Suniti Kumar Ghosh: An Assessment of a Revolutionary Activist–III

Amit Bhattacharya

To meet the revolutionary situation the government introduced two repressive legislations—the Public Safety(Removal from India)Bill and the Trade Disputes Bill. In the face of opposition in the Central Legislative Assembly, the first bill was promulgated by the Viceroy as Public Safety Ordinance 1929. On 20 March 1929, a number of communist and other militant leaders were arrested and elaborate preparations were made to launch the Meerut Conspiracy Case. Militant working class actions—led by the communists took place in the textile workers belt in Bombay, jute mill workers in Bengal, GIP Railway workers and the carters’ strike in Calcutta in 1929 and 1930. But the working class organizations were gradually disrupted.

However, because of severe repression as well as Comintern directives, the Workers and Peasants’ Party(WPP) gradually withered away. The young Communist Party was divided into groups. In Bombay, two rival factions appeared—one led by B.T. Randive and the other by S.V. Deshpande.

By then, the national revolutionaries were organizing themselves in different provinces, especially Bengal and the Punjab. A band of revolutionaries under the leadership of Surya Sen drew up plans to stage an armed uprising in Chittagong to liberate it from the shackles of British rule and hoped that their example would be emulated in other places. On 8 April 1929 Bhagat Singh (aged 24) and BatukeshwarDutt (aged 22) dropped two small bombs and fired some shots from the visitors’ gallery in the Central Legislative Assembly. The sound of the bombs and revolver-shots resounded throughout India. The shots were not intended to hurt anybody. The Red Pamphlet which they dropped on the floor below expressed their revolutionary optimism that “from under the seeming sereneness of the sea of humanity a veritable storm is about to break out… the sacrifice of individuals at the altar of a great revolution that will bring freedom to all rendering exploitation of man by man impossible, is inevitable. Long live Revolution”. In the midst of panic they had a good chance of making good their escape. But they threw away their revolvers and waited for their enemies to capture them.

What was the role of the mahatma? Gandhi repeatedly condemned Bhagat Singh and BatukeshwarDutt and put them in the same category as a Muslim fanatic who had stabbed a Hindu. And forgetting his gospel of love and forgiveness, he wrote: “The assassin will, I expect, in due course pay the last penalty for his deed” (CWG, XLI, 225, 260, cited in Ghosh, p.332).

The government launched the Lahore Conspiracy Case against Bhagat Singh, BatukeshwarDutt, Rajguru and other revolutionaries whom they had captured in the meantime. The revolutionaries transformed the court into a platform for giving the widest publicity to their political ideals, and the accused became the accusers and indicted the entire imperialist-capitalist system. Even their days in prison were full of struggle. There they defied their tormentors who subjected them to cruel physical torture and humiliation and went on hunger strike demanding their rights to be treated as political prisoners. The fast roused the people of the country and their hatred for imperialism grew. Political prisoners in other jails observed sympathy hunger strikes.

On 13 September 1929, after 64 days of fasting, and after suffering indescribable torment, Jatindranath Das, a young revolutionary died a martyr. He showed how the spirit of man, moved by great ideas, can triumph over all physical suffering and the terrors of slow, lingering death.. The epic fast shook the whole of India. Everywhere there were mammoth demonstrations, and in Calcutta there was a mass demonstration in which 5 lakh people (D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma Life of Mohandas KaramchandGandhi, p.473)—an inconceivable number in those days, took part. The entire country paid to his memory the tribute of its deepest love and respect.

Of course, except one. The only critic was the mahatma. He had described the epic fast undertaken by Jatin Das, Bhagat Singh and others on the issue of the political prisoners’ rights as “an irrelevant performance” and “preferred to observe silence over the self-immolation of Jatindranath Das because I feel that by writing on it I would have done more harm to the country’s cause than good” (CWG, XLI, 152-3, 528, 534, cited in Ghosh, p.333).

The Myth
Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Sukhdev had been sentenced to death and were hanged on 23 March. At that time, as Sitaramayya has said, Bhagat Singh’s name was “as popular as Gandhi’s”. In its publication the Intelligence Bureau, GOI, observed that for a time Bhagat Singh “bade fair to oust Mr. Gandhi as the foremost political figure of the day” (P. Sitaramaiyya, op.cit, I, 456; Terrorism in India, cited in Ghosh, p.367).

The people did not take the executions lying down. “The cry, ‘Bhagat Singh Zindabad’ as Gandhi’s disciple Tendulkar writes, “resounded throughout India. March 24 was observed as the day of mourning…In Bombay and Madras, there were angry demonstrations. Armed flying squads patrolled in Calcutta. A large number of people were killed in police firing and many more wounded and arrested.

