

# frontier

Vol. 4: No. 16

JULY 31, 1971

PRICE: 35 PAISE

## On Other Pages

COMMENTS	2
<i>View From Delhi</i>	
THE ANTI-CHINA ALLIANCE	
FROM A POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT	3
INDIA'S OPTIONS	
T. KARKI HUSSAIN	4
WILL THEY RETURN?	
ASHIM MUKHOPADHYAY	5
INDIRA'S BIRBHUM WAR	
PRABIR BASU	8
THE CENTRE'S OBSESSION	
R. P. MULLICK	11
<i>Book Review</i>	
UNDERSTANDING NYERERE'S PHILOSOPHY	
ANIRUDHA GUPTA	12
ABORTIVE COMEDY	
MRIGANKA SEKHAR RAY	14
<i>Clippings</i>	
MAO ON CONCESSIONS	14
LETTERS	16

Editor : Samar Sen

PRINTED AT MODERN INDIA PRESS,  
7, RAJA SUBODH MULLICK SQUARE,  
CALCUTTA-13 AND PUBLISHED WEEKLY  
FOR GERMINAL PUBLICATIONS (P) LTD.  
BY SAMAR SEN FROM 61, MOTT LANE,  
CALCUTTA-13  
TELEPHONE: 243202

## CART BEFORE HORSE

IT is not without significance that in the past few weeks Congress(R) and CPI members of Parliament have repeatedly pleaded with the Government for a dialogue with the Naxalites. The Naxalites' relation with the CPI(M) being what it is, the only parties likely to gain if the Naxalites take to parliamentary politics are the Congress(R) and the CPI. The Government has not disappointed these parties altogether. The Minister for Home Affairs, Mr Pant, has thrice assured them that the Government was ready to open a dialogue, and on one occasion he went as far as to declare that a dialogue was already on. Subsequent reports did not bear this out; and Mr Pant hastened to explain what he had meant by a dialogue that was not. Yet the discussions in Parliament seem to point to the marvellous realisation that the law and order problem in West Bengal cannot be solved by police methods alone.

The Prime Minister's dinner to Mr Jyoti Basu is also of some import. Obviously, they did not discuss the good old days in England. This was their first meeting after the Prime Minister had made her choice between the two Communist parties which forced the CPI(M) to take an anti-Congress(R) stance. In the intervening period Mr Basu turned down several offers to meet the Prime Minister. The party's sudden decision to hold the Politburo meeting in New Delhi when the majority of the Politburo members are residents of Calcutta may have been a hint to the Prime Minister that the party may now respond to a gesture. The PM took the loud hint and the Politburo meeting in New Delhi has provided an occasion for a dialogue between the CPI(M) and the Government. Mr Basu met the Prime Minister before the party took up discussion on West Bengal. Whether the result of his talk is reflected in the party resolution or not, there is no doubt that it is going to have some impact on the party's programme in the State and also on its stance at future sessions of the all-party conference to devise measures to restore normality in West Bengal.

The belated—and perhaps feigned—realisation on the part of the Government that what West Bengal needs is a political truce cannot by itself achieve anything. Dialogues may lead to temporary improvement, but a relapse will soon occur. The Government's professions will sound hollow as long as the army remains deployed virtually all

over the State, the police retain their unlimited freedom to persecute, harass, torture and shoot people, and the preventive detention laws are invoked wantonly to imprison people whose crimes, the Government knows, cannot be proved in a court of law, as long as political prisoners are treated as criminals and killed or maimed at the slightest sign of rebellion over the inhumanity and indignity heaped on them in jails. For more than six months the army is assisting the civil administration in

maintaining law and order, though the original plan was to keep the army deployed for not more than six weeks. Nearly half of the CRP units in the country are now stationed in West Bengal, and they seem to have set up abode here permanently. Can the administration remain at war if the leaders of the Government are really seeking a political truce? As long as the agents of terror are active and on the scene, no amount of talking at the leadership level will fool the public.

necessary by the failure of General Jaafar al-Nimeiry to redeem the pledges made to the people by the Revolutionary Council after the May 1969 revolution. He also seemed to forget that it was a coalition of progressives which ended the economic and political mismanagement of the Government headed by Muhammad Ahmed Mahgoub. Because of the importance he attached to personal loyalty, there was a steady erosion of the support he once enjoyed. Communists and their sympathisers were systematically weeded out of the army, civil service, and from Khartoum University, even though many of them were actively involved in the May Revolution. In any case, things were developing in such a way that if the leftists did not intervene, the rightists would have overthrown General Nimeiry as soon as the process of eliminating the Communists had been completed. Differences on policy within the Cabinet—between the Communist-minded and those with moderate Arab nationalist views—early became apparent. Atta was dismissed from the Revolutionary Council last November along with Babikr al-Nur and Osman Hamadallah. All of them, now executed, belonged to the original core of the Free Officers Organisation which led the May coup. General Nimeiry had begun to function without taking the Revolutionary Council or the Ministers into confidence. He was also not consistent in his policy toward a union with Egypt, Libya and Syria. The leftists did not favour the federation move as they thought that conditions were not yet ripe for it and the likely federating units were not all progressives. After having condemned those who opposed the projected union, General Nimeiry went back on the Tripoli agreement on the ground that Sudan's participation at this time would be a liability to other members of the projected union. He has now decided to join the group of Egypt, Libya and Syria.

The May Revolution promised a fair deal to the three southern provinces which in spite of severe repres-

## Setback In The Arab World

The forces of progress in the Arab world have suffered a series of reverses in the past few days. The relentless repression of the Fedayeen by the Jordanian King and the coups and counter-coups in Morocco and Sudan have at least for the time being consolidated the position of two monarchs and a general. It will now be very difficult for the Palestinian guerillas to stage a comeback after King Hussein's military avalanche of July 17. The repression in varied forms began since the September 1970 civil war; after the administration and the army were purged of all known sympathisers of the guerillas, the Jordanian army made repeated forays into Fedayeen bases. Cut off geographically from Syria which provided succour to the Palestinian movement and effectively barred from operating in the civilian centres, the guerillas have been driven to the wall in course of ten months. While the indignant but ineffective reaction of the so-called progressive Arab regimes had been quietly ignored by King Hussein, his army continued to get the backing of America in its operation against the guerillas.

Although there are still doubts as to who masterminded the coup in Morocco, King Hassan's assessment that it was full of imperfections will not be disputed. After the coup was foiled he said to the Press with a note of sarcasm that the plotters "took

over the Ministry of Information, but they forgot about police headquarters. They occupied the radio station, but forgot about the telegraph and post office." The exasperating corruption in high places led some straightforward army officers—who were themselves very rich—to replace the monarchy by a republic with the King remaining as a mere figurehead. What is more important than all this is how the Arab States reacted to the coup which had taken them by surprise: even Colonel Muammar Gaddafi who offered Libyan ground, armour and air support to his ideological brothers in Rabat in a manner as if this was pre-arranged had really no prior information of the coup which was put down in a few hours. President Hourai Boumedienne and President Anwar el Sadat were in the company of King Hussein and King Feisal to wish King Hassan well. Sadat also air-dashed to Mersa Matruh to persuade Gaddafi not to do anything which might disturb the power relations in the Arab world. There were, however, no differences so far as showing their teeth to undo the coup staged by Major Hashem al-Atta was concerned. (President Sadat said after the coup was foiled that the confederation of the Arab States was born with teeth and events in Sudan showed how sharp they were).

The coup in Khartoum was made

sion by Khartoum have continued a freedom struggle for fifteen years. The conflict between the Centre and Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal has already taken a toll of nearly half a million lives. Major Atta promised home rule to the south but that is now a closed chapter. Moslem Arabs of the north make up more than two-thirds of Sudan's 15 million population and have dominated the black Africans of the south. The southerner has never been influenced by the Islam of the north because of his tribal links across the borders of Congo and Uganda, geographical separation and indirect political rule practised under the British regime. Their problem will continue after the abortive coup in Sudan.

## Ambushes Again

Those who had been pondering over Tun Abdul Razak's trade pact with Peking for the past few months could not believe that the Malaysian premier was sort of a dialectician. While Kuala Lumpur was pulling off a \$150 million transaction with China in tin Razak began a drive against the peasants after Government troops had run into a guerilla ambush in the Ipoh-Sugei Seput area of Perak. A National Action Committee has been set up and officers in the affected districts have been given unrestricted powers to wield all the resources of their armoury.

Twice within a month government forces have been waylaid by peasant partisans at the same place where the uprising began in 1948. Though it

---

Our agent at Alipurduar

Mr SUBHAS BOSE,

Newtown Library,

Alipurduar P.O.],

Dist. Jalpaiguri,

West Bengal.

JULY 31, 1971

was put down ruthlessly recent incidents show that the guerillas have been able to hold on despite early reverses. In fact official channels have been giving out news of a steady trickle of communists to the south from their bases astride Malaysia's northern border with Thailand. They are reportedly aiming at the hearts and minds of the southern population. The existence of a sizable hideout within only 600 yards of a tin mine and three miles of a police outpost speaks eloquently of some success in winning over a part of the population.

Razak's tenure in office has never been without trouble. There is the strife between the Malaysian capitalists and their Chinese counterparts. Though the Chinese constitute 40 per cent of the total population their economic prowess is wholly out of proportion to their numbers. And it has been the constant endeavour of the Malaysian moneybags to use the state power to wrest the economic initiative from the Chinese. Evidently, the Chinese millionaires were unable to swallow the Sedition Act that reduced them to the status of second-rate citizens.

