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On Other Pages

COMMENT	2
<i>View From Delhi</i>	
EMERGENCY THOUGHTS FROM A POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT	4
A SPHINX RIDES THE PEACE R. P. MULICK	5
SOME TRENDS IN INDIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT—II PARESH CHATTOPADHYAY	6
<i>Book Review</i>	
THE INDIAN ARMY	12
QUEIMADA BY A F.L.M CRITIC	14
<i>Clippings</i>	
EAST BENGAL: THE YOUNG CONTENDERS	14
LETTERS	16

Editor : Samar Sen

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BY SAMAR SEN FROM 61, MOTT LANE,
CALCUTTA-13
TELEPHONE: 243202

BEGINNING WITH A BANG

WITH his known flair for overstatement Pakistan's new President has claimed that he is working twentyfour hours a day to restore his country to its lost glory. Mr Bhutto's claim is perhaps untenable in Indian estimation, but reports from Rawalpindi suggest that in two days he has issued more edicts than what used to be done in a month during Yahya Khan's stewardship. When Mr Bhutto was asked to return post-haste from the U.S. to take charge of the administration in Pakistan, violently convulsed by demonstrations of anger and frustration over the defeat on the battlefields, few had imagined that he was going to replace Yahya Khan as Pakistan's President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. Mr Bhutto had been Yahya Khan's principal political adviser for nearly a year, and it was thought that Mr Bhutto's recall was a prelude to the promised return to civil rule. The actual developments would suggest that the armed forces have not lost their grip on Pakistan; nor do they propose to relax their hold immediately. But the old junta has been replaced by a new one possibly consisting of the younger and the pro-China elements who look up to Mr Bhutto as their leader. That is why Mr Bhutto has forthwith eased out of office the majority of the old generals and promoted a few who were known to be dissidents.

Mr Bhutto has lost no time in putting to some good use the enormous power that is now concentrated in his hands. In a way, he has become the most powerful man in Pakistan after the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, for none other enjoyed the combined allegiance of the people and the armed forces. He seems determined to use his power ruthlessly to clean up the racket that has thrived in his country through all political vicissitudes. He has struck at the twentytwo families who control the destiny of Pakistan by impounding their passports with the obvious intention of compelling them to bring back to the country their foreign assets—a step not yet thought of by our socialist Government. By another stroke of the pen he has abolished the privy purses which we in this country could accomplish only after considerable ado, including a mid-term parliamentary poll. If he continues to exercise the arbitrary powers vested in him in the manner he has done so far he may soon leave India far behind in the race for egalitarianism. His Pakistan People's Party won an absolute majority in West Pakistan on the basis of a manifesto

pledging nationalisation of a wide sector of the economy, including heavy industry, banking, insurance, petro-chemicals and shipping; in cases the nationalisation would be without compensation; in some others the quantum of compensation would not be justiciable. If Mr Bhutto can put through this programme—which he seems intent on doing—he will throw a healthy challenge to the democratic process which has become a pretext for inaction and half-hearted action in India.

He has brought to bear a new approach on home politics also. Apparently, he is so sure of his position that he finds no necessity for retaining the restrictions imposed on some political parties by his predecessor. The ban on the National Awami Party has been lifted, and, what is more important, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is no longer a prisoner. It is not for the Congress Government in New Delhi to criticise Mr Bhutto if the Sheikh is in house detention; nor can we object if the purpose of the dialogue he has just started is to persuade the Sheikh to agree to retain a tenuous link between Bangladesh and West Pakistan. But for that hotheaded bungler, Yahya Khan, the demand for autonomy would not have transformed itself into a struggle for independence of Bangladesh. Mr Bhutto might have been partially responsible for the General's obstinate policy, but he seems a wiser man now. No politician can view with equanimity the dismemberment of his country, and any other politician in his predicament would not have reacted differently. His tirades against India may be partly tactical; they are genuine only insofar as he holds the Indian army responsible for the debacle of the Pakistani troops in Bangladesh. He may cool down once the delicate negotiations he has started with the Sheikh are over. At home he has made a prompt beginning in the right direction, and it may not take him long to realise that a warlike posture will hinder the more urgent task he has on hand.

Tanzania : Stock-Taking

President Julius Nyerere wanted the tenth anniversary of his country's independence from colonial rule to be an occasion for stock-taking. Although acutely aware that there is yet much leeway to make up in the economic, political and social fields, Nyerere has not considered it necessary to hide anything from the critical eyes of foreigners. In fact present at the Uhuru celebration were scores of former British civil servants along with other dignitaries. They were shown some important economic projects and the newly completed airport at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro. But if they have made their conclusion about the country merely on the basis of some dry statistics or what is missing at present, that is at the cost of the essence of the Tanzanian experiment of remaking a traditional tribal society into a modern socialist State.

In traditional African society everyone worked and everyone shared the fruits of labour; the wealth of a tribe gave security to all its members; as individuals took care of the community, so also the community of the individuals; and there was just no scope for exploiting others. That is why there is no Swahili equivalent to the word 'class'. But with the aliens came feudal and capitalistic exploitation. A country of colonial plunder had left the country in a state of total wretchedness—if the whole population was suffering from one or the other disease, the herds of cattle were decimated by ticks or tse-tse flies. Nyerere was not a very happy man when he outwitted the British at their own game to make Tanzania a free country. He found the attitude of leaders of many emerging African States sickening. Their main concern was to fend for themselves, to have their own Versailles and Elysees. Under them the only industry that flourished was administration; the only people benefited were those who replaced the colonial exploitation. At the beginning it seemed that Tan-

zania would be no different with the trappings of colonial administration remaining intact and class divisions appearing among fellow Africans. But Nyerere under pressure from the TANU hierarchy and because of the operation of a Westminster-style democracy could do little. He was, however, sure that the British system would not work; he was waiting for the time to introduce the tribal system which he thought would "work better". Soon after independence Nyerere resigned from Prime Ministership to reform his party and change the existing political system. After his impressive victory in the first Presidential election, he decided a socialist course for Tanzania. But the initiation of certain progressive measures was not enough; the absence of a stated philosophy and policy was allowing some government and party actions which were not consistent with the building of socialism and which even encouraged the growth of non-socialist values and attitudes. The TANU officials who had not worked all these years to see their privileges go in independent Tanzania started a campaign against Nyerere. A coup was also attempted in 1964. But all these further steered Nyerere's will. The missing links in the attempt to recreate the values of ancient African society into a modern political system were supplied by the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The fundamentals of the Declaration are that the principal means of production should be owned by the State, agriculture should have higher priority over industry and socialist co-operation, self-reliance and planning and not money should be the most important means of fighting poverty. Government and TANU officials were urged to give up the practices of colonial times and become peasants and workers again in the interest of the community. Ujamaa villages, as Nyerere will say, are the basis of Tanzanian socialism and development. There are over a thousand of them

now—over a thousand new societies—in various stages of development. Their size is such as to permit the use of machines and modern systems. People on their own join Ujamaa villages as they realise that it is better to work together for development than as individuals. Nyerere had also seen to it that the colonial system of education which taught people to hate manual labour was replaced by a system which would help develop an attitude that education was not a way of escaping the country's poverty but a weapon to fight it. Tanzania is today a country of hope and excitement.

Escalation

The Christmas truce, the quietest so far in Indochina, was broken before the truce period ended by the U.S. when its warplanes resumed massive attacks on North Vietnam, using even 6,800 kg bombs. As usual the U.S. Government has tried to justify it as punitive raids on military installations to protect the thinning U.S. ground troops in Vietnam. In Laos the U.S. has escalated its hostile activities perhaps as a part of the new Nixon strategy in the peninsula. On Dec. 22 the general cease-fire, unconditionally ordered by the Pathet Lao, was violated when warplanes, under the usual pretext of protective reaction, strafed the communist positions along the North Vietnam-Laos border and flew interdiction missions against radar positions inside North Vietnam.

The outcry over the Vietnam war has so far enabled the Nixon administration to distract public attention from its role in Laos where it is fighting an equally bloody war. Washington's 'secret' engagement in the highland country is already worse than its involvement in Vietnam in the mid-sixties. Nixon, in fact, confirmed in March 1970 that the U.S. air operations in Laos had resulted in the loss of about 400 aircraft and 400 airmen. More recently, the situation seems to have got worse. Latest

reports indicate that hostilities have broken out between the communist forces and the U.S.-backed government forces around the strategic Plain of Jars for whose possession the two forces have been fighting bitterly for the past few years. Last week, however, the communists showed the world their growing strength by overrunning the plain in one mass attack and then forestalling all efforts by the government forces to dislodge them. That they are capable of doing still more was amply illustrated by their advance to the key base of Long Chen, 50 km south-west of the plain. They have also mounted an assault on the Bolivens highland where a grim battle is reportedly on.

Unlike in Vietnam, the U.S. has maintained a low-keyed presence in Laos. It has dumped huge quantities of military hardware and inducted a sizable force dressed as 'advisers' but has not committed its boys openly in ground combat role as in Vietnam. The Nixon administration seems bent on pursuing this policy for the time being. Indeed, Nixon has behaved in his own way in enunciating his present Indochina policy. Recently a White House statement said that the President was eager to carry out his pledge to disengage from Indochina "in a way that would contribute to a larger and lasting peace". To secure this 'lasting peace' he has now sent his warplanes over large areas of Indochina, the most severe raids since Johnson ordered the bombing halt in 1968.

