Suniti Kumar Ghosh: An Assessment of a Revolutionary Activist—IV

Amit Bhattacharya

During the thirties both the Indian big bourgeoisie and the British capital felt the need for a joint front against foreign trespassers into this British colony as well as indigenous rivals. A process of greater integration between the two started taking place. According to Ghosh, during the inter-war period especially in the thirties, a new relationship developed between the British managing agencies and Indian big capital. The banians and brokers of British firms, whose industrial career had just begun or was about to begin—the Birlas, Goenkas, Bangurs, Jatias, Jalans, Bajorias etc.—increasingly invested in the companies controlled by British capital. They were allowed seats on the boards of the companies in which they invested, but without any share of control. Control remained firmly in the hands of the British managing agencies. “From the First World War onwards”, writes Tomlinson, “British-controlled firms, starved of capital from London, were forming alliances with Indian businessmen…” (B.R. Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj, pp.53-54, cited in Ghosh, II, p.12). This process was going on in Calcutta, Bombay and other places. A fusion of European and Indian big capital was taking place and large chunks of Indian big capital, subordinated to foreign capital, played the role of a junior partner (See: S.K.Ghosh, The Indian big Bourgeoisie, pp.210-11).

As Ghosh points, out, two significant processes were at work in the late twenties and in the thirties. First, the character of British investment in India began to change. Previously the typical foreign investment was small, made by individuals and directed by expatriates through managing agency firms. Previously, the typical foreign investment was small, made by individuals and directed by expatriates through managing agency firms. But these firms—Andrew Yule, Bird Heilgers, Jardine Skinner, Ralli Bros, British India Corporation and others—had served their main age-old purpose: that of mediating between metropolitan capital and the Indian market and sources of raw-materials. Though they controlled some manufacturing units like jute mills, cotton mills, engineering units, mining companies and tea plantations, they were chiefly exporters of jute, jute products, tea, raw cotton etc. and importers of manufactured goods like cotton textiles and yarn, paper, machinery and various other consumer goods.

A change had come over metropolitan capital itself during the inter-war period. Till World War I, Britain’s staple industries were cotton textiles, coal, ship-building and iron and steel. Even before the War these British industries, except ship-building, were losing their competitive strength. The supremacy of Britain was challenged by the USA, Germany, France and Belgium. British industries like cotton textiles relied for their market mainly on the colonies.

British capital had lagged behind the new industrial powers in the formation of monopolies and cartels and the adoption of mass production methods. However, during the inter-war period there was increasing concentration and centralization of capital; this led to the development of monopoly capitalism in Britain. That period saw the rise of giant monopoly firms like Imperial Chemical Industries, Unilever, Guest Keen, Nettlefold and G.E.C. And while old industries declined, new industries like chemicals, automobiles, aircraft, rayon and silk prospered from about 1924.

Taking advantage of the protection afforded to industries in India, new giant corporations set up their branches and subsidiaries here. As Eric Hobsbawm puts it, “gradually the sun of the old-fashioned rentier was setting” and the sun of the giant transnational was rising(Industry and Empire, pp.214, 223, 259). The days of the old expatriate managing agencies were numbered. British and other foreign trans-nationals like the ICI. Unilever, Philips, Union Carbide, Metal Box, Guest Keen Netttlefold, Dunlop, British Oxyzen, Glaxo and Swedish Match established their manufacturing units in India to dominate its industry.

Another event of far-reaching importance was taking place. As Britain was no longer the leading capitalist country of the world, the inter-war period marked the beginning of the transition from India’s unilateral dependence on Britain to its multilateral dependence on several advanced capitalist countries led by the USA.

