

# frontier

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## On Other Pages

## STRAY THOUGHTS

|                                       |    |
|---------------------------------------|----|
| COMMENTS                              | 2  |
| JAIL KILLINGS IN WEST BENGAL          |    |
| By A CORRESPONDENT                    | 4  |
| <i>Bihar</i>                          |    |
| POLICE AND PEOPLE                     |    |
| N. K. SINGH                           | 6  |
| <i>Perspectives</i>                   |    |
| BANGLADESH AND IMPERIALISM            |    |
| ARJUN BARUI                           | 7  |
| <i>Book Review</i>                    |    |
| THE CHAIRMAN IS ALIVE AND DOING WELL  |    |
| M. S. PRABHAKAR                       | 11 |
| PROPERTY, LEISURE AND CLASSICAL MUSIC |    |
| By A MUSIC CRITIC                     | 15 |
| <i>Clippings</i>                      |    |
| EAST BENGAL                           | 16 |
| LETTERS                               | 17 |

PARLIAMENT, when it meets again, is sure to discuss the question of recognition of the Bangladesh Government. All the opposition leaders favour recognition. The West Bengal Assembly, in a rare show of unity the other day, demanded it and arms aid too. A rather shrewd National Awami Party leader remarked that the option was either recognition plus arms aid or arms aid minus recognition. The latter course would be unattended by the unpredictable consequences of recognition, which include even a war with Pakistan. Mrs G. knows which course is better.

The next point to ponder over is who should get—or are getting—the aid. It would be rare naivete indeed to think that the Government of India is itching to aid the radical fighters in East Bengal, that it wants a democratic revolution to take place in the course of protracted struggle there. New Delhi would like the reformists to triumph. Whether they will in the long run is another matter. And, to be very frank, it is no use cursing New Delhi for wanting a regime with similar class-interests to dominate in a neighbouring country. That is statecraft. But those leftists, those Marxist leftists who want the Government of India to intervene openly in East Bengal should also tell people what motives inspire it. The CPM accuses the Indian Government of planning for greater repression all over the country and brackets Indira and Yahya Khan. How can such a Government help genuine liberation forces in East Bengal? The record this Government has already set is bloody and unscrupulous—we wish the refugee-consoling Prime Minister were presented on Sunday with the bodies of the detenus killed in Dum Dum Jail. To this list could be added the number of young men being rounded up in Barasat and Baranagore who never see the light of day again. But since their disappearance is not reported in the papers they are non-persons. The activities of a Sirimavo Bandaranaike in a small island get known while India is so big that you can hide countless skeletons. How can one, while pointing out the massive repression let loose in West Bengal, urge the same Government to behave as a helper of liberation forces in East Bengal? This is confusing Sultana Raziya with the Rani of Jhansi.

The confusion arises because we are basically weak and sentimental. But perhaps it is right to be sentimental when there is great justification

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for urging all-out aid to those fighting in East Bengal? It is now obvious that a massacre had been carried out by the cocky, ruthless West Pakistan army, in collaboration with non-Bengali elements spoiling for revenge for the wrongs done to them in moments of frenzy and that a process of further terrorisation, expulsion and selective liquidation is going on with the help of the same elements. The two million or more refugees, living in abnormal, sub-human conditions in West Bengal, Tripura, Assam and Meghalaya, and the thousands arriving every day are intolerable examples of what man can do to man. The feeling is growing that something must be done so that these people whose family life has been disrupted and homes broken can return and so that eastern India, not a region of plenty by any means, is not choked itself. The feeling is growing that the brazen army of West Pakistan and the goose-stepping, Yankee-loving officers who were so frank with foreign correspondents about their exploits against an unarmed population must be taught a lesson and be forced to pack off. The sooner the better. But if you want it sooner than later, you have to rely on outside arms and personnel. There's the rub. Knowing the butchers at home, we do still believe that nothing can replace self-reliance in East Bengal though the going would be hard and full of agony. The abiding suspicion about New Delhi, in the light of what its minions do here right before our eyes, will prevent many from appealing to it for a brave gesture. At the same time, it would not do for revolutionaries abroad to treat the East Bengal tragedy as the outcome merely of a sort of bigger Agartala conspiracy. The relevant measures that His Excellency the President of Pakistan is taking in East Bengal are an affront to humanity. The sooner these bloody generals who have no mandate from the people are kicked out the better. Sooner? Maybe in that case a moderate leader, with outside help, will take over in East

Bengal and exploit the workers and peasants? But why expect, say, a Kerensky to act like Lenin in furthering the historical process towards socialism? It is for the leftist forces to reorient the movement in the process of getting rid of the West Pakistani butchers. But they should remember that in that situation they may have to contend with the Indian butchers also.

## How They React

Mr Jyoti Basu wanted to know in the Assembly who were the people killed during the alleged jailbreaking in Dum Dum on Friday; and when he was told that all of them were Naxalites detained under the PVA Act during the last four months, he, like that devout man who wouldn't weep in the church because he belonged to another parish, had nothing to say.

The CPI daily from Calcutta promptly described the Dum Dum jail warders, who are said to have beaten the jailbreakers to death, as belonging to a CPM-affiliated union, just like the Berhampore jail warders. The daily hastened to add that some of the successful jailbreakers were caught by CPM cadres and duly delivered back.

The custodians of public conscience, the newspapers, were shocked to learn that bad history repeated itself, that there could be a Dum Dum after Midnapore and Berhampore and that the security of jail warders continued to be at the mercy of imprisoned Naxalites.

Some people who have a sneaking sympathy for the Naxalites admire the courage and heroism that the Dum Dum Naxalites displayed but are pained that they should make these disastrous blunders, that they should try to escape en masse without help from outside, that they should show their hands where the enemy was the strongest, that their leaders would encourage them to jailbreak which is bound to affect the comrades left behind.

We would never know what exactly happened at Dum Dum, no matter what the probe eventually reveals. Maybe some of the detenus really escaped; but the jail authorities have not been yet able to announce the names of the successful jailbreakers. The police intelligence claims to have had prior knowledge of the conspiracy and to have recovered detonators earlier at Bhowanipore; but the jail authorities say that the jailbreakers made use of a wobbly door and nothing else. Officials are contradicting one another regarding the weapons used, lathi or bullet. The present insistence on lathi is probably owing to the theory that the offenders had used iron rods and the warders had to act in self-defence. One wonders why iron rods are kept, invariably at times of jail crises, handy for culprits.

The fact remains that 16 young men died and 60 got maimed at Dum Dum and these boys were detained merely on suspicion that they were saboteurs of the dear system that runs in India. Close on the heels of Dum Dum, 11 other alleged Naxalites were severely beaten at Howrah jail because some of them wanted to read newspapers. The judiciary had nothing to say about their detention and they were abandoned to the mercy of the executive. We call it democracy and rule of law. West Bengal has been given over to the armed men of the State machinery and people here live at their will. The new Police Commissioner of Calcutta was wise to have noticed that combing operations had been fast alienating the people and ordered selective torture. And so the northern and southern fringes of the city have been turned into a big game area for the target-practising policemen. With equal ferocity have been going on other activities of the State machinery—closures of factories, hoarding at farms, fatal prejudices of the planners, deliberate inefficiencies of bureaucrats, corruption in educational institutions. We continue to ignore all these and continue to wonder why they burn the laboratories, why they

behead statues, why they gut trams. We take their actions in isolation, weigh their futility and call them anarchist and anti-socials. It does not matter whether we approve of their acts or philosophy. The insensate behaviour of the rulers—of which Dum Dum and Howrah are but symptoms which will subside and go fast out of public memory—is leading to the irrevocable corrosion of all the values we are supposed so dearly to cherish. We will all the same continue to wonder why the Naxalites defy the system and die for a cause which is not related to their personal advancement.

## Insuring What ?

Gimmicks have come to stay as a rule of thumb in the political system in New Delhi. Since assuming power, Mrs Gandhi has brought off one stunt after another to hoodwink her political opponents and to bolster up her party's sinking image. The latest feather in her cap is the take-over of general insurance.

An ebullient Chavan informed pressmen in New Delhi last week of an ordinance by which the Government has taken over the general insurance companies, Indian and foreign, to honour the 'people's mandate'. But, of course, the owners are not to be done in altogether. Upholding the ruling party's goal of 'socialism without tears' the ordinance has adequately provided for the rehabilitation of the ex-insurers. Though the mode of compensation for the final acquisition is yet to be worked out, the total asset value has been set at Rs 240 crores, without liabilities and business. To comply with the Supreme Court's directives on bank nationalisation, the compensation is to include losses as well, so that the payment will be much higher than the net assets and cover up the losers.

But the question is who will be the chief beneficiaries of this nationalisation scheme? Would it in any

way reduce the woes of the hungry, jobless and ragged millions? Mr Chavan has tried to reason that this take over will save much foreign money, though he has not given the exact extent of savings perhaps to keep his options open. But more significant than the official pleading is the response of businessmen, stock exchanges and political parties of known affections. Lack of interest has been the pervasive mood of these sectors though most of them have expressed surprise at the timing of the ordinance. Stock exchange operators in Calcutta, who have adopted a cautious attitude, have, in fact, taken comfort from the establishment of four companies "to introduce an element of competition."

Just after bank nationalisation, Mrs Gandhi said in a short broadcast that the step was "a continuation of a process which has been long under way". And it purported to remove the difficulties stalling resource mobilisation and to provide funds to the agriculturists. Obviously nothing has changed substantially in the ranks of the rulers since then to make us presume that the nationalisation of general insurance has loftier objectives. Schemes of nationalisation of vital sectors of the economy are not uncommon in capitalist societies for the larger benefit of the ruling class even though they might have harmed a few individuals. And this is particularly true of the budding capitalists in India who have been increasingly socialising the productive forces and bestowing upon the State—their instrument—a larger responsibility to hold together the present system. Nationalisation of general insurance is just another step towards this consolidation. Funniest, however, has been the reaction of the Left Establishment. The CPM Politbureau has lauded this "small step" towards trust-bursting. But this has not prevented the voluble Marxist leader, Mr E. M. S. Namboodiripad, to call it "nothing terribly new". Prevarication is an accepted art in politics but only to a limited extent.