For the Chinese peasants Razak has other methods. Often their yellowing crops are put to the torch or their title to land denied so that government farms can be further extended. Add to this the sufferings of a stagnating economy which has extended. Add to this the sufferings at the lower rung of the society and mobilised it against the oppressive regime. The result is increasing guerilla activity. And though such activities in Perak, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and in areas bordering Thailand have been written off by official sources as the propaganda trick of a handful of rebels, the incidents around Ipoh show that a fair-sized communist-backed guerilla force is again becoming a haunting reality. This acquires added importance when viewed from the perspective of the recent restructuring of forces in South-East Asia where the record of insurgency is the longest.

*View from Delhi*

## The Anti-China Alliance

FROM A POLITICAL  
CORRESPONDENT

THE new level in the Sino-U.S. relations has found everyone, from the anti-China gladiators in the Foreign Office down to Mrs Indira Gandhi's rupee trade-financed drummer boys, responding in the same Pavlovian manner, their reflexes conditioned over years. The CPI, the Foreign Office and the Kremlin find themselves thinking on the same wavelength and howling mad from the level of despair.

Following the Soviet Ambassador's unpublicised meeting with Mrs Gandhi to discuss Mr Nixon's Peking visit, the Lobby has got down to its job. It is touting a plan for everything short of an open defence pact (described as a "political treaty") with the Soviet Union and for an Indian initiative for a West German-Soviet detente on the basis of Willy Brandt's proposals.

This proposed counter-thrust to a Sino-U.S. detente aims at an anti-China phalanx of which India would be a vital component. It would mean a total accord of peace in Europe and a shifting of the zone of tension to the Ussuri and to the Sino-Indian borders. In the past all the inspired stories about West German supply of vital equipment for China's nuclear programme originated in Berlin. When the Ussuri clashes took place, there was an inspired attempt to suggest a West German-Chinese collusion against the Soviet Union because a minor crisis over Germany coincided with these clashes.

If the sinister plan goes through, India would be reduced to a new degree of satellitism because we know who mans the missile bases and the air force in the UAR. India would find herself in the position of the UAR and continue to confront China to please somebody.

There is candid admission in the

anti-China lobby here that the Soviet plan to wean Pakistan away from China has failed. It is possible that the Soviet attitude to Pakistan might undergo significant change in the next few weeks and India might be egged on to launching military action over Bangladesh if only to sabotage any chance of a Sino-U.S. detente. In the past both the super-powers have been prevailing upon India not to recognise Bangladesh or think in terms of a military intervention. But one of the two might now be interested in forcing India into a frame of action that would make for her total dependence on one super-power.

Indian help to the Mukti Bahini is no secret. Newspapers abroad have begun writing about it while Indian papers are still held on the leash. What has however gone unreported is the fact of discrimination in the matter of recruitment. The political commissars at the recruitment camps are making it a point to eliminate all leftist elements after careful screening. Secondly, there is a conscious attempt to minimise recruitment of volunteers of peasant and working class origin and to take in only middle-class elements. The premium is on those sections who can be easily won over by the Pakistani regime.

The Awami League is an amorphous political quantity while the Mukti Bahini has no real political leadership. New Delhi seems to be more concerned about the danger of a leftist leadership emerging in the Bangladesh struggle than in the victory of the Mukti Bahini. The daily briefings where reports of the Mukti Bahini's exploits are doled out to the gullible correspondents speak all the time of the Pakistani casualties but what about the casualties on the other side? Whether the Mukti Bahini can win a war by itself is open to question now.

The moment the Mukti Bahini's offensive makes an impact on the Pakistani forces, General Yahya Khan might open a front in the western sector, in Kashmir and this would suit the anti-China lobby fine. It sees in

such a situation the possibility of breaking the Sino-U.S.-Pakistan triangle. The United States would be in a serious dilemma and the development might have its impact, however limited, on the Sino-U.S. relations, according to the lobby.

In any case India has been played out. Recognition of Bangladesh would necessarily mean escalation. One fails to understand the logic of those (like the CPI and CPM) who want immediate recognition and open help to the Mujibnagar government but no military intervention. The line between the two is deceptive and thin. A protracted war in Bangladesh is no solution to the refugee problem. For India the immediate problem is one of sending the refugees back, reversing the flow. The new wave of refugees (this time a large proportion would be Muslim) would hit India in the next two weeks and the problem would have acquired a new dimension. Parliament would vote a supplementary budget and a stiff dose of taxation and that would be the breaking point. The government in Mujibnagar has nothing to worry about. The refugees are not its charges. Meantime, those styling themselves special envoys of the Bangladesh government go abroad on Indian passports and under assumed names and canvass plum jobs for themselves. There is something bizarre about the whole scenario.

July 25, 1971

## India's Options

T. Karki Hussain

NIXON'S announcement of his proposed visit to China has understandably caused worldwide surprise though a major American initiative had been anticipated for quite sometime in view of the evident shift in the U.S. position on China. The official reaction in India was expressed by the Foreign Minister, Mr Swaran Singh, who welcomed the American move as a vindication of

India's policy towards China and hoped that the visit to China would lead to general reduction of world tensions. He hastened to add that India wished that normalization of Sino-US relations was not conceived within the framework of power politics.

One can accept the Foreign Minister's statement as a mere academic exercise because, apart from expressing perfunctory sentiments, it does not spell out India's options. Though it is early to realize all the implications of a Sino-American detente, it may be worthwhile for the Indian leadership to consider the immediate effects of the new relationship on their own position, especially in the context of Bangladesh.

First of all, it should be recognised that Pakistan played an important role in facilitating Sino-U.S. contacts, thereby gaining further legitimacy for its military regime. In view of the Sino-American convergence on the issue of Bangladesh, it could be taken that Pakistan would now find it easier to resolve the Bangladesh crisis in its favour. For various reasons, both the United States and China are interested that the balance of power on the sub-continent should not shift in favour of India. It is from this point of view that they want to see Pakistan's territorial integrity remaining intact.

In order to overcome the impasse, India has three options. First, it can radically change its present attitude towards China and begin negotiations with it. It can continue with its present policy and behave as if nothing has changed. It can move towards the Soviet orbit for a kind of counterbalance against Sino-U.S. agreement.

The first choice would require a recognition of the fact that the territorial issue can, with some effort, be dissociated from several other aspects of Sino-Indian relations, including economic ones. Despite its serious differences with China in the recent past, including a border flare-up the Soviet Union has been able to restore diplomatic relations with China, con-

clude a trade agreement and enter into negotiations with it. India, on the other hand, has continued to adhere to its old stand that relations with China can improve only when the Chinese vacate the territories under their occupation.

Further, India should be aware of the broad aims and objectives of both the United States and China in South Asia. The United States knows that till such time that the two triangles, China-India-Pakistan and Soviet Union-China-India persist, its position in South Asia will be intact. The Soviet Union and China will continue to offset each other's influence. India will continue to depend on the USA as on the Soviet Union vis-a-vis China. That is why, the United States might be more than reconciled to China's 'presence' in Pakistan inasmuch as it acts as a counterweight to Soviet influence in India.

Under the present circumstances, it is not inconceivable that the United States and China may freeze the subsystem in South Asia and thwart India from re-establishing its credibility as a major regional power. India can break the vicious circle by adopting a more flexible policy with regard to Peking.

However, there are several constraints, internal as well as external, which will inhibit India from making friendly moves towards China. First, the leadership itself has restricted capabilities and is not in a position to project new thinking in its policy decisions. Secondly, the Soviet Union is an important constraint. As long as Sino-Soviet rivalry continues, it might not be favourably disposed towards a China-India detente. And finally, China may not be keen on a rapprochement with India or may insist on its own terms.

In view of the overwhelming odds at work, could India remain indifferent to the significant changes in the power structure around her? Or, could it continue to be unaware of those changes?

This leaves India with the third option of seeking closer relations with the Soviet Union. By implication this might mean alignment with the Soviet Union. But before doing that India should consider the various implications of using Soviet friendship as a counterweight. Though Soviet support to India, on the Sino-Indian question has been crucial for India

in several ways, it has been primarily motivated by the compulsions of Russia's own differences with China. In the context of Indo-Pak relations, however, the Soviet response has been perceptibly different. Having laid the foundation of a new policy of friendship towards Pakistan, the Soviet Union has gradually begun to stress the concept of parity between India and Pakistan. This implies that it might be willing to play the mediator as at Tashkent but not be an unqualified supporter of India.

Further, the Soviet Union may be interested to have India as an ally but not at the expense of her contacts with the United States and China. In the present triangular complex, therefore, the Big Three, despite their differences and competitions, have actively been seeking an understanding to co-exist. In case China and the Soviet Union arrive at a rapprochement, even if it may be a limited one, the Soviet Union might change its posture towards India accordingly. Indo-Soviet relations being based on inequalities, chances are that India may become a satellite without gaining a bargaining point in this kind of relationship.

## Will They Return ?

ASHIM MUKHOPADHYAY

**I**N spite of the reported victories of the Mukti Bahini in different parts of East Bengal, the exodus from there has not stopped. On the contrary thousands of people are still pouring in. According to Mr R. K. Khadikar, the Union Rehabilitation Minister, the influx may soon reach the 10 million mark as against the earlier expectations of about 8 million. As a result, the cost, for six months, of feeding and sheltering these people will also be much higher than the \$400 million (Rs 300 crores) estimated earlier in respect of 8 million refugees. The aid the

Government has received so far amounts to about \$151 million, but the entire aid is not in cash; it also includes materials for feeding and sheltering the refugees.

Whether India will get more aid is uncertain. What is certain is that she will get more refugees, and by the end of 1971, if the situation in East Pakistan is allowed to drift, the total number of people crossing into India will be not less than 15 million.