The establishment of branches by foreign transnational corporations—the ‘India Ltd.s’—was viewed with suspicion by a section of the Indian business magnates during the late thirties. But what they were opposed to was, as S.K. Ghosh argues, not “the increasing influx into India of foreign-controlled industrial establishments”, but the setting up of fully-owned subsidiaries of the powerful trans-nationals. Already in 1929, the Tatas had joined a Morgan subsidiary to set up a company to control its three hydro-electric companies. In the late 1930s, WalchandHirachand was inviting US trans-nationals to build automobile and aircraft factories in India with him as a collaborator and the Birlas were exploring chances of collaboration with US and later, British automobile giants to set up an automobile plant in India.  

Gandhi’s Concept of Independent India  
As Gandhi said during the Round Table Conference in London, the King of England might continue as the king of ‘independent’ India; a British Agent’ called ‘a Viceroy or Governor-General’ might remain, and the British troops might stay on to “protect India against foreign aggression, and even against internal insurrection” with the British Commander-in-Chief becoming Gandhi’s “technical adviser on military matters”. And there would be ‘safeguards’ as “a guarantee for the safety of every British interest to which India pledges her honour” (CWG, XI, VIII, pp.147, 177, 246, 306, 309; also 256. Emphasis added. Cited in Ghosh, II, p.36. )

In Gandhi’s future India, capitalism would be abolished but not capital; the capitalists would remain owners of their wealth but act as “trustees”, and the princes and the landlords would retain their possessions. As he stated, the Congress was “trying to serve” the landlords, mill-owners and the princes, besides, of course the peasants. “There is a State People’s Conference”, he said, ‘and it is held back under my iron rule. I have been holding them back… I have asked them to be satisfied with their present position”.

According to Ghosh, Gandhi was “most anxious” that the princes should join the proposed Federation. In this respect his policy was  complementary to that of the colonial rulers. They too wanted the princes, their puppets, whom they could manipulate according to their desires. The participation of the princes in the federation would be another important ‘safeguard’ ensuring protection of British rule.

It is obvious that the corollary to this policy was to help the raj to put down those who tried to rise against the imperial order and for the people and national freedom. In London, as  Ghosh points out, Gandhi refused to put his signature on a mass petition—sent him by Fenner Brockway—protesting against the arrest and detention of the Meerut prisoners and demanding their release as well as the release of the Garwali prisoners who had refused to fire on an unarmed gathering of their fellow countrymen at Peshawar. He refused to do anything for Lester Hutchinson, Meerut prisoner who, he knew, was then seriously ill, as he would “do nothing for the Meerut prisoners”. He did not think it advisable to start then a campaign for the release of political prisoners in India. The day he reached London he condemned the young men who belonged to the “school of violence”. He prided himself on the fact that “the Congress creed of non-violence” had “kept the forces of terrorism in check” and declared that Irwin had “opened up” a “course of cooperation” between him and the raj for fighting revolutionary violence on the part of the youth (CWG, XI, VIII, 3, 39, 45, 87 and fn.I, 289, 341, 376, in Ghosh, I, p.36-37).

The Sole Spokesman of India
Gandhi repeatedly claimed at the RTC that he and the Congress represented all classes—from princes to landless peasants—and all communities—Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and so on(Ibid, 14-5, 117, 277, 357. See also XL V, 253, in Ghosh, p.37). He questioned the representative character of the delegates who claimed to speak on behalf of their respective minorities. Interestingly, as Ghosh points out, referring to Gandhi’s claim to the sole right to represent the depressed classes and other minorities, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar remarked at a meeting of the Minorities Committee of the RTC: “to that claim I can only say that it is one of the main false claims which irresponsible people keep on making although the persons concerned with regard to these claims have been invariably denying them” (Ibid, 116, 160, 257; B.R. Ambedkar, What Congress and Gandhi Have done to the Untouchables, p.65).

