

# frontier

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## REVOLUTION BY CEILINGS

ADVANCE precautions were taken by the Prime Minister to ensure that this week's discussion at the policy-making level of the Congress on measures to implement the election pledges of the party did not become anything more than a mock battle. The discussions are not over at the time of writing, but after the Leader has spoken there can be little doubt about the outcome. She has debunked the "extremists", both of the right and the left, in the party and threatened to show them the door if they fail to behave. The admonition will salve the radical itch not only of the small fry, but also of the big men on the two committees, appointed by the recent mini-AICC session in New Delhi, to recommend what should be the ceilings for agricultural holdings and urban property. The committees will propose, if any, only minor modifications of the ceilings favoured by the Government, and they will be endorsed by the party, though, maybe, with much ado.

In retrospect it seems the entire controversy was simulated. Every Congressman knows that whatever be the ceiling on land holdings, it cannot vest in the Government sufficient land to settle the millions of landless agriculturists in the country. Nor can a curb on acquisition of urban property on the lines suggested in the model Bill improve the condition of the urban poor. They will not further the cause of "garibi hatao" to any appreciable degree. The election manifesto of the ruling party was, in this respect, a big hoax on the people, and the elaborate exercise of the party for the last three weeks is designed to prolong this hoax and create an impression among the people that the problem of poverty can be solved through reforms and the Congress is earnest in bringing about these reforms. That is why the Planning Minister, Mr Subramaniam, who should know better than all others, pleaded for a low ceiling on land holdings; otherwise, he said, many landless peasants will have to go without land; as if the ceiling proposed by him will achieve it. Equally phoney was the debate over the ceiling on urban property. Mr Chandrasekhar, another arch-radical, is reported to be in favour of a ceiling of Rs. 1 lakh. Does he seriously want the people to believe that the Congress is capable of ushering in a regime in which a Tata or a Birla will not be allowed to possess urban property worth more than Rs. 1 lakh and a piece of agricultural land not exceeding 10-18 acres?

No monopolist or kulak quaked in their shoes at the abuses hurled at them and their lobbies or at the threat of expropriation, for the whole Congress is their lobby. The socialism of the Congress party has got their blessing, and they know that whatever reforms the party may decide to introduce will not touch them. The Congress merely re-affirms its loyalty to them as a class when it talks of radical transformation of society through petty reforms in an effort to keep the people in hope and itself in power; for their interests are safe as long as the Congress is in office. The three-week debate is meant as a substitute for purposeful action and not a guideline for action. The Prime Minister cried a halt when she felt that the debate had served its purpose, that the make-believe of Congress radicalism had been sufficiently impressed on the people. The debate will be resumed only when this newly generated credibility has been exhausted. No doubt the AICC will make some recommendations, and some laws may be enacted. But the ways of circumventing them are many and known. Besides, the President of India can always make suggestions as he has done in the case of the Tata Zamindari Bill.

## The Summit

It was feared that in view of Vietnam, the summit in Moscow would be a small thing perhaps. But the molehill has produced a mountain. It has produced agreements covering the earth, air and water. But whether it will contribute to world peace and security remains a big question. The collaboration, despite areas of competition, between the USA and the Soviet Union will of course benefit both. The Russians have pledged to avoid military confrontations with the Americans in this nuclear age. Which means that the Americans will be free to carry on savage, local wars anywhere else except in Europe where a grand security conference is to be

held. The Russians will be free to wage wars by proxy. It is the small nations whose lot will remain unchanged or change for the worse.

The concern of these two great powers for cancer and heart patients is indeed touching. Like two Prosperos Nixon and Brezhnev have taken everything in their stride. Two or three years hence, there will be joint bolshoi ballets of cosmonauts in space. Mr Nixon, who saluted Tanya, the 12-year-old girl who left a diary of the Nazi German siege of

Leningrad in which she perished, spoke like Gandhi when he hoped that the Moscow talks would now safeguard the little Tanyas and their brothers and sisters from the calamity of war. What about the little Tanyas in Vietnam? Such doubts do not deflect the Big Powers from their unswerving pursuit of self-interest. Their forte is their lack of a sense of humour. The seventies will perhaps go down in history as an era of open Russo-American collaboration—and of breathtaking hypocrisy.

## Hopelessness In Cairo

What can you say of the man who finds himself installed in a big position to function as shock absorber so that the big boss remains unaffected by public criticism? Such a person is not recruited for policy formulation but to become a sacrifice at the altar of public scrutiny. This is a common practice in many countries but the discomfort of Mr Aziz Sidki, the Prime Minister of Egypt, is of late attracting the notice of the international press. Perhaps he could have been saved much of his embarrassment if President Sadat were not all the time talking through his hat. But the Present is incorrigible; he is so much given to dramatics that he will never learn from experience. He so often makes contradictory statements that Egyptian officials have to remain alert all the time to maintain the credibility of their President with the masses. Sadat says that he is trying to fight despair which foreigners are trying to foster among the Arabs but the rhetorics he has applied to do the job is creating hopelessness among the intelligentsia. We know what happened to the deadline he set last year for the liberation of occupied land; but the man appears unflappable. He almost set another deadline on the occasion of Mohammed's birthday celebrations. In a style which is typical of Sadat he said that God willing Egypt would have regained the lost land and the Israelis

returned to the submissiveness decreed for them. What was said was not meant. That was the officials' explanation after Sadat had made the speech. In a subsequent address the President, however, said that there was now a joint Egyptian-Libyan-Syrian strategy that would remain good generation after generation till the Arabs were in a position to confront the Israelis. Does not this statement set at rest all speculation about an immediate confrontation? One may here point to the Russian endorsement of the Arab right to use other than peaceful means in their attempts to recover the lost territories. Moscow has also agreed to supply "within a reasonable time" the necessary offensive weapons. Apparently it seems that Sadat has at last been able to wring major concessions from Russia. In fact the language used in the latest Soviet-Egyptian communique makes the Russian support appear more specific than ever before. What has forced Moscow to make this verbal concession? The most plausible explanation is perhaps the inability of the Arabs to undertake military action against the Israelis. Resentment against Russia is steadily growing in Cairo and Sadat is also under political pressure. This might have enabled Sadat to convince Moscow that both the parties could improve their position if strong words were

employed in the communique which in any case was innocuous. Although he has not said it in so many words, Sadat has given the commitment to pursue social and economic policies which would safeguard Russian in-

terests. Sadat's gain is that henceforward he can attribute inactivity on the part of his Government to the inadequacies in the Soviet-Egyptian alliance.

## Intellectuals, Then And Now

One hundred and fifty-six Indian branches of companies incorporated abroad remitted Rs 23.39 crores in 1970-71. One hundred and forty-one Indian subsidiaries of foreign companies remitted Rs 27.60 crores. Together the amount comes to about Rs 51 crores. In 1968-69 they remitted Rs 39.49 crores. The rise is 38 per cent. In just two years.

Repatriation of the money, by way of profits and dividends, increased because these foreign companies earned profits on a proportionate scale at a time when Indian firms faced a general slump.

This is just the beginning of another era, with the Government of India's new open-door policy to foreign investors. Remittance of profits by them is just one aspect of the picture. The grip that they are getting on the Indian economy is much more pernicious.

Raja Rammohun Roy, the father of modern India, had a solution for the ills that arose from colonial exploitation of India. He did not like the idea that so much wealth should go out of this poor country. But he liked the English industrialists who were harbingers of modernity in India and but for whom India would continue to be a land of polygamy, early marriage, widow-burning, so on and so forth. So the Raja suggested that English businessmen, who made enormous profits in India, should settle down right here.

But such a novel idea may not appeal to Mrs Gandhi because as it

is, India is overpopulated. Moreover, her modern economic advisers would laugh at the naive proposition.

The whole thing can be, however, twisted a little, without affecting the outflow of wealth from the country, but giving the Raja's idea a modern form. Aren't there too many unemployed people here? The planners have stated that Rs 8000 crores would be required to implement the employment intensive programmes during the Fifth Plan. The country's industry requires massive investment—Rs 30,000 crores during the proposed Fifth Plan for the public sector development projects. Welfare schemes would require another Rs 300 crores. Wherefrom would the money come? Taxes, deficit financing, foreign aid—all have been tried and exhausted. What harm, therefore, is there if the foreigners are wooed a little and allowed to invest their dollars and pounds in this country, where socialism has to be founded?

But since foreigners associate India with dysentery, there is no fat chance of their settling down in India, even for the sake of socialism or humanism. The Raja could not accept the idea of socialism; he debated the idea with Robert Owen and, history has it, defeated him pants down. Mrs Gandhi would not accept the idea that India is going comprador; she is no intellectual like the Raja, but in these days of division of labour, she has a host of intellectuals around her to help her know the truth. They fell her, self-reliance is the creed today. The Raja was a seeker of Self; no less a seeker is Mrs Gandhi. Her self is Immanent. International Capitalism manifesting in the national bourgeoisie as well as transcending it.

## Fuel For Optimism

*A correspondent writes:*

India has only a fuel problems but no fuel policy. This has been a serious lacuna and the Fuel Policy Committee, which released a press summary of the first part of its report last week, has now attempted, if rather belatedly, to fill it. On the face of it, the exercise looks like a bold one. It does not try to fudge the immensity of the task that lies ahead but holds out the hope that given the will and the investment, the needs can be met without much difficulty. It marks a departure from the practice of having shoe-string budgets that have plagued much of the planning, particularly in fuel items, and has made bold to set targets not for the barest minimum but something more.

