The ‘Bread And Butter’ Issue Matters
A Delayed Post-Mortem Report
Manas Bakshi
Modiji’s third term as
the prime minister of India
is marked by the political compulsion or imperative of a coalition government. It reminds one of the significant mandate of majority in 2014 when maximum governance with minimum number of ministers could be expected. But now the situation is different. The newly formed NDA government has (as on June 9, 2024) a record high of 72 ministers compared with 45 in 2014 and 57 in 2019. While the NDA government at present has got to fulfil the motto of ‘the coalition culture ‘ so as to prove ‘ his sceptics wrong ‘, how Modiji tackles the two key players this time–the TDP with 16 MPs and the Janata Dal United with 12 MPs—is also a factor to reckon with.
Now, to look into the reasons for BJP’s not-so-comfortable performance in the 2024 Lok Sabha polls requires an autopsy of certain aspects which were socio-politically as also economically relevant. The Lok Sabha polls results have evidently underlined the significance of bread and butter while dealing a blow to the hubris–laden slogans like ‘Aab ki bar, charso par’. Such high sounding slogan bore fruit in 2019 but not in 2024. There were some veritable factors behind the rise in the number of BJP’s MPs from 282 in 2014 to 303 in 2019 as against the unexpected decline to 240 in 2024.
In the all India context, the decision of I.N.D.I.A alliance was reportedly to focus on three major areas: first, a one to one fight on the basis of local or regional political strength; secondly, joint campaigning to prove ‘unity is strength’ wherever it was possible and thirdly, removal of all sorts of grudge and grievances persisting at the local level to fulfil a greater cause. Evidently, there was a thaw in the spirit of the opposition. Which is why even the groggy opposition got resurrected from the rubble.
On the other hand, BJP was confronted with several constraints. It could no more bank on the Pulwama issue as it could in 2019 when it was of relevance as a sensitive issue. It was not that in 2024. Not only that, between 2019 and 2021, the passing of two bills–The Citizenship (Amendment) Act and National Register of Citizens seemed to have cast an unfavourable effect on the mindset of a section of ordinary men scared of being ousted from their homeland if these were implemented. Hammering on these issues by some political parties adept in taking advantage of the imbroglio was what allegedly added fuel to the flame of desperation against BJP. Next, the Hindutva wave which had long ebbed away; but creating a fear psychosis over the issue continued—whatever the extent. Even the zeal around Ram temple had lost its sheen as proved by BJP’s defeat in Ajodhya where the temple has been built. But regarding this defeat, something needs further clarification.
UP which seemed to be a stronghold of BJP even in 2019 with 62 seats when Yogi Adityanath had a backing of favourable results from Muslim dominated areas largely turned its face away from BJP in 2024 allowing it to bag only 33. The initial fuss over Ram temple apart, anti-incumbency factor also cast an impact. Though there was no untoward incident in and around Ajodhya over the Ram temple issue, BJP could not win over the mindset of majority people suffering from lack of employment, price hike, threat of privatisation and disinvestment. Reportedly also, BJP has failed to make an edge over the Thakur, Kurmi and SC votes in 2024. And, defying the allegation of Congress against BJP of ‘using religion to polarise the electorate’, Modiji’s message on Hindu cultural revivalism revolving around a social sentiment on Ram temple issue also failed to pay electoral dividends.
Here, it merits mention that as far as the Ram temple issue was concerned, joining its inaugural function on January 22, 2024 was not conveniently acceptable to either of the parties–Congress, TMC or CPM; because, to consider Ram as a nationally acclaimed spiritual hero was not only to mean a tacit acceptance of BJP line of politics but also, at the same time, would tantamount to admitting the politically abrasive allegation of some sort of setting. However, indirectly it would mean coming close to BJP at the cost of minority vote bank. But it did not happen like that. Instead, the anti- fascist rally was organised on 18.1.24 at the call given by both TMC and CPM which displayed a positive impact.