The Congress had recognized the representative character of other organizations, especially the Muslim League, in earlier years. In 1916, the Congress had entered into what is called the Lucknow Pact with the League and in the twenties, Congress leaders convened several All Parties Conferences and Conventions. However, as Ghosh asserts, with the growing alienation of the Congress from the Muslims from the early thirties and with the British raj drafting a new constitution for India, Gandhi staked the claim that the Congress represented the entire people of India and should be recognized as such in any future constitutional settlement. During his interview with the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald on 30 September, 1931, Gandhi, claimed that “he could represent the Muslims and the Depressed classes better than those who purported to do so”, and urged the British Government to “settle thewholequestion” with him alone(See Ghosh, ibid, p.37). At the plenary session of the RTC on 1 December 1931, Gandhi, while insisting that Congress represented “the whole of India, all interests” and “all the minorities”, wished that he “could convince all the British public men, the BritishMinisters, that the Congress is capable of delivering the goods” (Ibid, p.357—emphasis added. Cited in Ghosh, p. 37-38). Ghosh remarks, “…these were no casual utterances but represented the deliberate policy of the Congress. This resolve to arrogate to themselves a monopoly of power as the sole heir to the British colonial rulers further widened the gulf between the Congress and the Muslim community” (Ghosh, ibid, p.38).

‘Civil Marshall Law’ and People’s Struggles: the NWFP, Bengal and UP
On entering prison Gandhi felt immense relief as it was for him an opportunity to escape from the turmoil of politics. It was an act of “God’s infinite mercy”, and when Patel and Mahadev Desai joined him, they became, as Gandhi said, “a merry company”. Immediately after his arrest, Gandhi, in his appeals to the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, as Ghosh points out, assured him of cooperation and desire for ‘peace’. (Ghosh, ibid, p.48).

The people were not as fortunate as their leaders. They found themselves in the midst of a situation for which they had not been prepared. A bunch of ordinances poured out of the raj’s armoury to add to those which were already in force in the NWFP, Bengal and UP. The Congress and various other organizations including peasant associations and youth organizations were banned, large-scale arrests were made. Bans were imposed on political meetings and processions. Every preparation was made to subdue the people by sheer terror. It was an all-out offensive against the people. Samuel Hoare declared that “there would be no drawn battle this time”, and adding insult to injury, said: “though the dogs bark, the caravan passes on” (cited in Ghosh, Vol. 2 p.48).

During that phase people’s struggles broadly took two forms: ‘civil’ and what the Congress leaders would describe as ‘criminal’ and try utmost to prevent. Civil resisters hoisted the Congress flag, held meetings, brought out processions, raised slogans, picketed foreign cloth and liquor shops—all  defying authorities and courted imprisonment. Closing of markets by traders, non-payment of revenue, rent and chowkidari tax, manufacture of salt were other features. There were also more militant forms of struggle and also peasant struggles not of the satyagrahic type. During 1932-33, there were as many as 120,000 arrests. Firing on unarmed crowds, physical torture and intimidation were used by the state on a wide scale. Prisoners in jails, even women prisoners, were subjected to inhuman torture.

The NWFP had been in revolt since April 1930. Leaders like Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the ‘Frontier Gandhi’, were in prison. In their anti-imperialist struggle the Red Shirts and other Pathans showed scant respect for the ‘creed’ of non-violence. In the late 1920s, the Red shirts organization—affiliated with the Congress in 1931—came in close contact with the Youth League which was under Communist influence. The Youth League and the Red Shirts organized the peasantry and waged a guerrilla warfare in the rural areas.

The British responded with savage repressive measures. Troops, tanks and planes were used to suppress the revolt. Yet the people’s resistance grew more determined. The number of the Red Shirts increased from 750 to 25,000 within a short time after the arrest of their leaders. Thousands of Pathans from the tribal areas of the NWFP, which enjoyed some local ‘independence’—the Waziris, the Afridis, etc.—marched on Peshawar and attacked British posts. It is significant that 3 May 1930 was observed in Punjab as ‘Peshawar Day’ and that a Sikh detachment from Amritsar set out to help the Pathan rebels but were stopped by the British at Jhelum and 200 of its men were arrested. Again in 1931-2 the NWFP played a leading role in the no-tax campaign, which spread to wide areas in the province.