## Sadat's Move

When El Rais died the succession problem was solved by an unstated understanding that a collective leadership would look after the affairs of the United Arab Republic. It was not expected of Anwar-el Sadat, who in his early life was given to levity, that he would ever make a bid to monopolise power for himself; but this is not the first time when such calculations went wrong. The recent shake up in the UAR which started with the dismissal of one of the two Vice-Presidents, Aly Sabry, was, according to the President, necessary to stave off a coup. For some time, the leadership of Sadat was being increasingly challenged on the twin questions of peace efforts and federation with Libya and Syria, and the critics rallied round Sabry. Both in the Cabinet and in the higher political forum, the Arab Socialist Union, Sadat faced the prospect of total isolation. At the same time, a controversy on the stands taken by the two leaders was going on in the country's leading newspapers. The article written by the editor of the semi-official newspaper *Al Ahram* justifying the desirability of improved relations with the United States was likely to have been inspired since Heikal has ready access to the corridors of power. His arguments ran on this line: the Arab-Israeli conflict could be solved only with the total involvement of the USA; Washington should be made to realise that it was in its interest to regain the confidence of the Arabs; and the Americans should be neutralised, instead of antagonised, so that they pursue an evenhanded policy in West Asia. *Al Akhbar* and *Al Gomhouria* took it upon themselves to point out why it was not possible for Washington not to support the Zionist policy. The pronouncedly anti-American Sabry, who may or may not be Russia's man, was joined in by Goma who was in control of internal security and General Fawzy who was assigned the task of reorganising the armed

forces after the defeat in the Six-Day War.

In spite of his efforts to live up to his reputation of being neutral to some Arab leaders, Mr Rogers had shown his own self once he was in Jerusalem. He could claim credit for persuading Sadat to make further concessions on his Canal reopening proposal; even though it amounts to a limitation on its sovereignty Cairo has given feelers that instead of cross-Canal troop movements following the Israeli withdrawal, it would initially settle for a police presence on the east bank. In case Tel Aviv rejects even this heavily watered down Egyptian proposal, America has pledged more military and economic aid to Israel and political support in case her "security" is threatened by Egyptian troop manoeuvres on the east bank. Another feather in Mr Rogers's diplomatic cap is the Egyptian readiness to initiate continuous dialogue with the USA on matters affecting mutual interests. Sabry's dismissal

had not only improved the atmosphere before the Secretary of State's visit but his absence in the high-level talks enabled Sadat to go to the extreme to befriend America. Earlier at a meeting of the ASU, Mr Sabry had questioned the authority of the President to sign the Benghazi pact with Libya and Syria. The bitter experience of the union with Damascus had left most Nasserites distrustful of the "brother countries" and the revolutionary front that the late President formed with Libya and Sudan had both economic and political connotations—the coordination of three complementary economies and to get support for a political strategy that alternated between war of attrition and diplomatic offensive. The top three leaders of the federating countries have personal interests in the hook up—Sadat thought that after his diplomatic moves had foundered on the Israeli rock his close association with Moamer Khadafi and Hafez Assad would help

improve his image; pan-Arabism had been the main plank of Khadafi's policy; and Assad needed monetary help from Libya and political backing from Egypt to consolidate his power. What the Sabry group was perhaps opposed to was the national security provision of the Benghazi agreement which says that in the event of internal disorder in any member country, the other countries would be obliged to intervene and re-establish order by force.

Sadat may have been able to remove an immediate threat to his Presidency, but his armed forces are already tired of the "no war, no peace" situation. If he cannot make peace, say, in six months he will be forced to give a free hand to the Army. The outcome of the fourth round of fighting with Israel is unlikely to be any different from the earlier three rounds. What will be Sadat's fate then is not difficult to guess.

## Jail Killings In West Bengal

By A CORRESPONDENT

THE cynical rulers have once more unleashed their well-trained police hounds on Naxalite prisoners, killing 16 them and mangling up more, several of whom are sure to die. This is the fifth major police onslaught on Naxalite detenus in less than a year, and they more or less conform to the same diabolical pattern.

On the first occasion, in Midnapore Jail, an MLA was used as the agent provocateur, and on the pretext of saving him, the police assisted by the EFR assaulted the Naxalites with lathis and rifle-butts, killing how many no one has ever known. Soon after in the same jail two well-tutored warders again succeeded in rousing the fury of the imprisoned and again on the

pretext of saving the warders the jail police and the CRP sprayed some of them with bullets and flattened others with lathis. Rumour put the number of killed at more than a hundred secretly removed and flung into the Rupnarayan. The third incident, which was a little different in character, took place in Presidency Jail where a real jailbreak seems to have been attempted. That however was followed by a spell of torture which had the effect of crippling or half blinding some of the Naxalite youths permanently. The fourth took place at Berhampore Jail only a few weeks ago. There too a body of warders, led by the notorious head warder Nirnanjan Kayal, succeeded by means of continual abuse in provoking the Naxalite youths. Again,

on the plea of saving the warders, the prisoners were fired upon and battered with rifle butts. Many were done to death on the spot, several others died in hospital and quite a few were crippled for life. It is important to note that on every occasion the alleged serious injuries suffered by dozens of warders and others were later found to be false. Particularly, in the Berhampore incident, only two warders were slightly hurt whereas it had been claimed that as many as 13 had been seriously injured.

This pattern has again repeated itself in the Dum Dum Jail killing. Apparently it was yet another attempted jail-break by the Naxalites, and this had "compelled" the police, quite against their will as ever,

to fire and use their lathis on them. (Even *Jugantar* wrote that while the jail authorities said the deaths were due to lathi-charge, Labazar gave it out that all of them were killed by bullets.) But will this version stand even the loosest scrutiny? The Dum Dum Jail, like all such places in neo-colonial countries where fascist terror holds sway under democratic slogans, is a well-guarded place, and particularly so because it holds so many Naxalite youths who are deadly enemies of the existing order. Why then, if 30 or 40 completely unarmed prisoners had really tried to escape, couldn't they be surrounded and captured by hordes of armed warders, policemen and para-military staff thronging the place? Why a fierce armed assault had to be launched on unarmed prisoners—fierce enough to kill 16 of the boys instantly and injure dozens—if the purpose was just to recapture them? The answer is that the purpose was entirely different. The coolly laid out plan at the back of it all, made by the West Bengal police chiefs, probably under CIA guidance, and obviously approved in principle by the Government of India, was to find excuses for killing off as many Naxalites *inside prisons* as possible. And this, equally obviously, is the counterpart of the long-approved plan of killing off as many Naxalites as possible *outside prisons*—by torturing them to death in police custody, by suddenly shooting them down in their haunts, by dragging them out of their homes, lining them up blindfolded against walls and gunning them down. When the police slaughter young Naxalites inside prisons, the cover they use is either a violent jailbreaking attempt or a

murderous assault on innocent warders. The cover they use while shooting down Naxalites in the streets is that they had compelled the police to fire by launching bomb assaults on them.

All this might give rise to a number of reflections. How could police atrocities like these go on for months in a "democratic Welfare State" like ours? If the Naxalites are criminals why aren't they being rounded up with the minimum use of violence and brought to trial and sentenced in accordance with the laws of the country? Why are they being wantonly butchered by the police of a "democratic" country—in police custody, in jails, in the streets, in their homes, at entertainment places? If this is not the coolly planned policy of a "democratic" government, why didn't the government stop this sort of thing after the first major incident and punish the offenders? Why have not Ranjit Gupta, Debi Roy and all the filthy crew been charged with multiple murders? The answer is that the police are not only not stopped, but are continually supported and encouraged in carrying on their anti-Naxalite brutalities for the simple reason that it is the deliberate policy of a "democratic" government that they are carrying out. The same is true in a lesser degree of the governments of Bihar, Orissa, Andhra, Kerala and Punjab. Well, if these are only undemocratic deviations on the part of provincial governments, what has the Union Government, the supreme guardian of "democracy", been doing? Indira's heart bleeds for the revolutionaries in East Bengal; but she pretends not to see and not to hear when hundreds of young men in her own country are ruthlessly butchered by her own police.

This is the nature of the "democracy" in India and in all other semi-colonial countries where world-capitalism calls the tune and local capitalism obeys. Democracy for the handful few; misery and oppression for the overwhelming majority. For them there is the far more effective justice of the machine-gun.

But the machine-gun has been changing hands all over the world. It changed hands most drastically in Russia in China, in Cuba. It is changing hands even now in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Ceylon, East Bengal and other parts of the imperialist-dominated underdeveloped world. This ruthless killing and torturing of revolutionaries over the last few decades—has it been able to stem the tide of revolution? Judging by concrete results, it has rather served to strengthen revolution and to accelerate its irresistible course. The daily police atrocities in a "democratic Welfare State" may not arouse the people to instant revolutionary fury. But the unrelieved misery of the people prevents the impressions of these gross contradictions of "democracy" from fading away. These shocked memories remain buried in the preconscious, only to emerge in a sweeping wave of hatred at a moment when the onward march of revolution has identified the enemy beyond all doubt. That the establishment is resorting to these extreme brutalities so early in the day, even at the cost of damaging the carefully fostered illusion of democracy, shows how terribly scared it is of the Naxalites. The desperation of reactionaries is an accurate measure of the true revolutionary potential.