In East Pakistan there is apparently an endless cycle of violence. Apart from the misdeeds of the 'Razakars' (volunteers), the army itself

has invented many new methods of repression. One of these is the concentration camp. The army has established these camps behind the high walls of the military cantonments in Dacca, Chittagong, Jessore and Comilla. A handful of army officers who could not stand the atrocities committed on the camp inmates by fellow officers, have risked their own freedom by describing the treatment now being given to thousands of Bengalis. In their desperately overcrowded cells these unhappy people have little space to sleep and sit. The army has at times killed so wan-

tonly that the prisoners naturally fear that they might at any moment be taken out and shot. On the other hand when the wives or other relations of the prisoners ask the Pakistani authorities for information they feign ignorance—maybe the missing persons have moved into India.

The concentration camps and the new constitution as envisaged by President Yahya Khan in his June 28 broadcast have equally terrorised the people, especially the Hindus. Because, in spite of the President's pledge that the Hindus will be treated as first-class citizens in Pakistan, his declaration that the constitution must be based on Islamic ideology and must be the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in the true sense has made the minority community apprehend many awful things in the near future if they dare to stay in that country any longer. The Hindus in East Pakistan have had many bitter experiences of what is called an ideal Islamic state. From the days of Mr Mohammed Ali Jinnah to date whenever there was any declaration about the introduction of some Islamic laws or an Islamic constitution, it was soon followed by communal riots resulting in the migration of the minority population and thus showing what such Islamic laws or constitution would mean actually. It is evident that most of the Hindus who have entered India will not go back, if they are not forced under some exceptional circumstances.

Not only the Hindu, but the Muslim refugees also are reluctant to go back. Most of them are peasants and peasants are the people who hold the key to what is going on in East Pakistan. They have suffered more in the fighting than anybody else. Their huts have been destroyed, their crops damaged or left to rot in the fields because the entire village has fled. A large number of them while trekking mile after mile to India died on the wayside. If the survivors are to go back to East Pakistan the most essential condition is land. But the small farmers and sharecroppers who

form a big portion of the migrating East Pakistanis, will not get back their land. Their land has now been distributed among the "loyal citizens", especially among the poor people who have either been forced by the authorities to stay or themselves have failed to flee because of some unavoidable circumstances. The policy followed by the Pakistani authorities is expected to pay some dividends. In a poor and underdeveloped country like East Pakistan, the people's major grievance is against poverty and starvation and not against the authorities as such. The regime of Ayub Khan, his rise and fall, is proof of this. The extreme poverty in rural areas, the corruption in the bureaucracy and the coalition governments both at the Centre and in the provinces enabled Ayub to capture power. As long as he continued to pour in economic aid to the villages, he remained popular among the masses. But as soon as he started to think that he had done enough to stabilise one man's rule, trouble started. Ultimately the situation reached a climax, and the Leviathan collapsed. The recent elections in Iran and Indonesia have, also shown that in spite of their deliberately reactionary character, the governments there have swept the polls only because they have lured the common people by certain pledges, some of which will surely be fulfilled. In East Pakistan, especially in the rural areas, people are less politicised. They voted for the Awami League not because they understood the complexities of the Six Points or the subtle disparities in the annual budgets, but because they were convinced by the Awami League that it was powerful enough to improve their conditions of living. But as things have now changed altogether and the Awami League has failed to cope with the situation, the people have no alternative but to see if the military authorities, in spite of their reign of terror, would extend some mercy to their victims. There is a Bengali proverb—never mind a kick from a milching cow. In East Pakistan, there are 6.5 million holdings

of which 80% families own less than 3 acres of land to cultivate and more than 36% of the agricultural population is landless. So, distribution of the land of the migrants will help the army authorities. People, so long landless or with plots of land not enough for bare subsistence, will begin to think that on the existence of the army depends their future. So, more people will get themselves enrolled as "Razakars" or members of the "Peace committees". Although they will do so because they are poor they will be called agents by some. Anyway, redistribution of land in East Pakistan will handicap the return of the refugees because those who have now acquired land will be in no mood to give it back. They will take all steps to prevent the re-entry of the evacuees.

This also explains why despite the many tall utterances by the Pakistani army officers, their refugee reception centres look so desolate—the entire population consisting of some forlorn dogs. Army officials claim that some 75,000 refugees have returned, but several reception centres have yet to register their first returns. Like the land-grabbing people, the army itself is also against the return of refugees. While the men given land are thinking in terms of economic advantages or disadvantages, the army is assessing the consequences of re-entry of the refugees from a political point of view. If it has to give a cover of what is called "guided democracy" to its autocratic rule then it has to prevent the return of refugees. If in the near future East Pakistan again goes to the polls, the West Pakistani ruling authorities will have no alternative but to show their own population either as bigger than or on par with that of the east. If the refugees are allowed to come back East Pakistan will again get an upper hand over the West.

#### Strategic Motive

Behind the present land policy of the Pakistan Government there is another motive, and it is more strategic than political or economic. The

districts of Dinajpur, Kusthtia, Jessore and Khulna in the western sector and Mymensingh, Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong in the east are very close to the Indian border. All these districts are targets of frequent attacks by the Mukti Bahini who generally do not go deep inside but operate within the first five or six miles of the frontier. Whenever they smell danger they cross back into India for shelter. Hence, according to the West Pakistani authorities, the best way to save these districts is to disperse the Hindus and those Bengali Muslims who are supposed to have some direct or indirect sympathy for the Mukti Bahini and distribute their lands among the Biharis and the conservative section of the Bengali peasantry. The process has already started, particularly in Jessore and Khulna.

Another great calamity is awaiting luckless East Pakistan—famine. According to reports from different fact-finding teams and parliamentary delegations, famine will start by the first week of August unless adequate precautionary measures are taken. A prominent Awami League leader of Kusthtia has told this correspondent that it is difficult to say how many people will be able to escape from disaster.

Though there are some immediate causes for the imminent famine, the ground was being prepared from long ago, especially since Ayub Khan's rise to power. Soon after the coup d'etat of October 1958, Ayub introduced the system of Basic Democracy to protect himself by a loyal electoral college. Actually, the members of this electoral college, the Basic Democrats, were nothing but political animals whose sole duty was to defend their master against the anger of the starving millions. It was to feed these people that Ayub started the Rural Works Programme. Within 21 months of the referendum and the "election" of the President in October 1961, the Government of Pakistan negotiated an agreement with the USA for the supply, over a four-year period, of \$62.55 million

worth of surplus agricultural commodities under PL-480 with the aim of carrying out the Rural Works Programme. From then till Ayub's fall, the USA continued to pour aid into the country, especially into its eastern wing where political and economic instability was more deep-rooted. The Basic Democrats who were in charge of the distribution of this aid in the rural areas became rich overnight. The only thing they did was to supervise road building. In the name of rural development Ayub made a heavy investment in road building which accounted for 70-80 per cent of the works programme expenditure. Why he did so has now become quite clear: since the outbreak of the recent trouble, except for the first few days when the Mukti Bahini was in a dominating position, most of the country remains in the hands of the West Pakistan army. The large network of lengthy metalled roads connecting the important towns and villages with Dacca has enabled the army to spread out at short notice.

The benefit of the Rural Aid Programme never reached the remote villages. Out of 300 circle officers who used to report on the progress of the Aid Programme, at least 134 had confessed that about 717 projects proved useless. Most of the embankments constructed "so carefully" were washed away by a single shower. The bridges were actually three or four bamboo poles placed horizontally over a canal. The school buildings, the "great monuments of Ayub's service to mankind", had corrugated iron sheets as their roofs; and the brickwalls sometimes disappeared under the pressure of low winds.

Nothing concrete was done during Ayub's regime to improve East Pakistan's agricultural production. Though the people were suffering from acute food shortage the Central Government continued to export rice to the USSR, Yugoslavia and Kuwait to the tune of 97,000, 6,000, and 1,000 tons respectively and 92,000 tons more to other countries. No genuine attempt was made to help the

agriculturists of East Pakistan. It has already been stated that 36% of them are landless and have even no plough or bullock and 33% do not have any foodstuff. Of those who possess land 80% have less than 3 acres each and therefore their scope of production is limited. Still, something better could have been done if they could get other facilities. Even at the height of the Rural Works Programme 50% of the genuine agriculturists in East Pakistan failed to get any loan from the government. They did not get chemical manures even for 4% of their cultivable land and only 7% of their fields were under irrigation. At that time 2,74,000 acres of land in West Pakistan had been placed under mechanised cultivation, but in East Pakistan only 7,000 acres. As a result of all these, the contribution of agriculture to the GNP went down from 50.3 in 1956-60 to 45.8 in 1968. Yield per acre of rice declined from 12.1 to 11.3 and that of jute from 19.8 to 14.4 maunds. In 1948 the per capita availability of food in East Pakistan was 15.82 oz per day. In 1965-66 it came down to 14.46 oz, in 1966-67 to 14.03 oz and in 1969-70 to 13.53 oz or less.

To date Rs 93 crores of official taxes and Rs 200 crores of unofficial taxes have been imposed on the poor peasantry of East Pakistan.

A comparative study of the production of food and cash crops in East and West Pakistan will show how badly the former had been neglected under military rule.

West Pakistan produced 6.8 million tons of wheat and 2.1 millions of rice in 1968-69, registering an increase of 8% and 40% respectively over the preceding year. The combined effects of intensive use of fertilisers, improved seeds and expansion of tubewell irrigation brought about by Government support and incentive since early 1967, have transformed West Pakistan from a deficit to a surplus region in terms of foodgrains. The area under Mexi-Pak wheat rose from 2.4 million acres in 1967-68 to 6 million acres in 1968-69 and is

expected to extend over an area of 10 million acres. Cultivation of maize, cotton and oilseeds has also greatly improved in West Pakistan. Currently, maize is cultivated over an area of 12 million acres and production is 7,00,000 tons. Cotton production has increased in the past four years from 2.01 million tons to 2.96 million tons with improvement in yields from 2.7 maunds to 3.3 maunds per acre. Export of cotton rose from Rs 287 million in 1964-65 to Rs 442 million in 1968-69 and cotton manufactures from Rs 189 million to Rs 417 million.