However, fierce repression could not suppress the revolt of the tribesmen. They were regularly bombed from the air by the British and other atrocities had been regularly committed by them. Ghosh refers to Gandhi’s letters to Agatha Harrison and Nehru—written in November 1933—warning them that the cases of atrocities should “be dealt with privately” and should not be given publicity. He did not “want any public propaganda”, he wrote(See: CWG, LVI, 179, 180: LVII, 77’ cited in Ghosh, p.50).

In Bengal, the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggles did not cease when Gandhi called off civil disobedience in March 1931, The Bengal Provincial Conference at Berhampur, Murshidabad, adopted resolutions in 1931 proposing to intensify the no-tax movement, to boycott Union Boards, British goods, British-owned banks, insurance and steamship companies and newspapers etc. (Ghosh, Vol.II ibid, p.50).

What was Gandhi’s attitude to Subhas Chandra Bose? And where did Jawaharlal stand in this relationship, according to Ghosh? Let us quote from Suniti Kumar Ghosh: “Thanks mainly to Gandhi and G.D. Birla, Gandhi’s man on the spot, the Bengal Congress was disorganized when the second phase of the civil disobedience movement opened. Subhas Bose’s anti-imperialist, militant activities did not suit the tastes of Gandhi, “the born co-operator”, as he often described himself. During his talks with Irwin in February-March 1931, Gandhi had confided to the Viceroy that “Subhas is my opponent”.

That brings us to the role of Nehru. According to Ghosh: “Jawaharlal did not belong to the Gandhian core in words but followed Gandhi faithfully  in deeds until 1946. Gandhi was never deceived by his words. His radicalism in words was of help to Gandhi: with his ‘left’ and ‘socialist’ rhetoric, as S. Gopal, his biographer and admirer, and many others have noted, he was “the best shield of the Congress against left-wing groups and organizations” (CWG, XLV, 200; XLII, 353, LXXV, 224; S.Gopal, op.cit, 137, cited in ibid, p.51). 

Role of Bidhan Roy, Nalini Sarkar, other Bengal Congress leaders and their relationship with G D Birla
What about the Congress leaders of Bengal? There were, according to Ghosh, groups of ‘pure’ Gandhains and from 1925, after ChittanrajanDas’s death, Gandhi, tried to set up J.M. Sen Gupta as his deputy in Bengal, whom despite protests of other congress leaders of Bengal, he gave the ‘triple crown’—presidentship of the BPCC, leadership of the Swaraj Party in the Bengal Council, and mayoralty of Calcutta. However, neither Sen Gupta, Bidhan Chandra Roy and NaliniRanjan Sarkar, whom Gandhi cultivated, nor the ‘pure’ Gandhian groups had that popularity among the masses and ordinary Congressmen that Subhas enjoyed. That was a problem for both British imperialism and Gandhi. The British rulers put Subhas Bose behind bars frequently or forced him into an exile for a considerable period and ultimately never to return.

Some Congress leaders of Bengal, close to Gandhi like Bidhan Chandra Roy and Nalini Sarkar, and Calcutta-based big bourgeoisie like G.D. Birla, closest to Gandhi and his associates, did not like civil obedience to flourish. Bidhan Roy served as mayor of Calcutta during much of the period of civil obedience. What was Bidhan’s role then? According to S.K. Ghosh, instead of leading or participating in the struggle, he hauled down the Congress flag from the Calcutta Corporations’s buildings at the dictates of Calcutta’s police commissioner. According to K.P. Thomas, “From 1925 onwards, Bidhan became an intimate friend of Gandhiji”. On 30 January 1932 Gandhi wrote to him: ‘‘I love and accept your correction and say with you that we are near to each other” (K.P. Thomas, Dr. B.C. Roy, Calcutta, 1955, p.163; CWG, XLIX, 47; see also ibid, LIX, 267-69).