Now, while looking into Bengal politics, one can take up some crucial aspects. Before coming to power in 1977, Congress was the arch enemy of CPM in particular and other Left parties in the Front in general. The slogan raised then was not to bring back ‘the black days of the seventies’. But being in power for nearly thirty four years, the Left Front allegedly gave way to some blots. Besides the flourish of the real estate business, exploitation of political power for fertile land acquisition for the Nano car project was allegedly liable for its debacle in 2011 assembly election. TMC which was formed in 1998 as a break- away force from Congress got thumping majority in 2011 when Singur and Nandigram issues paid rich dividends. Notably, in 1998, TMC sided with BJP, so also in 2004. In 2011, it joined hands with the Congress.
Side by side, in West Bengal in 2016, there were seat arrangements between Congress and CPM to fight together against TMC. Again in 2021, the alliance was between CPM, Congress and ISF but nothing congealed except Naushad Siddiqui of ISF marking a debut. Though ISF found in Naushad Siddiqui the only opposition in the West Bengal assembly, there was no sign of hope for either Congress or CPM at that time. But, in the backdrop of the unnatural death of Anish Khan together with the grisly Bogtui incident, the fielding of Byron Biswas afterwards as a Congress candidate backed by the Left from Sagardighi constituency and his victory from the area empowered with over 60 percent minority vote was expected to create a dent in the TMC’s share in the hitherto monopolised minority vote bank. Not only that, some sort of oxygen that invigorated the Congress and caused switchover of a section from some other parties to Congress–specially in Malda and Murshidabad districts–was remarkable. But strangely, Byron Biswas who won the election on 2.3.23 joined TMC on 29.5.23. What seemed–to some political thinkers–to bloom into ‘Sagardighi model’ turned out to be a damp squib.
It is against this perspective that the Lok Sabha polls results may be analysed. TMC’s victory was ensured by several factors. It is believed that dole politics played a pivotal role in appeasing a section of the people with some temporary benefits. It involved not only implementation of schemes–from Kanyasri to Lakshmir Bhander–but also the promise to increase its amount. BJP, in contrast, was not lagging behind in this respect–it too promised likewise. But one bird in hand is always preferable to two in the bush. And the success of some of the schemes launched by TMC apart, campaigning on the issue of deprivation of dues relating to 100 days’ works and the threat of CAA seemed to brush aside most of the allegations of corruption and appeasement against it.
BJP, on the other hand, was still to spread its network needed to cope with a formidable force like TMC. While TMC had a support base of over 30 percent minority vote, BJP relying only on a portion of a little over 65 percent faced the natural consequence. Secondly, the alleged groupism in some places, lack of regular contact and coordination at booth level bore no healthy sign. Thirdly, change of a candidate from his erstwhile constituency without explaining a tenable reason failed to catch up with what was there in the mind of the electorate. Last but not the least, though in the Lok Sabha polls 1998, Muktar Abbas Naqvi won the Rampur seat and Syed Shahnawaz Hussain won the Kishanganj seat–both on BJP ticket, not even a single Muslim candidate from the minority dominated areas in West Bengal in the Lok Sabha polls 2024 allegedly cast an adverse effect.
Undoubtedly, the alliance between Congress and CPM in 2024 was also not fruitful. Rather, the percentage of vote in favour of CPM has plummeted–so also in case of Congress. More alarmingly, while CPM drew a blank out of 23 seats contested by it alone, only two of the contestants–Md Salim and Mr Sujan Chakrabarty–though defeated, could save their security deposit. Now the question is why CPM’s efforts ended in a fiasco despite ample dependence on road show, meetings addressed by some heavy-weight leaders and social media coverage? It is perhaps because while as a sequel to the Loksabha polls 2019, TMC had the strength of 22 MPs, BJP had 18 and CPM none from West Bengal, people apparently preferred to vote for either TMC or BJP. But BJP’s 18 seats from West Bengal in 2019 have been slashed to 12 in 2024. It all bears an indication to the fact that if there be any significant contest at the time of 2026 Assembly election, it will be mainly between TMC and BJP. TMC is supposed to have a command over nearly 80 percent in the minority vote bank representing more than 30 percent of the total count. Of the rest nearly70 per cent, unless BJP can ensure over 45 percent vote, the possibility of which seems remote at the moment, it will be next to impossible for BJP to make a headway.
[Dr Manas Bakshi, author of From Feudalism To Capitalism and Land Reforms In Left Regime is recipient of Naji Naaman Award 2024 from Lebanon for his creative literary works.]
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Vol 57, No. 15 - 18, Oct 5 - Nov 2, 2024 |