The demand projections for various fuel products have been based on the assumption of a 6.2 per cent growth rate in the economy during the Fifth Plan period. At the end of the next Plan period (1978-79), the demand for oil products, including those used for fertiliser production, is expected to rise to 34 million tonnes a year; the corresponding figure for coal, including coal used for thermal power generation, has been worked out at 165 million tonnes and for power at 156 kwh, which would require an installed capacity of somewhere between 37,000 mw and 40,000 mw. The estimated investment on this package would come to about Rs 7,480 crores. The bill is big but considering the present power shortage and the obvious disincentives it poses to economic growth, the committee sets the targets high and suggests that the generation of oil, coal and power deserves higher priority and bigger investment than have come its way so far. The country's utter vulnerability in oil, where its dependence on foreign supplies is, if anything, growing, has come for special mention in the report. And even though it has not held out any enticing vision of self-sufficiency in petroleum products in

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the immediate future, it has suggested a change in the product mix which would help to minimise our dependence on foreign supplies and foreign oil companies.

A significant feature of the committee's report is the priority it has given to the development of atomic power. With most of the requisite raw materials available within the country and a growing build-up of technological expertise in this field, the A-power programme can legitimately be pushed much more vigorously than in the past. But can atomic power provide the complete answer to the fuel problem now facing the country? Experience of A-power projects in Britain has not been entirely happy; the first and second generation plants have turned out to be a big disappointment, and even though the programme is sought to be salvaged through the installation of power plants based on more modern designs, like the advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR), not everybody is assured that they will finally be able to deliver the goods. In India too, the experience of the Tarapur plant has not been entirely reassuring either. While the United States is going ahead with its A-power programme in a big way, its water-cooled reactors having stood the test of time more ably, doubts are still being held in many quarters—and not in this country alone—that atomic power after all might not prove to be more economical than the conventional forms of power. The committee in its eagerness to suggest a viable fuel policy has perhaps put too big a stake on the development of atomic power.

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## Letter From America

# The Prospects In Vietnam

ROBI CHAKRAVORTI

BY coincidence I had finished reading Barbara Tuchman's *Stilwell and the American Experience in China* at about the time Nixon ordered the blockade of Haiphong. For me, it turned out to be an illuminating coincidence. In a flash, the nagging pattern of American intervention in the Far East and its costly failures became vivid. History may not repeat itself, I thought, but surely the United States has shown an amazing capacity for repeating historic mistakes.

At the end of the war with Japan, the U.S. Government made a bold move for intervention in the civil war in China. The rot in Chiang Kai-shek's Government had by then gone deep. In desperation, the U.S. decided to move Chiang's troops to North China where they could be a threat to Mao's troops. The justification for the move included the term leverage and the reasoning was no less tortuous than in the case of the recent version of "leverage" we have heard during the Indo-Pakistan war.

The argument for moving Chiang's troops to the north was as follows. If the Communists refused to make reasonable concessions, General Marshall said that he would move Nationalist troops to North China. On the other hand, if Chiang refused to make concessions and this led to a breakdown in the efforts for unity, the U.S. could not abandon him because "there would follow the tragic consequences of a divided China and of a probable Russian resumption of power in Manchuria...resulting in the defeat or loss of the major purpose of our war in the Pacific." This is the classic heads-I-win-tails-you-lose argument which has been recently served up by Nixon and Kissinger in a more attractive package to soothe themselves and the American public.

As Barbara Tuchman wrote: "It was essentially a decision for counter-revolution. The same choice was made in former colonial territories where, contrary to the late President's (i.e. Roosevelt's) intent, American forces were actively helping to restore French rule in Indochina against a strong movement for independence. In charters and declarations American aims were democratic but in practice executives opted for the old regime. In China the decision was not merely futile; it aligned America in popular eyes with the oppressor and landlord and tax collector, it disheartened the liberal forces and violently antagonized the future rulers. While many suspected that the effort was misguided, *American policy could not readjust. It preferred the status quo even when the status quo was a sinking ship.* There seemed to be no feasible alternative. To abandon the legal government for the Communists was not within American capacity and would have meant political suicide at home. The only possibility was Stilwell's advice to 'get out—now', and this was ahead of its time by a year and half." (Italics mine.)

When we compare the case of American intervention in China with the later ones in Korea and Vietnam, we are struck by points of similarities as well as differences. In China, American intervention was indirect; in Korea and Vietnam, it was direct and massive. The scale of military intervention in Korea was bigger than in China, and in Vietnam it is bigger still than it was in Korea. Vietnam appears to be the terrifying apex of a historic process that began in China.

As in China so in Vietnam, the choice remained the same—more of the same, that is escalation or "get out—now", as Stilwell said in his bitter frustration. Possible solutions of

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the Vietnam war are two—China-type, i.e. united Vietnam under Communists, or Korea-type, i.e. a divided Vietnam. Communists obviously want a China-type solution while Nixon is trying hard for a Korea-type solution.

Either solution eludes the antagonists because the rules of the war-game have changed as a result of changes in international relations in recent years and spiralling escalation of war by both sides of the conflict. If there is any perimeter to the ferocity of the war in Vietnam, it is set by the strange balance of power game played by Moscow, Peking and Washington. It is obvious that the blockade and mining of North Vietnamese harbours would not have been undertaken if China had threatened to send armed forces into Vietnam and Russia had flexed its naval muscles off the coast of Vietnam.

It may be recalled that the possibility of Chinese intervention in Vietnam had always loomed large whenever the previous Administration discussed the "option" of blockading Haiphong. General Maxwell Taylor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently told CBS that Johnson had turned down proposals for blockade for fear of possible Korea-style reaction by China. The implication is that such a fear is no longer sustained by policymakers in Washington.

The war in Vietnam somehow reads like an old story in basic form, but the details are somewhat different. It is as if someone has rewritten an old story, keeping the same beginning and the end, but changing the details of the middle episodes. The ferocity of American intervention is different in scale from the Chinese and Korean cases, but the intent and purpose of the U.S. intervention is the same. The suffering of the Vietnamese people is far greater than that of the Chinese and the Koreans—the tonnage of munitions used in Indochina during 1965-1971 amounted to approximately twice the total used by the U.S. in all theatres of World War II,

as reported in a recent article in the *Scientific American*. The Communist objective, however, remains the same.

At this stage of the war, the intriguing question is not whether the Communists will be able to achieve their objective but when. The blockade of Haiphong, it is acknowledged by most observers including even Dr Kissinger, will not immediately affect the fighting prowess of the Communist forces in the south. They have their supplies stacked away. Besides, the supply routes from China are open. As a secret CIA estimate, recently leaked out, said, the uninterrupted capacities of the railroad, highway and river connections with China are about 16,000 tons per day. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum is reported to have said that it is difficult to "interdict" supply links with China. "A minimum of 6,000 sorties per month would be required against two rail lines from China," the JCS noted, adding, "Even at this level of effort, the North Vietnamese could continue to use the rail lines to shuttle supplies if they were willing to devote sufficient manpower to repair and transshipment operations."

The intensive bombings, throughout Indochina, however, may have an effect on the course of the Communist offensive. While the fighting spirit and military skills of the Communists, adequately aided by Soviet and Chinese aid, are acknowledged, some observers nevertheless anticipate serious logistical problems for the Communists as they make further advances. Robert Shaplen of the *New Yorker* magazine estimated that it takes between one and two truckloads of gasoline a day to keep one World War II vintage Russian T-54 tank in action. About 180 such tanks are reported to have been used by the Communist combat troops attacking across the DMZ. The problem of maintaining a steady supply of gasoline in the face of brutal and continuous U.S. air attacks can well be imagined.

As more and more armour is used, the dependence on supplies becomes

greater and to that extent, the Communist forces in the south become increasingly more vulnerable to air attacks. Shaplen wrote that the original Communist plan seemed to have been to push on and take Hue in ten days. "The best explanation of why the Communists stopped long enough for the South Vietnamese to send reinforcements was that they outran the range of their artillery, which was set up mostly in the DMZ, and, more important, their supplies."

Even assuming that the Communists anticipated these difficulties, the fact of their existence cannot be denied. Militarily, Americans do not have any feasible option left except to use aerial bombardments to kill as many Communist troops as possible (along with civilians, of course) and to destroy war materiel and supplies. The question whether these two tactical objectives can be fulfilled to such a degree as to be enough for stopping the present Communist offensive is difficult to answer. Military experts are saying that mere air power is not enough and in any case, even if it is important, it is questionable how decisive it can prove to be, and how soon. In 1966, when the Communists struck across and around the DMZ with elements of four divisions, it took most of two United States Marine divisions and more than one ARVN division some months to push them back into North Vietnam. Since American combat troops are not being used during the present campaign, the task is much harder and with the best of luck, it will certainly take longer to stall the Communist offensive raging on far-flung fronts.

If the Communist forces are not stopped soon, the alternative may prove disastrous for the Thieu regime. The tactical objective of the Communists so far has been not merely to capture the cities alone but also the total engagement of ARVN, including all its reserve elements, over as wide an area as possible. The short-run strategic objective of the Communists appears to be two-fold—to prove that the pacification and

vietnamization policy is a sham and to make shambles of the political basis of the Saigon Government. In the last analysis, if the airpower of the U.S. cannot stop the Communists soon, the alternative will be the erosion of the political power of the Thieu regime to the point of collapse.