In East Pakistan the damage done to rice and jute crops by floods in 1968-69 was so severe that there was a decline in value added in the agricultural sector by 0.5% from the preceding years. Production of rice fell from 10.99 million tons to 10.90 million tons, while jute somehow managed to maintain the previous year's level at 5.99 million bales. The typhoon of November-December, 1970 has not only depopulated many villages in southern East Bengal but also damaged hundreds of acres of surplus areas including Patuakhali and Barisal by saline water. The price situation in the country will also show how its eastern part has been gradually led towards a famine. During 1968-70 wheat prices in West Pakistan were generally lower while rice prices in East Pakistan moved upwards. On an annual average, the price index for wheat was 14% lower in 1969-70 compared with the previous year, but the price index for rice rose by 9.9%. In East Pakistan, the increase was 11.3%. The index of wholesale prices in West Pakistan rose by 2.8% but in the east it registered an increase of 8.8%.

All these together with the devastation caused by the West Pakistan army have made the situation really terrible. Wherever the army went, it destroyed the granaries of the peasants; even government storehouses were burnt down. The trouble in East Pakistan broke out at a time when the harvesting of the Iri paddy was about to start. The Don Quix-

es of West Pakistan not only killed the unarmed people but destroyed the matured Iri crops by spraying poisonous chemicals over the fields. Cultivation of the Aus paddy which had started by that time had to be abandoned. The army was in full action in the rural areas, so the farmers could not work properly; as a result weeds checked the further growth of paddy seedlings. Relief shipments for the typhoon-affected areas were coming in steadily mainly to Chittagong until the beginning of March, when the port came to a standstill during the civil disobedience movement of the Awami League. Since then little or nothing has been unloaded and several grain ships, after waiting for a

month or more, have sailed away.

At Washington, State Department officials announced on July 13 that Pakistan would have to import at least 1,090,000 tons of foodgrains during the current fiscal year. But even if this food reaches East Pakistan, it is doubtful whether it will reach the starving people at all. A lot will turn on the army's ability to get the ports working quickly and organise enough transport to get the food distributed. But if it does that, it must be prepared to cut back on its military operations and possibly lose control over large areas.

Any way the future of "Sonar Bangla" is quite dark. As for what we should do, no one seems to know.

## Indira's Birbhum War

PRABIR BASU

WHAT is happening now in Birbhum happened at Naxalbari, Debra-Gopiballavpur and many other places. It will happen everywhere. The scheme is the same and will be pursued by the servitors of imperialism and social-imperialism without any democratic inhibition. The most notable feature of the reality in Birbhum is that an occupation army has been torturing, maiming and arresting unarmed poor people in the most cowardly fashion.

We know that if CPI(ML) cadres are butchered in streets, fields or jails, our political parties would salve their conscience with a feeble impotent protest. What we did not expect is the silence of every parliamentary party, from the Congress(R) to the CPI(M) on the undeclared war launched by the government not only against the CPI(ML) but the unarmed people of the entire district.

In this silent war the government has all "patriotic" "national" newspapers as its cohorts. Professional journalists visit Santiniketan or Suri almost like thieves (we do not know why) in the name of collecting re-

ports—and TA and DA. Possibly the most courageous among them, once in a bus on his way from Bolpur to Suri, gave vent to his feelings on law and order in order to provoke some of his talkative co-passengers. Only a whispering remark came from a middle-aged state employee: "Shh! Don't discuss, spies everywhere!" The normal Calcutta journalist is instructed to hear nothing beyond official information. Even his visual experience is tailored at the time of writing. What the journalists do in the case of Birbhum is to explain their visual experience in the light of their confabulations with the high-ups of the district administration: roads are empty even at 9 a.m., the desolate and dark evenings in any subdivisional town bear the fearful semblance of midnight, the bi-weekly urban hats do not attract rural people. All this is part of the conspiracy of silence over the degree of military-police brutalities against the population. By raising a hue and cry about Naxalite violence, these journalists took adequate care to suppress news of the violence of the army and police.

The administration's complete iso-

lation from the people has led to widespread administrative violence. Having no confidence in its own police ranks and in people entrusted with collecting anti-Naxal intelligence, the Central Government has gone berserk and formulated the present anti-people plan. *The Statesman*, *Jugantar* and other newspapers, as precursors of this plan-execution, fostered the reports that even the police personnel of the district were helping the Naxalites. Veering round this pet thesis of a 'revolutionary' party like the CPI(M), one A.B. reported in *Frontier* (July 10) that, to his surprise, CPI(ML) activists caught with snatched rifles (including one of a murdered policeman) in the Rampurhat area were not shot dead at the time of arrest! This defiance of the Home Department's instruction, it was hinted, was the work of Naxal-police connivance. A.B. is a clever fellow and as a result he dramatised the Naxalite characters more than he did the events or the statistical figures of murdered jotedars' land acreage. It is not the place to challenge the death register of jotedar martyrs or his meticulous accounts of the property of the dead, but what is relevant for our purpose is his conclusion—indeed a clever variant of the same in *Jugantar* or *The Statesman*—that the Naxals do more harm than good to the rural poor, and that they, having no roots among the village poor, are teenaged adventurists and that but for the bad administrative set-up, these boys having personal connections with vested interests would not have been able to make such headway.

All these journalistic exercises were meant to justify the military-police action in the name of law and order and promote a psychological imperative that, as the CPI(ML) activists have nothing to do with the poor, the army and police have no other choice but to terrorise and torture 'some' people in order to trace out the Naxalite culprits.

A few days back the Vice-Chancellor of Visva-Bharati, under pressure from students and workers, re-

quested the District Magistrate not to harass or arrest Visva-Bharati employees without taking the authorities into confidence. The DM very politely informed him that he was authorised to take nobody into confidence except those in the administration and that his police could arrest anybody for 'interrogation' and he might at any time subject the whole university campus to combing operation.

#### Prominent Feature

The single most prominent feature of the present military administration is that no young person, whatever may be his avowed faith or faithlessness, is to be spared 'interrogation'. So, away from their own houses, Birbhum youths have been playing as far as practicable, hide and seek with the armed watchdogs of the world's biggest democracy. Every onset of a military caravan in the local towns or bazaars means darkness at noon and hell at midnight. It is not only young people or teen-agers that are having a trying time these days, rumours are there that if an aged person unfortunately looks young or oddly healthy, CRP officers consider him to be a possible Naxal and therefore a special target of the baton. Some shop assistants of a famous dealer—who happens to be a district stalwart of the Congress(R)—were arrested at Bolpur for 'arson, gun-snatching and murder' of spies. The youngest and sickliest of them—hardly twelve years old—was convicted in a case of rifle-snatching from the CRP. The employer telephoned the police station to certify that the arrested used to work for almost twelve hours in the shops and so could have had no connection with anything affecting law and order. He was advised to keep quiet. Ultimately, the arrested were bailed out to learn that for their safety the employer has extended their working hours without however increasing their wages.

The most worried man in Birbhum villages today is a poor father who happens to have a number of young sons, because he can neither send

them to some poor relatives for shelter nor afford the cost of establishing their innocence in court.

While there is hardly any policy discrimination between urban and rural people so far as arresting them is concerned, the methods of 'interrogation' differ. To be severely beaten in course of 'interrogation' is a special prerogative of the village poor—particularly youths. The villager is set free, but not before he has obliged the police with some money. Money is supplied by a village tout who behind his client's back negotiates the transaction. Some police officers, however do not allow middlemen into these transactions and straightaway take cash with an air of generosity generally found among old temple priests.

Somehow urban people are not asked to pay bribes unless the relatives of the arrested themselves throw hints through a middleman. One must admit that in the town areas beating in the course of interrogation has now been suspended. For example, in Bolpur town, on a particular day large numbers of people were arrested for 'interrogation' from both a middle-class area and an area largely inhabited by low-caste people (*Huari, Bagdi, Dom* etc). It was reported that while the second set of people were beaten up, the first group was not.

How do people react to the inflictions? The immediate reaction is all-pervading panic, but once the operation is gone through, wrath against the administration becomes violent and somewhat desperate.

In a village near Ilambazar a young pregnant woman suffering from some extra-physical ailment could not be sent to a local doctor staying just outside the combed area and died. The large-scale arrests and torture had already angered the people. The woman's death turned them violent. After the combing operation was over, the villagers held a meeting and thought of making a mass attack on the nearby army picket. The CPI(ML) activists reappeared and reportedly asked them

not to take such adventurous action at that moment. They explained that it was the People's Liberation Army which would take revenge against the entire state machinery.

This is not an isolated instance. In the Rampurhat area, the military-police brutality exposed the impotence of the local Congress(R) leadership of a group of predominantly pro-Congress villages. The leadership had tried to exonerate the police by pointing out the wickedness of the CPI(ML) cadres who had annihilated a local leader of the Congress(R)—a bad character and jotedar of the area. After the combing operations, however, the worst victims turned out to be young people—an active band of Chhatra Parishad workers—of the villages. Some were beaten so much that without timely hospitalisation they would have died. There were indiscriminate arrests. The net effect was that a good number of young boys of these villages tried to contact the CPI(ML) activists with the purpose of taking revenge on the police.

One more instance. Only a few miles away from Suri a village, predominantly inhabited by rich peasants and jotedars, and under the leadership of the so-called VRG (Village Resistance Group), did not let in unknown outsiders. Many usurers from nearby villages were extended temporary hospitality there in face of the growing anti-usury campaign of the CPI(ML). All of a sudden a guerilla squad entered the village at midnight when the entire contingent of the VRG was absent from the village (according to a local report, this VRG, in connivance with the police, used to commit dacoity in other villages) and snatched a few guns from some houses. The next morning the military and the police combed the entire village looking for guns and went in for selective beating and arrests. This led to mutual suspicion among the villagers, some of whom are reported to have sought protection of the CPI(ML). The particular village is now a house divided, with some of the VRG *mastans* engaged in anti-Naxal spying.

