An Assessment of a Revolutionary Activist—II

Amit Bhattacharya

One of the most revealing portions of the book is where the author dwells on Gandhi’s own philosophical justification of violence. It is here that the so-called ‘apostle of non-violence’ entered the stage as the apostle of violence, defending the use of violence not only in practice but also in theory. This philosophical justification of violence has never been mentioned in the vast literature on Gandhi either by conventional historians of ‘right’ or ‘left’ varieties and the Congress. It was in 1918 when Gandhi was serving as a recruiting agent in defence of the British Empire that he came out as a champion of violence. Let us quote extensively from the book as these are quite illuminating.

“Replying to C. F. Andrews who had doubts about his role as a recruiting sergeant, the mahatma wrote:

“You cannot teach ahimsa to a man who cannot kill. You cannot make a dumb man appreciate the beauty and merit of silence. Although I know that silence is most excellent, I do not hesitate to take means that would enable the dumb man to regain his speech” (CWG, XIX, p.444, cited in Ghosh, p.134).

“Interestingly, Andrews argued: “I cannot see the analogy of the dumb man in your letter. It seems dangerously near the argument that the Indian who has forgotten altogether the blood-lust might be encouraged to learn it again first and then to repudiate it afterward of his own account” (Ibid, 444, footnote 3, cited in ibid, 134-35).

“While recruiting in a village in Kheda, Gandhi said at a meeting: ‘The ability to use physical force is necessary for a true appreciation of satyagraha. He alone can practise ahimsa who knows how to kill. i.e. knows what himsa is” (Ibid, 454, cited in Ghosh, ibid.p.135).

“Again, he said: ‘To him who wants to learn the art of fighting, who would know how to kill, I would even teach the use of force… He who does not know how to lay down his life without killing others may learn how to die killing’ (Ibid, p.469, cited in Ghosh, p.135).

“In a letter of 31 July 1918 to Ada West, Gandhi, referring to his recruiting campaign, wrote: ‘The ancients in India knew the art of warfare—the art of killing—and yet reduced the activity to a minimum… Today I feel that everybody is desirous of killing[sic!], but most are afraid of doing so or powerless to do so. Whatever is to be the result I feel certain that the power must be restored to India. The result may be carnage. Then India must go through it’ (Ibid, p.520, cited in ibid, p.135).

“Hailing the Montague-Chelmsford Report of 1918 in a letter of 10 July to V. S. Srinivas Sastri, Gandhi asserted: “The gateway to our freedom is situated on the French soil. No victory worth the name has yet been won without the shedding of blood” (Ibid, p.489, cited in Ghosh, p.135).

While denouncing the use of force against the British Raj, Gandhi always claimed that violence was incompatible with India’s past history and culture. That was one of the stock arguments he used to condemn the revolutionaries. However, writing to C.F. Andrews on 6 July 1918, Gandhi asserted that such a view was wrong and argued that the Mahabharata, Tulsidas’s Ramayana, Manu and Sankaracharyya extolled violence. He also referred to the ‘Mahomedan’ and ‘English’ periods of Indian history to drive home his thesis that the Indian people had never repudiated violence or ‘blood lust’ (Ibid, pp.474-5, cited in Ghosh, p.135).

In another letter to Andrews, dated 29 July 1918, Gandhi wrote: “War will be always with us. There seems to be no possibility of the whole human nature becoming transformed… there is real ahimsa in defending my wife and children even at the risk of striking down the wrong-doer” (Ibid, p.509, cited in Ghosh, ibid, p.136).

If that was the realization of Gandhi, if one has first to know the art of violence before practising non-violence, if one can practice real non-violence by striking down the wrong-doer to defend one’s wife and children, as Gandhi himself stated, then why did he pour out endless homilies that no hand should be raised against the imperialist powers who had brought hunger, deprivation, and ruin for millions of our countrymen? Is there thus any way of denying the fact that the creed of non-violence was designed to deprive the oppressed of the weapon the oppressors freely used?

