway along a premeditated path. Setbacks are unavoidable for the revolutionaries to know the reality acting and interacting on their march towards making history. Unavoidability does not and should not however mean lack of revolu-

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tionary self-criticism and re-examination of methods of work.

In practice, for the CPI(ML) movement in Birbhum, setbacks were unavoidable, because the movement could not build up a production base under a mass movement of revolutionary peasants in the villages. Wherever mass movements made a headway, they could not consolidate themselves either in terms of production or revolutionary organisation. The exclusive stress on annihilation programmes seriously undermined the other essentials of revolutionary consolidation, i.e. (i) formation of peasant committees as an embryo of revolutionary administration and (ii) acceleration and organisation of production in villages as the embryo of a revolutionary economy, parallel to their counter-revolutionary counterpart.

Apart from these there were obvious petty-bourgeois deviations in methods of work. When police tortures began, many cadres working among the middle-class population took the latter (in both towns and villages) in good faith. But the maximum police murders of Naxalite cadres took place in middle-class areas because as a class these people could not protect the revolutionaries against the growing severity of police tortures—as a class it lacks the moral fibre to do that—and because its class-depravity (in spite of its socio-economic crisis and frustration) prevents it from committing itself to the cause of revolutionary violence at the initial stage of steady revolutionary movement. At the same time, in the present socio-economic context, revolutionary aspirations may not be lacking in the middle-class, and that makes it an ally of people's democratic revolution. The CPI(ML) in Birbhum, as in many other places, through its actual functioning over-estimated the revolution aspirations of the middle class, forgetting its basic petty bourgeois content and also forgetting the fact that so long as proletarian revolutionary movement does not make a steady advance within the working class and the poor and land-

less peasantry, the petty-bourgeois revolutionary aspirations of the middle class cannot go beyond the whirlpool of either CPI(M) brand or the Congress(R) brand economism and sporadic violence in order to bargain for its class-ends.

#### Achievements

What the Naxalite movement has achieved and preserved in arithmetical terms, we do not know. How far it will be reshaped and strengthened in the coming months or years, we are not competent to say. How far the CPI(ML) will be able to take lessons from its experiences of setbacks, it is yet to be seen.

But in qualitative terms the Naxalite movement has achieved something, which no left political party could dream of.

That the objective situation in India is fast moving to a revolutionary critical point and that the subjective preparation for revolution is rapidly extending in course of revolutionary practice are evident from the fact that within the first two years of its life the Naxalite movement has brought within its fold thousands and thousands of dedicated young cadres and has challenged the ruling classes and their political henchmen very effectively in different areas of the country. In every area the movement compelled the ruling classes to use its most efficient organised instruments of violence, the armed forces.

For the first time in India, the Naxalite movement exposed the facts that (i) without the police and the army, the existing state power has no other effective instrument to challenge the emergence of revolutionary movement even of a petty-bourgeois nature, not to speak of that fostered by the peasantry and the working class; (ii) no parliamentary political party from the Congress(R) to the CPI(M) has the guts to launch stage-managed mass movement even for pure partial relief, if it is not a priori approved by the police and military or if such political shopping is not protected by the police or CRP in the wake of the surging Naxalite

movement (in Birbhum, you can now see the old familiar political faces opening their so-long-closed party offices, box collections for parties on the streets, or familiar gesticulations of old leaders in course of their marathon Maidan lectures or meetings, processions etc.); (iii) in India today, every democratic movement or election or any middle-class-oriented movement cannot sustain itself if it goes beyond the narrow elbowroom provided by ruling class manoeuvres and much-trumpeted democracy is thrown off with the sanction of Parliament at the moment the ruling classes feel it necessary to launch neo-fascist attacks on its rival contenders for power; (iv) with the growing crisis, the exploited sections of the people do have no other choice but to take up arms against the ruling classes in course of their revolutionary movement against intense exploitation and age-old servility.