People, as Ghosh points out, have been fed on the myth that during his talks with Irwin before signing the agreement, Gandhi had tried his utmost to get sentences on Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Sukhdev commuted. This myth had been spread by Sitaramaiyya, Jawaharlal, Tendulkar and the mahatma himself. On 26 March, three days after the executions, the mahatma himself, greeted by hostile demonstrations, declared at the Karachi Congress: ‘There can be therefore no excuse for suspicion that I did not want to save Bhagat Singh…I had pleaded with the Viceroy as best as I could. I brought all the persuasion to bear on him”. (CWG, XLV, 349, 351 cited in Ghosh, p.367)

Suniti Kumar Ghosh argues that although Gandhi emphasized that these were the words of a life-long votary of truth, facts tell a different tale.

In his article “Gandhi and Bhagat Singh”, D. P. Das writes: “Alan Campbell-Johnson, in his book Lord Halifax… referred to an understanding between Gandhi and Irwin that Bhagat Singh should not get any reprieve” (Das, ‘Gandhi and Bhagat Singh’, Mainstream, Independence Day Number, 1970, p.15, cited in Ghosh, p.367). In his record of his meeting with Gandhi on 18 February 1931, Irwin noted that at the end of it Gandhi casually mentioned the case of Bhagat Singh. Irwin wrote: Gandhi did notplead for commutation… But he did ask for postponement in present circumstances” (CWG, XLV, 196; see also D.P. Das, op.cit, cited in Ghosh, p.368). The correctness of Irwin’s version is borne out by Gandhi’s own report on this meeting. It states that there was a third “titbit”which both he and Irwin had greatly enjoyed. It was about Bhagat Singh. “I told him: ‘This has no connection with our discussion, and it may even be inappropriate on my part to mention it.But if you want to make the present atmosphere more favourable, you should suspend Bhagat Singh’s execution’. The Viceroy liked this very much. He said: ‘…Commutation of sentence is a different thing, but suspension is certainly worth considering’. The mahatma said that he desired ‘suspension of sentence in order that there may not be unnecessary turmoil in the country… I would not take it ill even if you do not give any reply on this issue”(CWG, XLV, p.200 cited in Ghosh, p.368). Gandhi did not raise this question again before signing the pact with Irwin on 5 March.

In his record of a meeting with Gandhi on 19 March, Irwin noted that as Gandhi was leaving, he said that “he had seen in the Press the intimation of his [Bhagat Singh’s] execution for March 24th. This was an unfortunate day, as it coincided with the arrival of the new President of the Congress at Karachi and there would be much popular excitement.” Irwin explained to him why he had rejected the possibility of postponement till after the Congress”. Irwin noted : “He appeared to appreciate the force of the arguments, and said no more” (Ibid, pp.315-16).

In his note on his meeting with Gandhi on the same day—19 March—Emerson, the Home Secretary, wrote that Gandhi “did not seem to me to be particularly concerned in the matter”. Gandhi promised to cooperate to prevent outbreaks of disorder of which Emerson was apprehensive. When Emerson informed him next day that a protest meeting was going to be held under the leadership of Subhas in Delhi that evening and asked for his assistance, the mahatma replied” “I have already taken every precaution possible…. I suggest that there should be no display of police force and no interference in the meeting. Irritation is undoubtedly there. It would be better to allow it to find vent through meetings etc” (Ibid, 440, 446, 316 cited in Ghosh, pp.368-68).

On 23 March, barely a few hours before the executions of the revolutionaries were to take place, Gandhi appealed to Irwin for commutation or suspension of the sentences. The situation was getting explosive. So, Gandhi entreated the Viceroy: “Since you seem to value my influence such as it is in favour of peace, do not please unnecessarily make my position, difficult as it is, almost too difficult for future work” (Ibid, 333). Ghosh observes quite sharply: “Perhaps the mahatma felt that though this belated appeal was sure to fail, he might be able to use it, as he actually did (Ibid, p.177), to prop up the myth that he had tried his best to get the sentences commuted” (Ghosh, p.369). It is pertinent to point out that about this time, as Ghosh mentions, Gandhi also wrote in his Gujarati paper: “The government certainly had the right to hang these men.” “Hence our dharma is to swallow our anger, abide by the settlement and carry out our duty” (Ibid, pp.360-1) was the constant refrain of his speeches.

What was the role of Jawaharlal? Ghosh asks. In a statement issued on the day after the executions, Jawaharlal said: “I have remained absolutely silent during their last days lest a word of mine may injure the prospect of commutation”. Since his release he had been afraid that a word of his in favour of commutation might endanger its chances and so he remained discreetly silent! In his usual rhetorical style he added that “when England speaks to us and talks of a settlement there will be the corpse of Bhagat Singh between us.” (SWN, IV, p.500, cited in Ghosh, p.369). The reality, according to Ghosh, is that Jawaharlal was saying this when he had already made provisional settlement and were yearning for ‘permanent peace’ with the British raj.

Before his execution, Sukhdev, Bhagat Singh’s comrade, wrote from his prison cell to Gandhi that Gandhi’s open calls to the revolutionaries were helping the colonial rulers to isolate them from the people and hunt them down. Pointing out that Gandhi’s “appeals amount to preaching treachery, desertion and betrayal among them”. Sukdev suggested that, if Gandhi did not really want to join hands with the alien rulers, he should either discuss the problem in detail with “some revolutionary leaders—there are so many in jails—and come to terms with them” or he should “stop these appeals”. In his open reply to Sukhdev’s letter after his execution, Gandhi, condemning the Sukhdevs as “political assassins”, refused to do either of the two things suggested by Sukhdev (CWG, XI, V,322; XI, VI, 250, 256, 272-73, 405, cited in Ghosh, Vol.2, p.29.)