It thus seems to be clear that according to the needs of the hour, the apostle of non-violence could change into an apostle of violence—as Ghosh asserts, “in theory as well as in practice” (Ghosh, ibid, p.136).

What is worth noting is that, while preaching the virtues of violence, the mahatma saw to it that it was never directed against the British raj, but against its enemies for, to him, India’s salvation lay in standing by the side of the raj.

Ghosh argues strongly that what Gandhi aimed at accomplishing and succeeded to some extent in doing by his experiments with non-violence was the emasculation of the anti-imperialist militancy of the people and the spread of confusion among them. These, no doubt, helped the British raj, ideologically and politically to isolate and suppress the revolutionary forces whom Gandhi often denounced.

On several occasions, Gandhi talked of the importance of soul force. Ghosh argues that those who believe that force, physical force, is the midwife of the old society pregnant with a new one are no less conscious than at least people like Gandhi—‘‘who glibly extol the virtues of non-violent satyagraha and have at the same time self-aggrandizement as the soul aim of their lives”—of the need for soul force. It is they who realize that without soul force millions of people dare not fight against powerful enemies and prepare to lay down their lives and risk the lives of the near and dear ones, which a genuine revolution demands. “It is the experience of all peoples throughout the world, those who have made history as well as those who have as yet failed to do so, that soul force must be wedded to physical force, that peaceful struggle must be combined with non-peaceful struggle, in order to abolish the regime of the imperialists and domestic exploiting classes and, in the process, to cleanse society of the accumulated filth of ages. All else is camouflage and deception and is intended to hoodwink and divert the oppressed masses from the road that leads to their emancipation”, Ghosh observes. (Ghosh, pp.136-37).

Thus Gandhi’s creed of non-violence, as Ghosh asserts, seems to be both a shield and a sword. “As a shield, it was non-violence in thought, word and deed to be scrupulously practiced by the enslaved and the oppressed in their struggles with the raj and native exploiting classes; as a sword, it was violence in defence of the imperialist order and in defence of the interests of the domestic sharks” (Ibid, p.137).

In fact, Gandhi’s strategy and tactics, as Ghosh asserts, were an ideal counterpart of the British imperial strategy of devolution of power by successive stages to “friendly and reliable hands”, who have been tested and found worthy of trust.

Jallianwala Bagh Massacre (13 April, 1919)

At Jallianwala Bagh at Amritsar, defenceless people—379 according to the official estimate and nearly 1,000 according to the Congress Working Committee’s report—were butchered and many hundreds were seriously wounded by General Dyer and soldiers. The Congress Enquiry Committee, which inquired into what happened in the Punjab in the wake of the Rowlatt satyagraha, estimated about 1,200 men were shot dead, at least 3,600 wounded and some permanently disabled (CWG, XVII, p.287, cited in Ghosh, p.193).

On 30 May 1919, in an indignant letter to the Viceroy, Rabindranath Tagore shared “the universal agony of indignation” and wished “to stand, shorn of all special distinctions, by the side of those of my countrymen who, for their so-called insignificance, are liable to suffer degradation not fit for human beings” gave “voice to the protest of the millions of my countrymen” against the horrors perpetrated by the raj in the Punjab and renounced his knighthood.

 It is quite illuminating, as Suniti Kumar Ghosh points out, that on the same day—30 May 1919—Gandhi was writing to the Private Secretary to the viceroy: “It is within His Excellency’s knowledge that I have made no public declaration regarding the events in Punjab…I was not prepared to condemn martial law as such: I was unwilling to do anything calculated needlessly to irritate local authority”. He was sure that if a committee of inquiry was appointed by the government, “it would calm the public mind and restore confidence… in the good intentions of the government” (CWG, XV,, p.334-5, cited in ibid, p.194).