In towns and villages, there have also been abject surrenders to fate, particularly from the upper and lower middle class areas in towns and a section of the privileged peasantry in the rural areas. Age-wise, the reaction of the youths is extremely encouraging from the point of view of the CPI(ML) but the reaction of old people is presumably anti-Naxal in character.

#### On the Run

How do the CPI(ML) activists face the situation? It is almost anybody's guess. Certainly they are on the run. Seldom do people hear of bomb attacks on police pickets or troops. There are people who believe that CPI(ML) cadres are avoiding armed confrontation with the police. The reasons cited to explain this tactical retreat are however far from consistent. Sometimes it is said that in Birbhum, the CPI(ML) movement has no roots among the sons of the soil and therefore a compact military administration is bound to neutralise their manoeuvring capacity and drive them out from the district. This equation of CPI(ML) activists with youthful adventurers is in fact the pet thesis of all political parties opposed to any kind of Naxalism. But it is pointed out even by the sympathisers of the party that at the present level of organisation and experience, it will be premature on their part to engage in even a series of sniping attacks on police patrols or pickets. On the other hand, the people should be allowed to feel by themselves the need for total mobilisation against the police and the military.

What is to be noted at this stage is that the origin and development of the CPI(ML) in Birbhum has two distinct local characteristics. In the first place, although the party as in other districts followed the programme of class-annihilation as the form of class-struggle, unlike in Debra-Gopiballavpur it sought to take as many people as possible into confidence. There were instances when a particu-

lar jotedar was not annihilated, because the local peasants prescribed lighter punishment. In other words, the pattern of the movement followed, in a sense, the mass-line; and contrary to what other parties say, in Birbhum both among urban and rural poor, the CPI(ML) has successfully established itself as the only party of the poor. Nowhere else has the CPI(ML) gained such tremendous popular support and popular protection. As a matter of fact, in Birbhum, more than anywhere else, the party's action programmes were considerably influenced by the likes and dislikes of its supporters. This possibly explains the phenomenal growth of party support, while the organisation is lagging far behind.

The Birbhum party's main weakness stems from its second local feature—its underground organisation is not as mature as it is elsewhere. The activists are daring but not always tactful. The main reason for this organisational immaturity lies in its lack of combat experience and the relative ease with which the party made headway in this district. In other districts, there are different shades of political agents of the Establishment who operate from among the masses against CPI(ML) cadres. There are strong youth contingents of different political parties, particularly the CPM, operating against the CPI(ML) cadres, and over and above the state police administration is more alert about the left political elements in general, and the Naxals in particular. In Birbhum, the CPI(ML) did not feel these difficulties and as a result the party's steeling has not been adequate.

This may lead to danger in the face of the military-police combing operations going on throughout the district. One should not be surprised if the present phase of retreat of the district CPI(ML) ends in mass-scale arrests of activists causing the movement a temporary set back. The lessons are there, the CPI(ML) has to grasp them and use them in future.

# The Centre's Obsession

R. P. MULLICK

**S**PEAKING in Parliament on July 22 Mr K. C. Pant, Minister of State for Home Affairs, shrugged off his responsibility for conforming to the modalities of the legal process while holding thousands of young men in detention without trial. He did not even think it worthwhile to assure the House that the widespread complaints regarding pre-planned beatings to death of prisoners in West Bengal jails would be inquired into. Viewed against the tradition of such murders of prisoners in administrative custody, and the admission by Calcutta's Police Commissioner (last year) of more than one such prisoner being killed that way, the government's attitude amounts to abetting the acts.

Since March last year when President's rule was imposed on West Bengal, till its re-imposition in July, the basic motive of the Central Government has remained unaltered. The ruling party's spokesmen in the big business press had, in early 1970, spoken with raucous frankness about the government's intention to hold the CPI(M) "on probation", implying inter alia that even the party enjoying the largest measure of popular support could implement popular rule in the State only on the Centre's sufferance. Although the government was professedly concerned about the "maintenance of law and order", making it a plea for President's rule, the Home Minister had then conceded his inability to "give any rational explanation" as to why the "frequency" of disturbances and incidents caused by Naxalites after the imposition of such rule had gone up (during interpellations in the Lok Sabha in April 1970). Later a government spokesman said that it was "studying the Naxalite problem in depth", but apparently the study is not yet over, or even if made, the public would not be taken into confidence. However one of its spokes-

men in the Rajya Sabha said at the time that the CPI, CP(M) and CP (ML) were all parts of one whole with clandestine inter-relations.

Later the administration discovered that these units were so fiercely ill-disposed towards each other that they could be played off one against another to the ruling party's advantage.

The changes in the international situation, however, have modified the Congress(R)'s stance. Although the ruling circles are still chary of sharing power even with centre-of-left parties like the CPI—the Prime Minister said on the eve of the Parliamentary elections in February this year that "the future of the country would be doomed if there was a coalition Government at the Centre"—a closer veering together of these two parties is now discernible. The latest developments in the equation of power politics of the three super-powers over the Bangladesh issue have forced the Government of India to accept the USSR as sole mentor in international relations and to seek the collaboration of political elements within the country working under the latter's inspiration. Naturally therefore the CPI thinks it is still the friend, philosopher and guide of the ruling party, modifying the latter's steps in certain provinces (e.g. West Bengal and Bihar), acting as a go-between in political and foreign trade spheres, and finally functioning as a moderator of militant ultras within the country. The present moves of the CPI, divulging on the one hand the atrocities of the police on Naxalites, e.g. in Punjab where the provincial administration was till recently in the hands of the Akali Party, their political antagonists, and pleading with the Centre to take up an "enlightened" attitude of political benevolence towards the movement for buying off or domesticating their chief organisers, illustrate the revised political methodology of both. It shows the dimensions of the Centre's obsession with 'Naxalism'. But the target, as ever, remains the continuance of

Central rule over West Bengal, whatever the cost.

Facts about hundreds of political workers being eliminated under a systematic, Centrally directed plan of removing the bases of under-privileged peasant movements and of trade-union struggles are well known. Secret reports received by the Centre from its intelligence organisation in West Bengal dictate its actions. In late September last year, when the then Chief Secretary of the West Bengal Government and the State intelligence chief were shuffling about between Calcutta and New Delhi, the number of CRP battalions posted was 10. In the middle of May this year this number swelled to 15. Besides, there are companies of the Border Security Force and contingents from Haryana Police and a few battalions of Uttar Pradesh cops are possibly in position by now. The army has moved into eight districts out of sixteen, and a tightly patterned scheme of ferreting out the "suspects" by throwing three-ringed cordons around peaceful civil areas—an outer ring manned by military personnel, middle ring by the CRP and the police inducted from outside, and the inner ring for house-to-house searches by the provincial police including its armed and plain clothes sections—is being pursued. Results achieved so far, however, have increased the panic of the ruling circles. Knowledgeable circles in the capital confirm that the proportion of activists among the arrested in recent operations is negligible; that the trend towards hostile confrontation between the local populace and the police conducting inner-ring operations is marked; that the ease with which Naxalite workers intermingle with the masses is disturbing. As a result, and because of the fear of an impending Indo-Pakistani conflict, this time on a scale much greater than that of 1965, New Delhi's rulers are more prone than ever to see a conspiracy in every corner. Their chief political rival on the front of parliamentary politics in the State is the CP(M),

who, the Central Minister of State for Home is smugly convinced, are on their way out. But Mr Pant's complacency in this respect is not quite matched by the veiled warning he had to issue to this very organisation which, as he appears to feel, his "army" of CRP personnel, plus provincial police, the Central intelligence

men in plainclothes aided by their unappointed hirelings from fringe elements of hiehard anti-socials, will snuff out soon. If things were that easy, what is the need for masked threats, and for the continued dependence on supra-legal methods, abridging individual freedom and civil rights ?

of view that the books under review<sup>1</sup> render a great service. The first two volumes reproduce Nyerere's important speeches and writings from the early 1950s till the end of 1967, covering a number of topics ranging from the use of the *Swahili* language to the building of *Ujaama* villages. The other two give a collection of his essays on socialism.

## Book Review

# Understanding Nyerere's Philosophy

ANIRUDHA GUPTA

A Tanu leader once told me that Nyerere's intellectual attainments and bent of mind reminded him of Nehru. In some ways he was right. Like Nehru, Nyerere has a broad conception of history and an instinctive understanding of the problems and challenges facing the countries of Asia and Africa. He too is an "internationalist" in so far as he draws inspiration from, and sympathises with, popular causes beyond the frontiers of his own country. And like Nehru, again, he has a deep commitment to the past which is clear from his writings. Indeed, Nyerere's comments on the traditional values of African society read sometimes like Nehru's rambling thoughts on the unbroken continuity of Indian culture.

But here, perhaps, the similarities end. Nyerere lacks that flare for the dramatic which was Nehru's forte. He is neither passionate nor emotional in his public utterances. Indeed his style is that of an intellectual with this difference that, whereas the intellectuals remain unintelligible for the sake of their profession, Nyerere is anxious to translate his ideas into the everyday language of the masses.

He has also the rare gift of looking into the minor details of a problem which Nehru with his characteristic impatience—often misinterpreted as dynamism—might have swept aside for others to follow and tackle. The result was often a mess. With Nehru

"socialism" was a grand vision, a romance to be consummated, in his own words, "at the time of the tryst". With Nyerere, on the other hand, the building of socialism is a practical proposition that requires harder labour and greater sacrifice from the Tanzanian leaders and people. In the process, perhaps, new tensions may grow and even Nyerere's leadership may be challenged but, unlike Trotsky and Nehru, Nyerere does not seem to bother about his place in history.