Bidhan was also very close to G.D. Birla. Birla, who became president of the All India HarijanSevakSangh in 1932, nominated him president of its Bengal branch. Dyakov in his India during and after the Second World War, 1939-49 (Moscow, 1952, p.220) observed that Bengal’s Chief Minister B.C. Roy was hand in glove with the Central Government because he was a “stooge of the Marwaris” (cited by Ghosh, ibid, p.52).

What was the role of Nalini Sarkar during the civil disobedience struggle? It was “no less patriotic than Bidhan”, S.K. Ghosh sarcastically remarks. As Nehru wrote, Nalini, who then belonged to “the dominant part of the Bengal Congress”, which Gandhi had helped to install, “rejoiced to entertain Government officials, Home Members and the like, when most of us were in prison and C.D. was supposed to be flourishing… The Congress from top to bottom is a caucus and opportunism triumphs”. In July 1934 Sarkar managed to get himself elected as mayor of Calcutta with the support of Government-nominated as well European councillors of the Calcutta Corporation, who were “magnates of Clive Street”, the seat of British expatriate capital in India (Nehru to Gandhi, 13 August, 1934, A Bunch of Old Letters, 115; Statesman, 5 July 1934, cited in Ghosh II, p.52.

But he did not lose the friendship and trust of the top leaders of the Congress. He was Birla’s candidate when he became a member of the Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee 1929-31. Without Birla’s support he could not be elected president of the FICCI in 1933-34.

It is interesting to point out that G.D. Birla, who called himself Gandhi’s “pet-child” and whom Gandhi called one of the “mentors” whom “God has given me”, was effusive in his expressions of loyalty to the British imperialists during the second phase of civil disobedience and worked hard to terminate it “once and for all”.  

Birla’s Role in the formation of the Government of India Act 
G.D. Birla played an important role in arranging the ‘Poona Pact’ and on the Harijan front, helped in terminating civil disobedience (as Nehru said) and in guiding the Congress along the constitutional path. Ghosh spells out the new tasks that lay ahead. The new constitution that would be imposed by the British raj had to be worked, ministerial offices under the constitution had to be assumed and the role of “partners in this repression and in the exploitation of our people” (to borrow Nehru’s phrase) had to be played by the Congress in the coming days. 

The Joint Parliamentary Committee’s Report, which formed the basis of the Government of India Act of 1935, appeared towards the end of 1934. He wanted the British government to talk to Gandhi before the framing of the constitution. But all his appeals for a ‘personal touch’ were fruitless. Ghosh points out that early in 1935, helped by Anderson, Birla saw the Viceroy, Commerce Member Joseph Bhore and Home Member Henry Craik. Birla said to the Viceroy:

“There must be a proper understanding between the rulers and the ruled so that leaders like Gandhiji and his lieutenants may begin to teach people to treat the Government as their institution” (Cited in Ghosh, ibid, p.92).

Birla told Joseph Bhore that “If there was sincerity and goodwill, Mr.Gandhi may find a formula to work the constitution” (Birla to Gandhi’s secretary, Mahadev Desai, 18 December, 1934, Bapu a Unique Association, p.456; II, 11, 9, 14, 17. Emphasis added). Birla told Henry Craik, the Home Member, that Gandhi endorsed Birla’s view “that the proposed scheme could be worked successfully and to the advantage of India, if there was sympathy and goodwill from both the sides”. He stated to the Home Member:

“There is already a section growing up gradually which believes that even the best should not be achieved by constitutional means… Gandhiji is fighting against this mentality… It is essential that some settlement should be made in Gandhiji’s life time which may bring the government and people closer to each other. This would be the beginning of the new kind of education which would teach people to believe that the Government is their own institution, which should be mended and not ended”.