A few days ago, I pictured an imaginary scene. Communist rockets are falling on Saigon and people are fleeing helter-skelter. Thieu is

caught at the airport boarding a plane. Guess who caught Thieu? The U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, of course!

An empty dream? But a simpler version of this imaginary scene may very well be a reality. Instead of Thieu caught fleeing, he is seen off by the Ambassador. Hanoi and NLF are not only imagining such a situation, but actively working towards it.

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Removal of hardships faced by visitors; supply of three blankets to each prisoner; frequent change in the vegetables supplied with meals; end to warders' misbehaviour; cinema shows according to jail rules; prisoners sentenced up to three months should not be put in fetters and made to work in the jail compound; supply of fans; provision of earthen pots for drinking water; regular supply of lime and phenyl; supply of a wooden box for every ward; reintroduction of the supply of ink for writing purposes; and stoppage of the use of rotten vegetables.

The authorities agreed to concede the minor demands; others were "unreasonable" and could not be accepted.

The situation became explosive on May 5 when the agitators grew violent and virtually took control of the jail administration. They turned the prison into a virtual fort by driving away all the jail officials save one doctor and locking the entrance gate from the inner side. After that the 35 odd Naxalite prisoners were set free from their cells. Food was not a problem as there was enough stock in the jail godown.

The situation took a serious turn on May 7 when the agitating prisoners prevented the 323 homoeopathic students—whose release had been ordered by the State Government—from going out of the jail. They insisted on holding the students as hostages till their demands were met. Two of the students, however, gave them the slip. This enraged the convicts, who armed themselves with "bombs, arrows, swords and other weapons improvised out of iron rods, iron sheets, iron wire and other material kept on the premises for construction work" and took up positions on trees and walls. They threatened the students with dire consequences if they tried to escape.

The Jail Superintendent sought police help when violence by the prisoners did not abate even on the fourth day. The police operation began in the early hours of May 8. The inmates attacked the police with ar-

## Bihar

# Massacre In Prison

N. K. SINGH

**T**HANK God, after a brief but hellish stage of political instability, Bihar is once again ruled by a stable government, with a Chief Minister who claims to be firmly in the saddle of affairs. Many would find in him the shadow of Mr K. B. Sahay, the erstwhile 'strongman' of Bihar politics who would not budge an inch from his stand, however stupid it may be. Mr Kedar Pandey, who is being wisely "assisted, helped and guided" by a New Delhi controlled "liaison committee"—called by cynics the 'super cabinet'—made it clear to one and all that he is not one of those Chief Ministers who could be cowed down by the opposition's hue and cry. After all, he not only heads a government that rules over 60 million people but is also Mrs Gandhi's choice in Bihar. Or more likely, Mr Pandey, in his eagerness to become another Churchill and Nehru, merely followed the advice extended by Mark Twain: "In statesmanship get the formalities right, never mind about the moralities."

Justifying the police firing in Bhagalpur Special Jail last month, in which ten prisoners were killed and 160 others injured (according to official sources), Mr Pandey refused the opposition's unanimous demand for setting up a legislators' body to en-

quire into the incident on the grounds that "it would have a demoralising effect on the administration. And with a view to further toning up the administrative abilities of top bureaucrats, he also turned down a proposal that either he or one of his cabinet colleagues should visit the spot of tragedy. The opposition members, including the sarkari Communists, staged a walk out from the State Legislative Assembly in protest against the "false and misleading" statement of the Chief Minister.

Following is a brief resume of the "false and misleading" statement, which, if taken with a pinch of salt, makes an interesting story:

As a rule the Bhagalpur Special Jail lodges only hardened criminals—mostly murderers and dacoits and undertrial prisoners facing charges of equally heinous crimes, besides the Naxalites. However, about 323 homoeopathic students, arrested in April in connection with their agitation for better educational facilities, were sent to the same jail as the other jails were jampacked. The students went on hunger-strike for better amenities and the authorities conceded to their demands. Impressed by the success of the students, the ordinary inmates too launched an agitation on May 4 in support of their demands:

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rows, stones, spears, iron rods and even bombs when they moved into the jail premises to rescue the students. With "the situation going out of control," the services of the notorious Central Reserve Police were requisitioned. As "minimum force was applied and the firing was controlled" (vide the Chief Minister) only ten prisoners were killed and about 160 injured. While no student was injured in the firing, some of them sustained injuries in their efforts to escape from the violent prisoners. Here ends the official version of the massacre.

#### Another Side

However, the General Secretary of the Bihar State Homoeopathic Students Union, who was in the jail along with other students, has come out with a different—and shocking—version. According to him, the utter misbehaviour with prisoners by the authorities like Superintendent, Jailor and Assistant Jailor led to the firing. He put the casualties at 58 killed and 200 injured against the official figure of ten killed and 160 injured. Challenging the official statement that the firing was made only to rescue homoeopathic students detained by the 'habitual criminals', he said that those prisoners were demanding only adequate food, clothes, medicine and other amenities as prescribed under the jail rules. He denied that some homoeopathic students were injured while

escaping from the clutches of the convicts. These students were in fact, he alleged, severely assaulted with lathis and boots by constables.

The episode is only a further reminder of the fact that something is basically wrong with the jail administration in Bihar. To kill prisoners by the dozen, unthinkable even during the British days, has become a routine feature. Only last year in similar incidents in Patna and Hazaribagh jails a score of prisoners were killed—nay murdered. Apparently there is no sanctity of human life in Bihar jails which, owing to gross corruption and inefficiency on the part of officials, have been turned into a devil's island.

Complaints against the jail administration and charges of corruption have often been aired by political as well as ordinary prisoners. Shocking exposures have been made in course of an enquiry conducted into the Patna jail firings. According to a prisoners' representative, various malpractices committed in that jail forced the starving prisoners to sell their blood. Mr Ramratan Singh, the sole member of the enquiry commission, himself spotted a ganja shop in the premises when he visited the jail at the request of some prisoners. Many journalists and lawyers were also witnesses to it. In one sub-jail in Purnea district, it is said, even prostitutes are provided for favoured prisoners.

Overcrowding is a common problem in all the jails—most of them

housing twice as many prisoners as they are meant to lodge. In some jails the prisoners have to sleep in three-hour shifts. The classic example of overcrowding in Patna jail was disclosed when over 100 Jana Sangh workers arrested in connection with a demonstration had to be set free after several hours' because there was no room for them. Toilet facilities are practically nil and the lavatories are stinking horrors. Food and clothing meant for prisoners are sources of income for the jail staff. The prison administration never complains of overcrowding because it is a case of 'more-the-merrier'—the totality of their share from the sanctioned expenses incurred on boarding and clothing is naturally higher.

More than fifty per cent of the prisoners rot in jails without trial for years together. In many cases they remain in jail for four to five years although the charges against them do not warrant more than six to twelve months imprisonment. Nobody has cared to improve the living conditions of persons deprived of their liberty for periods longer than those prescribed even under the laws of the land. The jail administration is hand in glove with the worst type of criminal convicts who act as their agents, share alike the loot and enjoy facilities denied to their victims inside the jail.

If the prisoners become restive and revolt against a callous government and the corrupt and brutal jail administration, who is to blame?

## The Indian Bourgeoisie In Its True Colours—I

MONI GUHA

**T**HERE has been very little discussion about the role of the Indian bourgeoisie and the history of Indian independence except phrāse-mongering. So serious discussion, as in the paper on the Indian bourgeoisie serialised in *Frontier* (March 4, 11 and 18) is welcome.

However, the authors admit that the supporting material was 'more or

less arbitrary'. Lenin pointed out, "in order to depict the objective position one must not take examples or isolated data (in view of the extreme complexity of the phenomena of social life it is always possible to select any number of examples or separate data to prove any proposition) but the *whole* of the data concerning the *basis* of economic life in all bellige-

rent countries and the whole world.' 'The Indian Bourgeoisie' is a striking demonstration of an attempt to prove any proposition' with 'any number of examples or separate data' ignoring the '*basis* of economic life' of India in relation to imperialism.

The authors of the paper all through lumped all the bourgeoisie into a single category and called them 'nation-

alists', thus introducing a geographical concept regarding the bourgeoisie of a particular geographical territory, completely ignoring the political concept and political and economic stratifications. This fundamental departure from the position of Marxism-Leninism led the authors to wrong conclusions. In order to avoid ambiguity and inexplicitness one has to define compradorism and nationalism of the colonial and semi-colonial bourgeoisie. The compradorial character of the bourgeoisie is not determined by its bigness or smallness, nor by its industrial or trading character as some people think. This is determined by whether or not it has strong and inseparable economic and political ties with imperialism and world imperialist economics and politics and whether or not it can retain its independent existence without and in spite of imperialism. The peculiar feature of the compradorial character is that it is not only the victim of imperialism, it is as well imperialism's willing servant, while the national bourgeoisie is only a victim of imperialism, but not a willing servant, though at times it surrenders reluctantly. As a victim, the comprador bourgeoisie of a colonial country 'fights' against imperialism for greater share in exploitation and policy-making administration and as a willing servant its 'fight' sets the limit to semi-colonialism within the framework of imperialism. This is what is called compradorism. The compradors of one country may have more manoeuvrability than the compradors of another, but the limit is semi-colonialism.