Yet another report of assault on Naxalite prisoners—in Howrah Jail—has appeared. This time it has not been possible even for the police to cover up the deliberate nature of the assault. This is "democracy" at its glorious best, and the glory is sure to impress the people sooner or later.

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## Police And People

N. K. SINGH

**P**OLICE atrocities—atrocities committed by the agents of the ruling classes on the populace—are not uncommon in India. And Bihar is a part of India.

However, police atrocities have grown in number and become more sophisticated in nature since the Naxalite growth in the State. Now and then operations are launched, the 'miscreants' escape and innocent people got caught in the large-scale, massive operations, often assisted by the para-military forces. Sometimes even army helicopters are used.

Perhaps the first ever 'Operation Naxalite' conducted in Bihar was in the Mushahari region of Muzaffar district in North Bihar. It was in late 1968, when Naxalite activities increased and a few 'class enemies' were killed that a combing operation was launched by the local police assisted by the hired goondas of zamindars. Since then Mushahari, where the Sarvodaya leader, Mr Jaya Prakash Narayan, was trying to save the skin of his class brethren, has become a happy playground for the hunting hounds.

At least two or three operations have been launched in the Surajgarha region of south Monghyr, followed by allegations of police highhandedness. The operations were rather modern and sophisticated in nature. For example, in one operation the services of more than 300 jawans of the Bihar Military Police were requisitioned from NEFA. Besides, 30 officers of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or above and 100 sub-inspectors were deputed to supervise the combing operation in the fields, the hills, the jungles and all the other suspected hideouts. The place was under the direct charge of a special police squad comprising border experts, senior intelligence officers and the combatant section of

Military Police. The services of the Central Reserve Police were also requisitioned. Besides Home Guards, the local police also had been asked to stand by for any assistance the special squad might need. According to an unofficial report, a total of 6,000 troops had been pushed into the area. The armed force was functioning from a number of static camps and mobile units equipped with wireless vans. To cap it all, helicopters were used to help the Military Police.

### Outcome

What was the outcome? Four or five arrests. And that also was followed by allegations that the police arrested innocent people to cover their failure to arrest the real 'culprits'. Grave allegations—ranging from loot to rape—were levelled against the police, especially the notorious Central Reserve Police. Even the higher strata were not spared. A bitter Naxalite leader put it thus: "our womenfolk have to work in fields, they are not much to look at; *their* womenfolk, enjoying all sorts of minimum comforts of life, are fragile, delicate and beautiful enough to attract the CRP wolves. *We* have very little to spare; *they* own huge property". So the zamindars, rural kulaks and rich peasants were harassed by both the Naxal terrorists and the law and order arm of their own State machinery. No wonder, voices were raised for removing the notorious CRP from the region and questions concerning police atrocities in Surajgarha were raised in the State Assembly.

In Katihar too, the district headquarters of Purnea, where the police had launched a special combing operation to curb the growing Naxalite activities in the towns and adjacent villages, a largely attended public meeting jointly sponsored by the

Congress (R), PSP, SSP, CPI and CPI (M) protested against "indiscriminate arrests of railway employees, mill workers and students by the police in the name of curbing the Naxalites". It was alleged that the arrested men were beaten and tortured in the police lock-up.

To meet the Naxalite challenge, security measures have been tightened, weapons supplied to the police personnel and new methods of carrying rifles by policemen have been introduced all over the State. All police officers above the rank of assistant sub-inspector have been provided with revolvers. Police constables have been armed with special types of spears and knives. This is in addition to the deployment of para-military forces in disturbed zones. But the most important thing is that the police have been given a free hand to deal with the public.

Recently three cases of police atrocity were reported from the tribal belt of Chotanagpur.

### Firing in Court

The first was reported from Dhanbad where the Bihar police created a new record of official highhandedness when they fired on undertrial prisoners in the court *hajat* on March 16. Mr Arun Kumar Roy, the CPI (M) MLA from Dhanbad, described it as "the most ghastly act surpassing all records of police brutality in Bihar". There has been firing in jail, but this time it was in the court *hajat* in broad daylight under the nose of the magistracy and all the senior officers of the town.

On the day of the incident, more than 100 undertrial prisoners—described by the police as 'criminals'—were locked in rooms meant to accommodate 20. The cell—called lock-up—had no ventilation and was never cleaned. No prisoner, it is said, was ever produced physically before the magistrate from this court *hajat* without a bribe. The magistrate only puts dates on custody warrants without seeing the face of the prisoner. It is said that on March 16 the prisoners refused to pay bribe for production, which led to a hot alterca-

tion. The prisoners were allegedly denied drinking water and when they protested, were fired upon in the lock-up from pointblank range.

The police, however, gave a fairy tale to cover their action. The walls of the hajat were broken and it was said that the prisoners were trying to escape. One wonders how concrete walls could be broken with bare hands.

The prisoners of the Dhanbad jail boycotted the court. The Dhanbad Bar Association came out with open condemnation of this brutal assault. A Patna daily commented: "In any civilized society police firing on helpless undertrial prisoners is a grave matter. When such a firing takes place in a court hajat, the dignity of the judiciary also suffers and it is brought under contempt".

The second case of police brutality was reported from the steel city of Jamshedpur which is known as the 'little Calcutta' of Bihar in view of the widespread Naxalite influence. On March 26 groups of students—one from the local K.M. P.M. H.S. School, which is said to be the main centre of Naxalite activities in the town, clashed over purchase of cinema tickets. The police intervened much too swiftly and attacked the K.M.-P.M.H.S. School in course of "chasing the culprits". According to the school administration, the police entered the campus without the permission of the Principal or any order from the Magistrate or S.P. They struck the students with spears, bayonets and lathis. Doors of class-rooms were broken open, small boys were dragged out and beaten up. Some of the teachers who tried to protect the boys were also severely dealt with. What is particularly distressing to note is that the victims were just small boys. Three boys, all under 15, died. They were murdered. About 200 people, including students, teachers and the public were caught in this operation.

In an atmosphere surcharged with emotion, Jamshedpur observed a one-day complete bandh. There were protests from all quarters. The Bihar

Government had to face loud protests in the Assembly. One MLA went to the extent of comparing it with Jallianwalla Bagh while another said that he had not seen such a heart-breaking incident during 42 years of his political career.

It is being whispered in Jamshedpur that the attack on the school was pre-planned and well organised. It was done in order to teach the Naxalite boys a good lesson. Have the people and the Naxalites become the same in the eyes of the administration?

#### In Ghatshila

To crush the Naxals, an operation was launched in the Ghatshila area of Singhbhum district bordering West Bengal. In March Naxalite guerillas attacked the Rupaskundi police picket, killed two policemen, injured three and snatched away nine rifles, 105 rounds of bullets and a few uniforms. It was followed by a massive combing operation launched under the personal guidance of the DIG, Southern Range assisted by the SP, Singhbhum, and D.I., Ghatshila. Six hundred armed men were engaged in the operation and a police dog was airlifted from Patna to trace the guerillas. But none of the alleged Naxalites could be arrested.

While this massive, round-the-clock operation was in full swing, the Naxalite guerillas attacked a village in the Gopiballavpur area of West Bengal, killed four of their "class enemies" and injured two. The high police officers of both West Bengal and Bihar decided to launch a joint combing operation.

The inevitable result of this joint operation was grave allegations of repression and torture. It was said that the villagers, including womenfolk, were publicly insulted, tortured and beaten up. Male members were beaten indiscriminately. Even the jewellery, cash and other belongings of the poor rural folk were looted and the police forces took away fowls and goats for feasting.

"Laws", says Cicero, "are dumb in the midst of arms".

## Perspectives

# Bangladesh And Imperialism

ARJUN BARUI

**W**ESTERN European imperialism sank its fangs on the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent in the eighteenth century and has not yet let go. Economically, India and Pakistan still remain neo-colonies of the Western powers, with Pakistan at perhaps a lower level of development along the capitalist path.

Colonial exploitation under capitalism has always had two functions—extraction of the surplus and its reinvestment. (Most of the recurrent crises of capitalist imperialism can be explained in terms of the failure of the two activities to keep in step). In the nineteenth century, the non-European countries, particularly India and China, were made to yield large surpluses to be reinvested in the new white colonies of the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. After the Third World achieved political independence, colonial exploitation has changed its modus operandi, though not its basic character. While the surplus is still extracted at enormous human cost from the underdeveloped countries, there is a pretence of reinvesting at least some part of it in the countries themselves in the form of aid, loans and foreign private investment in traditional extractive and new technology-based industries. The quantitative importance of the surplus yielded by the underdeveloped countries has diminished (partly because of their relative, and sometimes absolute, immiserization) but the problem of reinvestment of the growing surplus of the advanced capitalist countries has become more and more acute. The new super-imperial power, the United States, has tried to solve this problem by giving arms aid to the ruling cliques of the erstwhile colonies and by making

Asians fight more and more Asians.

India and Pakistan both rank high as neo-colonies of the Western powers: in some respects, India might get a share in the condominium of the advanced capitalist countries over the backward ones (witness the joint or single ventures of Indian businessmen abroad). But the capitalists in India or Pakistan have not yet been able to extract a surplus which is adequate to their economic and political pretensions. With a very low level of development of the productive forces, they are compelled to resort to the most primitive modes of exploitation of peasants and workers. Furthermore, capitalism leads inevitably to the unequal development of ethnic groups and regions—the more advanced groups (that is, groups with stronger connections with trade, finance and the bureaucracy) ruthlessly exploit the less advanced ones. The position of the tribal people all over India and Pakistan, the position of the black people in the USA, Rhodesia and South Africa, the position of Amer-Indians in many Latin American republics are cases in point.