The Naxalite movement has also taught us that revolution is not fine parliamentary speeches or alert and argumentative debates on the strategy or tactics of the Indian revolution. The more one merely reads and debates the mechanism of revolution, the more stupid and vulgar one becomes to the one involved in actual work of revolution. The correctness of their view the Naxalites have proved beyond any doubt.

The most important contribution of the Naxalite movement in Calcutta, Nadia, Burdwan or Birbhum is that the poor people of the villages or towns have realised that there are people who not only talk of revolution, but make effort for it by dedicating their priceless lives. Therefore the Naxalite movement will never die, it cannot die and it is bound to have a wider resurgence in the immediate future.

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## Before The War

...With India tying some 78,000 West Pakistani soldiers along the border, the Mukti Bahini has been able to strike effectively at government forces, destroying coastal ships, damaging electric installations, disrupting communications. It is doubtful, however, whether there is a competent central guidance of the different guerilla units operating in different parts of the country. The collapse of communications, for example, affects the guerillas more than the army which has its own radio network. Also disadvantageous to the guerillas is the fact that bandits have started operating in the name of the Mukti Bahini.

But the biggest anxiety the Mukti Bahini fighters have is caused by the attempts of local Maoist extremists to assume the leadership of the liberation movement. Such a struggle within the struggle had been forecast by many observers even in the early stages of the crisis. Now it appears that the "Naxalites" have become influential in some districts; in Noakhali near Chittagong they are said to be in command.

Eyewitnesses say the fight between the Naxalites and the Awami League elements in the Mukti Bahini is even more fierce than that between the Bengalis and West Pakistanis. The Naxalites denounce the Awami League in ideological terms. While the Awami League is bent simply on driving the West Pakistanis out of Bangla Desh, the Naxalites seem to be looking further ahead to an ideological dawn over East Bengal.

Meanwhile, morale is a nagging problem for the troops from West Pakistan. As they concentrate on border defence, internal civil defence and general policing duties have been handed over to "Razakars" or volunteers. Their job is defined as "to protect the peace-loving and patriotic people from Indian agents". They have been recruited hastily and mostly

consist of very young boys no taller than the guns they carry. Naturally the sense of security they spread around them is dubious. But they can, and often do, aggravate the sense of insecurity among the local population they are supposed to protect by, for example, forcing people now and again to buy their "innocence" with small sums of money. There are about 55,000 men in the Razakar force. Each receives about US \$0.50 a day—quite attractive pay by local standards.

But the inexperienced Razakar boys cannot be giving much solace to around 1,000 West Pakistani policemen who are supposed to back them up. These men are far from home and increasingly suffering from demoralisation. The regular troops are also showing signs of the same affliction. They left home many months ago and there is no sign yet of their combat assignment being over. The brigade commander in Sylhet said: "if nothing happens by November—be it negotiation or war—I do not know how the situation will develop." A young Pathan captain of the Frontier Corps was much more vehement when he said "we are hungry for peace, but this hunger can only be satisfied by destroying India".

(Warner Adam in *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 20, 1971.)

### An Interview

(Prof Muzaffar Ahmad, President of the pro-Moscow Bangladesh National Awami Party (Wali Khan group) was interviewed by Feroz Ahmed of the *Pakistan Forum*, an independent magazine of Pakistanis in the USA and Canada. Extracts from the interview are taken from the October issue of the journal).

...F. A. : I see that your party—the National Awami Party—and the Bangladesh Communist Party have both been included in the consultative committee. What is the difference between the two?

M. A. : The Communist Party, led by Moni Singh, is a working class

Party which wants independent national democracy, while our party is a multi-class party struggling for parliamentary democracy and full regional autonomy.

F. A. : That was before March 25, 1971. Now the military has made the question of autonomy irrelevant.

M. A. : Yes, we no longer demand autonomy. We want complete independence.

F. A. : So does the Communist Party. How do you differ now?

M. A. : The essential difference is still there. The Communist Party would like to introduce independent national democracy in accordance with the concept developed at the Moscow conference of 81 Communist Parties in 1960. We, being a multi-class party which includes some progressive *jotedars* (landlords) and businessmen in addition to workers, peasants and students etc., are striving for the establishment of parliamentary democracy...