Those sections of the bourgeoisie are called national who have got little, weak or no ties with imperialism and international capital and develop more or less with their own national resources and whose interests are commensurate broadly with the national interest and who if necessary can afford a complete break with imperialism in a favourable situation with a favourably, *all but not independently* to build an independent national economy. As it is only a vic-

tim of imperialism, not willing servant, it is capable of fighting imperialism more determinedly and consistently than the compradors. The peculiar feature of the national bourgeoisie is that it vacillates between compromise with imperialism and alliance with the revolutionary people and as such it is sometimes pro-people and at other times pro-imperialist, while the peculiar feature of the comprador is that it does never vacillate between the above two as it is for all time anti-people and pro-imperialist and an instrument of colonial rule.

#### Misrepresentation of Mao

The authors of the paper failed to distinguish between the two sections of the Indian bourgeoisie and lumped them together. In doing so they have grossly misrepresented and misinterpreted Mao Tse-tung. Mao Tse-tung, quite in accord with the assessment of the Communist International, demarcated the Chinese bourgeoisie into two distinct sections, comprador and national, and then analysed the character of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, not the Chinese bourgeoisie as a whole, as the paper wants us to believe. As such the long quotation from Mao Tse-tung in the paper's last instalment regarding the character and the role of the national bourgeoisie is a gross misrepresentation. Mao said, 'The big local bullies, the big gentry, the big warlords, the big bureaucrats and the big compradors have long made up their minds. They have said and are still saying that revolution (of whatever kind) is after all worse than imperialism. They have formed a camp of traitors; for them such a question as whether or not they are to become slaves of a foreign nation does not exist because they have already obliterated national demarcation and their interests are inseparable from those of imperialism and their chief of chiefs is no other than Chiang Kai-shek. The traitors of this camp are sworn enemies of the people... They are the jackals of imperialism.' After saying so much about the Chinese compradors Mao Tse-tung analysed the character and

role of the Chinese national bourgeoisie. But here too. Mao said, 'Within the national bourgeoisie there is a section of people who have more affiliations with foreign capital and Chinese landed interests, people who constituted the Right wing...' In spite of this clear distinction by Mao the 'Group of Students' says 'Mao Tse-tung in his analysis of the character of the bourgeoisie of colonial and semi-colonial countries points out that' and then quotes Mao, deceitfully avoiding his analysis of the comprador section of the bourgeoisie and the right wing of the national bourgeoisie.

The 'Group of Students' quoting Lenin says that 'imperialism accelerates the development of capitalism in the most backward countries like colonies,' and concludes, on the strength of the above quotation, that if development of capitalism takes place in colonial countries, then the 'possibility of the rise of a nationalist bourgeoisie cannot be denied'. After the formulation of this hypothesis, the authors of the paper establish that the Indian bourgeoisie are nationalist. This is not only misleading but also a wrong conclusion for more than one reason. First, here the indigenous bourgeoisie is called nationalist bourgeoisie. The indigenous bourgeoisie can be nationalist or anti-nationalist or can be both. If it is called national or nationalist bourgeoisie, then the concept will be geographical, not political. Secondly, the possibility of the rise of a nationalist or national bourgeoisie does not necessarily negate the possibility of the rise of a comprador bourgeoisie, as has been seen in China. Thirdly, and which is more important, acceleration of development of capitalism in colonial countries occurred in the era of finance capital. It signalled the fact that the era of industrial capital was ended and the great industrial-finance monopolies were busy slicing up the whole world into colonial spheres of investment and exploitation. It signalled the fact that export of capital to the colonial countries was replacing the export of goods as the typical

feature of world capitalism. As such, the 'acceleration of development of capitalism, on the colonial and semi-colonial soil was the acceleration of development of foreign capitalism, not national capitalism, as the authors of the paper try to impress. Whatever national capitalism developed and develops in colonial and semi-colonial countries in the era of finance capital, it developed and develops as a side current, as an offshoot, not as a national current, not as a principal, predominant trend. It is one of the fundamental differences between the Marxist-Leninists and the Revisionists of all hues.' Lenin did not only write about the acceleration of capitalism in the colonies in the epoch of imperialism, he also said that monopolies in economies are not compatible with non-monopolistic, non-violent, non-annexionist methods in politics. Lenin approvingly quoted Hilferding that 'finance capital does not want liberty, it wants domination'. This is most important. It means capitalism in colonial countries cannot be independent, cannot be national capitalism, independent of the tentacles of world finance-capitalism. It is always controlled by imperialism both politically and economically. As such, the possibility of the rise of a servile bourgeoisie is far greater than the possibility of the rise of a nationalist or national bourgeoisie in colonial countries. 'Finance capital', says Lenin, 'is such a great, it may be said, such a decisive force in all economic and in all international relations that it is capable of subjecting, and actually does subject to itself even states enjoying fullest political independence.' If 'even States enjoying fullest political independence' can be subjected to the power of finance capital, one wonders how the 'Group of Students' can conclude that the Indian bourgeoisie remaining under the direct colonial thumb of imperialism 'from the very beginning' had 'a monopolistic position'.

The authors have played a trick in the name of Mao Tse-tung again! Quoting, rather, misquoting him, they try to establish that the bourgeoisie

of the colonial countries, in the epoch of imperialism and of the proletarian revolution, is capable of establishing an independent bourgeois State. The paper further says that if weak, the independent bourgeois State may degenerate into a semi-colony again and if strong it may turn imperialist. It says, "citing the success of the bourgeois Kemalist revolution in Turkey and the emergence of the country as a weak bourgeois State from the old colonial rule, he [Mao Tse-tung] pointed out, 'eventually Kemalist Turkey had to throw itself more and more into the hands of Anglo-French imperialism, becoming more and more a semi-colony and part of the reactionary imperialist world.'" Unfortunately this is a gross and unpardonable distortion of Mao's quotation. What did Mao Tse-tung actually say and what was its political and historical implications? The section heading of the quotation under reference is 'Refutation of the theory of Bourgeois Dictatorship'. Its meaning is clear. A section of the people, like our 'Group of Students', was advocating that in a semi-colonial country like China, an independent bourgeois State and bourgeois dictatorship was possible and feasible as was in Kemalist Turkey. Mao Tse-tung refuted this theory in this section. He inter alia, says, raising the question whether an independent bourgeois State is possible: 'Judging by the international situation, that road is blocked. In its fundamentals, the present international situation is one of struggle between capitalism and socialism, in which capitalism is on the downgrade and socialism is on the upgrade. In the first place international capitalism will not permit the establishment in China of a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship... just because it is dying it is all the more dependent on colonies and semi-colonies for survival and will certainly not allow any colony and semi-colony to establish anything like a capitalist society under the dictatorship of its own bourgeoisie...' Then he says why the working class also will not allow the bourgeoisie to set up dictatorship.

Explaining all these things in detail Mao Tse-tung refutes the theory of a Kemalist type of revolution and the possibility of it in China. Then he says, 'Even though a petty Kemalist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie did emerge in Turkey after the First World War and the October Revolution owing to certain specific conditions (the bourgeoisie's success in repelling Greek aggression and the weakness of the proletariat) there can be no second "Turkey" with a population of 450 million after World War II... Did not some members of the Chinese bourgeoisie clamour for Kemalism after the First Great Revolution failed in 1927? But where is the Chinese Kemal? And where are Chinese bourgeois dictatorship and capitalist society?' After decisively rejecting the possibility of a Kemalist type of revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries Mao Tse-tung says what has been quoted by the authors of the paper. Stalin in 1927, also most decisively demolished the theory of the possibility and feasibility of a Kemalist type of revolution in China and other colonial and semi-colonial countries advocated by Zinoviev, Radek and Trotsky. Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung said unequivocally that in the epoch of imperialism and of the proletarian revolution there was no possibility of emergence of an independent bourgeois State and capitalist society in colonial and semi-colonial countries, let alone an imperialist state. We find in the paper an echo of Trotskyism again! The 'Group of Students' tries to justify the theory of an independent bourgeois state and a capitalist society in colonial and semi-colonial countries and calls India a capitalist society and the Indian State a bourgeois dictatorship in flagrant violation of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The authors applying their pet theory of the Kemalist revolution in India say that such revolution did not occur merely in India. The same is the situation in all the countries which emerged politically independent from colonial and semi-colonial bondages in the past two decades and

where the rule of the bourgeoisie is established. They further say that 'all these countries and their developments confirm Mao Tse-tung's theses'. While Mao Tse-tung says that especially after World War II, Kemalists type of independent bourgeois State and capitalist society in colonial and semi-colonial countries is definitely an impossibility, the 'Group of Students' finds confirmation of Mao Tse-tung's theses in these more than 130 new neo-colonial products passing off as independent bourgeois States! According to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought, imperialism makes alliance with domestic reaction to extend its social base of support with a view to continuing its rule in disguise which is neo-colonialism. If there is any confirmation it is this. The 'Group of Students' echoes Khrushchev-Brezhnev but chants the name of Mao Tse-tung.

#### Theory of Imperialist State

The group raises the question of the possibility of independent bourgeois States of colonial countries turning into imperialist States, provided they are strong enough. This question demands attention and refutation because it is no longer an academic question. The erstwhile colonial bourgeoisie, with expansionist desires is attacking neighbouring countries. As a result some confusion is being created in the minds of the people regarding the role of the colonial and semi-colonial bourgeoisie. History provides us with an example. The Tsarist bourgeoisie stood on its feet and threw away its semi-colonial character by taking advantage of the inter-imperialist contradiction and became imperialist. But in today's international context this is not possible. One should be reminded of Lenin's analysis in this regard. He said, 'an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between Great Powers in the striving for hegemony i.e., for the conquest of territory not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary and undermine his hegemony.' The erstwhile colonial bourgeoisie acts as an instrument of a

particular imperialist power to weaken its master's adversary. This is attack and conquest by proxy. This very fact sets the limit to the colonial bourgeoisie's bid to be an imperialist power.