#### Extreme Form

In Bangladesh this exploitation of the less advanced (though more literate) ethnic group took an extreme form. There was nothing neo-colonial in the exploitation of that land by the ruling clique of West Pakistan. There was an uncanny similarity between the modes of exploitation of India by the British ruling classes in the nineteenth century and of Bangladesh by West Pakistani landlord-bourgeois-military-bureaucratic alliance. Up to 1914, India usually had an adverse balance of trade with Britain and a large surplus with the rest of the world. Britain used the deficit balance she forced on India through the preposterous "home charges" and through the stifling of all industry in India to square her accounts with the rest of the world with which India had a surplus. During the period 1950-51 to 1954-55 East Pakistan had an adverse

balance of trade of Rs 2120.0 million with West Pakistan, a favourable balance of trade of Rs 2,20.0 million with the rest of the world and an aggregate surplus of Rs 1,309.5 million. During the period 1954-55 to 1959-60 East Pakistan had an adverse balance of Rs 1418.5 million with the West wing, a favourable balance of Rs 1,775.0 million with the rest of the world and an aggregate surplus of Rs 356.5 million. The West Pakistani ruling classes pursued the policy of making the eastern region purchase high-priced West Pakistani goods and starving it of all developmental resources so successfully that during the Second Plan period (1960-61 to 1964-65), the adverse balance of trade of Bangladesh with the west wing widened to Rs 2122.5 million, the favourable balance with the rest of the world diminished to Rs 205.5 million and the aggregate balance yielded a deficit of Rs 1617.0 million.

This was, however, no signal to the West Pakistani ruling circles to relinquish their colony as a depreciating asset. For, in spite of the American-inspired (and directed) "green revolution" and industrialization behind high tariff walls in West Pakistan, the gap between the domestic investment and domestic saving continued to be wide there, jute and jute fabrics continued to be the biggest earners of foreign exchange, and East Pakistan continued to provide a large and sheltered market to the high-priced goods of the west. Furthermore, the possession of East Pakistan was a very valuable bargaining counter in the hands of the West Pakistani rulers in their negotiations for more and more aid from the West. The loss of Bangladesh would deprive them of their position as rulers of the largest, free-enterprise Islamic State under direct American tutelage. In any case no traditional exploiting power has ever voluntarily given up a colony without taking steps to see that it remains a neo-colony for the foreseeable future. The pampered capitalism of West Pakistan is too weakly developed to

ensure anything like that.

The enormity of exploitation of Bangladesh is hardly conveyed by the figures of the surplus she generated with the external world, and the ransom she paid yearly to the West Pakistani capitalists. The goods she bought from the west wing were at least a third to half costlier than they would have been if she had shopped in the free markets of the world. On the other hand the goods produced by the Bengali peasants were sold at world prices. Bangladesh was overwhelmingly a peasant economy at the time of independence. One would have expected that there would be even a half-hearted attempt at building up industry. Look at the actual record however: in East Pakistan, in 1951 the agricultural labour force formed 83.2 per cent of the total civilian labour force; in 1961 it formed 85.4 per cent of the same. This de-industrialization was achieved to a large extent by denying East Pakistan her rightful share of the imports needed to build up industry. As in India, so in Pakistan, all major imports were centrally controlled and licences had to be obtained to import goods from foreign countries. Although East Pakistan has generated between 50.3 and 61.4 per cent of the total exports of Pakistan, she has not been allowed to bring in more than 30.5 per cent of the total imports. In 1953-54, East Pakistan secured between 10.2 and 28 per cent only of the total value of all import licences issued in Pakistan. Her share practically never rose to more than 30 per cent of the total value of import licences issued in the early fifties. In the late fifties and sixties her share in the value of commercial industrial licences rose—but only marginally, and the share rarely rose to 45 per cent (although her population accounted for 55 per cent of the total population of Pakistan).

#### Source of Surplus

The ultimate source of the surplus extracted from Bangladesh was, of course, the peasantry. The poorer peasants were exploited in the usual

fashion through an extremely unequal distribution of land combined with the financial apparatus of primitive or colonial capitalism. But they were also exploited by being made to pay far higher prices than prevailed on the world market for the few industrial goods they bought. The ratio of the terms of trade received by agriculture in Bangladesh to the terms it would have received in world markets was only 28 per cent in the period 1952-55 and 59 per cent in the period 1961-64. (Under conditions of free trade the ratio would have been 100 per cent in both cases). Since peasants were deprived of the means and the incentive to invest in land, and since West Pakistan Government would not invest in it either, agriculture in Bangladesh grew at the derisory rate of 1.7 per cent per year over the period 1949-50—1964-65. The rate of growth of population was 2.5 per cent per year so that the per capita availability of foodgrains declined substantially over the same period although it had been very low to begin with. The gross provincial product increased at the barely perceptible rate of .3 per cent per year—this figure of “growth”, of course, conceals severe fluctuations. The utter stagnation of the economy was reflected in other indices of social welfare as well.

In 1951, East Pakistan was way ahead of the west in respect of education with a literacy rate of 18.8 per cent as against that of 7.6 per cent in the west. By 1961, West Pakistan had nearly caught up with the east, not because it had progressed phenomenally well, but because East Pakistan had progressed hardly at all: in that year, the literacy rate was 14.4 per cent in West Pakistan and 19.9 per cent in the east (reflecting an increase which might well be a statistical error). These differences in the aggregate rates of growth of literacy infact conceal even greater differences in the rates of growth of higher education in the two wings. Consistent with their policy of pampering the privileged, the West Pakistani ruling clique had vastly in-

creased the capacity of higher institutions of learning in their wing, although little provision was made for increasing the literacy of the mass of people of either wing, and the institutions of higher education were systematically starved of resources in East Pakistan. (This has been done, as under British rule in India, on the plausible excuse that more university graduates would merely mean more educated unemployment.)

Whatever increase in income did take place in Bangladesh was extremely unequally distributed, and income distribution probably became more unequal over the years. The proportion of landless agricultural labourers in the agricultural labour force increased from 14 per cent in 1951 to 17 per cent in 1961; the proportion of people who were mainly sharecroppers also increased; under Ayub's regime, the Basic Democrats, who came mainly from the ranks of the rural rich, increased their power and wealth, so that it is quite possible that the distribution of land among the landowners became more unequal. So Bangladesh is not quite the land of peasant-proprietors as it has sometimes been made out to be. What is true is that, as of 1963-64, incomes were even more unequally distributed in West Pakistan than in the east, and that even with the very limited degree of industrial growth that the two wings achieved, the average urban incomes were much higher and much more unequally distributed than the rural incomes. Of course, like the rural poor, the urban poor—and in particular, the industrial proletariat—remained as poor in both wings of Pakistan in 1963 as they had been ten years earlier. Assuming that a household income of Rs 100 per month represented the lower limit of subsistence, it has been estimated that around 1963-64, two-fifths of all households in East Pakistan and one-fourth of all households in the west lay below the “poverty line”. If the developments in India are any guide (see, for example, Pranab Bardhan, *Frontier* April 17, 1971), the proportion be-

low the wretchedness line must have increased in the years since 1963.

Thus the people of Bangladesh were exploited in the old colonial fashion. Very little industry was created there, very little “aid” in any form was pumped into the land. Whatever aid came it came primarily for building “outhouses” for the colonial people, as Che Guevara once put it. The people of the east wing started poorer than the people of the west and were yet forced to save a larger fraction of their miserable incomes for the greater glory of the ruling classes of the west. Although the peasant masses of Bangladesh were tricked by their leaders in 1947 into joining a federation ruled by the army, the bureaucrats, the landlords and the bourgeoisie, the Bengali upper classes were also not given much of a share in the West Pakistani rule. Most of the senior bureaucrats were recruited from among the West Pakistanis (particularly Punjabis) the army and its brasshats were overwhelmingly recruited from among the West Pakistanis as well. Even before the army formally took over power from the politicians in 1958, it was an oligarchy elected on the basis of the very limited franchise of 1946 that was ruling Pakistan. Bengalis had very little say in this oligarchy: Khwaja Nazimuddin, an inhabitant of East Pakistan, never acknowledged Bengali as his mother-tongue. Only a third or less of total private investment flowed into the east wing, and practically all of it was owned by West Pakistani capitalists (or migrants from India). Very little attempt was made even to convert the Bengali middle classes into collaborators of the West Pakistani regime. This is, of course, one of the main reasons why the current struggle has become a truly national liberation struggle, and why West Pakistan has found it so difficult to make even gestures of instituting a democratically elected government in Bangladesh. Only advanced capitalist nations can afford to experiment with constitutional government in their colonies—not countries like Portugal or West

Pakistan which are themselves neo-colonies of advanced capitalism and which have to retain their colonies with the use of brute force.

### Conditions In The West

What did the common people of West Pakistan gain from this bureaucratic-military raj their ruling classes built up? No dreams of embourgeoisement for their working classes as yet. They have been deprived again and again of their right to strike and their wages, as we have pointed out already, remain at the level of subsistence, although the measured rate of industrial growth in West Pakistan, thanks to foreign economic aid in massive quantities and the exploitation of Bangladesh was impressive in comparison with that of many underdeveloped countries. Whatever industry has developed remains concentrated in Karachi and is controlled by a few families who were immigrant traders, and financiers from West Pakistan. In 1968, the top economist of the Planning Commission of Pakistan officially admitted that about 20 families controlled 66 per cent of industrial assets, 70 per cent of insurance funds and 80 per cent of bank assets. The peasantry in West Pakistan are, relatively speaking, even more oppressed than in Bangladesh. The big landlords there effectively controlled a larger fraction of the land in 1951 than in Bangladesh, and their power was never broken by even nominal land reforms. The land reform law allowed any single person to retain 500 acres of irrigated land, and 1,000 acres of unirrigated land, and even that law was evaded by methods which are all too familiar on this subcontinent. All the development efforts in agriculture including the "green revolution" strengthened the landlords and big farmers, and all attempts to introduce effective agrarian reforms were sabotaged by the joint pressures of the American advisers and the local bureaucrats and landlords.