There is another difference. In his personality and mental make-up Nehru was Westernized and urbane whereas, although Nyerere was trained in a Western university, he still thinks and acts like an African with his roots firmly planted in the soil. So far he has'nt had the occasion to regret that he too feels like a stranger in his own country!

However, in what way can we describe Nyerere as a philosopher? Is he a starry-eyed visionary with an Owenian flavour for socialism? Or, is he simply an eclectic who picks up ideas in the same way as a child collects pebbles on a sea-beach? Or, is he sincerely committed to reshaping Tanzanian society according to recognizable principles? It is hard to answer these questions. But the best way to understand Nyerere's political philosophy is to read his own writings and speeches and it is from this point

The first thing that strikes one is that at no stage during his political career has Nyerere closed his eyes to the immediate realities of the world so as to cling to a pet theory of his own. At the same time, while applying his mind to the problem of the day, he has not also lost sight of the long-term goals. As a result Nyerere is neither dogmatic nor—what is more unique—unprincipled. This combination of principled and unorthodox reasoning is what makes him indeed, an original thinker. Thus, to give an illustration: when in 1962 Nyerere propounded his ideas on socialism (*ujamaa*) he drew his model from what he considered to be the durable values of the extended African family-system. As he wrote: "In our traditional African society we were individuals within a community. We took care of the community and the community took care of us. We neither needed nor wished to exploit our fellowmen".<sup>2</sup> Accordingly African traditions stand against both capitalism and doctrinaire socialism.

### Romanticised View

This is obviously a romanticized view of Africa's past. Nevertheless one finds Nyerere making attempts to revise his opinion in view of the lessons he has learnt over the years. Thus, by 1967, when the Arusha Declaration came, he began to stress less

\*1. Julius Nyerere : Freedom and Unity : A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952-65 (Oxford University Press, 1967).

2. Julius Nyerere : Freedom and Socialism : A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1965-67 (Oxford University Press, 1969)

the importance of African traditions and more the practical aspect of socialist behaviour. "Socialism", as he points out, "is not built by Government decisions, nor by Acts of Parliament. A country does not become socialist by nationalizations or grand designs on paper. It is more difficult than that to build socialism, and it takes much longer".<sup>3</sup>

This too may become mere phrasemongering if the details of working out a policy were left in the hands of the bureaucrats or a fossilized Planning Commission which revels in turning out volumes in print in the name of abolishing poverty. Instead, Nyerere is conscious of the fact that socialist goals can be pursued only by a new type of leadership. The operational section of the Arusha Declaration thus lays down that no leader in the party or government should (i) hold shares in a company; (ii) hold directorship in any privately-owned enterprise; (iii) enjoy more than one source of income or (iv) own houses rented to others. Not only are these rules strictly followed, it has also been Tanu's consistent policy to prevent the growth of "new privileged groups" in society. And it is here that Nyerere's political style differs radically from Nkrumah's. For the latter, it was enough to make a "dawn broadcast" against corruption and nepotism in high places and then forget all about it. As a result the leaders continued amassing wealth as the masses grew more restive and angry. Finally the army intervened.

Any broad conceptualization of socialist goals must also take into account the hard realities of everyday life. It is here that Nyerere's mind is most creative. He raises issues which appear simple but have an immediate bearing on the life of the common man. For instance, he asks, should African patients be treated by non-citizen doctors? He answers in the affirmative, that is so

3. Julius Nyerere : Ujaama : Essays on Socialism (Oxford University Press, 1970).

long as a sufficient number of African doctors are not trained. What about taking aid from foreign countries? Should it not interfere with Tanzania's policy of self-reliance? Nyerere asserts : "...if we get outside assistance to carry out purposes decided by us, then we shall welcome that decision. Thus we welcome the Chinese decision to help with the Tanzam Railway. Thus we shall welcome an American decision to help build our road from Dar-es-Salaam to Tunduma".

Similarly Nyerere's observations on "Education for self-reliance" are as relevant to us as they are to his own people. The basic issue involved is whether a post-colonial society can afford to continue with a system of education which produces false values, imitative culture and a class of parasites. Unless education is integrally related to the immediate needs and requirements of society, any expenditure on education will be sheer waste. Nyerere, therefore, proposes that schools and colleges should become a part of the communal life of the villages; they should impart such training as would help production and they must prepare students "for life and service in the rural areas of the country".

Since the bulk of Tanzanian people live in the villages, the immediate task before the leadership is to reorganize rural communities on socialist lines and provide them aid and guidance to help increase their productive capacity. "In our socialism", Nyerere says, "this means that the emphasis of our development will be in the rural sector, and particularly in agriculture. Further, it means that we shall modernize within our resources". But "modernization" does not mean borrowed tractors, foreign experts and still more sociological surveys : "we have to modernize by utilizing to the full the tools which are within our capacity to buy and to make... The oxen-plough, the oxen-cart, the use of the donkeys which now eat our grass without working—all these can make a tremendous improvement

in our output and therefore in the lives of our people".<sup>4</sup>

On this basis should be organised the Ujaama villages where the land and the crops will be owned and shared by the whole community. All the members of the community will be equal in status and any variations of income will reflect only differences in the amount of work done. They will be governing their own village affairs and be able to discuss together national issues as citizens of Tanzania. What about the "capitalist farmers" who have already invested in land and have profited from it by engaging hired labour? Nyerere is firm that this trend towards class division should be stopped and the "capitalist farmers" should be integrated into the new socialist agriculture.

#### Pitfalls

There are, nevertheless, many other problems and pitfalls. Tanzania's earlier experience with the cooperative movement has been rather dis-

4. Julius Nyerere : Nyerere on Socialism (Oxford University Press, 1969).

*Just published*

পূর্ববাংলা প্রসংগে

*A collection of essays published in*

পূর্ববাংলা সংখ্যা 'অনীক'

Price : Rupee One

বিপ্লবের গান

*Revolutionary novel from China*

Second Edition

Price : Rupees Six

**PEOPLE'S BOOK AGENCY**

I, Kishore Ghosh Lane :

P.O. KHAGRA

Dt. Murshidabad

201/A Muktaram Babu Street,  
Calcutta-7

appointing. The introduction of compulsory national service provoked a near-riot among the students of Dar-es-Salaam University. Further, would it be easy to build the *Ujaama* villages "where the people cooperate together for joint enterprises"? Cooperation within a group is not difficult but can groups with different backgrounds and interests work together for the benefit of all? Finally, since Tanzania has not yet become a socialist society and since certain rights and privileges are conferred on the party and the bureaucracy, is it improbable that new tensions and rifts would grow at different levels of society? Would not some chafe at the restrictions imposed on them by the Arusha Declaration? Already, as the trial of some Tanu leaders has shown, not all sections of the party and the government are happy with Nyerere's philosophy.

It is not that Nyerere is unaware of these shortcomings.

In fact he constantly points out the hard time that lies ahead. However, there are some strains in his thinking which may not always appear complementary. Thus, his anxiety to prove that socialism is not against any religious faith, especially Christianity, is somewhat misplaced. Religion as a personal faith is certainly harmless but when it takes an organized shape and frames its own laws and institutions it may as well create new interests and tensions in society. Besides the Gandhian theory that the rich and more fortunate ones can act as "trustees" in the general interest of the community is, to say the least, unrealistic. In India it has helped in devising only new methods of exploitation.

Nyerere also opposes Fanon's theory that violence can be "self-purifying". "Violence", as he remarks, "cannot be welcomed by those who care about the people". Perhaps Tanzania's relatively peaceful transition to independence and its limited experience with violence may have influenced Nyerere's mind. This helps him to believe that the peaceful democratic path is most suitable

for Tanzania's economic and political development. This is what he tries to explain in his directive to the presidential commission of enquiry into one-party democracy. To avoid both the divisive aspect of Western democracy and the rigidity of a one party-state, the commission recommended a novel method of election in which rival candidates of the Tanu party contested all the 105 seats of the National Assembly. Popular participation and the defeat of several influential ministers in the elections showed that the democratic element had been largely preserved by Tanu's one-party system.

However, the system has yet to go a long way to prove its viability. Far too many radical leaderships in Africa have been replaced by military juntas to make us over-optimistic about Tanzania's future. However, so long as Nyerere is at the helm of affairs one can only hope for the success of his unique experiment.

## Abortive Comedy

MRIGANKA SEKHAR RAY

COMEDY in the conventional Bengali films is a tortuous affair and *Dhanni Meye* is no exception. Uttamkumar, a soccer-crazy business magnate, sends his team to play in a village football tournament under the captaincy of his brother who wins the match and the heart of Manasa, a wayward girl. A forced marriage and heart-rending phases of separation follow, because the elder brother refuses to admit Manasa into the family. It requires another bout of soccer and the subsequent victory to blunt the arrogance of Uttamkumar who ultimately accepts the union of two hearts. As usual, the comedy is based mostly on gross and banal dialogues and not on funny situations and during the second half the unnecessary interpolation of the domestic melodrama disturbs the comic pattern. Jaya Bhaduri is fairly delectable in

her tomboyish pranks but in the portrayal of subtle emotions, she is a failure. Uttamkumar tries to build a different image of himself, but the role is a considerable strain on his slender resources. The other artistes, however, appear as a bunch of fugitives from bedlam, living up to the common tradition of comic acting in our films.

Hrishikesh Mukherjee's *Buddha Mil Gaya* has Om Prakash as the mysterious, generous and rumbustious old man who creates havoc in the quiet lives of two boys and a girl. The boys are looking for jobs, often punctuating their cruel routine by romantic interludes. Om Prakash's appearance brings crime and violence in its wake and the faint beginnings of genuine humour are lost in the vicious web of a tiring goonshow.