A Revolution Exported

A correspondent writes:

The liberation of Bangladesh is now complete. The left parties in our country have all taken clear stands on Bangladesh. Let us take stock, for whatever it is worth, of their so very unambiguous stands and try to link the yawning gaps they left in their doctrinaire views.

On one point every left party has agreed: Bangladesh was exploited by

West Pakistan and the nature of the exploitation was colonial. Therefore the liberation of Bangladesh is the successful culmination of a national liberation war which completed the bourgeois democratic revolution of Bangladesh.

This view is plausible if several things are taken for granted. If Bangladesh was liberated, it was liberated from whom? From West Pakistan of course, but was it a foreign power and was it a colonial power? Even if it is not a foreign power, the war could have been however considered a liberation war, if it could be accepted that Pakistan was a colonial power. Nobody would of course admit that Pakistan was an imperialist power, the economic and political structure of that State being what is. It is a feudal-bourgeois State, immensely depending on American aid, a dependence it tries to offset by seeking aid from China. But economically and politically it is more a colony of America than independent and therefore Bangladesh, by liberating itself from West Pakistan, has liberated itself from the colonial exploitation of West Pakistan, that is of the United State.

If it was then a liberation war against American imperialism, it was indeed a curious phenomenon because American imperialism offered a walk-over to Bangladesh, because it did nothing to win the war except talking at the talking shop, the UN. It can be argued that the U.S. just couldn't dare because of the changed international situation, with a powerful socialist camp. The U.S. of course does not show such a loss of heart in Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.

Some people say that all these riddles need not demand a solution and in fact there is no need to pose the riddles at all if the whole thing is seen from another angle. Was it a case of colonial exploitation or a case of uneven growth of capitalism? East Pakistan was a poor country in comparison with West Pakistan and there was a marked preference for the west in investment of capital. But this could be as well a case of regional imbalance. Orissa

happens to be the least developed State of India; is it a colony of New Delhi? There has been an abundance of investment in certain selected areas of India for which the partial Green Revolution has been successful. Are these areas a colonial power? If Telengana demands secession, would it be a case of national liberation war? If East Pakistan was being exploited, who was the exploiter? The State of West Pakistan as a whole could not have been the exploiter. Sind, Baluchistan and parts of Punjab are being similarly exploited. It boils down to this: a part of Punjab alone was exploiting the whole of Pakistan; to be more precise, 22 families for whom the state power was acting as an agent were the exploiters who again were comprador to American imperialism. The fight was between the bourgeois classes of Pakistan, a fight that is often fought in capitalist countries without changing anything significantly. And the fight has been fought under the imperialist shadow of the super-powers.

Left parties would not of course agree. They say the people of Bangladesh have decisively destroyed American imperialism and West Pakistani militarism. Which brings us to a more curious point. The Mukti Bahini was not strong enough to overthrow the West Pakistani militarism and so the Indian Army went in and did the job. So, what happened? The Indian Army waged the national liberation war and completed the bourgeois democratic devolution in Bangladesh. In other words, a revolution was exported. Some of the left parties however, aware of the imbecility of this stand, are urging the people of Bangladesh to take things into their own hands and pursue the revolution, brought about by a foreign army. If the people of Bangladesh succeed, the left parties in India would heave a sigh of relief and get out of the funny entanglement they are in. But if the Bangladeshi people can do so, a whole chapter of Marxism would have to be re-written.

View from Delhi

Emergency Thoughts

FROM A POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT

MRS Indira Gandhi's rhetoric, in her new found role as a liberator of small nations, is expected to win the elections for her party in West Bengal and of course, in the other States which are less difficult. The Defence of India Rules, barely a month-old now, will provide the tactical ground support for the operation to restore to New Delhi its lost glory as the real centre of power in the whole sub-continent.

Every political party has in a sense abetted the monstrosity called the national emergency. Feigning to fight the Bill seeking to provide for "partial emergency", the parties played into the astute Prime Minister's hands and ended up accepting prolonged, indefinite emergency. The CPI (M) discovered that a partial emergency would mean defeat in West Bengal but would not fight the plan to prolong the emergency all under the "We will drop the 28th amendment if you don't like it" patter.

Back in 1966, under pressure from the Opposition parties, Mrs Gandhi gave the impression that she wanted to revoke the state of emergency, proclaimed in hurry in October 1962. The Jaipur session of the AICC witnessed fierce attacks on the government from the party middle-rungers for continuing the emergency indefinitely. The Home Minister, Mr G. L. Nanda, promised a review but the Chief Ministers, all Congressmen, ganged up to confront the Centre and win. A fact that was forgotten was the Centre's finding that the Chief Ministers had quietly armed themselves with such sweeping powers that a state of emergency and the DIR were superfluous and their arguments that they needed these special powers were specious. It was not until after the Congress got a whacking at the 1967 polls that the

Centre thought of scrapping the emergency at the end of 1968. But this was to be followed by draconian Bills like the one on unlawful activities in addition to the Preventive Detention Act since replaced by a more authoritarian Maintenance of Internal Security Act.

The ruling party is planning assembly elections not only in the States where they are due in normal course in February-March. Plans are afoot for imposing elections in States like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and possibly Haryana too. The Prime Minister's bully boys in the Kerala unit of the Congress, masquerading as the Youth Congress and fattening on liaison work for Marwari firms from the distance of Delhi, are itching for a fight to wrest power in the State ending the CPI-led coalition. The CPI (M), which has been tailing the ruling party and identifying itself with the worst national chauvinist trends, would lose considering that they would have to fight the elections under the shadow of the DIR. The hot-line between the CPI (M) leadership and Mrs Gandhi established through the courtesy of Mr Sidhartha Shankar Ray may not be of much help now.

On this side of the ceasefire, New Delhi is in exultant mood. Nobody seems to pause to realise that the left-of-centre politics fashioned in New Delhi is catching in Islamabad too and the pattern is the same from Dacca, Islamabad and Colombo to New Delhi: abolition of privy purses, State trading, nationalisation of what have you... By the Soviet norms, the Bhutto regime is a left-of-centre government like Mrs Gandhi's or Mrs Bandaranaike's or Mr Tajuddin Ahmed's. All of them deserve socialist economic aid and diplomatic support which interacting on the na-

tional bourgeoisie should usher in socialism, without novocaine. Since 1967, the Soviet Union has been the largest supplier of arms to Pakistan and India. It should not shock anyone if Moscow sees progressive features in the new Pakistani regime and moves back to a position of equidistance, the Indo-Soviet treaty notwithstanding.

Some of the East European countries would be quick to set up trade missions first even if formal diplomatic recognition of Bangladesh takes time, to foreclose any Chinese influence on the Bangladesh government. The British still own 50 per cent of the tea garden acreage in Bangladesh and the new country has to export about 80 per cent of its tea output. West Pakistan is lost as a market and this surplus tea will compete with India's. Indian jute mills are short of bales and Bangladesh mills cannot take in all the output. So the tea and jute policies of the two countries will dovetail to the advantage of the Soviet bloc countries. Pakistan would have to buy Ceylon tea, reducing the competition for India abroad. So politics mix with vengeance with Bangladesh tea and jute and Indian coal and textiles.

Mr D. P. Dhar's appointment as special envoy to Dacca is a stop-gap arrangement. It might ultimately be Mr Ashok Roy of the External Affairs Ministry, a man rated high by the Prime Minister as a trouble-shooter or Mr Siddhartha Shankar Ray, whose role as the Viceroy to West Bengal should earn for him the assignment. On the whole Mrs Gandhi has the feeling that she has successfully ridden both the Bengal tigers—the west and the east.

The Mukti Bahini is forgotten.

For FRONTIER contact

S. P. CHATTERJEE

Statesman Office

Steel Market

Durgapur-4

From available reports the dissident wing of the Bahini will not lay down arms which means that an Algerian type military nationalist leadership might emerge. The Indian army cannot take upon itself the task of disarming the Bahini without inviting the wrath of the Bangladesh people. If the Indian army pulls out soon, the regime in Dacca may come under the "tactical control" of the mini-junta of the Mukti Bahini. The Soviets who condone armed struggle on the sub-continent for the first and the last time would not countenance such adventure by the Mukti Bahini. Bangladesh is supposed to accept its liberation by the Indian army as final, irrevocable and complete, as Mr Krishna Menon would put it.

In the western sector, the problem of Pakistan territory occupied by Indian forces remains. The feeling is high against giving up this territory. Mrs Gandhi so far has been non-committal on this but the government itself speaks in many voices. While Mr Jagjivan Ram told the Press Club of India on Thursday that he did not see any danger of a new war, Mrs Gandhi held forth to her Amritsar and Ambala audiences that she did not know if it was the end of war or just breathing time. The next day Mr Jagjivan Ram, an aspirant for the coveted Bharat Ratna title, retracted to join the chorus. Mr Bhutto's threats are cited as incontrovertible evidence in support of arguments to continue the emergency indefinitely. Mr Erasezhian of the DMK had a telling point when he asked if the emergency would continue for 1,000 years because Mr Bhutto had threatened a war of that duration. If the CPI(M) and other parties are really honest about protestations against the continued state of emergency, they would do well to take the step that they would not participate in any election until the emergency was scrapped and try to enlist support of other parties for such a stand.