F. A. : Even after independence has been won by means of a protracted armed struggle?

M. A. : Yes.

F. A. : How do you differ from the Awami League then?

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M.A.: We stand for independence, secularism, parliamentary democracy and eventually socialism...

F.A.: The Awami League says that it also stands for the very same ideals.

M.A.: The Awami League's maximum program is our minimum program. We would like to go further than that and to lay the foundations of socialism...

F.A.: Have you defined your socialism differently from the Awami League's?

M.A.: Before the military action, the members and supporters of the NAP advocated socialism as their ultimate aim but did not spell out what it was and how to achieve it. Since March 25, our party has not met. So I cannot tell you what our revised program is. I can only speak in an individual capacity. Again, when the Awami League includes socialism in its program, you should not simply go by the paper. In Pakistani politics there is no limit to the promises you can make and the slogans you can use. The rightist parties have out-bid the leftist parties in proposing limits on land-holding.

F.A.: Am I correct in saying that at this stage there is little, or no, difference between your party and the Awami League?

M.A.: Yes. But you must also recognize the fact that the Awami League leadership is reluctant to expose imperialism, whereas we are staunchly anti-imperialist.

F.A.: Why is the Awami League reluctant?

M.A.: Because of their experience and class character.

F.A.: Do you think that disillusionment with the imperialist powers will bring the Awami League even closer to you and make it an anti-imperialist force?

M.A.: The Awami League is not monolithic. The pro-Western tendencies are to be found in their parliamentary leadership. There are other elements in the party, especially the youth and the students, who are becoming increasingly anti-imperialist. Then there are those who are

fighting in Bangladesh against the Pakistan Army. There is a contradiction—but not conflict—between the fighting forces and the parliamentary leadership. That contradiction might develop into a conflict.

...Maulana Bhashani does not have a party anymore. He is an immensely popular figure and he supports the struggle for independence. Therefore he must be included in the committee. But the elements of the National Awami Party who had gone with him after the initial split in the party in 1968 have all abandoned him. Even his secretary, Masihur Rahman, has joined the People's Party (the majority party in West Pakistan, led by Z. A. Bhutto). I had to lend the services of one of our members to Maulana for helping him out in secretarial work.

...only three of these eleven groups (into which the NAP has split) support the independence struggle.

F.A.: Which ones?

M.A.: The groups identified as: (a) Zafar-Menon, (b) Nasim Ali and (c) Serajul Hossain Khan.

F.A.: As you know, the radical left groups, consisting of Bhashani NAP, Zafar-Menon group, Deben Sikdar group, Hatier group and several workers' peasants' and students organizations, have formed a co-ordinating committee for Bangladesh National Liberation Struggle...

M.A.: As I said, they do not have any organization and they represent only a few individuals. Now they want to make a mini United Front of their own, without the Awami League...

F.A.: In their June 1 declaration they have clearly called for a National Liberation Front consisting of all political forces, including the Awami League. What is your basis for saying that they want to exclude the Awami League?

M.A.: They talk about United Front but in practice they are striving for an all-left front. You are attaching unnecessary importance to these elements. Most of them have been my students and I know what kind

of organizations they have. The less you talk about them the better it is.

F.A.: How is it that Bhashani NAP maintains membership in their co-ordinating committee as well as in your consultative committee?

M.A.: Maulana has repudiated them in a statement he issued recently. They have only been using his name. You know that Maulana Bhashani is a peculiar phenomenon in Bengal politics. He is like a pipal tree under which all kinds of weeds grow.

F.A.: You said earlier that only three minor groups support the independence movement and now you are implying that the radical left is not organized...

M.A.: Only one group has some organisation and following and that is the Toha-Abdul Haq-Dastidar group which calls itself the East Pakistani Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist). Although they consider us their enemies and attach all kinds of labels to us, I must be honest in acknowledging that they have been in the working class struggle for a long time and they do command some significant following.

F.A.: What are they doing Are they fighting the Pakistani army?