## Clippings

### Mao On Concessions

The Chinese public were told indirectly at the beginning of this month that a period of long and hard negotiation was to begin with an old adversary—now designated as the United States. In the factories, people's communes and even primary schools, they have carefully studied the long editorial published on July 1—the fiftieth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. This editorial clearly indicates that President Nixon's journey to Peking, while opening new perspectives for world detente, will be marked by tortuous and difficult negotiations.

...The editorial was written in the past tense because it referred to relations between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang during and after the war against Japan. But all observers noted that these historic recollections were destined to serve as lessons for the present and the future. ...Observers believe that the Chinese, who are experts in "great diplomatic activities", are unlikely to sacrifice their basic principles to attain their

JULY 31, 1971

objectives, particularly the evacuation of Formosa by American troops, the total withdrawal of American forces from Indo-China, and recognition of their right to represent all of China in the United Nations.

But the Chinese are also experts in "long marches", and the editorial particularly emphasizes that the "Chinese path" is tortuous and long, and gives a warning against "some people afflicted with impetuosity" who want to solve all problems overnight. ... Some sections of the editorial are quotations from an article written by Chairman Mao Tsetung in October, 1945, concerning the "Chungking negotiations" between General Chiang Kai-shek and himself.

Informed sources say that Chinese officials have been advised to read Chairman Mao's article carefully. It takes on particular significance in the light of present developments in Chinese-American relations.

The Kuomintang, "which always refused to recognize the equal status of the Communist Party, is now obliged to do so. Since they want to be realists, we shall be realists too", he wrote.

He said that concessions were necessary, for "as long as we respect the principle of never harming the fundamental interests of the people certain concessions are permitted to obtain in exchange for peace and democracy, of which the people as a whole have need".

And he added: "The capitalist and communist countries will finally reach a compromise on a great number of international questions, because compromise will be advantageous." (Jean Leclerc du Sablon, Agence France Presse).

### Hanoi's Doubts

...The leading Hanoi newspaper the *Nhan Dan* in a long leading article (July 19) attacks President Nixon for "dividing the socialist countries, winning over one section and pitting it against another". The article accuses the President of embarking on a strategy designed to "carry out a counter-

revolutionary peaceful evolution in the socialist countries".

This accusation is particularly significant because one of the main allegations against Liu Shao-Chi, the deposed Chinese head of state, was that he believed in "peaceful evolution". This theory was condemned by Peking as a betrayal of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung's theories of class war.

In a veiled warning to the Chinese that the North Vietnamese will settle the war with the United States on their own terms, the article says that small nations have proved their ability to defeat big powers.

The article also implies that Mr Nixon is trying to make a deal with Peking to settle the Indo-Chinese war in the hope that the Chinese will be powerful enough to impose the deal on Hanoi even if its conditions are unfavourable to North Vietnam.

The *Nhan Dan* writes: "Nixon's policy also consists of trying to achieve a compromise between the big powers in an attempt to make smaller countries bow to their arrangements."

Hanoi apparently realizes that China is now more concerned—as the Chinese press and radio clearly reveal—with the possibility of a Japanese military threat which could use Formosa and South Korea as springboards. This shift in China's strategic thinking has made Indo-China much less important to Peking particularly with the steady rundown of American troops in Vietnam.

(Leo Goodstadt in *The Times*, London).

### "Great Victories"

In the last few months the internal strength and unity of the Chinese people and the Marxist-Leninist line of the leadership in foreign affairs have resulted in a series of diplomatic victories which have left U.S. imperialism's policy of isolating and containing China in ruins and thrown the Soviet revisionists into a state of panic.

With their thorough understanding of the contradictions within the imperialist camp, between the imperia-

list powers and their client states, between the military forces of imperialism and the worldwide anti-imperialist liberation movement and between the ruling class and the working class inside each capitalist country, the Chinese have kept the forces of reaction and oppression divided and off balance, thus making a major contribution to confirming the main trend today as world revolution rather than world war.

The trickle of countries prepared to defy the US embargo on relations with China and accord full recognition to the People's Republic of China has become a flood—from the US's own closest neighbour to the north, Canada, to Italy and tiny San Marino in Europe, including Cameroon and even that erstwhile linch-pin of British oil imperialism in the Middle East, Kuwait. Negotiations are far advanced with other countries. All this has made greater nonsense than ever of the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from its rightful place as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This is not China's problem. The Chinese know only too well the reactionary role the UN has played under the domination of the US and, more recently, the USSR. It is a problem for the US who see this instrument of their imperialist interests losing any credibility as a world organisation.

These diplomatic victories, based on correct relations between states having different social systems, have nothing in common with the Soviet distortion of "peaceful co-existence". The Soviet revisionists bought their way into collaboration with the US by ceasing to support and actually condemning anti-imperialist movements and by urging the "parliamentary road" which is no road at all on the potentially revolutionary working classes in imperialist countries. The present nuclear limitation talks between the two major imperialist powers, the US and the USSR, are a continuation of the policy of trying to keep these weapons to themselves to enforce by nuclear blackmail their world hegemony. But as Lin Piao

has pointed out: If there are areas of collusion between them, there are contradictions too—which the Chinese know how to exploit.

China has never made the slightest concession on diplomatic grounds in its Marxist-Leninist policy of supporting liberation struggles in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, as formulated by Mao Tsetung in his call to the people of the world: "Unite and defeat the US aggressors and all their running dogs!" Le Duan, First Secretary of the Vietnam Workers' Party, said on his recent visit to China: "The battlefield in our Vietnam is not just a battlefield of Vietnam and the battlefield in Indochina is not just a battlefield of Indochina because we have your mighty people as our backing and your vast land as our great rear area". These are the feelings of all peoples who have taken up arms to liberate themselves from imperialist exploitation.

Nor has China ever failed to distinguish correctly between reactionary imperialist governments and the working people in those same countries. At the very time that the Chinese indicated that they were willing, as always, to enter into discussions with Nixon based on absolute equality, they did not hesitate to welcome the mighty upsurge of the American people against the vicious policies of their government and to characterise Nixon's actions as fascist. And when Nixon tried to exploit Chinese friendliness to some visiting US citizens by dusting off his old, discredited two-Chinas policy, he was quickly told what he could do with it.

China supports all genuine anti-imperialist struggles but China also adheres firmly to the Marxist-Leninist principle that revolutions cannot be exported. China does not interfere in the internal affairs of those countries which have detached themselves from imperialist domination to the extent of entering into correct state relations with the Chinese People's Republic, however reactionary their regimes may be internally. But the rich revolutionary experience of the Chinese people under their great lea-

der, Mao Tsetung, is at the disposal of the workers and peasants of those countries when they organise themselves, self-reliantly, to throw off the yoke of local oppression and defeat the attempts of imperialist powers to come to the defence of their landlord and comprador class enemies. They may be sure that the Chinese people will be with them in their struggle—whatever that close comradeship-in-arms may entail.

Some ultra-leftists, who do not understand the Marxist-Leninist dialectics of combining correct state relations between countries having different social systems with full support for the revolutionary movement of the world proletariat, have seen China's diplomatic victories against the main enemy of the revolutionary peoples, US imperialism, as compromises with the class enemy. They have no understanding of contradictions. They had better remember what Lenin said to that arch ultra-leftist, Trotsky, at the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations.

(*The Worker*, organ of the Communist Party of Britain-Marxist-Leninist, June 1971).

## Letters

### What To Do ?

I am astounded to find in the pages of your journal fantastic claims regarding the success of Nagi Reddy's politics. The claims made by C. Chandrasekhara Rao, in his Andhra Report 'What to do' (June 12), are blatant lies, spread only to confuse the revolutionary people and cadres led by the CPI(ML).

The line advocated in the 'now famous' 'Immediate Programme' was: Intensify mass movements on mass issues which naturally would be subjected to the onslaught of the forces of repression. At the height of such a movement arm the masses for mass resistances.

Armed resistance in defence of mass movement—such is the line

which was counterposed to the line of class-enemy annihilation to seize political power advocated by the CPI(ML).

The Nagi Reddy line is of a defensive nature, legal in form, economic in its immediate and political in its "ultimate" aims. The CPI(ML) line is offensive in nature, illegal in form, political in the immediate, for ultimate economic salvation.

More than two years have elapsed since these two lines distinctly emerged. Each line had its share of successes and setbacks in their implementation and have yielded enough results for everyone to judge.

While the CPI(ML) proclaimed seizure of political power in Srikakulam, Debra-Gopiballavapur and elsewhere and announced the formation of the People's Liberation Army and even while the neo-colonial State had to admit it, burn down whole villages and regroup the people into strategic hamlets, Messers Nagi Reddy & Co. have been proclaiming from rooftops that liberated areas cannot be formed till a new stage emerges wherein all the armed forces of the State would be pinned by mass resistance across the whole country.

Their line was put to trial in Anantapur, Kurnool, West and East Godavari and Nalgonda districts. Government waste land was occupied in all these districts during April-November 1969. Preparations for armed resistance had not even been contemplated and where they were, in East Godavari Agency, the result was a miserable failure. All the organisers are now in jail, while people in about 175 trespass cases have been going in for arbitration by bourgeois courts.

This line of land-grab, emulated later by the revisionists and other parties on a countrywide scale as a check to the growing consciousness of the people, was subjected to withering criticism by their own provincial committee, which ultimately led to disciplinary action against its Secretariat member, C. Pulla Reddy.

Since the ill-famed 'Immediate Programme' was adopted not a single

JULY 31, 1971

mass movement has been launched. All forms of Girijan exploitation continue. Forest, revenue and police officials, besides landlords, money-lenders and contractors, continue their exploitation unhampered.