Birla warned that, otherwise, “A revolution of the bloody type may become an inevitable factor. And this would be the greatest calamity not only to India but also to England. Tories may say this would be India’s funeral. I say it would be of both” (Ibid, 10-14. emphasis added).

Ghosh remarks: Birla was right. As the interests of the Birlas and those of imperial Britain were tied together, the ruin of one would spell the ruin of another” (Ibid, p.93). 

Ghosh has summed up the situation in the following words:

“First, before the Government of India Act of 1935 was enacted in August of that year as well as after, Birla on behalf of Gandhi and the other Congress leaders repeatedly gave the raj the assurance that it would be worked by the Congress. Gandhi approved of the commitment that Birla made to the raj.

“Second, on behalf of Gandhi and the other Congress leaders, Birla assured the raj that they would abandon the path of mass action ‘once and for all’ and take to the road indicated by the raj—the peaceful. constitutional road to self-government and expect to be guided there by British imperialism.

“Third, Birla held that an understanding between the raj and Gandhi and the other Congress leaders was necessary so that the latter could teach people that ‘the government is their institution, which should be mended and not ended’. Such understanding would also create the proper atmosphere in which the constitution could be worked. In the absence of such an understanding a violent revolution might spell “the funeral” of both Tory Britain and the Birlas’ India.

“Fourth, Birla, who held that imperial Britain and colonial India were bound together by destiny, urged that the raj and the right-wing of the Congress should combine to crush the left-wing” (Ghosh, II pp.95-96).

It is important to note that Birla’s views and commitments to the raj received Gandhi’s unqualified approval.

The constitution bristled with things like “reserved subjects”, “special responsibilities” and “safeguards”. The British-owned industry, trade, banking etc. were protected by the “safeguards” against any interference with their right to fleece the country as before.

As Ghosh points out, the Act was devised to build up a constitutional alliance between the imperialist masters, princes, big landlords and the compradors—all reactionary forces, foreign and native—to thwart the aspirations of the people.

When the Act was at the stage of preparation, an article in the Communist International observed: “In its scheme of a pseudo-federal colonial India British imperialism seeks to create such a system as would enable it to preserve and consolidate in the safest possible manner its rule over India, by utilizing to the utmost the feudal relics and all the different contradictions(of a national, religious character etc..)… The constitution which imperialism seeks to introduce is aimed not only at strengthening the British yoke but at consolidating all exploiting classes for the struggle against the Indian people, against the Indian revolution” (Valia, “The Economic Crisis and the Policy of British Imperialism in India”, Communist International, 15 May, 1932, in Radical Periodicals, 1932, p.285, cited in Ghosh, II, p.97. 

Gandhi and his close associates and the Indian big compradors like Birla were optimistic. Even when the constitution was under consideration in the British Parliament, he “realized that the ‘Bill’ was capable of producing benefit, if worked in the right spirit”. As Ghosh observed, indeed the Act which Gandhi later described as “the creation of the best British brains: and behind which “there were honorable motives” was capable of producing benefit for the classes Gandhi represented. To Birla, the Act “did contain seeds which were to germinate, blossom and bear fruit giving us ultimately the full independence that we aspired for”. According to Ghosh, Birla was right as he added: “we have embodied large portions of the Act, as finally passed, in the Constitution which we have framed ourselves which shows that in it was cast the pattern of our future plans. (Birla, In the Shadow of the Mahatma, p.131; Bapu III, p.268, cited by Ghosh, p.98).

Before leaving England, Birla wrote to Anderson” …so I am returning now to India with the blessings of the new Viceroy, the Secretary of State and those others who count” (Birla, Bapu, II, 140—emphasis added, cited in ibid).On his return to India, Birla went to Wardha to Give Gandhi a first-hand report of his impressions as well as the messages from Hoare, Halifax and others. Mahadev Desai, Gandhi’s personal secretary, was sent to Bombay to bring Birla and Patel. Rajendra Prasad and Rajagopalachari had also arrived.

[To be continued]

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