Earlier, on 10 May, Gandhi had sent a telegram “strongly” advising C.F. Andrews not to proceed to Lahore “without sanction” (CWG, XV, pp.334-5, cited in ibid, p.198). Significantly, even earlier, on 20 April 1918, Gandhi had written to Sir Claude Hill: “You will admit that the leaders have with remarkable self-restraint[!] hushed all the tales of the forcible recruitment that is reported to have gone hitherto. I venture to think that the danger point has been reached” (CWG, XIV, p.373, cited in ibid). “This also clearly shows on which side leaders like Gandhi stood in those tumultuous days” (Ghosh, p.198).

Ghosh refers to a letter to Srinivasa Sastri, dated 6 June 1919, in which Gandhi criticized Rabindranath’s “burning letter”, which “the Punjab horrors have produced” as “premature”. It is interesting to reproduce here what Andrews wrote from Lahore to Tagore about the effect of the letter described by the mahatma as “premature”. “Everyone knows how from that time forward, the reign of terror was broken, insidious dread, which was hanging over them like a pestilence was lifted from them” (Rajat Kanta Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest In Bengal, 1875-1927, Delhi, 1984, cited in Ghosh, p.198).

It is important to remember that the AICC at its meeting held on 20 April, had demanded an enquiry into the Punjab wrongs and “pressed Gandhi to proceed to the Punjab immediately in disregard of consequences”. According to Tendulkar, Gandhi wired to the Viceroy for permission, which was refused(See: D. G. Tendulkar, Mahatma, Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Vol.I, New Delhi, 1969, p.262, cited in Ghosh, p.198). Ghosh, however, notes that no such telegrams or letters seeking the Viceroy’s permission(or conveying the Viceroy’s refusal to grant it) can be traced in CWG. This appears to be a deliberate omission, for obvious reasons).

In Young India of 11 June, Gandhi justified his “complete silence” over “the Punjab disturbances” “though he “allowed myself to be misunderstood by many friends” (CWG, XV. p.356, cited in Ghosh, p.198). He felt proud of the fact that ‘I enjoy fairly intimate relations with him [the Private Secretary to the Viceroy] and we often freely write to each other” (Ibid, p.391).

Ghosh points out that while perpetuating a regime of terror, the raj reciprocated Gandhi’s feelings of warm friendship. Congratulating him on his “calming influence”, the Viceroy’s Private Secretary advised him:”Don’t do too much fasting! You are not strong enough yet and I am sure yours is an influence which we all shall want at full horse power” (J.L. Maffey to Gandhi, 20 April, 1919, SN No.6551; cited in Judith M. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power, Cambridge, 1972, p.179, cited in Ghosh, p.200).

Later, at about the middle of June 1918, when there was considerable criticism of his manner of conducting the satyagraha, Gandhi proposed to launch civil disobedience. The executive committee of the Satyagraha Sabha entrusted Gandhi with full powers to guide the movement. Gandhi decided that he would start after taking “every precaution against violence breaking out” and after all demonstrations including hartal and that it would be “confined only to myself” (p.201).

From Cooperation to Non-cooperation Gandhi welcomed the appointment of the Hunter Committee to inquire into the “disorders” and asked people to trust the Commission and “respond to the Viceregal appeal for a calm atmosphere”(ibid). He did not forget to add: “If there has been a plot really to wage war against the King or to overthrow the Government, let those who are found guilty by a properly constituted court be hanged”.

Ghosh points out: “It was characteristic of the votary of non-violence to prescribe shooting and hanging for all those who dared to challenge the raj. On the other hand, in the days of the Jallianwalla Bag massacre and the martial law, he advised the oppressed that, in order ‘to regulate the relations between rulers and the ruled’ they should apply ‘the standard that we apply to the regulation of domestic relations’ (ibid, p.202). One can multiply such instances.