December 26, 1971

A Sphinx Rides The Peace

R. P. MULLICK

THE recent Indo-Pakistan tragedy which began on December 3 with the last act of political ambivalence by Pakistan's military-oligopolist government when it tried to play off China's "friendship" to secure more American strategic support and aid, has ended with the master-minded military-diplomatic coup of the Indian Government made in subtly contrived collaboration with the USA and the USSR. The finesse of the Indian moves can be gauged from the fact that the USA did respond meaningfully to Mrs Gandhi's appeal to President Nixon on November 5 "for greater understanding and support" to India in her troubles with Pakistan, since theirs "have always been an open society." The sluice-gate for supply of military equipment and hardware to Pakistan was closed for a time, while pressure began towards the goal of a tailored political settlement in Bangladesh that would have served the arch-imperialist State of the world with a protege government, subservient system and a buffer administration somewhat on the model of the Philippines and Thailand.

The compounding of blunders by Pakistan's rulers between December 1 and 3, when Yahya Khan bragged overconfidently about China's support to Pakistan, and the actual starting of military operations on the western front of India, closed all possibilities for the USA to exert whatever political and economic leverage it had with India and afford it an escape-route from the constrictions of its near-insuperable political dilemma. The final blunder in the afternoon of December 3 was perhaps inescapable for Yahya Khan—to be fair to this little dictator who had his own stilted logic and norms to cling to untenable, and outclassed, theories of sovereignty, integrity and the like—bu

then, it brought about just the situation India's ruling class was seeking, and for which the USSR too had been waiting in tense expectation all these suspenseful months from August 9, the date of the Indo-Soviet treaty. It was the set end of the USSR's world strategy to have a string of secure buffer-states, with a political set-up that would succeed in containing and quietening the basic urges of the peoples of countries on its southern frontier, at the time when the treaty was signed. Obviously, Russia could not allow a repetition of her 1967 mistake in regard to the Egyptian misadventure (and the mauling at the hands of the small but fiercely efficient Israel). Naturally she was keen to ensure that this time she backed a winning horse. The stakes were many; and of course, the six-year-old rivalry with the USA for securing an unchallengeable position of advantage for controlling the Indian Ocean, as well as the Indo-Pak sub-continent was the determining spur for her to get committed to India's ruling class interests and purposes in the region. Bangladesh offered the proverbial babe in the wood to every valiant protagonist of super-power hegemony for posing and passing off as liberators.

It should not be forgotten in this context that all the special pleadings which the governmental circles of India were making at the time of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, for the USA to "tighten the screw on Islamabad to reach some patchwork arrangement with the true leaders of Bangladesh", were not lost on the USSR. All the reason why the latter felt doubly impelled to go

all out in extending logistical (i.e. strategic-military) help to India, and on the global scale the needed diplomatic support. The result was foregone. The Indian army beat the Pakistani expeditionary force—which was less than half the size of the combined bulldozing military machine India had built up with near-German thoroughness—while the air wing, expectedly reinforced with Russian equipment and military-technical expertise, smashed Pakistan's air defence to pulp. At the same time discussion of the Indo-Pakistani war was effectively stalled by the Russian veto in the UN.

The USA was caught on the un-alert side of its world strategy. It decided to send the 7th Fleet to retrieve the military image of its protege in East Pakistan, but by the time this "too little and too late" move was made, the fast-moving military situation left no option for the Pakistanis but to surrender and give up for good their self-appointed role of saving East Pakistan from the rising tide of revolutionary socialism.

India's army has now, willingly and gladly, stepped into a similar role, for (i) the securing of the eastern frontier from any possible danger of liberation struggle infiltrating across and influencing her poverty-ridden people, and (ii) for stopping communism on the march.

Not surprisingly, the big guns of Pakistan's army in the east, steeped in the tradition of imperialistic army training, found a surrender to their Indian counterparts more suited to their interests than a fight to the finish, a sure usherer of the inevitable revolutionary phase await-

ing Bangladesh. The Government of India has found the concealed viaduct of the USA's diplomatic service, and linkage, of great utility in this transference of roles.

The political concomitants of India's newly acquired status as a nascent super-power are many. On the one hand it would invite the USA to a readjustment of its system of international relationship, at least in South Asia. It also beckons the USSR to a new vista and fresh pastures for the application of the Brezhnev doctrine in a modified form in this sensitive region bordering Burma, NEFA, Tibet and Nepal. Whether the emerging political structure, after the present phase of political surveillance to India ends—it has to, after all, since the question of mutual withdrawal of troops and evacuation of occupied territory is seized of in the UN—would afford sufficient elbow-room for the functioning of such a doctrine, is yet to be seen. For the time, a balance, a tenuous one though, has been struck between the USA's geopolitical interests and the USSR's, with India, a benevolent friend and *via media*. Ultimately, however, a nuclear India is likely to be the determining factor in South Asia. Will Japan then pale out and yield place to this new giant?

Either way, the USA has little to lose and everything to gain by playing up love to both Moscow and New Delhi. Already, strident voices are being heard here of the Indian Army having to stay on in Bangladesh, since, whatever others might say, it cannot take the risk of the new civilian authority being overwhelmed there.

Some Trends In India's Economic Development—II

PARESH CHATTOPADHYAY

NOW we turn to industry. The pattern of industrial development in the post-independence era shows interesting features from the point of view of the development of

capitalism in India. First we note that industrial production has grown at a fairly rapid rate and much more rapidly than agricultural production

—thereby widening the differences between the town and the countryside almost at all levels. The following table gives some idea.

Table 9: Production of Selected Industries

Industries	Unit	1950-51	1955-56	1960-61	1965-66	1967-68
Pig Iron	Million tonnes	1.69	1.95	4.31	7.09	6.91
Finished Steel	-do-	1.04	1.30	2.39	4.51	4.00
Machine Tools	Million rupees	3	8	70	294	283
Railway Wagons	'000 nos.	2.9	15.3	8.2	25.5	11.9
Diesel Engines	-do-	5.5	10.4	55.5	101.2	115.3
Electric Motors	'000 h.p.	99	272	728	1753	2029
N. Fertilizers	'000 tonnes of N.	9	80	101	232	367
Soda Ash	'000 tonnes	45	82	152	331	370
Jute Textiles	-do-	837	1071	1097	1302	1156
Cotton cloth	Million metres	4215	6260	6738	7440	7503
Cement	Million tonnes	2.73	4.57	7.97	10.82	11.5
Sugar	'000 tonnes	1134	1890	3029	3510	2243
Tea	Million kgs.	277	299	320	373	383
Electricity (generated)	Billion k.w.h.	5.3	8.8	17.0	32.0	39.4

[Source: *Economic Survey 1969-70* (Govt. of India)].

If we leave out the years 1966-67 and 1967-68 which were exceptionally bad years for Indian industry we see that the index of industrial production went up from a level of 74 in 1951 (1956=100) to 182 in 1965—an increase of 146 per cent in 14 years.³⁹

At the same time the index of factory employment of labour rose from 93.9 in 1951 (1956=100) to 136.5 in 1966.⁴⁰ Also the total productive capital—that is, fixed plus working capital—in large-scale industries increased from Rs 5,095 million in 1949 to Rs 12,147 million in 1958 and from Rs 17,374 million in 1959 to about Rs 65,000 million in 1965.⁴¹ This picture however does not give any definite idea of the structural changes that the industrial sector has undergone. First, not all industries grew at the same rate. Thus during the period under consideration large-scale (i.e. the factory) sector grew faster than the small-scale (i.e. the non-factory) sector. In 1950-51 the ratio of large-scale to small-scale was roughly 38:62. In 1968-69 it rose approximately to 60:40.⁴² Secondly, we have two important indices of increasing capital intensity in Indian industries.

In the first place the ratio of total

productive capital to wages plus salaries and other benefits rose from about 3 in 1949 to about 4.5 in 1958 and from about 4 in 1959 to about 6.6 in 1965.⁴³ In the second place electricity consumption per factory worker rose by more than two and a half times between 1949 and 1958 and by one and a half times between 1959 and 1965.⁴⁴ Thus it seems that the organic composition of capital in the industrial sector is rising. Next, within the large-scale sector itself, in general, consumption goods industries have shown a lower rate of growth than capital goods industries. Thus whereas, for example, food manufacturing, beverage, textiles and leather products show, respectively, 3.2, 6.1, 2.0 and 3.0 per cent rates of growth, electrical machinery, non-electrical machinery, chemicals and petroleum products show, respectively, 14.9, 17.7, 9.1 and 20.8 per cent rates of growth during the period under consideration.⁴⁵ The same idea is obtained through another way. The share of consumer goods in total industrial production declined from 67.9 per cent in 1950-51 to 34.0 per cent in 1965-66 and the share of non-consumer goods rose, correspondingly, from 32.1 per cent to 66.0 per cent

during the same period.⁴⁶ Again, this shows that the Department I is growing much faster than Department II.