The professional classes of West Pakistan have paid heavily by acquiescing in the criminal operations of

the military-landlord regime. They have been deprived of even their elementary democratic rights and have not developed any independent modes of expression or action. As is well known, the militant spokesman of the so-called leftist parties in West Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, proved worse than even President Yahya Khan in his chauvinistic attitude towards his brethren from Bangladesh; doubtless the military regime will complete the carnage by taking away even some of the concessions it had made in the recent past. (One should remember that Salazar ruled Portugal for more than forty years). The subservience of the West Pakistani intellectuals is evident in every one of their public acts. In the discussions of the panel of economists on the proposed Fourth Plan at the end of 1970, all the non-official economists from West Pakistan remained silent throughout and rubber-stamped every proposal of the two official representatives and it was left to the economists from Bangladesh to protest against the anti-people plan and issue a public statement.

The facts related above are enough to establish the West Pakistani ruling class as a loyal, though very junior, member of the club of regimes headed by the USA. One does not need an explicit theory of conspiracy to show that Pakistan has faithfully served the new imperial order, and will continue to do so until it is overthrown. It happens to be the case that Pakistan's membership of the club was formalized with legal instruments. As is well known, the Pakistani Government became a member of SEATO in 1954 and of CENTO in 1955. (It is an irony of history that the seat of the Baghdad Pact, Iraq, opted out of the league of "freedom-loving" countries very soon after the treaty was signed). The Pakistani regime in return received massive economic and military aid from the new master, the USA, and her allies. The military aid was explicitly meant to help Pakistan fight communism—that is, its own people whether they be of Bangladesh or of

West Pakistan. How can the USA officially protest now against the killing of people of Bangladesh when the condition for the USA to aid a former colony really bountifully has been that it should get rid of its popular government as soon as possible?

### Involvement

The involvement of the American Government, American big business, and American academics in the guidance has been very intimate for the last 15 years or more. It was American engineering companies which designed and built the new irrigation works of West Pakistan; it was American companies which built roads and drew up flood control schemes for East Pakistan; the top American academic establishment helped by setting up the Development Advisory Service at Harvard, which had Pakistan as its most important client. The bright young economists and engineers from this service lent respectability to the schemes for fattening the rich and sucking the life-blood of the poor. The economists and civil servants manning Pakistan's research institutes, universities and governments were trained abroad on the money supplied by the American Foundations. It says something for the essential patriotism of the Bengalis that many of these foreign-trained professionals have refused to collaborate with the military regime. How long this patriotism will endure in the face of the present armed repression is a different matter.

The involvement of the World Bank in the Government of Pakistan is publicly documented. This institution, speaking in the name of free enterprise and democracy, has always preferred rule by the army and the bureaucracy to rule by undependable politicians. At critical stages, it has intervened in favour of super-bureaucrats like M. M. Ahmed of West Punjab, and resisted attempts at the introduction of a greater degree of equality as an explicit objective of economic policy. The junketings of Peter Cargill, in charge of the South Asia Department of the World Bank,

anxiously protecting the interests of his proteges, are also public knowledge; so is the recall in disgrace of a World Bank official who had let his conscience get the better of his official duty.

Thus if the West Pakistani ruling clique is now under trial, so is its mentor and provider—Western European and North America imperialism. It is futile to expect it to own up its

own mistakes; it will not recognize Bangladesh until it can make sure that another anti-people regime is installed there. In a way, it is a good augury that the international robbers have refused to recognize the freedom movement in Bangladesh: it means that they cannot trust the Bengalis not to go socialist on them and further restrict their area of exploitation.

of the more important writings of Mao is interesting as a piece of well-informed literary political detective work, quite refreshingly different from that of the Pekinologists. The most interesting of the documents reproduced from these sources is the tribute to Stalin on his sixtieth birthday, a far more fulsome tribute than the more subdued version available in the 1965 edition of the Selected Works (II, 335-6). The second major source from which this collection derives is the two publications of the Union Research Institute, Hong Kong; a collection of *CCP Documents on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1967* and *The Case of P'eng Teh-huai*. Finally, much of the material in this collection is drawn from a selection entitled *Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought*: (1969), and most interesting of all, a volume consisting of Mao's statements and essays, with the title page torn away. According to the U.S. State Department which secured these papers through its sources in Hong Kong, Taipei and Tokyo, and which made them public towards the end of 1969, these are all Red Guard publications. The major part of Jerome Ch'en's selection is based on the last two sources mentioned: *Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought*: and *The Collection Without A Title Page*: Jerome Ch'en supplements the selection with an introductory essay on Mao's Literary Style, and a chronological bibliography of Mao's writings is provided at the end.

#### Style of Writing

The introductory essay on Mao's Literary Style presents a highly interesting analysis. Most of the analyses of Mao's style provided by Pekinologists emphasize its 'classicism', and so, by implication, commentators have always stressed the 'paradox' of the revolutionary implications of Mao's writings which are themselves steeped in a classical idiom. Jerome Ch'en's analysis, on the other hand, draws attention to the continuous pressure of 'vernacularisms' on Mao's style. While recognizing the impact

### Book Review

## The Chairman Is Alive And Doing Well

M. S. PRABHAKAR

ALMOST to a man, the Pekinologists (with or without the inverted commas) have interpreted the Cultural Revolution in terms of personal rivalry, sometimes extended to cover the wives of Chinese leaders, party infights, etc. That important political issues were involved was rarely recognised, and professional anti-communist analysts found in Soviet commentators a strange ally in their highly subjectivist treatment of the events. Particularly in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution, it was almost impossible to get any serious (even if unsympathetic) analysis of these events. The one honourable exception was the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, but this journal could hardly be described as 'popular'; for the most part, the intellectuals of the Free World were moved to unprecedented heights of hilarity at the goings-on in China. The worst kind of sensational propaganda put out by scandal sheets from Hong Kong was solemnly reproduced in the Indian press as indicating that China was falling to pieces, that Chairman Mao was seriously ill, dying, dead, that he was senile, mad, that he was entirely under the control of Chiang Ch'ing, that it was due to rivalry between

the women (*Yeh Sub Zenana ka Jhagda Hai*, as the idiom of the dominant element in our culture would put it). At the more sophisticated level, the Cultural Revolution was seen as being the result of "an obsessive concern of a dying old man with the future of his name in history". Further Pekinological wisdom: "Sometimes, the megalomaniac visions or hallucinations of a leader or, at the very least, his egotism and eccentricity, his suspicions, and even his senility have been known to be significant reasons for division at the top."

For all such people, one would like to report after reading the *Mao Papers*\*: Mao Tse-tung is alive and doing well in Peking.

There are six major sources from which this collection derives. First, the 1944 and 1947 editions of Mao's Selected Works, and old files of *Liberation Weekly*, *Liberation Daily* and *Masses* in which some writings of Mao originally appeared. Jerome Ch'en's use of these versions of some

\* *Mao Papers*: Anthology and Bibliography  
 Edited by Jerome Ch'en  
 Oxford University Press, London,  
 1970. Price £2.75.

of classicism on his style and thinking, Jerome Ch'en draws our attention to the equally powerful impact of the vernacular style movement of 1919, which was of course part of the larger May Fourth Movement, marking the beginning of modernisation in China. But Mao had hardly sufficient time to fully assimilate vernacularism in his writings. To quote Jerome Ch'en, 'Had he had enough leisure in the early 1920's, he might have availed himself of that time for reading and experimenting with writing in modern forms. But right from the beginning of the May Fourth Movement he was involved in its political work—the founding of the CCP, the organization of its Hunan branch, the provincial politics of Hunan, the alliance with the KMT.' (p. xiv) Jerome Ch'en analyses in detail the ways in which Mao's style was influenced by the two early literary mentors Mao had: Ch'en Tushiu, Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the Peking National University, and Li Ta-chao, the University Librarian and close collaborator of the former in the editing of the influential magazine *New Youth*. From Ch'en Mao learnt a straight-forward and unadorned vernacular style, and from Li, a down-to-earth style of short, crisp sentences, Jerome Ch'en traces four distinct phases in the writing career of Mao: First, the period between 1927 and 1935, which was, politically and militarily, a period of continuous siege, and which left Mao little time for revising and polishing his writings; consequently, 'the sentences become shorter and crisper, allusions less, and classical structure infrequent.' (p. xvii). Third, the post-Yenan phase, with the writings being mainly on military matters. These, particularly the writings on strategic problems, show Mao at the height of his powers. In this context, it may be noted that Jerome Ch'en is silent on the question of the date of two of Mao's most famous writings of this period: his essays *On Practice*, and *On Contradiction*. Western Pekinologists invariably reject the date given in the Chinese

edition of the Selected Works (which is 1937), and date the essays between 1950 and 1952. According to them, the early dating of the essays has to be related to a desire on the part of Mao and his sycophants to seem to anticipate some ideas of Stalin in his *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (1938). Jerome Ch'en, by plainly stating that 'Mao's essays on Contradiction or Practice show an exceptionally high degree of europeanization and read like translations', accepts by implication the dates assigned to these works in the Chinese edition. But his bibliography doesn't seem to note the item cited by Prof. Schram (*The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, Pelican Edition, p. 180, note) which conclusively proves that the Chinese claims (that the essays were written in 1937) are substantially true. The fourth phase of Mao's writing career begins from 1937 onwards. The most important event of this period which was to have a profound impact on Mao's writings, was his meeting Lan P'ing (Ching Cheing) and falling in love with her; in the words of Jerome Ch'en, 'Shortly after their marriage, Mao began to show an increasing interest in modern Chinese literature and art.' (p. xviii) Thus, according to Jerome Ch'en, though Mao had spoken about Lu Hsun in a speech in 1937, the real impact of Lu Hsun's style can be seen only after 1939. The short, crisp, introductory sentences which form 'prefaces' to major essays are a feature derived from Lu Hsun. The bite and sarcasm and the combativeness which are a characteristic of Mao's writings are also derived from Lu Hsun, according to Jerome Ch'en.