The 'Group of Students', when it leaves the arena of politics and economics and enters that of sociology, tells us that a society is known and determined [by its superstructure! No, I am not joking. 'In any country', they write, the ruling classes exercise political power through the State, dominate over other classes and make a society of their own.' Then by applying a simple rule of three they sum up: as India is ruled by the capitalists, Indian society is a capitalist one and the principal contradiction is between the capitalist and proletariat. As such a socialist revolution would be the logical conclusion, but the authors sensing the pulse most intelligently avoided this point and kept themselves busy in a hypothetical attack on the country by imperialism etc. However, can political domination through the State, which is nothing but a superstructure—though very important and pivotal—simply change the basic structure of society? What is the Marxist-Leninist view on this? In contrast to idealism which sees the main and determining force of society in given social ideas, social consciousness or politics, historical materialism sees the main force determining the character of a social system in the mode of production of material values. The mode of production of material values determines the structure of society, its physiognomy, ideas and institutions. Every society is more or less a mixed society but the social structure of a society is determined by the predominant mode of production. The authors of the paper completely ignoring this materialist interpretation adopted the view of the idealists and determined the Indian social structure not from the basis but from the superstructure.

The 'Group of Students' with a

view to maintaining that India is a capitalist society and at the same time a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, again chanted Mao Tse-tung's name. The paper says, 'Mao himself included the bourgeois State of Turkey after the Kemalists revolution in semi-colonial countries'. It does not stop there but says, 'Even Russian Socialist Society (??) just after the October revolution was described as semi-colonial by him' [Mao Tse-tung] - Either the 'Group of Students' has gone crazy or Mao Tse-tung himself. Firstly, Mao did not call Turkey a bourgeois state, as Turkey at that time practically had neither an industrial proletariat nor an industrial bourgeoisie: Mao called it a 'petty Kemalists dictatorship of the bourgeoisie', meaning that 'Kemalists revolution is a revolution of the top stratum, a revolution of national merchant bourgeoisie'. Secondly, with the establishment of the bourgeois dictatorship, Turkey did not become a semi-colony instantly. It 'more and more, became a semi-colony'. This time and space relation is completely ignored by the 'Group of Students'. That there is a process of becoming a thing and that process covers time and space, which, if not counted, leads us to *Mayabad* is not known to the idealists.

The second argument is more queer than the first. Because Mao Tse-tung in course of explaining the principal aspect of the contradiction cited one example of China and the other example of Russia, the 'Group of Students' takes them to be examples of semi-colony, not of principal aspect of contradictions.

(To be continued)

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# Portrait Of A College

ABIR MULLICK

**T**HERE is no reason why Tata College, Chaibasa, should be in the news. Nor, in fact, do happenings there attract the attention of sub-editors to merit more than a passing mention in some obscure corner of some (obscurantist) newspapers. This is nevertheless unfortunate—for the labour pains of fascism have begun there.

Built in 1953 on a grant made by the Tatas on the outskirts of Chaibasa, the headquarters of Singhbhum Adivasi district, the College was thereafter nurtured on the munificence of the mines magnate, Rungta, who became its secretary till a few years ago when it became a constituent college of Ranchi University. Most of the students are tribals, and most of the teaching staff (quite naturally) non-tribal. The teachers have been used to considering themselves culturally and intellectually so advanced that they have no scruples at all about befooling their pupils, who, in any case, are referred to as "semi-educated monkeys" (incidentally, a term used by Hitler to describe Negroes). The students, who are mostly first generation literates, eke out their college term on measly stipends doled out by the Welfare Department of the Bihar Government. After taking their degrees, these students are placed in a situation where most of them can neither get jobs nor are able to afford higher (post-graduate) education nor revert to the idyllic existence of their forefathers—which, in any case, is fast disappearing under the stresses of the outward "colonial" expansion of mining, forestry and other activities of comprador capitalism. Of the teachers, many left their homes in North Bihar ages ago, glad to get jobs in this area for (what now appear to be) ridiculously low salaries. Having fulfilled their mission in life, they then proceeded to sink into somnambulance, passively fitting themselves into the

exploitative machinery of the non-tribals and, having for many years received their salaries and other advantages from Rungta, 'referring to him as "our inspiration", "our friend, philosopher and guide" etc. (vide "Address presented to Sri Sitaram Rungta on his having received the Bharat Scoutes & Guides Silver Elephant award"). Intellectually, as they continue to talk of the price of cabbages and kings (Mrs Gandhi/Rungta/Kennedy/Khrushchev—not all seen to be aware of the fact that the last two have long departed to happier hunting grounds), and think of the sexual misdeeds of the various caste cliques which run Bihar, they present a scene straight out of the Rottingbrain College of *Shankar's Weekly*.

Recently, the winds of change reached this college too. Within the system itself, a practice of appointing lecturers for limited terms of six months to deal with the increased numbers of students acted as a small stone thrown in the stagnant, putrid existence of the college. Some of these young men, intellectually more alert and definitely more informed than their seniors, managed to make some impact on the students and to establish some—though still negligible—communication between the two "nations": the Adivasis and the non-Adivasis, the students and their teachers. Secondly, the rotting of the educational system in Bihar brought things to such a pass that change *had* to take place.

Outside the system, two factors contributed to this process of change. The first was the "Diku Movement" launched within the last few years. ('Diku' is an Adivasi term signifying "aliens", exploiters, zamindars, moneylenders, shopkeepers etc.). In the beginning the attack was directed only against non-tribal exploiters but later, perhaps under the influence of opportunistic leadership, the field was wid-

ened to include even those who were not directly involved in economic exploitation, the petit bourgeoisie, but who, in any case, definitely contributed to social and cultural injustice. The movement further increased the sense of insecurity in the petit bourgeoisie, the college teachers in this case, and turned them more violently "racial" in their assertion of superiority—one step further towards fascism. Another factor bringing about this process of change was, ironically, the Naxalite movement. Naxal cadres, who correctly saw the potential of a revolutionary upsurge in this area, reached here soon after the break with the CPM and started silently spreading their politics among the peasants and, naturally, their children. While Baharagora, Jaduguda, Chakulia and Jamshepur caught the headlines, the work of ideological diffusion continued till the State machinery, and those who depend upon it for their security—the big businessmen, the moneylenders, and even the non-Adivasi petit bourgeoisie in this area—started being haunted by the spectre of Naxalism. A brutal crackdown was organised by the police, the Bihar Military Police, the Central Reserve Police, Jyoti Basu's Eastern Frontier Rifles, and the army, as a result of which most wholtime cadres from outside the area were either killed, arrested or (temporarily?) driven out. The split in the CPI (ML), involving as it did the adjacent Midnapore region, further confused the picture. The outcome today is that the 'Naxals' have gone, but the term 'Naxalism' remains—as a codeword of hope among the masses and as a curse to the Establishment. The administration, the businessmen, the police and the teachers are still haunted by its spectre. Basically, it is this sense of economic and cultural insecurity which is at the root of their responses to the changing course of events in this area, and, since Tata College is the biggest 'industry' of Chaibasa, in this college.

## Mass Copying

Influenced by the situation in

the other colleges of Bihar where mass copying is the normal feature of examinations, and dissatisfied with the bleak prospects which education provides for them, a section of the students started an agitation last summer demanding the free usage of "unfair means" in the examinations. The bulk of students, who are disgusted with the existing system but who lack direction in expressing their dissent—took up the issue and mass copying was adopted with rare zeal. This was the first act of defiance of authority by the students. During the agitation, a few "Naxal" slogans about the futility of the present educational system appeared on the walls, and the authorities saw red. However, in this instance they were unable to check the tide of mass copying and the elaborate structure of "sound education" which had been maintained in Chaibasa, primarily, it seems, to overawe the illiterate tribals, collapsed like a house of cards.

Mass copying, however, did not satisfy the students and some of them started whispering about "jobs", "Dikis", "Exploitation", etc. at one level and "books", "canteen", "buses" etc. at another. It was this second level of propaganda and action which caught on more rapidly and the result was that in retaliation against the brutal beating up of a student by the employees of Ratanlal Surajmal (one

of the biggest private transport networks in Bihar), the students allegedly burnt a bus. It was whispered in the town that the bus-owner had sworn that either he or the students would remain in Chaibasa. Since, under the present conditions, there was no question of the Seth going out, it was the students who came under attack. The police, having perfected methods of dealing with students and youth in other parts of the country and obviously under orders from above to break the fighting spirit of any section of the population that is potentially rebellious, struck. In early-morning Gestapo-like raids on the college hostels and private lodges, nearly 300 students were picked up and herded into jail. An atmosphere of terror was created in the town which, in the absence of the students, wore a deserted look. Sec. 144 was enforced. Police vans carrying armed constabulary zipped here and there, picking up students and student-looking citizens from the roads. When some teachers, workers, lawyers etc. expressed their sympathy with the imprisoned students, they were threatened that they would be implicated in the case. The whole town was reduced to panic.

After a few days in jail, where they came in contact with many kinds of prisoners, including political ones, the students were released on PR bonds when the administration, under pressure of public opinion, realized the gravity of what it had done. For, never in the knowledge of anyone involved had 300 absolutely innocent people been imprisoned in such a manner. But then, fascism does not work by precedent.