The figures on the rate of growth of industries cited above should not give rise to an exaggerated notion about the extent of industrialization of India. Thus the share of industries including mining, in Net National Product of India, at 1948-49 prices, actually fell from 17.1 per cent in 1948-49 to 16.6 per cent in 1960-61 while it rose only slightly, at 1960-61 prices, from 20.2 per cent in 1960-61 to 22.4 per cent in 1967-68.⁴⁷

Stronger Bourgeoisie

There is conclusive evidence that the progress of industry has strengthened the bourgeoisie. First, there has been a steady rate of increase in the industrial profits of the joint stock companies over the Third Plan period. Thus, according to the Reserve Bank of India, between 1950 and 1956 (1950=100) gross profits of joint stock companies rose by 65 per cent while the gross profits of public limited companies rose by 42 per cent between 1955 and 1959 (1955=100) and by about 51 per cent between 1960-61 and 1965-66 (1960-61=100). The comparable figures for the private limited companies during the same two periods were respectively 65 per cent and 67 per cent.⁴⁸ On the other hand as regards the real earnings of factory workers earning less than Rs 200 per month the index rose from 100 in 1951 to 123.7 in 1953 and then gradually declined to 104.6 in 1964.⁴⁹ In fact an official report has admitted that "during 1951-64, real wages have shown little improvement, while in 1964 there has been a substantial decline".⁵⁰ It adds that "the provisional data for 1965 and 1966, now available, don't indicate any change in the trend".⁵¹ Then again, the paid-up capital of joint stock companies increased by about five times in 1947-48 and 1965-66.⁵² The particularly rapid expansion of large companies confirms that the

big bourgeoisie has reaped the greatest advantage from this development. Thus as Professor Hazari has shown, the four largest groups of capitalists—Tata, Birla, Martin Burn, and Dalmia-Sahu-Jain—had increased their share of capital of non-government public companies from 18 per cent in 1951 to 22 per cent in 1958.⁵³ An official report, listed, as

of 1963-64, the top 75 groups of monopolies who, owning less than 6 per cent of non-government non-banking companies held about 47 per cent of their total assets.⁵⁴ In 1967-68 the share of these groups in the total assets of the non-government non-banking companies, of which they owned about 8 per cent, rose to about 54 per cent.⁵⁵

III

Who are the agents behind the development of capitalism in India? We have seen above that the Indian bourgeoisie wanted to carry India along an independent capitalist path. This most mature bourgeoisie in Asia outside of Japan was conscious of the difficulties faced by a backward capitalism and was aware that private enterprise alone could not deliver the goods. It had two non-exclusive alternatives—intervention by the State—their State—in the economy at an accelerated pace and collaboration with foreign capital.

That the Indian bourgeoisie opted for a large public sector is clear from Nehru's account of the big business component of the Congress National Planning Commission⁵⁶ as well as from the fact that the so-called Bombay Plan, formulated towards the end of the Second World War by Tata, Birla, and six other big capitalists, provided for a considerable extension of State ownership and management of the economy. An examination of the Government of India's *Industrial Policy Resolutions* of 1948 and 1956 shows that the State has agreed to step in only where private enterprise for various reasons cannot do the job alone. The intervention by the State in the Indian economy was meant *primarily* to create conditions for the rapid development of capitalism and *secondarily* to prevent excessive concentration and monopoly of economic power—this last being promoted by the exigencies of parliamentary democracy and the necessity of not alienating the small and the middle bourgeoisie from the

big bourgeoisie; in other words, in order to serve the interests of the capitalist class as a *whole* even at the cost of the interest of *particular* capitalists. As to the secondary purpose of the State intervention we have seen above that it had very little negative effect on the growth of concentration and monopoly.

Primary Purpose

As to the primary purpose, it is proved by the essentially capitalist character of the State intervention itself and by the growth of the private sector during the planning period. For the first point it is enough to go through the measures of nationalization effected so far including the much vaunted bank nationalization. If we consider the nationalization of air transport in 1953, the Imperial Bank in 1955 and life insurance in 1956 we see that each of them was undertaken with some specific objectives in view and none formed part of any concerted anti-private enterprise strategy. The same holds good for bank nationalization in 1969. In the first case the resources at the disposal of air transport were insufficient; in the second case there was the necessity of having an extensive credit well beyond the scope of private moneylenders; in the third case, there was the uncertainty of mopping up savings for large industrial investments as well as clearing up of an industry that was insufficient and corrupt; in the fourth case, an important reason was the need to extend credit and banking facilities to agriculture in order to widen the basis of capita-

lism in the countryside. Obviously the basic question is who holds the State power. As this power is essentially held by the big bourgeoisie, in alliance with the landlords, the character of State intervention cannot but be capitalist. Even the share of the State in the economy need not make one enthusiastic. Thus two decades after independence 88 per cent of the domestic product is still at the disposal of the private sector and the share of the government rose by only about 5 per cent over the period.⁵⁷

Also to be noted is the rapid growth of the private sector over the planning period—a growth that has been facilitated by the activities of the public sector. We have already cited some data in support of this contention. As an ex-Cabinet Minister of India has observed, "the private sector could not have achieved the expansion that it has but for the public sector investment in economic overheads and heavy industries".⁵⁸ We also know that the State has helped the private sector by extending long-term credit to big industries through its financial institutions like Industrial Finance Corporation, National Industrial Development Corporation and State Finance Corporations.⁵⁹

IV

Thus by all evidence India is following the capitalist path of development. We have already seen the impossibility of following such a path in the 'classical' way, that is, by depending on private enterprise alone. The Indian bourgeoisie had to create the State capitalist sector for the purpose. Indeed the private sector plus the State capitalist sector were at first considered sufficient for taking India along the capitalist path of development, that is, without *substantially* depending upon foreign capital. As a matter of fact till the middle fifties the Indian bourgeoisie was not very enthusiastic about the *fresh* inflow of foreign capital into India lest it jeopardizes the

very purpose for which it had fought the British rule, namely, independent capitalist development. That justifies the remark of an American observer, "Until the late fifties the total inflow of foreign capital into India was sluggish. The inflow of American private capital amounted to little more than a trickle".⁶⁰

India's economic development, however, began to show alarming trends towards the end of the Second Five Year Plan. Growth of industrial production slowed down considerably, investment fell off and India faced the worst balance of payments crisis. The stage was set for a marked shift in the whole trend of foreign capital inflow. Thus whereas between 1953 and 1958 the book value of the outstanding foreign business investments in the private sector—that is, the sector involving commercial and industrial undertakings including State-owned enterprises—increased by Rs 135 crores, between 1958 and 1963 it increased by Rs 244 crores.⁶¹ On the other hand of the total number of foreign collaboration agreements approved amounting to 2200 between 1948 and 1964, 1900 were effected between 1956 and 1964 alone.⁶² Then again as a proportion of total investment in India the net inflow of capital into India rose from 6 per cent in 1954-55 to about 23 per cent in 1964-65.⁶³

However one should not look merely at the quantitative aspect of foreign investments in India. More important is the *character* of foreign investments as revealed, first, in their country-wise sources and, secondly, in their industry-wise distribution. On both these counts the character of foreign investments in India has undergone a sea-change in the last two decades. In the first place, whereas the share of the U.K. in the total foreign investments in the private sector was roughly 80 per cent in 1948 it came down to 54 per cent in 1965 and 48 per cent in 1967. The corresponding figures for the USA was 4 per cent, 22 per cent and 25 per cent.⁶⁴ In other words, the

change reflects, broadly, the shift in the balance of forces in world capitalism. Secondly, industry-wise composition of foreign investments in 1948 showed 'classical' colonial patterns: if one excludes services and concentrates on the productive sphere

alone one can see the overwhelming preponderance of the non-manufacturing sector (excluding petroleum) compared with the manufacturing sector (including petroleum). Two decades later the roles are completely reversed:

Table 10: Private Sector* : Outstanding Long Term Foreign Business Investments**

(Rs. crores)

Industry group	As at the end of June 1948	As at the end of December, 1958	As at the end of March, 1967 (++)
Plantations	52.2	95.1	111.4
Mining	11.5	11.8	10.1
Petroleum	22.3	118.4	164.9
Manufacturing	70.7	214.9	630.9
Services	107.9	122.3	313.3
Total	264.6	562.5	1230.6

* Excludes Banking and Insurance.

** Book value of Investments.

(++) At the pre-devaluation rate.

Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, August, 1969.

Within the manufacturing sector itself the growth of foreign investments has been much higher in capital goods—including the most technologically sophisticated ones—than in consumption goods as the following table shows:

Table 11: Private Sector: Outstanding Foreign Business Investments in Manufacturing

Items	(Rs crores)		
	At the end of June, 1948	At the end of Dec., 1958	At the end of March, 1967
Food, beverages, etc.	10.1	30.4	40.6
Textile products	28.0	21.1	52.1
Transport equipment	1.0	5.7	65.7
Machinery and Machine Tools	1.2	5.9	36.3
Metals and Metal products	8.0	76.0	116.6
Electrical goods and Machinery	4.8	17.1	52.1
Chemicals and allied products	8.0	25.9	183.8
Miscellaneous	9.6	32.6	83.7
Total Manufacturing	70.7	214.9	630.9
Total (all industry groups)	264.6	562.5	1230.6

For explanations see the footnote to the preceding Table.