The rest of the introductory essay on Mao's Literary Style is devoted to an elaborate stylistic analysis of Mao's writings from different periods; and an account of the editing of Mao's Selected Works since their first appearance in 1959. The stylistic analysis of Mao's writings is of strictly limited interest to most Indian readers; but the account of the 'editing' of Mao's writings, the possible

reasons for various omissions and changes in different editions of the works, is a highly interesting one, particularly Jerome Ch'en's analysis of the substantive as well as stylistic and verbal emendations carried out in successive editions. But one misses the total thrill of detection, for Jerome Ch'en only cites page numbers of various early editions, indicating passages where the originals have undergone revisions over the years. Summing up, Jerome Ch'en says: 'No one outside the inner core of the CCP seems to know who actually edited the *HC* (Selected Works); there is insufficient evidence for anyone to hazard a guess. According to the editors' note, Mao himself took a hand in polishing up his old essays. This may be so. But one may be more inclined to accept the possibility that the stylistic uniformity of the *HC* was the painstaking work of a lesser man than Mao. Whoever this man was, he did a splendid piece of work at the expense of some historical truth. The present selection, fortunately, has had a different kind of an editor.'

#### Cultural Education

The main body of *Mao Papers* consists of two parts. One, *Writings by Mao*, which itself is sub-divided into four sections, and the second, *Mao's Instructions*, mostly consisting of very brief remarks by Mao, most of which (156 out of a total of 187) dating from 16th May 1966. Section I of Part I consists of six letters from Mao, dated 1917, 1936, 1937, 1959 and 1961. The source for all these is *Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought*: (1969) The second letter, addressed to Lin Piao, in 1936 is specially interesting, in the light of the Cultural Revolution. As early as 1936 Mao was emphasizing the importance of the 'cultural education', and the fact that 'culture' tools were a part of the 'practice' which links up theory with practice. All the letters are interesting, and not merely because anything by Mao is bound to be interesting; the concern with detail is

evident everywhere. For instance, the letter dated 29th November 1959, addressed to Production Brigade Leaders, is so full of highly practical suggestions and probing questions on such arcane subjects as density of planting crops, that it is difficult to imagine that this letter was written by one who was about the same time engaged in momentous affairs of the State which were to culminate in the dismissal of P'eng Teh-huai. And Mao's interest in minute details, is not that of a fussy busybody who just hates to let other people do a job (like our own Jawaharlals); on the contrary, his interest is well-informed, but not overbearing; not self-introspection before an admiring audience, but down-to-earth practical commonsense from a practical revolutionary.

The Second section of Part I consists of 'Commemorative writings'. There are eight of these, the interest of most of which is historical. The most interesting of these is the tribute to Stalin on his sixtieth birthday, a reference to which has already been made above.

The Third section consists of 'Talks and Conversations.' There are thirteen of them, eight of them taken from *Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought I*, and five, from *The Collection Without A Title Page*. Most of these writings (eleven out of the thirteen) are directly related to the events of the Cultural Revolution, being utterances during the Cultural Revolution. But even in the remaining two, the preoccupations are the same: the evils of bureaucracy, the need to be practical and not dogmatic, the need to have faith in the Young. Of particular interest are the remarks on Education in his conversation with a Nepalese Delegation of Educationists: 'The school years are too long, courses too many, and the method of teaching is by injection instead of through imagination. The method of examination is to treat candidates as enemies and ambush them.' (P. 22) One would have liked to know the reactions of the Educationists from Nepal (who

could not be much different from Our Own Educationists) to these forthright observations. The sentiment is repeatedly echoed in the 'Instructions' which form the second part of the book. A similar attack on dogmatist thinking among communist party leaders features in his Talk to the Leaders at the Centre (21.7.1966). The solution to bureaucratic apathy and a fear to face uncertainties is, to stir up the mixture, as it were. A little bit of anarchy does nobody any harm. Says the Chairman: 'On my return to Peking, I feel sorry that things are so quiet. Some schools are shut: some even suppress student movements. Who (in the past) suppressed student movements? Only the northern warlords. [A few weeks later, Mao was to return to the same theme, in Instruction No. 58]. It is anti-Marxist for the communist party to be afraid of student movements. Some people talk about the mass line, talk about serving the people everyday, but they actually follow a capitalist line and serve the bourgeoisie.' (p. 29). Some of our 'Leftist' leaders could take note of these observations.

#### Destroy Elitism

The Selection of Mao's writings concludes with five written statements'. The most important of these are 'The Situation in the Summer of 1957', and the item that follows—The Draft Resolution from the Office of the Centre of the CCP, dated 19.2.1958. In both these documents, the concern is with the problem of making the CCP acceptable to the masses. The first states the problem: 'Our aim is to create a political situation which is centralist and yet democratic, disciplined and yet free, ideologically united and yet individually content, and dynamic and lively... Members of the CCP must have the spirit of dawn, firm revolutionary will, and determination to overcome difficulties with no fear of setbacks; they must overcome their individualism, particularism, absolute egalitarianism, and liberalism. Otherwise, they are communists in name only

... Members of the party must be good at discussing and handling affairs with the masses. They must not at any time detach themselves from the masses.' The sixty points on working methods that follow detail the working out of the principles laid down in the passage cited above. The message of Mao can be summarised in two words: Destroy Elitism. Even in 1958, it was the elitism of the CCP that Mao was warning against. Eight years later, he was to initiate a process which would achieve this objective to a large measure. (It is needless to say that the destruction of elitism is a continuous process, for elitism has the resiliency to manifest itself in a variety of new garbs.)

#### II

Part II of *Mao Papers* is perhaps the most exciting part of the book. There is nothing new in the 'Instructions'; the substance of these is mostly anticipated or even stated in many items in the first part of the book. And yet, this part is quite exciting to read, for we hear the authentic voice of Mao Tse-tung in these 'Instructions'. There is no reason to doubt that these 'Instructions', while not exactly unpremeditated, are at least unvarnished, being spared the editorial skills available at the CCP headquarters. A very large number of these 'Instructions' date from 16th May 1966, and the Ten-point Circular of the Central Committee of CCP of that date is itself included in full, as Instruction No. 32. It is very difficult to summarise these 'Instructions'; for one thing, they are so varied, and for another, they are all mostly very short. But certain major preoccupations, already present in the earlier part of the book (and indeed running through all the writings of Mao from the earliest phase) are given greater emphasis in these 'Instructions'. Foremost of these is Mao's concern with the youth. Mao seems to have an almost miraculous capacity to talk to young people in a language to which they instinctively respond. The secret, of course, is that he never talks down to them, but

talks to them as an equal. Another major concern is with the problem of education, particularly with the examinations. It is not merely that Mao returns again and again to the repressive nature of the current educational system. What is to be noted is the willingness to discard a whole system, when one is convinced that the vitality the system did possibly possess once has entirely been buried under a bureaucratic superstructure. Such, for instance, is the basis of his criticism of the existing system of examinations, particularly the government examinations. 'The present examination system is more suited for enemies, than for people; it is like an ambush, because the questions are remote, strange, and still in the old tradition of the eight-legged essays [a set of stereotyped style of questions and answers]. I am against it. My suggestion is to publish the questions first, let the students study them and answer them with the help of their books...' 'Students should be permitted to doze off when a lecturer is teaching. Instead of listening to nonsense, they do much better taking a nap to freshen themselves up. Why listen to gibberish anyway? (P. 94) It may be noted that Mao's attack is here directed against a system, which in the truest sense of the term, was 'liberal'. Who could be a more 'harmless' creature, in a liberal system of values, than a professor? But as early as 1937, Mao had noted the repressive tolerance that is a characteristic of liberalism, and in these 'Instructions', he identifies the bureaucratic tendencies which sought to suppress opposition and debate with the same kind of forces which he had defined in 1937.

#### Literature and Art

There are a few items on Literature and Art (eleven of them), mostly criticism of film, opera, novels, plays etc. While these do not exactly place Mao as the Greatest Critic Of All Times, they are nonetheless interesting, in that they reveal a lively mind which is forcefully political, but not dogmatic. The very first

item in the 'Instructions' is concerned with an episode from the 14th century classical novel *Shui Hu Chuan*, which was the theme of a Peking Opera. The way Mao is able to draw a political lesson from the least promising of subjects can be seen in his remarks on the film *The Life of Wu Hsün*. The film sought to glorify the life of Wu Hsün (1838-96), a beggar who invested his savings from begging in free schools for poor boys. Mao attacked this attempt to present a sympathetic portrait of one who, objectively speaking, was only instrumental in strengthening feudal tendencies in Chinese culture. (Humility, thrift, and appropriately, founding free schools which in turn would foster the same qualities). Mao pinpoints the ideological confusion that had spread even among party cadres in these remarks on Wu Hsün, and on the film about him: 'Certain communists who have reputedly grasped Marxism warrant particular attention. They have learnt the history of social development...—historical materialism—but when they come across specific historical events, specific historical figures (like Wu Hsün) and specific ideas contrary to history (as in the film *The Life of Wu Hsün* and the writings about Wu Hsün), they lose their critical faculties, and some have even capitulated to these reactionary ideas. Is it not a fact that reactionary bourgeois ideas have found their way into the militant Communist Party? Where on earth is the Marxism which certain Communists claim to have grasped?