However, what fascism does work by is fraud. And fraud was the next weapon used in Tata College. One consequence of the mass arrests had been the generation of sympathy for the students among the teachers etc—a dangerous trend from the point of view of the authorities who also disliked, among other things, the sense of victory among the students and the feeling of revulsion in the general populace at the brazen fascistic me-

thods used by the Government. In order to cover those very methods with the veneer of "democracy", to teach the students another lesson, and to get the petit bourgeoisie—the teachers—on its side (for without the support of that class it is difficult for fascism to come into the open), another drama was enacted in the college. (The term 'petit bourgeoisie' has been used to denote only the teachers as only by stretching class analysis too far can most students be included within its purview).

While preparations were on in Patna to do away with such outdated things as "autonomy of the universities" etc., with the help of a disgruntled section of students, an 'examination hatao' agitation was launched to again divide the teachers and students. Unfortunately, while it succeeded in that, it exceeded its original purpose. When the mass of the students got involved in the agitation, they changed its very quality, demanding, for the first time, basic changes in the administration of the college, replacing authoritarian dual governance by the Principal and the District Magistrate (who, incidentally, concerns himself with such routine matters of the college as terminal examinations) by a more democratic set-up. The students were not very clear about the implications of what they were asking for but the Establishment readily understood. The Principal, forced to write a letter of resignation and driven out of his office, closed the college sine die. The teachers, scared out of their wits by false apprehension of another 'Diku Movement', pledged their support to the Principal and that very body, the Staff Association, which, less than a month ago had been scared by the government into giving up its proposed strike on the issues of retrenchment of temporary lecturers, non-payment of DA and house rent allowance etc., went on strike against its own students. The District Magistrate, Superintendent of Police and Sub-Divisional Officer etc., glad to get another opportunity to wreak vengeance on the students for their im-

মানুষের হাসি-কান্না সুখ-দুঃখ স্নেহ-শ্রমে  
ভালোবাসা আর সংগ্রামকে উপজীব্য করে  
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কলিকাতা

puddence against Seths Ratanlal Surajmall & Co., posted police on the campus, in spite of an assurance given only a fortnight earlier that such a step would not be taken unless very grave incidents of arson etc. warranted it. The result was panic again. The hostels were cleared. Examinations were cancelled. Examinees were forced out on to the streets to spend the nights under trees, while policemen relaxed in the college hostels. The University, sitting in majestic isolation in the cool atmosphere of Ranchi, was approached. After several appeals it sent a body of university professors "to investigate". Meanwhile, MLAs of various hues had started involving themselves in the affair. (In the fitness of things, one of the university professors sent for investigation is also an MLA belonging to the Bhumi-har group in Mrs Gandhi's Congress). There was complete turmoil. A suggestion was made to write to the Chief Minister and the PM.

While these frantic exercises were going on, the blow came from above. On the grounds of removing the rampant corruption in the universities, the Bihar Government, in its wisdom, decided to "take over" (nationalise?) the universities. Commissioners belonging to the IAS were appointed vice-chancellors, and magistrates, also of the IAS, registrars. Having thus, once and for all, buried the myth of university autonomy etc., and leaving the learned gentlemen of the bureaucracy to squabble among themselves as to whether they would call each other "Mr Registrar" or "Mr Special Officer on duty", the State Government applied itself to more important and interesting tasks, like using homeopathic students as scapegoats in brutally shooting down prisoners in Bhagalpur 'Special' Central Jail.

So, the police are on the campus, and all is quiet on the Tata College front. With an IAS Vice-Chancellor and an IAS Registrar, what remains is the appointment of a Sub-Inspector of Police as the Principal and constables as teachers of the college of which, in any case, they are the sole occupants at present.

JUNE 3, 1972

## St. Peter's Pieta

RANJAN K. BANERJEE

ST. Peter's *Pieta* which recently fell victim to a maniac's hammer was executed in 1497 when Michelangelo was twentytwo years old. The *Pieta* is not one of his best, nor is it one of his representative pieces. His own denunciation of it in later years led him to recast the Christ-Mary theme in the somewhat quizzical style of the Ronadanini *pieta* which he either could not finish or deliberately left incomplete. The Ronadanini *pieta* is a complete denial of the earlier *pieta*. The difference between them is one of temperament. The earlier work expresses profound grief as much as the determination to accept the inevitable without repining. The steep of the Virgin's head and the quiescent spread of her left hand have about them a sure suggestion of deep tragedy. The later work, on the contrary, is not an attempt to interpret the Virgin's grief in terms of art. It expresses the artist's own disillusionment and the spiritual turns that tortured his last years. The chisel marks deliberately left on the faces of the Virgin and her son and the Virgin's uncarved breasts are highly personal idioms expressing the artist's complete alienation from his earlier style.

In fact the elegance and restraint that characterize the *pieta* in St. Peter's, manifesting the hold which the classical tradition, as interpreted by the Graeco-Roman sculptors, had upon Michelangelo, were never recaptured in the artist's mature works. What marks the *pieta* off from the rest of his works is the impression of a deep-felt peace that it so unmistakably produces in the beautiful composure of the Virgin's grief-struck contour, in the easy and quiet flow of the drapery, in the resigned attitude of her left hand and in the masterly treatment of the dead Christ, lying limply across the Virgin's knees, as the symbol of sleep, summing up as it were the emotional background to all the lullabies

of the world. Especially the folds of Christ's legs, one foot touching the ground, intensify the impression of tranquillity. One is inevitably reminded of the trouble that Michelangelo's predecessors had with the legs of the dead Christ that so indecorously hung out.

If Michelangelo came to scale greater heights in his later works it was not the Michelangelo of the earlier *pieta*, but altogether a different artist who had been steadily emerging since his celebrated *David*, carved out of a wasted block of stone in 1501, symbolizing the new Florentine republic defying its enemies. From *David* to the *Moses* of his mature years, which was designed for the tomb of Julius II, is one unbroken line of development that seems to have reached its acme in the complete rejection of the *pieta* style in the execution of the *Slaves* which were also designed to form part of the monument to Julius II. The obvious contrast between the restrained expression of grief in the *pieta* which is almost lyrical in its appeal and the moving pathos of the doomed figures of the *Slaves*, furrowed by an endless series of lines, suggests that from suffering

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itself he could no longer wring out any transcendental beauty and that his own experience of life and reality led him in his last years to visualize the universe as a grim and remorseless system that held out no promise and no prospect.

From the *pieta* in St. Peter's to the *Moses* in the monument to Julius II is a journey from beauty to violence. Two facts account for the touch of violence especially in Michelangelo's later works. Firstly, it should be remembered that he was influenced only by the decadence of classical art; had he seen the masterpieces that had since been brought to light, it is possible that his style might have been largely modified. Secondly, the touch of violence especially in his last works may be rightly ascribed to his own personal suffering. In adopting as his theme not beauty but power he was emphatically protesting against the injustice done to him by his contemporaries and particularly against the jealous intrigues of Raphael and Bramante from which resulted all his troubles with Julius II.

The disillusionment and suffering of his last years isolated him. In a letter to Vasari dated June 22, 1555, he wrote: "In every thought that enters my mind death is sculptured". His later works became the language of his lonely and agonized soul. They expressed on the one hand his fury and austerity, on the other his frustrated hope to recapture his spiritual equilibrium. And weary of the struggle that was riveting his soul he once again wrote to Vasari that there was no peace except in the woods.

But at least once in life he had known this peace and expressed it in the marble language of his *pieta*. The damage done to it by a mad man's hammer perhaps lends it a roughness that brings it closer in spirit to Michelangelo's later works. The artist tortured by loneliness and spiritual turmoil in his last years would have probably approved of the *pieta*'s present state.

## Book Review

### MAKERS OF MODERN CHINA

Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China  
Edited by Hsueh Chun-tu  
Oxford University Press, New York, 1971  
Price \$4.95

**T**HIS is a welcome addition to the literature available on modern China in English, despite some reservations I have, about which, later. One welcomes it for it is not too 'specialized' a book, and could be read by even one who is interested in modern China in a rather non-academic way. Much of the most important work on modern China available in English is the product of university research centres, particularly those in the universities of Harvard, Columbia, Berkeley, Seattle and Michigan. While the monographs produced by the various East Asia Study Centres at important American universities—whatever the motivation behind the research—have added immeasurably to some sort of an understanding of modern China, none can say that these specialized monographs can be safely recommended to the common reader who is curious about the developments in modern China, but who shuns esoteric knowledge about his subject. For such a reader, the book under review should be most welcome.