Why was the Non Co-operation movement launched? In a letter to The Times of India of 3 April 1920, Gandhi wrote: “The country requires some definite action. The forces of violence cannot be checked otherwise”. According to Ghosh, it was suggested in a confidential Government Note of May 1921 that Gandhi opted for non-cooperation in order to save India from Bolshevism (p.205). Interestingly, in reply to questions put to him at a meeting in Bombay on 18 June 1921, Gandhi claimed that “his movement was a great bulwark against Bolshevism” (p.205). The fact is that the mahatma, who was “ignorant of what exactly Bolshevism is”, as he confessed soon after (CWG, XXV, p.424, cited in ibid, 206), felt alarmed at the prospect of an upsurge of mass unrest, especially Muslim unrest, and the challenge it might throw to the established order. Interestingly, as Ghosh points out, after the Russian Revolution, the official writings, including intelligence reports, as well as writings of Congress leaders like Gandhi show that the spectre of Bolshevism was haunting them, though no Communist Party existed in India. They seemed to see the Bolshevik spectre behind every popular upheaval.

As Gandhi repeatedly pointed out, non-co-operation that he proposed was intended to forestall violent struggles against the raj. “I am convinced”, said Gandhi, “that had there been no move for non-co-operation, violence would long since have broken out. It is non-co-operation which has prevented violence. The Muslims are boiling over, but they have kept their patience in the belief that the Hindus are with them” (Ibid, CWG, XVII, p.415; see also 390 in Ghosh, p.206).

While moving a resolution at a meeting in Bombay in April 1920, asking every Indian to withdraw co-operation from the government, if the Khilafat question was not properly solved, Gandhi declared: “When they in India asked for self-government it did not mean that they did not want British rule. There was no Hindu or Mohammedan who was against the British flag waving over India” (CWG, XVII, p.310, cited in Ghosh, p.207). Ghosh remarks that truly Indians like Gandhi were happy to see the British flag flying over India. Gandhi was quite categorical: “…the movement [proposed non-cooperation] is not anti-British. It is not even anti-Government.” (Ibid, 389; also XX, 122,408).

Paradoxically, as Ghosh asserts, Gandhi served the interests of the raj by offering co-operation and rendering obedience as well as non-cooperating with it or civilly disobeying it. “Satyagraha”, he said, “consists at times in civil disobedience, other times in civil obedience” (CWG, XV, 264, cited in Ghosh, p.208).

At the special session of the Congress, held in Calcutta early in September 1920, Gandhi’s resolution on progressive non-violent non-co-operation faced strong opposition from C. R. Das, Vijayraghavachari and Motilal Nehru, but was ultimately adopted.

The non-co-operation programme included the surrender of titles and honorary offices conferred by the raj, resignation from nominated seats in local bodies and refusal to attend official and semi-official functions—all these items, as Ghosh mentions, concerned the members of the upper classes who were particularly noted for their loyalty to the raj—and gradual boycott of government schools or aided schools and colleges, law courts and legislatures and boycott of foreign goods. Besides, “the military, clerical and laboring classes” were advised to refuse “to offer themselves as recruits for service in Mesopotamia”.

Interestingly, elected members of local bodies like municipalities, districts and local boards were permitted to co-operate with the raj.

It is worth pointing out that the basic masses—the peasants and workers—had hardly any role to play in the proposed movement except by boycotting foreign goods. Participation in the programme was confined only to a microscopic minority—members of the middle and upper-middle classes.

Although the non-cooperation movement included the boycott of foreign goods, Gandhi went on denouncing it. He wanted the boycott only of foreign clothes. He argued that “boycott of British goods has been conceived as a punishment and can have no place in non-co-operation which is conceived in a spirit of self-sacrifice and is a matter of sacred duty”. He also criticized it on the ground that “boycott of British goods is thoroughly unpractical, for, it involves the sacrifice of their millions by millionaires…” (CWG, XVIII, 199, cited in Ghosh, p.210. For more detail, see p.211).

[To be continued]

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