Sometime ago, one heard a lot of 'Communists' in this country speaking on Gandhi and Lenin as two great revolutionaries, and if I am not mistaken, the centenaries of both their births were celebrated from a common platform, with Gandhians and Communists (or should one say, Gandhian Communists and Communist Gandhians) sitting cheek by jowl. The very apotheosis of liberal tendencies, one might say.

Mao Tse-tung discusses a variety of problems in the course of these 'Ins-

ructions'. On some questions, his comments are brief, casual, perfunctory; about some others, he is thorough and deep, as for instance, in the Sixteen Articles on the Resolutions of the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP (a document which has been analysed closely by Joan Robinson in her little volume on the Cultural Revolution, pp. 84-5). But whatever Mao is discussing, be it the importance of the triple alliance of the masses, the army and the party cadre, or the evils of the examination system, or the correct way to play table tennis, he is never dull. Even the most casual remark is enlivened with a touch of freshness, originality. Thus, on the course of Revolutions: 'In any revolution, its internal causes are fundamental, and its external causes are supplementary.' (No. 61). On Mistakes: 'It is difficult not to make mistakes. The thing is to correct them conscientiously. (No. 121). On Left, Centre and Right: 'Except in the deserts, at every place of human habitation, there is the left, the centre and the right. This will continue to be 10,000 years hence. (No. 165). 'Unity—criticism and self-criticism—Unity. (132) There are flashes of sly humour as well: '(One can) never be sure that what is written in a resolution will be carried out by all our comrades: some of them will not.' (No. 69) 'Some of our comrades toddle along like women with bound feet. They complain about others: "Too fast, too fast!" (No. 133). A certain kind of pleasing directness is present, even as Mao attacks: 'The Secret History of Ch'ing Court is regarded as a patriotic film, but as traitorous, traitorous through and through, by me.' (No. 88). Some of the 'Instructions' are genuinely aphoristic, with a touch of poetic magic about them: On the Objective Existence of Class Struggle: 'Wind will not cease even if trees want to rest.' (No. 34).

Everywhere, one recognizes the essentially civilized character of Maoism. The statement might seem odd, particularly in the light of the

more well-publicized manifestations of 'Maoism' in our country in recent years, which are presented to be almost deliberately, aggressively, barbarous. But reading this book, one realizes that there is nothing savage about the idiom and the culture of Maoism. It is a hard, ruthless doctrine, but the hardness and ruthlessness is reserved only for confirmed class-enemies, not for every kind of an opponent. For instance, Instruction No. 16 presents a Mao who is a patient teacher, one who is anxious to win you over, not annihilate you. While the purport of 'The Centre's Instruction on Learning from Each other and Overcoming Complacency and Conceit', is, Down With Individualism, Mao goes about it in a highly individualistic way. Or, take Item No. 48, and articles 6 and 7 thereof. I think these will bear quotation in some detail: 'A strict distinction must be made between the two different types of contradictions: those among the people and those between ourselves and the enemy. Contradiction among the people must not be made into contradictions between ourselves and the enemy; nor must contradictions between ourselves and the enemy be regarded as those among the people. . . . The method to be used in debates is to present the facts, reason things out, and persuade through reasoning. Any method of forcing a minority holding different views to submit is impermissible. The minority should be protected, because sometimes the truth is with the minority. . . . When there is a debate, it should be conducted by reasoning, not by coercion or force. . . . How necessary it is for our revolutionaries to ponder over these words!

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Business Manager  
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MAY 22, 1971

#### A Real Man

*Mao Papers* is one of the most exciting books to read, and even one who is only marginally interested in revolutionary politics will be fascinated by the portrait that emerges out of the pages of the book. A proven leader of world revolutionary movement, the leader of 700 million Chinese as well as a beacon of hope for the many many millions more who are struggling to be free; a reputation almost mythical, but at the same time, a real man, alive, concerned with problems trivial and momentous; there is hardly any suggestion of the megalomania, so frequently attributed to him by Pekinologists, in any of these writings. On the contrary, we see a personality that is alive, curious, questioning, ready to criticise and be criticised. The intense faith in the revolutionary potential of the people of the world that is implicit throughout the book is only tempered by a certain robust commonsense, which, even more than ideology, has been one of the strongest points of Mao Tse-tung.

One final remark, about this selection. I am less than a novice in the esoteric subject of Chinese studies, but I think it would have been better if the editor had included the 'Twenty-three Articles on Rural Socialist Education' of January 1965. That it is an important article having a bearing on the events of the Cultural Revolution is recognized by all the scholars, and yet it is not easily available. (Even Prof. Schram cites only part of the article). But even without that, the selection is highly welcome, in that it presents the Cultural Revolution as a political struggle over important political issues. The collection also provides conclusive evidence that Mao Tse-tung was throughout in full control of the events of the stormy months; that indeed, far from being senile or dying, he was (and is) alive and doing well in Peking. But whether he is doing quite as well in other areas (say, in Bengal), that, as they, is another story.

## Property, Leisure And Classical Music

BY A MUSIC CRITIC

**PUBLIC** attendance at the classical soirees presents a rather dismal spectacle. The ambitious programme of the Sarbabharatiya Sangit Samaj last winter was a great flop. The first two nights of the Park Circus Music Conference were discouraging. The law and order situation and apprehended Naxalite intervention do not fully account for the popular apathy shown in recent times towards this age-respected art. It was pitiful that in spite of elaborate police protection provided at the behest of the sponsors the auditoria wore a deserted look; the number of listeners could be counted on one's finger-tips. What a shame for artistes of all-India fame to have had to sing or play to the walls of an empty hall!

Why were the sponsors of such conferences so sure that Indian classical music was going to attract Naxalite condemnation? The position of the listening public was indeed quite otherwise a few decades ago when ordinary office-goers used to squat on the tram-tracks in the biting December cold, when outside megaphones used to be provided for them. The present scribbler was one of such pavement listeners in the forties and fifties. Far from being novices, the crowd consisted of connoisseurs coming from such places as Ranaghat-Krishnagar and Chinsurah-Chandernagore, who were more erudite in matters musical than many sleeping front-benchers. But the sponsors of the fifties thought that discontinuance of the free means of listening would cause an automatic rush to the box-office. This was not the case at all. On the contrary classical music in this city lost contact with ordinary people and became a pastime of the propertied. They could buy a minimum 30-rupee season ticket, sleep away all the *alap* portion of Ravishankar and be pushed

out of slumber by a neighbour when the *jujutsu* began with the *tablawala*. Apart from lack of popular teaching arrangements, this mercenary attitude of the sponsors of classical soirees has contributed not a little towards reducing it to an esoteric affair of a number of leisured people.

Whole-night functions held on holidays used to encourage the enthusiasts of the outlying townships because then they had not the problem of a night-halt. But modern evening shows have debarred such people from attending. I would not believe that the police stood in the way—they are never supposed to stand in the way of business, and there's no business like the show business. Therefore the complicity of the sponsors in this trickery cannot be denied.

Evolution of the patronage of classical music from the landed aristocracy of the nineteenth century to today's commercial bourgeoisie is interesting. While soirees held in the last century in the different aristocratic chambers of this province were financed by the rajas and maharajas and any interested person was welcome, the patronage shifted, especially since the last war, to the propertied and leisured classes by way of donations and advertisements. Conferences now-a-days are financed not by sale proceeds but by advertisement revenue. The star artistes were not late in realising the fun of the business: when Ravishankar pushed his fees to Rs 6,000, Ustad Vilayat and Mia Vismilla could hardly remain far behind. Thus laws of the money market began to operate in the celestial domain of music to the banishment of the poor music-lovers. No wonder that in no time classical music in the city became a private preserve of the privileged classes.

A careful scrutiny of the lists of patrons, office-bearers and committee-members of the so-called 'music conferences' of the city will be both revealing and instructive. They are graced by millowners, bankers, contractors, businessmen, sharemarket sharks, company directors, govern-

ment bureaucrats (to obviate amusement tax, the finance department and official grant matter), police bosses, newspaperwallahs, blackmarketeers (the money is white!), and big publicity bosses. Of late AIR bosses also are being appeased for obvious reasons. Under the ideal guidance of such big moneybags of society classical music is trying hard to imitate the West, which is a rather difficult proposition. Did consciousness of the class alignment of classical music make the sponsors apprehensive of Naxalite intervention last winter and lead to elaborate armed police arrangements? But do we not know that the people themselves protect the valuable specimens of their culture and lay down their lives? Then, why not make our classical music a thing of the people, not a heritage of the propertied class alone—a people's art not only in form but also in content and accessible to the ordinary people?

#### Jhankar Convocation

Nikhil Banerjee gave a superb rendering of the major morning raga, Bhairava, at the 23rd annual convocation of Jhankar. He elaborated the characteristic ascent and descent of the raga with special emphasis on its melodic chords bringing out the beauty of the vibrating and microtoned D flat and A flat. He demonstrated a wonderful grip over tonal harmony and rhythmical symmetry which imparted vitality to his *alap* and *gat kari* respectively. The impromptu flourishes in the *Masidkhani* movement received general acclaim.

#### Solo Violin

It was really an experience to listen to the three morning ragas—Vilaskhani Todi, Bairagi and Asabari—played by Mrs Sisirkana Dhar Chowdhury on the violin on a May morning at the Rabindra Sadan. Although sweet, Vilaskhani (said to have been created by Vilas Khan, the youngest son of Tansen) has a robustness which is not obtainable in its nearest prototype, Bhairavi. Bairagi, a penta-hexatonic variety of the Bhairav group,

has of late become very popular in the north. The third raga, Asabari with D flat need not be specially named Komal Asabari because Asabari with the natural 2nd is nothing but Jaunpuri. It also superficially resembles Bhairavi and Vilaskhani in the number of notes employed, but by omitting the E flat in the ascent and employing the typical *todi* *angrgrs* it differentiates itself from Bhairavi and establishes itself as a variety of Todi. Mrs Dhar Chowdhury showed a commendable grasp of the spirit of the ragas and their microtonal inflexions which differentiate a raga from a similar one. The *Jod* portions were as accurate as lively. She demonstrated a rare command over *laya*. Her bowing did not produce any scratching sound.