Source: *Ibid.*

Similarly of the total number of effective foreign collaboration agreements—as opposed to total number of approvals—amounting to 1050 by 1965 the number of agreements in manufacturing alone was 1006 and an industry-wise classification revealed that machinery and machine tools, electrical goods and chemicals together alone accounted for 55 per cent of the total effective agreements.⁶⁵ Nothing illustrates better

the control of the commanding heights of the Indian economy by imperialism. All this shows that the capitalist path that India is following is essentially a *dependent capitalist path*. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact of the increasing amount of foreign assistance—loans and grants excluding foreign business investments—for India over the three Plan periods as the following table shows:

Table 12: External Assistance to India

	Authorisations	Utilisations
1. Up to the end of the First Plan	381.75	201.67
2. During the Second Plan ..	2531.14	1430.19
3. During the Third Plan ..	2935.91	2867.52

Source: *Economic Survey*, 1968-69

Concurrently there is the dwindling share of the national resources in the investments made by the State capitalist sector as is seen from the fact that the share of foreign assistance in total public sector outlays has grown from 9.6 per cent in 1951-56 (First Plan period) to 44.99 per cent in 1967-68.⁶⁶ The lion's share in the total foreign assistance—it goes without saying—is provided by the USA. This has amounted to more than 9000 million dollars between 1951 and 1969—an amount that is higher than the rest of the foreign assistance over the same period put together.⁶⁷

U.S.-Inspired

Last but not at all the least, it should also be emphasized that the 'new agricultural strategy', referred to earlier, has been directly inspired and promoted by the USA through both technical and financial means. According to an official handout, "At present agriculture accounts for 40

per cent of the technical assistance expenditures of the USAID Mission (in India). Five years ago the figure was only 24 per cent. US foreign exchange assistance for Indian agricultural development exceeds Rs 525 crores. In addition the US has extended to agricultural development loans and grants totalling Rs 750 crores from the sales proceeds of commodities supplied under PL 480. Some 125 American agricultural specialists are now serving in India at the request of the Indian Government".⁶⁸

It must be pointed out here that the increasing Soviet economic (and military) aid to India does in no way alter the situation. Rather this aid while strengthening the position of the Indian ruling classes at the cost of the emerging revolutionary forces inside the country serves, at the same time, the Soviet Union's global strategy of isolating China.

V

The consequences for India, of following the *dependent capitalist path* are for all to see. We shall touch upon the broadest economic indicators.

National income and, still more, per capita income, in real terms, have shown extremely moderate rates of growth. Thus at 1948-49 prices national income shows an annual growth

rate at 3.5 per cent during the First Plan and 3.8 per cent during the Second Plan. The corresponding rates for per capita income are 1.6 per cent and 1.7 per cent. During the Third Plan the growth rates of national and per capita income, at 1960-61 prices, have been a paltry 2.8 per cent and 0.1 per cent.⁶⁹ In fact their index numbers with 1960-61 prices and with 1960-61 as base show increases, respectively, by only 27.4 per cent and 4.9 per cent over a period of eight years (1960-61—1968-69).⁷⁰ Similarly the annual growth rates of industrial and agricultural outputs (at 1960-61 prices) which were, respectively, 7.9 per cent and 3.1 per cent between 1954-55 and 1964-65 declined to 4.1 per cent and -0.1 per cent between 1964-65 and 1969-70.⁷¹ Correspondingly net investment as a proportion of national income—according to Reserve Bank estimates—after increasing from 8.5 per cent in 1954-55 to 14.0 per cent in 1964-65 showed continuous decline thereafter and reached 9.3 per cent in 1969-70. On the other hand the annual rate of growth in the wholesale prices increased from 4.7 per cent between 1954-55 and 1964-65 to 7.4 per cent between 1964-65 and 1969-70.⁷² Thus the Fourth Plan assumption of relative price stability on which all its estimates are based is fast proving illusory. Again, giving a lie to the Government of India's proclaimed goal of eradicating unemployment in India by the middle sixties various Plan documents estimated the number of unemployed to have increased from 5.3 million at the end of the First Plan to between 9 and 10 million at the end of the Third. On all accounts these were gross underestimates. Now the Fourth Plan document has given up all estimates of the unemployed. Finally, India's external debt has shown an alarming growth over the years. Thus from Rs 32.03 crores at the end of 1950-51 it rose to Rs 1001.37 crores at the end of 1960-61, to Rs 3,152.10 crores at the end of 1965-66 and to Rs 6,030.56 at the end of 1967-68.⁷³

The economic policy pursued by the ruling classes of India has already affected the level of living of the Indian people in a significant way. Taking a conservative estimate of Rs 15 per capita per month (at 1960-61 prices) as the minimum level of living in the Indian rural area a recent study has shown, on the National Sample Survey data, that the percentage of people below the minimum level in rural India went up from 38.03 in 1960-61 to 53.02 in 1967-68, thus registering a rise of about 40 per cent in less than a decade.⁷⁴ Another recent study, taking about the same minimum level of living as above for the rural area has estimated that 40 per cent of the rural population remained below this minimum in 1960-61 but that the percentage remained the same in 1967-68. However, taking Rs 22.5 as the minimum for the urban area the same study has estimated that 50 per cent of the urban population remained below this minimum in 1960-61 and that the condition of the bottom 20 per cent of the urban population deteriorated by 1967-68. "Thus while the character of rural poverty has remained the same as before, the character of urban poverty has deepened further".⁷⁵

The serious difficulties that the Indian economy has been facing regarding the growth of national product and all-round improvement in people's living conditions do not, in the main, arise from any natural or technical deficiencies. They arise from the particular path of economic development that India has been following.

Choice of this path was primarily due to the incapacity of the Indian bourgeoisie—given its relative weakness and its solidarity with the semi-feudal elements in the countryside in the face of growing mass struggle—to effect radical agrarian reforms and thereby remove the obstacles to the development of productive forces for the immense majority of the Indian people. It is only when the poor and landless peasants who constitute the majority of the rural people directly

take politics in their own hands that the indispensable agrarian transformations can be effected, the main obstacles to economic development removed and India's dependence on imperialism ended. This, however, is unthinkable without the seizure of political power by the proletariat in alliance with the peasantry.

(Concluded)

Reference Notes

¹ *Indian Agriculture in Brief*—Government of India (1968), pp. 118-121 and *Fourth Five Year Plan* (1969-74)—Government of India, p. 117.

² Cited by S. R. Sen in *Commerce*, Annual Number, 1967, p. 43.

³ *Fourth Five Year Plan*, p. 117.

⁴ *Third Five Year Plan* (Govt. of India), p. 382 and *Fourth Five Year Plan: A Draft Outline* (Govt. of India), p. 9.

⁵ *Indian Agriculture in Brief* (op. cit.), p. 189.

⁶ Two important references are his *Agrarian Programme of Russian Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (1907) and Preface to the Second Edition (1907) of *Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899).

⁷ Thus a keen American observer of the Indian agrarian scene, Daniel Thorner, pointed out that in the State of Bihar the landlords, taking opportunity of the definition of personal cultivation as given in the legislation, could retain 500, 700 and even 1000 acres of land in the post "reform" era. See Daniel Thorner, *The Agrarian Prospect of India*, (1956), p. 34.

⁸ *Khudkasht* signifies land under personal cultivation of the landlord.

⁹ See the consolidated study by P. T. George in *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics*, July-September, 1968.

¹⁰ P. T. George—op. cit., and Singh and Misra—*Land Reforms in Uttar Pradesh* (1964), p. 160.

¹¹ P. T. George—op. cit. (our emphasis)

¹² *Third Five Year Plan* (Govt. of India), pp. 236-38.

¹³ Basu & Bhattacharya—*Land Reforms in West Bengal* (1963), p. 82.

¹⁴ Marx, *Das Kapital* III, S. 607 in *Marx-Werke*, 25 (1964).

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 608.

¹⁶ Lenin, *Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899)—ch. XIII.

¹⁷ *National Sample Survey* No. 95 (July 1960-June 1961), and *All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey* (Reserve Bank of India), 1961-62.

¹⁸ See *All India Rural Credit Survey* (1954), vol. II, Chapter 30.

¹⁹ *Census of India*, 1961. Paper No. I of 1962 Appendix III.

²⁰ See the reference already cited.

²¹ *National Sample Survey* 8th Round, 1953-54 and 17th Round, 1961-62.

²² See K. Kautsky—*La Question Agraire* (1900), Preface to the French edition and ch. VII; and Lenin—*Capitalism in Agriculture* (1900), First Article, sec. III.

²³ *Growth Rates in Indian Agriculture*, Government of India (1966).

²⁴ *Indian Agriculture in Brief* (1968) Table 6.2.

²⁵ Cf. Lenin—*New Data on laws of Development of Capitalism in Agriculture* (1914-1915)—Part I, Sec. 16.

²⁶ Cited by Lenin—op. cit., Sec. 5.

²⁷ *Report of the Second Agricultural Labour Enquiry* (1960), Appendix IV.

²⁸ *Ibid*.

²⁹ *Ibid*.

³⁰ See G. Kotovsky—*Agrarian Reforms in India* (1958-59), Eng. translation 1964, p. 158. The existence of wage-labour, though perhaps the most definitive evidence of the capitalist mode of production is, however not its only evidence, at least in agriculture. Ploughing back of profit for further production is also an important evidence. Lack of sufficiently disaggregated data on capital accumulation in relation to the farm size in India prevents us from any measurement in this regard.

³¹ Here we follow Bettelheim's characterization of India's agrarian structure which is not fully feudal but shows the features of a declining feudalism such as: absence of labour market over a large part of the rural sector, personal subservience of the immediate producer to the landowner, excessive importance of land rent, use of produce to satisfy immediate needs mostly, underdeveloped social division of Labour (Bettelheim—*India*

Independent, 1968, p. 23).

³² *All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey 1961-62 Table II in Reserve Bank of India Bulletin*, June 1965.

³³ Planning Commission (Govt. of India)—*Implementation of Land Reforms* (1966), pp. 2-13.

³⁴ S. A. Shah and M. Rajagopal, *Economic Weekly* (Bombay) October 12, 1963.

³⁵ Planning Commission—*Memorandum on the Fourth Five Year Plan* (1964), p. 26.