Hsueh's collection consists altogether of twenty articles (which vary greatly in quality), of which—apart from the brief introduction—four deal with the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion, seven with the leaders of the Republican Revolution and eight with the leaders of the Communist Movement. The terms 'Rebellion' 'Revolution' and 'Movement' are the Editor's and it would perhaps be unfair to draw any conclusions from the use of these terms to denote the three phases of modern Chinese history. The four articles on the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion deal with the three important leaders of the movement; Hung

Hsin-ch'uan (1814-64), the leader of the rebellion who is the subject of two articles in this collection; Hung Jen-kan (1822-64), cousin of the former and premier of the rebel administration for five years; and Li Hsiu-ch'eng, a second generation leader of the Taiping revolt and a remarkable military leader in the later phase of the movement. Of the two articles devoted to Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, the one on his mental illness is an interesting attempt at 'a psychiatric interpretation' of the career of Hung. But the very basis of these 'psycho-analytical' approaches to the career of revolutionary leaders seems quite wrong to me, for they seek to interpret immense political and social movements on the basis of the quirks and oddities of individual characters. If I understand the author's interpretation correctly, the whole revolutionary fervour of the Taiping revolt can be understood if only we bear in mind that one of its leaders suffered from acute mental disturbance; and this is supposed to have 'undoubtedly moulded his destiny', and by implication, the destiny of the whole movement of which he was a part. I think it is a peculiarly self-defeating way of looking at a great revolutionary movement from the perspective of individual frustrations or ambitions; whether Hung's illness was schizophrenic or hysterical is far less relevant to an understanding of the Taiping revolt than the objective factors that made the revolt possible. The last of the essays on the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion was especially commissioned for this selection, and it is a very interesting and sympathetic account of the career of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, with whose capture and execution, the Taiping Rebellion was crushed. The account is mainly based on the original testimony of Li, made available for the first time in 1962. The role of Li in the Taiping Rebellion has been recently a matter of controversy (during the Cultural Revolution), but this account of Li's career substantially holds to the view that Li's behaviour after his capture—including the recording of his

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personal disposition—was exactly what a revolutionary's behaviour ought to be, given the circumstances.

The second section of the book consists of seven essays devoted to the study of seven leaders of the Republican Revolution. Of these, only one essay—on Tsou Jung—is written especially for this collection. Actually, to call it an 'essay' on Tsou Jung is a bit of a misnomer, for it consists in the main of Tsou's tract entitled *The Revolutionary Army* which presents his programme of post-revolutionary reconstruction of modern China. The tract is interesting in that it appeared two years before the publication of Sun Yat-sen's own formative ideas on the Three Peoples' Principles. Two other essays in this section of the book deserve to be noted; the one on Sun Yat-sen, which exposes some utterly incredible errors perpetrated by Western writers on Sun's career in their accounts of it; and the very interesting Chinese Communist account of the career of Huang Hsing, the co-founder of the Republic of China, an essay now easily made available in an English translation by the editor.

The largest number of essays (eight) are devoted to the leaders of the Chinese Communist Movement. But the collection, on the whole, is disappointing, even though there are three essays (on Li Ta-chao, Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Chang Kuo-t'ao) which have been written especially for this volume. Of these, by far the best is the account of the career of Li Ta-chao; this is but natural, for it is difficult to write in a dull manner about Li Ta-chao. One eagerly looked forward to reading the essay on Liu Shao-chi; but this account of Liu, reprinted from an early issue of *The China Quarterly* with extensive (post-Cultural Revolutionary) revisions, still does not provide one enough insight into the strange career of Liu. One still waits for an interpretation of the career of a man who, as it were, straddled the whole spectrum of the Chinese Communist Movement. The essay on Chou En-lai is the most disappointing of the lot, for it is really nothing more than

a stringing together of publicly available facts about Chou, with little attempt at interpretation. The extraordinary political resilience of the man cannot be simply explained away as successful opportunism.

#### Scholarship

Reading a selection like this raises some larger questions about the nature and function of Western scholarship (especially American scholarship) on China, questions which I felt I am not even qualified to pose, let alone attempt to answer. Still, one cannot resist the temptation to raise the question of the motivation behind much of the work on China that is being done in the West, mainly in the U.S. The obvious political and material advantages that are derived by the academic and administrative establishments—each often doubling for the other (about which aspect see the very interesting essay "The China Scholars and the U. S. Intelligence" by David Horowitz, *Ramparts*, February, 1972) are too obvious to be noted here. Know thy enemy has always been the motto of all rulers, and no doubt the vast material churned out by the various East Asia Study Centres including the translations of the Peking Telephone Directory which activity too would presumably come under 'Research on China', serve a purpose. But these studies of individual leaders of the Chinese Revolution raise other questions as well. For we have here an attempt—sometimes obvious but more often than not subtle—at seeing the vast social and political changes that constituted the Chinese Revolution, not merely in individual terms, but even seeing them as the results of some real or imagined angularities in the characters of the persons involved. Hung's mental illness is only the most notable of the many 'personal peculiarities' possessed by many of the leaders of modern China, and in our own day, we have had attempts at 'explaining' the Cultural Revolution in terms of one man's desire for personal immortality, if not worse. It should be noted that rarely are at-

tempts made to read Western history in such personal terms, though schizophrenia and madness and other signs of mental disorder are not lacking among even well-known leaders of the Western world. But somehow, it is seen as a peculiarity of the East or the underdeveloped world, wherein history itself is seen as the doing essentially of individuals, with the masses blindly and patiently acquiescing in what the leaders did. For example, much of the wisdom of Western political scientists is spent on investigating the influence of caste on Indian politics; what is important is not whether caste plays so significant a role in political behaviour as the fact that it is seen to be the determining factor to the exclusion of other, more important, forces. But to acknowledge the presence of 'non-behaviouristic' forces in determining political choice on the part of a people is to acknowledge the possibility that the masses are intelligent, an acknowledgement which would undermine the whole basis of the cooperation that exists between the ruling elites in the poorer societies, and their political masters in the West. It is a pity that such a useful collection of essays on some of the leading figures of modern China is yet marred by an overall attitude towards political developments in modern China, an attitude which seems to be tainted by the totally discredited concept of behaviourism.

M. S. PRABHAKAR

#### Fil Haal\* : May Day Issue

SINCE the middle of the fifties May Day, the Red Letter day of the first historic victory of the U.S. working class and for that matter of the toilers of the whole world, has become almost a routine affair in our country marked by public meetings devoid of any militancy, special

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issues of left journals and papers with stereotyped subjective articles. The leaders of the world's first proletarian State no longer consider it necessary to demonstrate its defensive might on this historic occasion of victory, proving thereby from the point of view of content that theirs is no longer a working class State.

*Fil Haal's* May Day issue, as an exception, is vigorous, militant and refreshing. The article on the importance of May Day in India could not be more timely and it has aptly put the subject on an *Indian* basis specifically. Among other items highly relevant to India at the present moment, Economic Struggle And Economism, hits at pure trade unionism; Who doesn't have family? Whose Motherland it is not? show the eternal truth that the proletariat has no motherland and thus negate rampant chauvinism. Beginning the issue with a readers' view is pleasantly out of the ordinary. Three items on Vietnam where a new glorious historical chapter is being written lend proper weight to the subject.

T.C.

## Clippings

### No Mercy

...Sitting back with soft music in the Intercontinental Hotel and the Dacca Club, the average Bengali repeats the official cliches in the Government-controlled press and waves the helpless non-Bengali community aside as "miscreants, collaborators and thugs". There is no compassion, no mercy and no comprehension of the word humanitarianism.

...A visit to the overcrowded non-Bengali area on the outskirts of Dacca would prove to them that most of these "miscreants and thugs" are terrified women, starving children, the homeless, the aged and weeping widows whose husbands have been slaughtered by fanatical Bengali nationalists.

Non-Bengalis are pulled out of

their homes almost every day, in most cases in front of the police. They simply disappear. The police remain indifferent to requests for assistance.

The facts have been suppressed until now, but I can reveal that an estimated 200 to 300 Biharis were slaughtered by mobs of Bengalis two weeks ago on the outskirts of Dacca when busloads of relatives of prisoners returned to Mirpur camp.

...An eyewitness of the slaughter, a weeping 15-year-old girl...explained that the Bangladesh Rifles had entered the camp in February this year. They instructed the male and female inmates to assemble in different fields.

"My brother and thousands of other young men were arrested and taken away. In the middle of April my father took me by bus with many other people to visit our relatives in jail. When we returned by bus the police at the entrance of the camp demanded a permit and would not let us pass.

"Just then, I saw some women from the bus being dragged away by some Bengalis. I screamed to my father to run but we were surrounded.

"The police just turned away. I pleaded with the Bengalis and offered them 200 rupees and my watch but they laughed and took the money. One man said: 'We are going to kill you Biharis.' They dragged us across the road into a ditch.

"I saw them take my father a few yards away and they cut his throat with a large knife. Two men were doing the killings while the others were laughing and holding other people. The killings went on for several hours but they eventually let me go", the weeping girl said.

Other inmates of the camp said that the killings on April 18 started after the Bengali press had given wide publicity to the discovery of a pit of skeletons near the camp.

A Bihari clerk claimed bitterly that the bones belonged to people from his community. "In a few days the bones of the latest victims will be found and they will be called Bengalis and the killings will continue."

Another witness to the slaughter, a 50-year-old weaver from Mirpur, said he saw mobs of hundreds of Bengalis roaming through the camp. "They had long knives and dragged everyone they could find, including women and children, to a ditch out of sight. I don't know what happened to them but they have never come back."

...Another woman from the Mura-para camp, 23 miles away said the Bengalis were cutting through the wire and kidnapping women. The girls were usually raped and never reappeared, she said. Police protection was inadequate and officers were usually indifferent to the appeals of the women.

There is no sign of a police presence at Mohammadpur either. At the insistence of militant chauvinists in the Government, the International Red Cross has been forced to hand over supervision of the camps and the distribution of food to the Biharis to Bengali nationalists belonging to the Bangladesh Red Cross.

But the Bangladesh Red Cross is completely indifferent to its task.

