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The British Game-Plan

Who Partitioned India?

Osman Sher

In 1947 the British were the strongest link in the chain of three contenders of power; they had 100% authority as the owner of the Government and armed forces. In fact, it was the British Parliament that had ultimately partitioned the country. The Hindus, comprising three quarters of the population, were the strongest voice to decide the fate of the country while the Muslim population of India was merely a quarter, hence the weakest link. A demand for separation is made when the minority community is oppressed by the majority. In this case, the majority had not yet been in power and they never had the occasion to brutalise the minority. Therefore, the Muslims had not been put in such a disparate situation as to make a serious demand for the division of the motherland. It was a hollow slogan. The break-up of a country is an extreme measure and the people who wanted it, and those who did not, both had to plunge in blood-baths to achieve their respective objectives. In this case all the concerned parties agreed to the division of the country without undergoing the necessary trauma. Therefore, in the scenario described above, does it not appear strange that the smallest “pistol” (in the words of Jinnah) had won the battle despite the common belief that the Hindus and the British were against it? In fact, had any of the three parties resisted the division of the country, the Partition would never have happened. So, it seemed all were complicit. Britain divided India to be able to keep a hold as a strategic part in the North i.e. Pakistan. It was important for it in its larger game of keeping Russia/ Soviet Union off Pakistan militarily from the beginning.

In their struggle for Pakistan, the Muslims had acted as if they were in the intoxication of being the ex-rulers of India and were not ready to play second fiddle, without realising that the days of kingship and colonialism were gone and democracy had dawned in the world as a means of governance. However, despite the Pakistan Resolution of 1940 (repeat RESOLUTION), the Muslim League’s continued negotiations for more rights and privileges in a united India, and the subsequent acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan clearly demonstrate that they had no conviction for Pakistan, and wished India to remain united. Jinnah had earlier presented himself as a great nationalist, earning the appellation of “Ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity”. When the Muslim League had invited Muhammad Ali Jinnah to join them, he did so in 1913 without giving up his membership of the Congress. He joined the Muslim League with a “solemn preliminary covenant that loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way and no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause (Indian nationalism), to which his life was dedicated.” (Mrs Sarojini Naidu, MuhammadAliJinnah: An AmbassadorofUnity, See V H Hudson: TheGreatDivide, Chapter2) Later, however disgruntled with the policies of the Congress, especially, M. K. Gandhi’s mixing of religion in politics, he turned an advocate of Muslim interests. However, in the process of extracting more concessions for the Muslims, the project Pakistan materialised when he did not expect it to actually happen. He had, perforce, to accept what had been thrust upon him: a “a maimed, mutilated, and moth-eaten” Pakistan.

During the internecine fighting in which the Indians had been put by the British rulers, the attitude of the Hindus, even of as liberal and enlightened a person as Jawaharlal Nehru, seemed to be under the exhilaration of conquerors who had before them the sight of wresting their land back after centuries of subjugation and now it was their turn to have full freedom of action, conceding little to others. This sentiment is reflected in his own words. Michael Brecher writes in Nehru, A Political Biography, “Flushed with success (in 1937 Provincial elections) the Congress adopted an imperious attitude to all other political parties, a ‘Himalayan blunder’, for which it was to pay dearly in the years to come. Nehru himself set the tone with his haughty remark in March 1937: ‘There are only two forces in India today, British imperialism, and Indian nationalism as represented by Congress’. Jinnah was quick to retort: ‘No, there is a third party, the Mussulmans’. History was to bear him out.” Further, while rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan in the press conference in Bombay on 10 July 1946 he had said that the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly “completely unfettered by agreement and free to meet all situations as they arose”. This rejection of the Plan, the last chance to have India undivided, has been described by AbulKalam Azad in his book, India Wins Freedom, as “one of those unfortunate events which change the course of history.” Again, insisting the Congress for the last time not to accept the Partition Plan of 1947, AbulKalam Azad had observed: “The verdict would then be that India was divided as much by the Muslim League as by the Congress”.

On March 24, 1947, Lord Mountbatten was appointed as Viceroy with instructions from the Prime Minister Atlee to announce the British intention to leave India in June 1948 and to make the Indian politicians agree on a united India. The Viceroy was directed to report back to the Prime Minister by October 1947. Despite such an instruction, within a span of 5 weeks of his arrival, Mountbatten prepared the Partition Plan and sent it to London, which was discussed by the India Committee of Cabinet in the first week of May, 1947. After discussion, it was approved by the Cabinet and India’s freedom was announced by the All India Radio on June 2, 1947, jointly by Mountbatten, Nehru and Jinnah. The Bill for Indian Independence was introduced in the House of Commons on July 4, and was passed on July 15. The House of Lords passed it on July 16, and the Bill received the Royal assent by a Royal Commission sitting in the House of Lords on July 18, 1947.

The British policy of “divide and rule” had served its purpose well. They were now leaving of their own because they had reached their strength’s end to hold on to India. They did not even wait for their original date of June 1948 despite the fact that such haste did not give the administration sufficient time for adequate preparation to cope with the subsequent large-scale massacre in Punjab despite the repeated warnings given by the Governor. Here the question arises: why the British broke India and that too helter-skelter? Whatever reason one may advance, but it was an irresponsible behavior on both accounts. The answer may be, firstly, that in June 1948 the British Government would have been fully occupied with another colony, Palestine, as reflected in the concern of the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. While discussing the Partition Plan of India he put the condition that he would agree to it provided the British Government took “our lads” (British soldiers) out of Palestine (William Fracis Hare, Foreign Secretary for India, Memoirs of the Earl of Listowel, Chapter 9). Probably, Bevin intended to facilitate the unilateral declaration of independence by the Jews for Israel in May 1948. Secondly, the British knew about Jinnah’s medical condition and that he might die by June 1948 (he actually died in September 1948) of acute tuberculosis without whom the idea of Pakistan would fizzle out.

Anyway, Mountbatten was rewarded with the position of the first Governor-General of India and the British got a pre-arranged justification for the creation of Israel on religious grounds.

 14-08-2024

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Vol 57, No. 10, Sep 1 - 7, 2024