³⁶ [See, among others, F. Frankel—*Agricultural Modernization and Social Change* (mimeographed), September, 1969; W. Iadajinsky—"Green Revolution in Punjab" in *Economic and Political Weekly*, June 28, 1969, "Green Revolution in Bihar" in *ibid*, September 27, 1969 and "Ironies of India's Green Revolution" in *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1970].

³⁷ F. Frankel—*op. cit.*

³⁸ *Foreign Affairs*—July, 1970.

³⁹ *Fourth Five Year Plan: A Draft Outline* (Planning Commission, Govt. of India), p. 10.

⁴⁰ *Indian Labour Statistics*, 1968 (Govt. of India).

⁴¹ *Census of Manufacturing Industries and Annual Survey of Industries* (Central Statistical Organization, Department of Statistics, Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India). CMI data refer to the period up to 1958 with a much narrower coverage of industries than the ASI data which refer to the period beginning with 1959. For details see the Introduction to the ASI.

⁴² Our calculation based on data given in *Statistical Abstract, India*, 1962 and *Estimates of National Product*, 1970 (Central Statistical Organisation, Govt. of India).

⁴³ Calculated on the basis of data given in the *Census of Manufacturing Industries and Annual Survey of Industries*. The 1959 ratio though seemingly smaller is not strictly comparable to 1958 ratio for the reasons already given above.

⁴⁴ Calculated on the basis of data given by CMI, ASI and Central Water and Power Commission (Ministry of Irrigation and Power, Govt. of India).

⁴⁵ Calculated from *Economic Survey*, 1968-69 (Govt. of India).

⁴⁶ Calculated from *Fourth Five Year*

Plan: A Draft Outline (Govt. of India), p. 10.

⁴⁷ *Economic Survey*, 1968-69. In the latter so-called "revised" estimate as between 1960-61 and 1967-68 construction and electricity were added to industries and mining.

⁴⁸ *Statistical Abstract, India*, 1958-59, 1962 and 1968.

⁴⁹ *Indian Labour Statistics*, 1968.

⁵⁰ *Report of the National Commission on Labour* (Govt. of India), 1969, p. 189.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Statistical Abstract, India*, (1958-59 and 1968).

⁵³ *The Structure of the Corporate Private Sector* (1966), p. 305.

⁵⁴ *Monopolies Enquiry Commission Report* (1965), pp. 121-122.

⁵⁵ B. Datta, Growth of Industrial Houses in *Company News and Notes* (May 1 & 16, 1970), Dept. of Company Affairs, Ministry of Industrial Development (Govt. of India).

⁵⁶ *Discovery of India* (4th ed.) p. 404.

⁵⁷ *India: A Reference Annual*, 1966 (Govt. of India), p. 150 and *Estimates of National Product*, August, 1970 (Govt. of India).

⁵⁸ Manubhai Shah in *Eastern Economist*, July 21, 1967.

⁵⁹ For a fuller analysis of the role of the State in India's economic development see P. Chattopadhyay, "State Capitalism in India" in *Monthly Review* (March 1970).

⁶⁰ J. P. Lewis—*Quiet Crisis in India* (1962), p. 211. For a good summary of the evidence see M. Kidron—*Foreign Investments India* (1965), pp. 65 ff.

⁶¹ *Source: Reserve Bank of India, Bulletin*, August, 1969.

⁶² Reserve Bank of India—*Foreign Collaboration in Indian Industry* (1968), p. 4.

⁶³ Our calculation based on the RBI data.

⁶⁴ Reserve Bank of India—*India's Foreign Liabilities and Assets*, 1961—*Survey Report* (1964) and *Bulletin* (August 1969).

⁶⁵ Reserve Bank of India—*Foreign Collaboration in Indian Industry* (1968), p. 102.

⁶⁶ Planning Commission, as given in *Records and Statistics, Quarterly Bulletin of the Eastern Economist*, November, 1968.

⁶⁷ United States Information Service—*Fact Sheet: US Economic Assistance to India* (1969).

⁶⁸ USIS—*Fact Sheet: US Economic Assistance to India*, June 1951—January 1970.

⁶⁹ *Economic Survey*, 1969-70.

⁷⁰ *Estimates of National Product*, August

1970 (C.S.O).

⁷¹ *Reserve Bank of India Bulletins*, April, June and October 1969, and Sept. 1970.

⁷² *RBI Bulletins*.

⁷³ Ministry of Finance, as given in *Basic Statistics relating to the Indian Economy* December, 1969 (Planning Commission).

⁷⁴ P. Bardhan—"Green Revolution and Agricultural Labourers: A Correction in *Economic and Political Weekly*, November 14, 1970.

⁷⁵ Dandekar and Rath—"Poverty in India: Dimensions and Trends" in *Economic and Political Weekly*, January 2, 1971.

Book Review

THE INDIAN ARMY

By Stephen P. Cohen
University of California Press
Rs. 35

MR Stephen P. Cohen is surprised that conventional political history, especially in India, has virtually ignored the military as a factor in the process of nation-building. He thought that in India the military had a profound impact on the course of nationalist politics and also upon politics after 1947. He finds the impact in India's military establishments, and in the cantonments, on matters of badge, dress and drill and also in more fundamental ways. In fact, he adds a sub-title to his book, "Its contribution to the development of a nation."

Mr Cohen thinks that democratic politics in India are burgeoning behind the protective shield of the world's fourth largest army. A powerful army places limits on political behaviour. Groups which would otherwise incline toward revolutionary strategies are forced to stay within the legal parliamentary system. Modernization, Mr Cohen adds, will come to South Asia, but only at the pace tolerated by the military.

This is a good point, except for the fact that Mr Cohen's book does not deal with the point. He spans three hundred years of British military presence in India in about two hundred pages and most of his his-

tory is dead wood. The role of the Indian army after independence has been treated in about thirty pages which consume his ideas about the new civilian-military relations and the broader base of recruitment. Nothing special about parliamentary democracy as practised in India and absolutely nothing about the revolutionary urges.

If we can ignore the terms of reference Mr Cohen has set for his book—we have to, because he does not give us any idea as to the nature of the Indian nation and how the Indian army contributed to its development—we can derive some incidental points of interest, which again are not by any chance very significant as far as India's future is concerned.

For example, Gandhi's views on the military. Gandhi as we hear believed in non-violence. He was vigorously opposed to compulsory military training under any circumstances, regardless whether it was a non-national government such as the British or a national government. He disliked the brutalising features of the military. This was however Gandhi philosophy for public consumption. What was the other side? Mr Stephen quotes an Indian lieutenant-general whom he interviewed in 1963:

My father was a doctor, a famous doctor in Bombay. Mahatma Gandhi was a patient of his. Once, after finishing an examination, my father asked, "Mahatmaji, what will my boy become?" I was only 15 at the time, I thought I might become a lawyer, but I liked sports, very much, and I was very chubby. Gandhi suggested I join the army. "But Mahatmaji", my father replied, "what kind of life is that for an Indian?" Gandhi answered, "every tree starts with only one branch: it will grow in time, there will come a time when many Indians will be officers. Besides, the army is just the place for games, that's all they do; it's a good, outdoors, healthy life."

That was Gandhi, the champion of the downtrodden Indians, regarding the British army in India, which was an occupation army, playing polo,

observing officers' mess etiquette and in off moments firing in Jallianwalla-bagh or indulging in some such pleasure.

Mr Cohen, of course, quotes the interview with approval because it establishes the elitist character of the Indian army. The Indian nation, he thinks, would do well in shaping itself after the Indian army with its health standards, discipline, centralised command, sense of etiquette, so on and so forth. What he fails to understand is that no nation in the world can shape itself after its army, which heavily draws on the national exchequer for its existence. It is on the other hand the army which should shape itself after the nation.

Civilian-Military Ties

A substantial part of the book has been used by Mr Stephen to study the civilian-military relationship, a part more or less useful for study. In India, civilians have always controlled the military; that is, politics has always had the upper hand. Except for a brief interlude, when Lord Kitchener eased Lord Curzon out of India and gained supremacy of the military over the politicians, the civil administration in India never lost ground to the military. The armed forces have had always a secluded life and have been taught not to study politics. India, after independence, had inherited this tradition. The armed forces have built themselves up just professionally and have always acted at the dictates of politicians.

There is of course a bizarre corollary of supremacy of politics over military. Indian military officers are discouraged from studying politics, let alone mixing in politics. This is how to make an automaton, a devastating one, to be used in the interest of the ruling clique in the government. What this can lead up to has been fairly demonstrated in the twenty-five years' history of Pakistan where the military has driven out the civilians in the Government and led the country from disaster to disaster.

Jawaharlal Nehru, the representative of liberal intellectual Indian

thought, used to be appalled by the evil nature of the military. But he did nothing to humanise the military, which he could have done by politicising it, by transforming it into a viable instrument in building up the country. His professed guru, Gandhi, wrote about the military in 1946, "Up till now they have only been employed in indiscriminate firing on us. Today they must plough the land, dig wells, clean latrines and do every other constructive work that they can and thus turn the people's hatred of them into love." This was however, ludicrous to those who have been shaped by the British tradition which looked up to the military as an efficient war machine. Nehru however did nothing to bring the nation and the army closer. It was Krishna Menon who made an endeavour to put the military to something other than war. However, when the Sino-Indian confrontation led to disaster for India, all blame was put upon Krishna Menon's worthy efforts to civilise the military, even though the Indian army, in any case, were no match for the Chinese then. The only Indian general who had some politics in him was B. M. Kaul, who again was made a scapegoat for the disaster which was more political than military. This is a point Mr Cohen raised but very superficially, because the Establishment historian as he is, he would have been in deep trouble had he further studied the implications of imbuing the military with politics.