### Clippings

#### East Bengal

...Every military plan has a psychological content. Pindi's planners in their search for speed, played on the East Pakistanis' non-martial proclivities. If at the start they could terrorise the population, initial resistance would collapse quickly. Subsequently any counter movement, which would have to be Bengal managed, whichever side of the border those Bengalis came from, remembering this harsh repression would re-form slowly. Counter movements are stoked by intellectuals though in the field they may be less effective. Consequently, as part of the terrorism process, it was felt necessary to set an example among the Dacca University staff and students. This was ordered and executed.

This same philosophy of repressive terror to subdue the Bengalis, explains the otherwise senseless destruction of crops and stored foodgrains. The resultant famine and suffering, however unfortunate it appeared internationally, would remind the rebels of the retribution they might expect and dissuade the country folk from

joining or supporting them. The Punjabi army and so-called loyal Bengalis, supplied by helicopter, would also show how much better off 'good guys' could be.

Pindi in making their plan, obviously felt that the time achieved by these harsh methods, would give them the opportunity to consolidate their gains and install in East Pakistan a subservient government of their choice. As for world opinion did it really matter? The clamour would quickly die down with success and India was always available to be cast in the role of villain. Therefore Pindi's policy was that of maximum not minimum force. This policy will continue.

Inconceivable though it may be, from the evidence presently available it appears that Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League not only failed to anticipate what Rawalpindi might do, but they had absolutely no plans of their own. Perhaps carried away by their euphoric victory at the polls and deluded by the distance between the two wings of Pakistan, the East Bengalis felt contingency planning was unnecessary. Their leader was captured with ease, no sequence of successors was nominated, resistance was sporadic and uncoordinated, no rallying point was formed, no manifesto for Bangladesh was kept ready and even the classic links which any revolutionary party has with its neighbours or with countries supporting revolutions as a matter of business, were missing... what resistance there was got inexorably pushed back and split up. All these errors will make future resistance more difficult to organise. Also, who will organise and sponsor such resistance?

Talks have already started about a guerrilla movement, to win back by a process of erosion Bangladesh's lost freedom. It is easier to talk about guerrillas than to organise them into a fully functioning, effective force, particularly when a strong base is missing as it seems to be in this case. During World War II, it was over two years before the French Maquis became more than a pinprick and yet

they had the full support of allied resources. Postwar, the history of successful guerilla movements shows the same lengthy period of gestation and even Mao's revolution took 20 years. History also shows that guerillas require strong and constant motivation. Such motivation is usually provided by appropriate wings of a communist party, for the communists have the right specialities within their ranks and in chaos retain coherence. Despite its strong socialist doctrine, Mujibur's Awami League was never communist.

There is no doubt that a resistance movement, which in the beginning might be part dacoit and part guerilla, will gradually emerge with the aim of freeing and forming Bangladesh. Their main bases will lie in India just as the bases of the Naga and Mizo anti-Indian insurgents lay in East Pakistan. Had China not been pro-Yahya, some support could have been located in Burma, but the Burmans will do nothing to aggravate the Chinese who are on their northern border. The chances are that after the usual internecine squabbles for leadership, a communist party will gain control of the movement and will look to support from their Indian colleagues. Among the big powers, presently it appears that the only one who might conceivably assist an East Pakistan resistance movement is the Soviet Union. With her Indian Ocean ambitions and recent military aid to Ceylon, a foothold in a possible new South Asian country could have advantages.

Whatever shape this resistance movement takes, there will always be some embarrassment for India. Emotionally West Bengal will demand support for East Pakistan but this support could well rebound, for revolutionaries have no frontiers. Overt support will draw international criticism while the inevitable border clashes between the opposing security forces will exacerbate existing hostility to neither advantage. A shooting war developing between the two countries is unlikely, for India doesn't want one and Pakistan is fully com-

mitted in East Bengal. Even if India does nothing except act in a humanitarian way, the influx of Muslim refugees into West Bengal and Assam, must be causing serious problems...

In this struggle round one seems to have gone to President Yahya and his generals for by the first monsoons they will have gained their primary aims. During the monsoon, helped by helicopters and hovercraft, consolidation will take place. On the other side a resistance movement will emerge but the process will be slow and at first uncoordinated for it starts from scratch. Anyone expecting quick results from these guerillas will be disappointed and if there is no change in Rawalpindi's present policy, the struggle will be a lengthy one. Bangladesh's future is really dependent on events in West Pakistan (rather) than on local guerilla movements. Economically and politically, Pakistan has been hit hard by the revolt in the East and the West Pakistanis know this. It could be a mortal blow. (General J. N. Chaudhuri in the *Hindusthan Standard*.)

## Letters

### China, Pakistan And India

It is becoming increasingly clear that New Delhi is not likely to recognise the Bangladesh government in the near future and on its own. Having made very strong criticism of the barbarous atrocities that are being committed by the Pakistani forces our Government, however, did not find it at all embarrassing or shameful to play the role that it did recently in Ceylon in active co-operation with Pakistan, the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain to quell a growing revolt against the Ceylonese Government. Of course, India took part in this joint action at the request of the Government of Ceylon. Freedom fighters of Bangladesh and their

Government have also made repeated requests to the Indian Government for all possible help and immediate recognition. Have their requests been conceded? If so, how and on what scale and manner?

The Congress Government has never recognised any new government formed by freedom fighters carrying on a revolutionary war. Algeria's case may be cited. But the Congress Government has extended much material and military help to suppress revolts in other countries. Burma and Ceylon are but two shining examples.

China has become very handy for the Congress Government to cover up its own failures, deficiencies and impotence. It is well known here that owing to arm-twisting by some big powers and later developments inside Bangladesh (such as ascendancy of left elements—the degrees of leftism are not much known and well defined at the moment—and decline of Awami League elements in the leadership of the armed struggle gradually transforming itself into a protracted guerilla warfare of national liberation) the Congress Government, despite all its public postures and heroics, is constrained to have second thoughts in the matter of extending material support to Bangladesh freedom fighters. This shift in the policy necessitates the presence of a scapegoat and China is always there.

It is interesting to note how our 'nationalist' Press propagated all sorts of interpretative stories to produce the impression that China is backing President Yahya Khan's repressive policy in East Bengal. This they did simply by ignoring or misquoting the actual wording used by China. Didn't the Chinese Embassy note of April 7 to the Government of India protesting against the Jana Sangh demonstration of March 29 before its premises in Chanakyapuri characterise as slander the report that China is aiding the Pakistan Government in its war on the freedom-loving people of East Bengal?

Chou En-lai's message to General Yahya Khan was also subjected to

misinterpretation. In this message Premier Chou said:

"Your Excellency and leaders of various quarters in Pakistan have done a great deal of useful work to uphold the unification of Pakistan and to prevent it from moving towards a split. We believe that through the wise consultations and efforts of Your Excellency and leaders of various quarters in Pakistan the situation in Pakistan will certainly be restored to normal. In our opinion the unification of Pakistan and the unity of the people of East and West Pakistan are the basic guarantees for Pakistan to attain prosperity and strength.

"Here it is most important to differentiate the broad masses of the people from a handful of persons who want to sabotage the unification of Pakistan."

On the issue of a united Pakistan, it will be interesting to note what the Soviet views are on the developments in Bangladesh. This is what A. Ulansky said in his article "Events in Pakistan", published in the April 15 issue of the official Soviet Weekly *New Times* (pages 8-9, April 15, 1971):

"In short, the relations between the eastern and western parts of the country (that is Pakistan—KCC) are complicated.

"It is a noteworthy fact that some Western newspapers, apparently betraying the hopes of certain imperialist circles, are predicting that Pakistan 'cannot remain united' and that sooner or later it 'will be partitioned'. It looks as though the imperialists would not be averse to taking advantage of the situation in Pakistan to further their selfish neo-colonialist aims.

"As for the Soviet people," President Podgorny said in his message, that they "have always sincerely wished the Pakistani people good fortune and prosperity, and rejoiced in their success in democratically solving the complex problems confronting their country... A peaceful solution of the problems that have arisen would be welcomed by all Soviet people."

Are these two approaches any differ-

ent in their operative parts? The Soviet Union wants "a peaceful solution" which can obviously come only through consultations between various sections of the people. Didn't the Chinese Prime Minister say almost the same thing? But our nationalist Press created a row over the Chinese Premier's message and did not take any note of the Soviet point of view as expressed above—as a matter of fact this Soviet view was completely blacked out by our Press and officialdom. Is it accidental or deliberate? How long should India allow herself to put her own relations with China in jeopardy to serve the Soviet interests which began as early as 1955?

KALI KINKAR CHAUDHURI  
New Delhi

## Secondary Teachers

Part of the notes appended to a recent order of the West Bengal Government for introduction of the revised scales of pay for secondary teachers says that existing untrained teachers of 40 years of age and below with 10 years teaching experience in a recognised secondary school on 1st April, 1966 will be treated as trained teachers for the purpose of the revised scales of pay. (Finance Department Audit-Memo. No. 666-F dated the 1st March, 1971).

Thus a large number of untrained secondary teachers completing 10 years of service after 1st April, 1966 will not be entitled to annual increments. The ominous silence maintained by the ABTA over this matter is mysterious. It is time the date bar was eliminated and the secondary teachers with at least a decade's experience were given a fair deal.


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