...Most non-Bengalis have been unemployed since December and they are now selling the last of their clothes and belongings to remain alive. They are simply too terrified to leave the camp. Previously they needed permits to leave and enter the ghettos, but now they have been told that they can leave the area but cannot return.

Food supplies are inadequate: two ounces of cornflower per person per day. Foreign observers have also discovered that food supplies have been pilfered and tampered with since the Bangladesh Red Cross insisted on handling the distribution of foreign assistance to the non-Bengalis.

There are some pitiful sights in the camps. Mr Paul Connett, a member of the mission led by Mr David Ennals, discovered hungry people eating grass in the Mohammadpur camp.

A weeping woman explains that she is 80 and alone in the world. Her two sons were slaughtered by Bengali mobs and she was evicted from her

house. A boy, of 12, Ishan, is attempting to fend for his sister, aged 10. Their entire family was slaughtered by Bengali mobs in the district of Mymensingh in March last year.

Heads of families show me their dismissal notices. "What is to become of us? Pakistan will not have us, India will not have us and we will either be liquidated or starved to death here", a young accountant said.

Ultimately, the blame for the deteriorating plight of the non-Bengali community must be squarely on the shoulders of the Prime Minister, Shaikh Mujibur Rahman. Apart from his initial plea for harmony the Shaikh has refused to take a firm stand on the question of their security.

Apparently he does not have the courage to oppose the narrow chauvinists and the bigoted student leaders who surround him. Essentially, the Shaikh has found it easier to ignore the question and to swim with the tide of hatred and unreasoned emotions.

And as time passes it would seem that his public utterances are becoming more irresponsible and prone to further inflame public feeling against the minority community. For instance, in response to the British mission's appeal for tolerance, the Shaikh has made a public statement which can only aggravate the issue.

Speaking to trade unionists over the weekend the Shaikh reverted to pure demagoguery and called on his people to launch a movement against the "collaborators who are conspiring with foreign collaborators to undermine the freedom of Bangladesh."

Under the circumstances the average Bengali would accept this as open licence to hunt down the non-Bengalis. (Peter Hazelhurst in *The Times*, London, May 8, 1972).

For FRONTIER contact

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Statesman Office

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JUNE 3, 1972

## Letters

### Indian Bourgeoisie

In an attempt to establish feudalism as the principal contradiction (between feudal exploitation and the common peasantry) Mr Bandyopadhyay (April 1, 1972) has landed himself into several contradictions.

(i) It is not clear why the top peasantry "tries to extract more concessions" from the bourgeoisie when the class is at its "mercy".

(ii) The adverse terms of trade of the bourgeoisie are only a recent phenomenon. Till yesterday (1963-64) "farm prices have been systematically kept down, since 1960, by the release of not less than 3½ million tons of imported food grains... each year by the government for consumption—even in 1960-61 and 1961-62 when bumper harvests resulted in peak levels of production." (Lipton, para 33 in *Crisis in Indian Planning*.)

(iii) The principal contradiction suggested is tenable only when it is proved that foreign capital is at the mercy of the top peasantry. How fine does it sound? To quote, "Commodity imports into India tend to be highly priced." Imports were made at such prices by the foreign companies and their associates and the Government is weak about the suppliers abroad. "Together they form nearly one half of the terms of trade equation which moved steadily against India during the first two Plans." (Kidron, *Foreign Investment in India*, pp. 312).

In specific terms we pointed the weakness of the bourgeoisie; it is true that it gives concessions to the peasantry—credits, co-operatives, local self-government etc. Terms of trade are only one of them, but not one so important as to infer the principal contradiction from it. Under certain conditions the wages of workers may be increased at a rate higher than that of commodity prices. Do we have to declare, since the terms are in favour of the workers against the bourgeoisie, that the bourgeoisie is at the "mercy" of the working class

and the working class has assumed real power?

There is scope for confusion in the article. Does Mr Bandyopadhyay conclude total dependence of the bourgeoisie on the peasantry because of votes? Real power does not rest on the vote and elections are nothing more than mere shows. Power needs legitimacy. That is why the franchise, the free press, and the 'national governments' of puppets like Diem are formed. If found unsuitable these are thrown away, and there occurs bureaucratic rule instead of parliamentary rule and, finally, a take-over by the army. It is the army, therefore, that is the source of the 'real power', and who controls the army also decides what is to be allowed and what not.

With this prerequisite—control of the army—the ruling class influences other institutions to serve its interests. Any other force willing to take over also aims at this technique. Here lies the basis of the neo-colonial form of exploitation. It was an army under U.S. control in Cambodia which took care of the interests of U.S. capital there.

The control of the army in South Vietnam was secured, as is well known, through thousands of U.S. advisers, military experts along with the reorganisation of the army and police and other assisting agencies. But the direct U.S. aggression or the physical presence of the U.S. army in the war did not take place at the very initial stage. Against the popular upsurge the local reactionaries in Vietnam, even though aided by the imperialists, were gradually diminishing in strength, and consequently seeking an increasing volume of assistance from the imperialists. In due course the assistance surpassed the original, and in 1965 came the downright aggression by the USA.

Mr Bandyopadhyay asks, "It there any physical presence of a foreign army in India?" Such presence is not needed at this moment since the local reactionaries are strong enough to resist the sort of limited revolu-

tionary struggles fought here and there; the presence is a certainty in the future as the popular upsurge mounts. The capitulating nature of the Indian reactionaries as well as the present all-round orientation of the imperialists to assume control over the Indian army are sure enough pointers.

In our thesis we clearly distinguished two situations of foreign intervention—one of direct expansionist war, another through resistance against popular upsurge. Since no third imperialist power challenging the USA or USSR has yet come up, the possibility of the first is less. In the present state the interests of the imperialists may be retained through milder means like influence on the bureaucrats or the ministers (A.P.M. in *Frontier*, April 1, 1972).

No systematic information about the potentiality of the Indian counterparts of the advisers in the Vietnamese army is yet available but we can mention some points.

(i) In 1946, testifying before the Armed Forces Nationalization Committee most of the Indian officials expressed views which were unpatriotic even according to General Kaul (*The Untold Story*, pp. 82).

(ii) C. Rajagopalachari in his anti-communism brought out the implications of the training programmes of Indians by Soviet pilots and flying over strategic border areas. (*The Hindu*, April 3, 1961).

(iii) Sir Garfield Barwich, the Minister for External Affairs, Australia, announced (April 20, 1963) that an exchange of military experts had been arranged on a continuing basis between India and Australia. (*Dawn*, Karachi, April 28, 1963).

(iv) During the recent white terror period the Calcutta Police was reorganized by foreign experts, according to some reports.

The slit in a ship becomes a hole during a thrust and ultimately the ship sinks. The loopholes in the army and the ruling class made the way for huge foreign penetrations during the thrusts of the 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars. They are now wait-

ing for the collapse and final takeover by imperialists against the rising popular upsurge. If one tries to indicate the position of only one country—Soviet Russia one finds:

(i) A major share of control of the Indian Air Force is with the USSR.

(ii) Similar is its control in the Indian Navy. Soviet experts are placed in many a responsible position.

(iii) The task of modernizing the Indian Army has been taken up by the USSR. Certainly there is a huge number of advisers in different capacities in the army to check upon anything going against Soviet interests.

(iv) In recent years the visits of high army officials from Russia have become frequent.

Coming to the USA Mr Bandyopadhyay says, "After the debacle of the American policy in Indochina American imperialism does not want to be involved physically in an effort to suppress revolutionary upsurges in other countries. It would carry on the milder means of oppression and maintain apparent neutrality." Imagine this situation—the revolutionary tide grows, Indian reactionaries fail, India is becoming liberated, U.S. capital is losing a huge market—yet with a huge resisting capacity the U.S. imperialists are busy sucking lollipop, not thinking of anything but mild means of oppression. In India, at present, milder means suffice to retain imperialist interests. In Vietnam this is obsolete and hence direct intervention. When the revolutionary tide grows in India the present milder forms will be rejected.

A GROUP OF STUDENTS

### A Bank Strike

The 73-day-old agitation and 63-day-old strike in Andhra Bank was called off on May 11, following the signing of a draft termed as Labour Minister's advice, prepared by the management of the Andhra Bank Ltd. and the Andhra Bank Employees Association.

The issue whether the union, claiming to be an all-cadre union where membership of the majority of the employees belonged to the officer cadre of the Bank, has the right to represent, negotiate and settle with the management the grievances and demands pertaining to its membership belonging to the officer cadre has been referred to the Central Labour Minister, R. K. Khadilkar.

The revisionism which was always present in the leadership of bank employees and worked on economism, went down the wretched path, repressed the movement of the bank employees and paved the way for organized class co-operation. The leadership has submitted to the Labour Minister; his decision will be binding.

And it has called this 'victory', 'biggest achievement' and 'significant victory'!

JYOTI BANERJEE  
Calcutta

### Kashmir

Mr Ashok Rudra in his article "Bangladesh and Kashmir" (May 20 1972) says that "...no Indian protested—no political party, no individual, no intellectual—at this assumption by India of the role of international police." But the fact is that a few Indians, individuals, intellectuals and at least one political party did protest at the moment it happened. Had Mr Rudra gone through the pages of *Frontier* again or *Purba Taranga* and *Anik*, he would have found it. To mention the name of a single political party, it is the CPI-(ML); of course if Mr Rudra recognises it as a political party.

SUCHIBRATA SEN  
Benuria, Birbhum

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Business Manager  
Frontier

JUNE 3, 1972

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