Mr Cohen similarly has very mistaken ideas about the broad-based recruitment now adopted by the military forces in India. True, in the British days, only the aristocratic families could afford the prohibitive costs of Sandhurst training and could send their wards for a career which was then more prestigious than any civil service. After independence, the civilians have done enough in slighting the military prestige by devaluing it in terms of pay and ranking. The training in the National Defence Academy as well as in the Indian Military Academy is more or less available today to any middle-class young

man who can compete in examinations. However this alone does not make the Indian army a national army. Mr Cohen is probably unfamiliar with the word, embourgeoisement. That is what has happened in the Indian army. It does not represent the country just as the elected Parliament and Government do not represent the country. Officers of the Indian army who lead the army are as aloof from the masses as the British officers were. The change in colour does not make for a change in character. Mr Cohen's reference to the Russian army in 1917 is superfluous and to the PLA of China utterly irrelevant.

N. P. G.

Queimada

BY A FILM CRITIC

WHEN His Brittanic Majesty's trouble-shooter No. 1, Sir William Walker, arrives on a Portuguese-held island in the Antilles the people fail to spot the Union Jack that he carried under his shoulders. They become willing collaborators in the British game of overthrowing Lisbon's rule and in the process become subjugated by the Antilles sugar company serving as the long arm of England. The action is set in the 1830s and 1840s.

Gillo Pontecarvo has already given us the very powerful film about the Algerian war of independence, *The Battle of Algiers*. Whereas the contemporary scene allowed him to bring his camera down to the very streets of Algiers lending a rare touch of authenticity to the film, in *Queimada*, he has had to depend a lot on studio props and mechanisms. In *The Battle of Algiers*, his documentary skill was tested to the utmost. But here he deals with straight fiction, the theme of colonial expansion and exploitation providing the contemporary chain. And Pontecarvo succeeds in the fiction into strains of reality. In *Queimada*, a bitter colonial period has indeed been brought brutally alive.

It is not easy to point out the hero or the heroes of this kind of film. Is it a film of anger? A tragic one? The director is ruthless in his exposition of colonial machinations, the torture and savagery being subjunctive elements. Marlon Brando's Sir William is a cynical, skilful, daring adventurer: the finest mettle for expanding the imperial horizon. His inevitable clash with the man he made into a leader and hero of his people, José de Lorres, brought out the empire-builder's self-pity. And this is about the only drawback of this fine film surprisingly shunned by the cinema-going public in these euphoric days of Jai Bangla.

Clippings

E. Bengal : The Young Contenders

According to the latest census figures, as much as 65% of the Bangladesh population is in the below-35 age-group. There is evidence to suggest that elder politicians, not excluding Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had not missed this reality. They had even allowed themselves, at various stages, to be influenced by what the youth thought and did, to add a radical edge in the Awami League's strategy.

Since March 25, it had been the youth again who had swelled the ranks of the freedom-fighters and got themselves trained in military tactics and operations, including guerilla and commando activities. Competent observers here say that about 80% of the Mukti Bahini irregulars consisted of youth drawn from among Awami League supporters.

On the other hand, the Mujib Bahini was meant to develop as an exclusive platform of the Awami League students' wing. But it is doubtful if it has been able to maintain its exclusiveness. Both Mr Rab and Mr Tofail seem to enjoy the confidence of the radical youth wing of the Awami League and, therefore,

constitute a powerful factor in future developments.

Radicalism, as the supporters of Mr Rab and Mr Tofail understand it, clearly has a connotation which is different in many significant respects from the conventional definition of the term. They are, for example, thoroughly opposed to communism or the communist path of socio-economic development. They prefer a non-communist, somewhat socialistic way.

But their concept of socialism is still nebulous. They say the Indian experiment in democratic socialism has disappointed them. They will, therefore, prefer to have, at least for the time being, some sort of a dictatorship to push through reconstruction without let or hindrance.

They are fully aware that to ask for a fresh spell of dictatorship is to run a grave risk. But what else can be done? they argue. They say: "We have not fought this battle to restore old and oppressive social and economic relations." Their concept of a new society is more akin to an egalitarianism than to socialism proper, and a new dictatorship presupposes Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's presence to take up the leadership.

In this context, their determination not to lay down arms until Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is freed, assumes more than usual political significance. It is difficult to visualise at this stage that they might give in to any alternatives.

At the other end of the Bangla Desh political spectrum, where again the hegemony of the youth is unchallenged, the disarray among the not-too-powerful left forces continues.

Admittedly, the baptism of fire has apparently not enabled them to think in terms of coming closer to one another organisationally or on the basis of political slogans. In fact, a powerful plea made at the November conference of the Purba Bangla Communist Party for unity among the left forces reportedly met with no response. The PBCP, of course claims that it is not giving up the idea altogether.

However, all the groups, mostly National Awami Party factions, seem to have undergone significant transformation during the... nine months of the struggle against the occupation army.

For example, the pro-Peking Huq-Toaha group is said to have been split on more or less the same lines as its counterpart in West Bengal (CPI-ML) over the issue of China's attitude to the freedom struggle in Bangla Desh. The Huq group continues to share the Chinese view and thereby enjoys Peking's blessings. But Toaha and his men rallied behind the struggle, though in their own way and on their own terms, and played a role in parts of districts like Noakhali, Barisal, Faridpur and even Jessore.

No one in Dacca seems to have any clear idea of what the Toaha group will do now. Nor is the number of its men in arms known. However, this much is known at least—that some of his associates are already in Dacca, presumably in an effort to establish contacts with other leftist groups, the PBCP in particular.

The PBCP, (a splinter group of which had withdrawn to India and thereby allegedly lost touch with events inside Bangla Desh) claims to have been the first to organise a training camp for guerillas, inducting about 7,000 of them. The activities of these volunteers, who had brought themselves under the overall discipline and command of the Mukti Bahini, were confined mainly to parts of Chittagong and Comilla districts.

While Maulana Bhasani had pledged his unqualified support for the freedom struggle, his associate, Jadu Mian, allegedly turned collaborator in the long run. The role of the Jaffar-Menon group was none too impressive, being confined mainly to the Tongi area. And it is considered doubtful if the pro-Moscow NAP faction, led by Mr Muzaffar Ahmed, has been able to retain its influences in the areas it once enjoyed since the withdrawal of its top leadership to India.

It is not known how much arms

each of these groups has. It is doubtful if all the arms distributed through the Mukti Bahini can ever be retrieved. Moreover, unauthorised collections must have been enormous in some cases. (Sivdas Banerjee in *The Times of India*).

The Roots Of Trouble

The follownig is the text, slightly abridged, of Mr Chou En-lai's comments on South Asia in the course of the interview granted to Mr Maxwell and published in the *Sunday Times*, London, on December 5, 1971:

Q: Could we turn away from South East Asia to the recent developments in South Asia? How do you see those?

A: Regarding the Indo-Pakistan question, our acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei already stated our principles in his speech on November 7 (on the occasion of the Peking visit of Mr Bhutto, Chairman of the Pakistani People's Party. The draft of the India-Soviet Treaty had lain for two years in a drawer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. After the announcement of Nixon's visit to China, the Soviet Union hastily concluded this treaty with India. Its aim is to realise Brezhnev's "Asian Collective Security System," which is directed against the countries to which Russia is hostile. But this aim is probably difficult to realise. There is no response from any other country. It expressed its readiness to sign similar treaties with other countries, but was rejected by them....

Once a war breaks out, both sides, not just one, will incur losses. You know what our attitude will be if a war breaks out between India and Pakistan against India's subversive and aggressive activities. India would in the end taste the bitter fruit of its own making. And from then on there would be no tranquillity on the sub-continent.

Q: Well there is some evidence that the Indians were backing the Bangla Desh movement from quite an

early stage. But there is another aspect to the situation. On the one hand the Bangla Desh movement certainly now has India's all-out backing, but on the other hand, there is a genuine Bengali nationalist movement in East Pakistan. And Pakistan herself is, in a sense, the product of the British Empire's withdrawal from the sub-continent.

A: It all stems from Britain, and particularly the Mountbatten policy. Mountbatten carried out the British Empire's policy of "divide and rule" and left many roots of trouble and planted many time bombs.

It can be said that this is a law of the development of colonialism. When colonialism subjects a region to its rule, it unifies the region in its own interest to facilitate exploitation. When it quits it leaves behind some roots of troubles to facilitate its remote control.

Imperialism invariably trains a bunch of flunkeys for the control of its colonies. India originally was not a single entity. But the colonial rule of the British Empire fostered the Brahmin upper stratum's idea of building up an Indian empire. Nehru had this idea and such was his policy. Take the case of China's Aksai Chin (in the Ladakh region of Kashmir). Originally it was not shown as within the British Empire on British maps, and we had not at all expected that Akasai Chin would become a problem.

I referred to this question, to the origin of the question of the western sector of the boundary, in my letter addressed to the leaders of Asian and African countries on November 15, 1962. I talked with Nehru about the so-called McMahon Line. He referred in a very vague way only to the Indian boundary line with Sinkiang. He even regarded Pakistan-administered Kashmir as part of India and alleged that in his view there was some discrepancy between the alignment of the boundary line there on the maps of our two sides.