M.A.: No. Following the Maoist line, they have refused to support the independence struggle. They say that it is a struggle between the West Pakistani monopolist capitalists and the East Pakistani nascent bourgeoisie and that they will not have any part in it.

F.A.: So what are they doing? Sitting it out? Collaborating with the Army?

M.A.: They have organised some guerrilla bands and killed several *jotedars* (landlords) and distributed land to the peasants. But when the Pakistan Army came, they ran away. They are waging a "class war" in a land occupied by foreign forces. They don't talk about fighting the invaders.

F.A.: They don't want to be in a National Liberation Front with you?

M.A.: That's correct.

F.A.: But the other so-called

Maoists who have given a call for the formation of a NLF, why don't you want to co-operate with them?

M. A. : I have already said that only three groups have so far approached me. We cannot possibly give each one of them separate representation. If they come united, the members of the Consultative Committee can consider their case. I do not know if they have contacted the Awami League leaders.

F. A. : How do you characterize the present stage of the struggle?

M. A. : It is a struggle for the national self-determination of the people of Bangladesh. It is anti-monopolist and anti-imperialist in character...

F. A. : Anti-imperialist in what sense?

M. A. : In the sense that the Pakistan army is an instrument of U. S. imperialism and a strong Pakistan is helpful in the imperialist drive for the "containment" of the Soviet Union and China. By fighting the Pakistani army we are weakening the imperialist stranglehold in the region.

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F. A. : You have emphasized the "anti-monopolist" character of the movement. Earlier you said that your objective was to achieve parliamentary democracy after independence has been won. Why are you so keen about bourgeois economic and political institutions?

M. A. : Because the consciousness among the masses is not developed to a level where socialist ideology can be accepted by them...

F. A. : Now they are engaged in an armed struggle against the forces which represent capitalism and imperialism. Given the nature of their enemies and of their own society, where there is no indigenous bourgeois class, and given the fact that that their struggle might be a protracted one, do you think that they will still be unprepared for socialism when they achieve their independence?

M. A. : There will be some change in their consciousness but it will not be a qualitative change.

F. A. : Therefore a stage of bourgeois democracy will be necessary even if it takes ten to fifteen years for Bangladesh to gain its independence?

M. A. : Yes.

F. A. : How does the Awami League leadership, with its parliamentary orientation, find itself leading an armed struggle?

M. A. : Some of the leaders are already getting tired of the war.

F. A. : It seems that as the armed struggle prolongs, the Awami League leadership will find itself more and more isolated from the masses, thus allowing the leadership of the independence movement to fall into the hands of the fighting forces of the left.

M. A. : It will not happen in a mechanical sense. The Awami League will not be eliminated as some leftists are speculating. However, the experienced left forces will acquire a leading role during the struggle.

F. A. : Wouldn't that give them an opportunity to lay the foundations of a socialist society during the struggle instead of waiting for a stage of bourgeois democracy?

M. A. : The objective conditions might favour introduction of a socialist

economic program but not a socialist philosophical program.

F. A. : What kind of Bangladesh will emerge when it wins its independence? M. A. : Sweden, at best.

F. A. : So you don't see the Indian ruling classes faced with a "danger" of having a radical Bangladesh on its eastern flank?

M. A. : No. The threat to India comes from the right, not from the left. The rightwing forces, while pretending to be sympathetic to our cause, have already launched a drive for creating war hysteria and communal tension.

F. A. : Wouldn't the establishment of an independent Bangladesh intensify the feelings in West Bengal for a united Bengal?

M. A. : A United Bengal will not be tolerated by caste-Hindus. They are afraid of Muslim domination. I do not see any possibility of a United Bengal. Those who are raising the slogan of a united Bengal are hurting our cause by creating a rift between us and the people of India.

## Book Review

KATHERINE MAYO AND INDIA

By Manoranjan Jha

People's Publishing House.