The call for civil disobedience which the Congress leadership issued when the revolutionary wave was rising, as Ghosh points out,”did contribute to the rousing of the sections of the people who were untouched by it and helped it to rise higher. The leadership chose to ride the wave to bring it under control and to project its own anti-imperialist image while seeking all the time to stem and disperse it and anxiously waiting for some concessions both as a pretext to ditch the movement and as a gain for the big bourgeoisie”. (Ghosh, p.370)

Global Economic Depression and the Indian Big Bourgeoisie
According to S.K. Ghosh, the world economic crisis of 1929-33, instead of giving rise to antagonistic contradictions between imperialist capital and Indian big capital, as V.I. Pavlov and others have argued, helped to bring them closer than before. In fact, the 1930s were a period of unprecedented growth and expansion of Indian big comprador capital. While the old, or relatively old, big bourgeois groups like the Tatas, Birlas, Shri Rams, Singhanias and Walchands vastly expanded their industrial activities, there were several new entrants into industry who had previously been banians, brokers and big speculators, like the Goenkas, Dalmia Jains, Thapars, Chettiars and Naidus. Many of the new entrants like the Goenkas and Chetttiars were diversifying from trading and indigenous banking into cotton textiles and other industries. Even during the depression years, profits were quite handsome. Between 1931 and 1939, the Birlas, Dalmias, Mafatlals, Sri Rams, Walchands and so on had a meteoric rise (Claude Markovits, Indian Business and National Politics, Appendix I, pp.190-193, cited in Ghosh, Vol.II, p.6).

Gold Drain: Role of Thakurdas and Birla
During this crisis, a huge amount of Indian gold was exported to Britain with the connivance of the Indian big bourgeoisie to help the foreign rulers tide over the crisis. Speaking in the House of Commons on 29 February 1932, Samuel Hoare said: “More gold has been exported from India since last September at a higher rate than it has even been exported from the gold fields of South Africa” (Cited in Ghosh, ibid, p.7). R.J. Moore has observed that “Suspicion was rife that Britain had manipulated the rupee to snatch the vast private hoards of Indian gold…”. (R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, p.268, cited in ibid)

Who actually were the Indian accomplices of British finance capital in this massive spoliation of India? The bullion trade of the whole of India, as Ghosh points out, passed through Bombay, and the firm of Sir Chunilal B. Mehta, cousin of Sir PurushottamdasThakurdas and the “king of the bullion trade in Bombay”, along with four others, served as “the sole links between the London bullion merchant brokers and the ‘orthodox’ bullion merchants of Bombay”. Among the leading brokers in the Bombay Bullion Exchange were the G.D. Birla Brothers (C. Markovits, ibid, 111, fn.47; ADD Gordon, Businessmen and Politics, pp.70,80, cited in Ghosh, p.7).
Ghosh points out that when Gandhi, Patel and other top Congress leaders were in prison in 1932, the Bombay Congress Bulletin, issued by the Emergency Council, the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee, branded PurushottamdasThakurdas and G.D.Birla as traitors. It stated:

“SIXTY MILLION POUNDS WORTH OF INDIAN GOLD was exported from this country to England during the last year. IT HAS BEEN A VERITABLE WINDFALL TO BRITAIN… By helping to sendIndian gold to England at a time like the present when India is fighting a desperate fight for liberty and life, the Indian Bullion merchant has literally supplied our enemies with valuable ammunition at our own expense to be used against us. By helping in the dangerous flight of gold from this country, the Indian traitors dealing in bullion have deliberately impoverished us to enrich the enemy… Sir Purushotamdas and Mr. Birla have made lakhs recently from this immoral traffic… Meanwhile, we shall fight both the enemy and the traitor” (Bombay Congress Bulletin, No.247 of 17Oct. 1932, PT Papers, File 101; see also Bombay Congress Bulletin, No.241 of 10 Oct.1932, ibid, cited in Ghosh, Vol.II, p.8).

However, the fact is that their fight against the traitors had to be abandoned almost as soon as it began. When the news of their demonstrations in front of Sir Purushotamdas’s palatial residence in Bombay reached Vallabhbhai in prison, he immediately sent instructions to withdraw the Congress pickets. In fact, as Ghosh writes, Patel was quite right in claiming that Sir Purushotamdas was “more our man than anyone else’s” (Frank Moraes, Sir PurushotamdasThakurdas, p.202, emphasis added. Cited in Ghosh, p.8). As it stands, with the help of the big compradors the British imperialists were able to shift some of the burden of their financial crisis on to the shoulders of the Indian people.

[To be continued]

Back to Home Page

Frontier
Vol 57, No. 20, Nov 10 - 16, 2024