Afterwards, when we signed our boundary treaty with Pakistan, readjustments were made in that sector by both sides. At that time Nehru was aware only of the existence of our

route (across Aksai Chin) linking Sinkiang and the Ari area of Tibet. But he did not know that we were building a road there. In fact we had long been building the road. But he did not know when and how we built it. He found out later only after reading a pictorial magazine of ours...

Once a war breaks out it often develops independently of men's subjective will. The turmoil would not be easily stopped.

(From *The Times of India*)

Letters

CPM And Bangladesh

For the first time in many years there appears to be a deep cleavage between the cadres and leadership of the CPM. The cadres are finding it difficult to applaud Mrs Indira Gandhi's role as liberator of Bangladesh. It seems incredible to praise the government, so long dubbed as neo-fascist and which still is engaged in the persecution of CPM cadres. To praise and to condemn in the same breath is rather too much to accept even if it comes from the top leadership.

The leadership has presumably felt this inconsistency and Mr Basavapurniah has tried to answer the various questions concerning Bangladesh in the *People's Democracy*. But his entire effort has been an exercise in evasion of the real issues involved. He has tried to justify the CPM's support to the war effort on the simple plea that the war was imposed on India by the military junta of W. Pakistan. But no characterisation of the Bangladesh movement is there. At the same time how the liberation movement is affected as a result of Indian military intervention is not touched.

The CPM's stand has all along been to extend support to the Mukti Bahini by supplying arms but without the physical intervention of the Indian Army. But the party has now tried to support the physical intervention on the ground that the Indian Government by itself was unwilling but that it was done under the popu-

lar pressure of the Indian people. What were the forums through which this popular pressure was exerted? Were the people fully informed of the real issues involved in the Bangladesh crisis? Is it not a fact that but for the CPM and some other left parties, the so-called forums of expression of the people's wishes are parties like the Congress(R), Congress(O), Jana Sangh, Swatantra etc. who represent the reactionary exploiting classes? And when such parties extend full support to a cause, however popular it might appear, it has to be taken with suspicion. Will it be too far out to surmise that, considering the geographical position of Bangladesh and taking it for certain that the Indian Army will win, the pressure mounted by these parties was to some extent neo-colonial in character i.e. it was a search for a new market for the Indian bourgeoisie who had been stagnating and finding no avenues for expansion either at home or abroad? In this they found the nascent bourgeoisie of Bangladesh represented by the Awami League leadership a close ally. In spite of possible penetration of the Indian business community the Bangladesh bourgeoisie will have a large area to operate in. For obvious reasons Indian participation will have to be limited if it cannot be prevented. It should not be forgotten that the leadership of the movement was in the hands of the Bangladesh bourgeoisie which was not being allowed to operate by the exploiting bourgeoisie of West Pakistan. The entire Six Point Programme of the Awami League was meant to serve the interests of the Bangladesh rich. Left to itself the Awami League leadership would never have allowed the movement to take the form of a violent liberation struggle. But when this could not be prevented, thanks to the foolhardy tackling of the situation by the military junta, the sole concern of the Awami League leadership has been not to allow the movement to slip out of its grip and turn into a real liberation movement.

The original stand of the CPM, of extending only arms assistance to the

Mukti Bahini without physical intervention, was quite logical. As in that case a sizable portion of the arms would have found their way to the real Mukti Bahini who were fighting for the real emancipation of the exploited people of Bangladesh. It seems that when the movement was slipping out of the hands of the Awami League leadership the war broke out. Apparently the war has been a boon to most of the parties concerned. The Awami League leadership which was feeling unsure of the future has become the master of the new country without much effort. The Indian Government has now a dependable ally, and the Indian business community a new area to probe. The only casualty seems to be the liberation movement and the exploited masses of Bangladesh. On the Indian side while the Congress(R) and revisionists are dreaming of spoils in the next elections, the CPM's credibility has suffered a severe setback. The CPM leadership would do better to make a reappraisal of the situation in the correct perspective and revise its stand. The earlier the better.

S. N. Roy
Dum Dum

Lessons Of Birbhum

"Lessons on Birbhum" by Prabir Basu (December 18, 1971) is an exercise in petty-bourgeois muddle-headedness. Mr Basu knows and admits that the annihilation programme in Birbhum has received a severe setback, that the class enemies there are now on the top. In course of analysing the reasons for this grievous debacle, he has striven to propound a number of profound theses: (1) that there is a revolutionary-proletarian annihilation programme as opposed to a petty-bourgeois one; (2) that in a revolutionary-proletarian annihilation programme the middle class cannot be won over as an ally, -so it needs to be neutralized; (3) that polemics on the strategy and tactics of the Indian revolution is stupidity and vulgarity; the ones "invol-

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ed in actual work of revolution" know best how to make a revolution (Those not engaged in their brands of revolution should shut up their mouths).

Now, what are the content and forms of a "proletarian-revolutionary annihilation programme"? How and by whom is the programme realized? These pertinent questions, Mr Basu has not cared to answer. Secondly, when he raises the slogan of neutralizing the middle class, he refutes the theory of four-class united front but does not explain why it is necessary to reject it. Thirdly, by ridiculing polemics on strategy and tactics of the Indian revolution, he unmistakably shows himself up as a blind worshipper of empiricism, in Mao's words, a "collaborator and accomplice of doctrinairism" which is alien to Marxism-Leninism.

Who is an empiricist? As explained by Mao, "...if any comrade experienced in political work rests content with, or still more, rests content solely with his own limited experiences, as though they were dogmas applicable everywhere, if he does not understand or refuses to understand the truth that without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary practice and that 'in order to lead, one must foresee' and consequently belittles the study of Marxism-Leninism which is a summary of the world's revolutionary experiences, and if he is obsessed with narrow-minded and unprincipled 'pragmatism' and routine activities which require no brain-work and lead nowhere, while sitting on the commander's platform and thoughtlessly styling himself a hero and veteran, and refusing to listen to comrades' criticism or to practise self-criticism—if he does all this, then he becomes an empiricist." ("Our study and the current situation," Peking 1955, pp. 79-80).

Objectively, an empiricist is an enemy of Marxism-Leninism. The sooner the communist movement here purges itself of these non-proletarian empiricist elements, the sooner it may hope to lay a solid basis for its growth.

DIBAKAR MUKHERJEE
Howrah

A Query

The Government of India has finally closed the Darjeeling area to foreign travel, thereby banning foreigners from visiting Darjeeling, Sikkim and Bhutan.

A similar measure was taken in August-September 1962. Are we about to "defend ourselves" in the Tibet and Yunnan areas of China?

SUDARSAN RAI
Calcutta

'Liberation War'

The 'liberation war' of Bangladesh, we are told by learned 'Marxists' is a part of the worldwide national liberation' wars waged by the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism. I'm not too sure whether the World Bank or the USA is 'imperialist' or not; for, thus runs a report in *The Statesman* of 19.12.1971: "Mr Siddiqui (Ambassador-designate of Bangladesh to the United States) said that Bangladesh will require a 'helping hand' for reconstruction from both the World Bank, and, hopefully, the USA".

A READER
Calcutta

No Fission

As a result of our weak and wrong policy we have been isolated by the reactionaries from the toiling classes. There is no denying the fact that we have to bear severe loss at this early stage of revolutionary fervour and organisational capacity.

But whatever be the picture today, we need not be disappointed and brokenhearted. We neither should stand and stare at the planned killing of our comrades-in-arms, nor over-emphasise our individual capacity to tackle the white monsters. What we need to do is to analyse the situation and to take a good lesson therefrom. We must accept the fact that we have incurred losses because of some egoistic adventurous and petty bourgeois trend with the ranks of the party.

We should put an end to the process of formation and separation of cells within the party. In other words we should not split and destroy ourselves by stepping into the trap of the reactionaries in the name of "inner-party struggle. If Lenin could work with Trotsky during the long revolutionary slump and boom period, if Mao Tse-tung could do it with counter revolutionaries like Li li-san and Liu Shao-chi then why should Charu Mazumder sneer at Satya Narayan Sinha or Ashim Chatterjee at the CM during this period? Purification of the party through inner-party struggle is indeed a dynamic task. But by ousting someone from the party or by giving blind allegiance to one man we shall never thrive. In the name of ideological struggle democratic centralism should not be banished from the party.

SUNIL SINHA RAY
Calcutta

Jail Killing

We, the undersigned, are affected by the torture and death of prisoners in Ward No. 9 in Alipore Central Jail on November 26. Our children along with other undertrial prisoners were the victims of this incident. Far from being allowed to meet them we are not even allowed to know of their condition. Quite a few of them have died and many others are awaiting death for lack of medical treatment.

This kind of barbarous Hitlerite fascism cannot go unresisted. We call upon the people to unite, rise in protest and conduct mass resistance against all fascist laws like the detention acts and all fascist actions like indiscriminate mass killing.

K. C. Roy, Anima Chowdhury, Basanta Sarker, Khirod C. Saha, Renuka Mitra, Niva Guha, Indira Mati Poddar, Shuraprova Dhar Chowdhury, Nidhi Ram Das, Minati Bala Ghosh, Prafulla Mitra, Biraj Chattopadhyay, C. R. Dhar Chowdhury, Badal Chakrabarti, Sanchinath Choudhuri, Dulal Bandopadhyay, Pradip Sen Gupta, D. Dutta.

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