Rs 12.50

*Mother India* written by Katherine Mayo some fifty years ago was the archetype of books Nirad C. Chaudhuri and V. S. Naipaul write today. But the Chaudhuris and Naipauls write for fame or some such thing. Mayo had some greater objective in view. She was commissioned by the British Government to write a deprecatory book on India to establish the fact that the Indians were not fit to rule India and thus forestall the gradual emergence of the American consciousness that the British had no right to administer India. *Mother India*, in other words, was propaganda work and no study of a dispassionate sociologist.

That Miss Mayo was politically motivated was suspected right at the

time the book appeared. What was suspected then has been substantiated now by Mr Jha who had access to the private papers of Miss Mayo lodged in the Historical and Manuscript Division of the Yale University Library in the US, records in the India office and Public Record Office in London and in the National Archives in New Delhi.

But, whatever Miss Mayo's motive might have been, it is undeniable that she was a very competent writer. What she wrote about India, about Hinduism and the lot of Indian women, about health conditions of the Indians, about Gandhi, about the persecution of low caste Hindus and Muslims by the Indian ruling class and its parasites was not only unassailable then but is true even today. Gandhi described her book as a drain inspector's report, but given to describe a huge filthy drain that India was then and now, it was hardly rational to expect that Miss Mayo could take an angle other than of a drain inspector's. An American weekly was not by any long shot wrong when it said that when suave gentlemen from India preached their mystic messages in women's clubs and select circles of those who had nothing better to do, they should be asked to account for the facts presented in *Mother India* before they preached the teaching of Hindu philosophy.

But the two aspects of Miss Mayo's work should not be confused. She was entirely right that by and large India was a filthy country, a sort of chamber of unhygienic horrors. But she was entirely wrong to jump to the conclusion that the Indians were

not fit to rule their country and the British were doing a lot of good in India. Mr Jha has confused the two issues and all along in his book maintains an indignant tone to prove that Miss Mayo was a bad woman. Miss Mayo was not. She had no grounding in politics or economics and so fell an easy victim to the British propaganda machine. If she were a wise person she should have guessed why the British officials, right from Lord Lytton down to the district magistrates, gave a VIP treatment when she roamed over India and asked for statistics. Either she knew for whom she was working or she believed in what she wrote and if her commission and belief fitted with each other, why shouldn't she write what she wrote? The fact that she was commissioned to write does not devalue the book. *Mother India*, with a few changes in details, continues to be *Mother India* in Miss Mao's image and the realization would do a lot of good to people like Mr Manoranjan Jha.

N. P. C.

### Letters

#### Refugees

Mr Premen Addy's article on Delhi's "Understanding of Bandung Spirit" (27 November 1971) throws light on quite a few activities of Delhi. Most glaring of course is India's role, in collusion with U.S. imperialism, regarding the refugees from China's Tibetan region. Mr Addy deserves a pat on his back for the revelation.

To my knowledge "refugee problem" dates back to October 1917, when 1,500,000, who opposed and feared the revolution led by Lenin, fled from the USSR. It may be recalled that these 1.5 million "refugees" were made a pretext for imperialist aggression on the new-born socialist State. Since then refugees have been over and over again used as pawns by the imperialists.

A. DAS  
Calcutta

### Revolution Tamed

This refers to the excellent article "A Revolution Tamed" by Mr Lajpat Rai (October 16). It expressed what many friends of the Cuban revolution have been feeling for some time. The metamorphosis of the Cuban leaders is strange indeed. From utter heterodoxy, which played a positive role in the world communist movement, they have embraced utter orthodoxy which looks so unreal in the case of Fidel Castro. The Russian revisionists have won their point and tamed the lion of Latin America. I used to read *Granma* regularly and always found it inspiring. Now it contains nothing except stale reports about sugar production. But the Cuban heroes are in for disappointment. The Chilean revolution is likely to go the same way as the Bolivian revolution. Castro, it appears, has forgotten what Che said about revolutions in Latin America. According to him, only by breaking the professional army and defeating it could the people make the revolution. But now Castro hails the "revolution" in Peru made by the leaders of the professional army. Experience will yet teach the Cuban leadership. At this moment there is no difference between Cuba and the satellite countries of Eastern Europe.

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