In 1970 March the PC representative guiding the Mulug Area Committee entered into electoral alliance with certain landlord groups to oppose the rest, while the campaign for boycott was conducted by the squads as a face-saving tactic.

While the report boasts of "village committees", of whole areas coming "under control of revolutionaries" and says that "for all practical purposes civil rule is absent", in reality there was not even a party unit in the villages. Not only that, village panchayats are running smoothly and the age-old feudal practices of village elders (patels) and caste traditions are strictly observed. The so-called "movement" has no influence over the thinking, habits and social set-up of the people in the area.

The army units, called in in March 1971, were deployed "to ensure peaceful polling" and left after their specific job was finished. The only incident reported during the period of army presence is one in which 3 armed reserve (dt.) constables accompanied by a DSP chased a squad.

In the liquidation programme, the people were never mobilised to convene people's courts to pass judgments. Even revolutionary peasant committees have not been formed to guarantee that justice is meted out. Well-known landlords and traitors move about in the whole area while 'revolutionary squads' seek shelter in hillocks and deep jungles.

For recruitment from among the local population the main source is deserters and vagabonds, in the absence of party and peasant organisations in the villages. This explains the dominance of the roving rebel ideology among the squad committees. Any guerilla squads or organisation at the initial stages of its emergence is likely to be swayed by such a harmful bourgeois ideology but the

point is that it is the dominant ideology holding sway in their committees.

The existence of these armed squads does not pose any danger to the exercise of political power by the landlord class. Taking into cognizance the support extended by these 'revolutionaries' to certain sections of landlords, the Government has deployed only such force and is employing only such methods as would enable its men to train themselves in jungle warfare, then send them to wipe out Naxalites i.e., the CPI (ML).

Mr Chandrasekhara Rao says that hundreds of Girijans occupying the lands were imprisoned. Not a single Girijan was imprisoned on this pretext in this area, for such instances of occupation were lacking. In the course of these two years, around 200 people belonging to the struggle area were imprisoned at any time on false charges of having been apprehended during encounters. Most of them were either acquitted or released on unconditional bail and presently no more than 40 people are in different jails at Warangal, Gothaguden, Yellendu, Khammam and Karimnagar. Contrast this with the more than 800 Girijans in Visakhapatnam and Rajahmundry jails for over two years and thousands of them regrouped into strategic hamlets in Srikakulam district.

T. CHINNI  
Visakhapatnam

### Birbhum

It should be kept in mind that one annihilation with the support of the people of the locality is worth many more *without* the same, so far as the contribution of the annihilation to the cause of revolution is concerned. I am afraid, your reporter is certainly at pains to note (June 26) "in these cases (murders of two big landowners) it was the Santals who had joined the procession

who gave the verdict, not the local people." I admit that revolution knows no racial barrier, no barriers of locality. But at the same time it should be observed that at the initial stage of the revolution, these barriers, should be, to some extent, admitted for tactical reasons. A thorough understanding of the public sentiment would help the revolutionaries to tackle such difficulties.

BILASH BHUYAN  
Jorhat, Assam

### Too Late To Lament

I fully appreciate your apprehension that army take-over is round the corner in West Bengal. But who are responsible for this development? There was a time when a single murder committed by the police could cause a statewide conflagration resulting in the fall of a ministry (e.g., the death of Nurul Islam in 24-Parganas in the food movement of 1966). But today a dozen killings a day leave people unmoved. The reason for this change in the public attitude lies in the fact that for the past six years, our sensitivity to the horrors of death has been eroded by interested parties. How can one expect the common people, not trained in sophisticated political doctrines, to discriminate between "a successful annihilation programme" and "a fascist killing"? For them the two sets of killings are but two aspects of a single perversity—namely, total disregard for human life. Now every party—not excluding the police—can claim to have a cause for killing. And anybody challenging this claim is at once penalised either as 'an ultra' or 'a reactionary'. But to one about to get killed, does it really matter who is going to be his killer, a Rama or a Ravana? To my thinking, it is high time for journalists to give up their duplicity—gloating over certain killings in Birbhum on one page and lamenting over certain others on the next.

S.G.  
Berhampore

## Naxal Land

Mr Arun Kumar Sen's letter (July 17) proves his political identity—none but the neo-revisionists of the CPI(M) talks of a link between the Naxalites and the ruling Congress party. I live at Chanditala, Jadavpur P.S., which is a stronghold of the Naxalites and I am at one with Mr S. Roy. I support the CPI(ML) heartily and I know very well that most of the people from Tollygunge tram depot to Kundghat sympathise with the CPI(ML) not out of fear but out of love and respect. The Naxalites have actually mobilised the common poor people and rely entirely on them. The annihilation of class enemies and anti-people policemen get their moral support. The CPI(ML) has been able to stop gambling among the poor rickshawpullers and kindred folk. Rampant drinking is also going to be tackled.

NARENDRA CHAKRABARTI  
Chanditala, Tollygunge

## Nomadic Left

The advantage of being a communist is that you can toe either the Russian line or the Chinese, and be safe. A third brand not only maintains an equi-distance from either but also is critical of both the varieties of communism, and calls itself true communist. Is it possible to become a communist without international link and internationalism? The answer is negative. The idea of a nationalistic communism is beyond the comprehension of any sensible man. National communism is nothing but fascism in disguise. But there are certain people who, utterly confused by the stand taken by the international communist movement everywhere but in heart aspiring to be leftists in the true sense of the term, roam hither and thither in search of a port where shelter makes sense for them. These people, call them the nomadic left, are yet disorganised, but they mean business. I think *Frontier* will be able to unite

and organise them under the banner—  
'Nomadic Left of the world unite ;

ANOOPAM MAZUMDER  
Agartala

## Role Of CPI(ML)

Sumanta Banerjee is successful in giving a correct political assessment in his 'The Two Bengals'. He puts forth the real policies of the three so-called Communist parties of India. He correctly says that the CPI(ML) is following a terrorist line of action. But at the end he declares that the CPI(ML) has been successful in reducing parliamentary democracy to a farce and rendering it unworkable, bringing the repressive machinery to the forefront and in the gradual de-democratization of the system in West Bengal. Of course the CPI(ML) has brought the repressive machinery to the forefront, but it has failed to show the people the real face of parliamentary—the people in West Bengal did not boycott the last elections even at a single place. On the other hand, because of a lot of state repression, the communist movement has been sabotaged. There was no participation of the people in general and there was no mass movement, peaceful or militant, sponsored by the CPI(ML). Mr Sumanta Banerjee himself admits that the "CPI(M) is in command of a relatively well organised mass movement." Therefore we may conclude that the CPI(ML) will not be able to create a situation in which the common folk will fight resolutely for socialism. And this is the inevitable outcome of a terrorist movement.

No doubt the CPI(ML) advocates people's war and a protracted struggle, but to say something and to apply that concretely in concrete conditions is another thing.

PARMINDER SINGH  
Lamhi

## Vidyasagar

Benoy Ghose in his article 'Vidyasagar : "Fate of A Liberal" (July 3)

has evidently given an account of his good home-work. But a post-mortem on Vidyasagar from the Marxist angle of class contradiction is an unkind cut to that great personality. Mr Ghose has perhaps ventured to build up an imaginary enemy in Vidyasagar, trying to point out that he was for spreading education only among the higher castes while denying the same to the lower castes. But once Vidyasagar wrote to the Government of Bengal : "To educate a whole people is certainly desirable but this is a task which it is doubtful, whether any Government can undertake or fulfill". It is clear that he favoured the idea of educating the masses, but doubted the feasibility of the programme at that critical juncture when his bold stand on widow remarriage rebounded on him. So in the later years of his life he was cautious against any move that might militate against the sentiment of society as, in that case the spread of education itself would have been completely jeopardised. He compromised, surely not unwittingly.

DEEPAK BANERJEE  
Agarpara

Vidyasagar's fate has been linked with his failure to comprehend the depth and dimension of the social reality of his time. Fortunately for us, this ignorance helped him to steer clear of the "flabby liberalism" of the English-educated Bengali liberals of the 19th century like Rajnarain Bose, Keshab Sen and others and enabled him to embark on educational and social reforms regardless of consequences and this makes all the difference between a reformist and a revolutionary. Before concluding I cannot help saying "Vidyasagar, thou shouldst be living at this hour. West Bengal hath need of thee" and in saying so I am sure I voice the agonised feelings of millions of people.

SOMNATH BHATTACHARYYA  
Santragachi, Howrah



These are the shoes that are strictly NOW!  
Young... dashing...hip.

Styles that move in a new kind of groove, for dressing up or going casual. They're your kind of shoes if you're a today's fashion swinger. See the full GoGo range. Today.

*Bata*

# GO GO

shoes that are strictly now!

GoGo Boot  
Sizes 5-10  
Rs 30.95

GoGo Oxford  
Sizes 5-10  
Rs 30.95

Before you have another child

# think

wouldn't you first  
like to give this child  
all the care she needs?



Life-giving milk. Nourishing food. The clothes, the toys, the books...the little things you want to make sure she gets. But if another child should come along too soon, this may not be easy. Wouldn't you prefer to avoid this?

Millions of couples all over the world are doing just that. They put off having another child till they are ready for it. You too can do this with NIRODH. It's the world's most popular rubber contraceptive for men. Remember, NIRODH is the safest, simplest method of family planning and has been used successfully for generations. So why don't you too use NIRODH.

Available everywhere at only 15 paise for 3 because it is subsidised by the Government.



Until you want another child, use

# NIRODH ▼

the rubber contraceptive millions choose

Sold by : General Merchants, Chemists and Druggists,  
Provision Stores, Pan Shops, Etc.

dayp 7/1/111