Suniti Kumar Ghosh: An Assessment of a Revolutionary Activist—VI

Amit Bhattacharya

Now Gandhi prepared tolead the Congress step by step to work the constitution, while keeping his plans secret from the Congress and people, and even from Nehru, as Ghosh observes. Gandhi remained silent when the Government of India Act of 1935 saw the light of the day. He sent a message to Nehru offering him presidentship of the next Congress session and trying to impose a vow of silence on him about the Act (Mahadev Desai to Nehru, 6 September 1935, J. N. Papers, Vol. No.17, cited in ibid).

Why Gandhi offered presidentship to Nehru, Ghosh asks. “It seems that Gandhi wanted to attach him to his bandwagon in order to work the provincial part of the constitution without meeting with any serious challenge from within and outside the Congress, for Nehru was ‘the best shield of the Congress against left-wing groups and organizations’ (Gopal, op.cit, 137, italics mine, ibid). In fact, Gandhi was sure, as he said at an AICC meeting in January 1942 that Nehru “says whatever is uppermost in his mind, but he always does what I want”. In fact, Nehru’s rhetoric would lull the people into complacency and suit Gandhi’s purpose, though Gandhi could not repose the same trust in Subhas (Ghosh, p.98).

The decision about whether to accept ministerial office under the new constitution was deferred by the Congress Working Committee and the AICC till the Lucknow Congress due to be held in April 1936. The Lucknow Congress under the presidency of Nehru rejected the new constitution “in its entirety” as it was “designed to facilitate and perpetuate the domination and exploitation of India and is imposed on the country to the accompaniment of widespread repression and the suppression of civil liberties” (The Congress Encyclopaedia, Vol.XI, 116-8, cited in ibid, p.99). However, as Ghosh points out, Nehru refused to support the socialist amendments committing the Congress to a policy of rejecting ministerial office. Though the Lucknow Congress rejected the new constitution “in its entirety”, it resolved to contest the next provincial elections under the new Act and left the question of accepting the ministerial office “to be decided at the proper time by the AICC…” (Gopal, op.cit, 205; The Congress Encyclopaedia, XI, 118, cited in ibid.)

Meanwhile–on 20 April, 1936, after the Lucknow Congress–Birla wrote to Thakurdas that he was “perfectly satisfied with what has taken place [at Lucknow]. Mahatmaji kept his promise…. Jawaharlal’s speech in a way was thrown into the waste paper basket… because all the resolutions that were passed were against the spirit of his speech… the things are moving in the right direction. The election which will take place will be controlled by ‘Vallabhbhai group’ and if Lord Linlithgow handles the situation properly, there is every likelihood of the congressmen coming into office” (PT Papers, File: 177, cited in Ghosh, p.99).

Nehru’s verbal radicalism, however, did not cease. On 16 June 1937, he declared: “If the Congress decides to accept office under the new Act, I am sure that to that extent it will cooperate with and strengthen British imperialism” (Cited in Ghosh, p.99). In July 1936, the Congress Parliamentary Board Executive with Patel as President and Rajendra Prasad and G.B. Pant as Secretaries was appointed by the Working Committee. The Executive “declared that its main purpose was to transform the Congress organization into an electoral organization and to revitalize and reorient it to this end” (Leader (Allahabad), 4 July and 9 July 1936, cited in B.R. Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj 1929-42, p.60, cited in Ghosh, II, p.99). As desired by the British imperialists, the Congress and Gandhian organisations like the Gandhi SevaSangh were converted into vote-getting machines to work the new Act (See D. G. Tendulkar, op.cit, IV, 191).

As Ghosh states, Birla had an interview with the Viceroy in March 1937 after the elections were over. The Viceroy was happy at the Congress’s success in the elections and said: “In fact, in substance the difference between Gandhiji’s position and my position does not at all exist”. He asked Birla: “Would Gandhiji rise against Jawaharlal if the latter disagreed with him on any compromise?” To this Birla unhesita-tingly replied: “Jawaharlal would simply follow”. Linlithgow agreed with Birla (Birla, Bapu, II, 327-30–emphasis added, in ibid, p.100). “They knew the limits of Nehru’s verbal anti-imperialism and socialism”, Ghosh remarks (ibid, p.100).

“Play Fair and We Will Play Fair”
The AICC at its meeting on 17 and 18 March 1937 acknowledged that people had voted for the Congress for its declared policy “to combat the new Act and end it” and instructed the elected Congress members of the legislatures to adhere to this policy. Rather surprisingly, the same resolution decided in favour of “acceptance of office in provinces where the Congress commands a majority”, provided the leaders of the Assembly parties received assurances from the respective governors that they would not interfere when the ministers acted within the framework of the constitution (The Congress Encyclopaedia, XI, 253-4. Cited in Ghosh, ibid, p.100). As Ghosh writes, wrecking the constitution came to mean in the Congress leaders’ parlance working it. Earlier, on 28 February, a similar resolution had been had been adopted by the Working Committee. Referring to that resolution, Gandhi said:

“The practical part of that resolution concerning acceptance of office has been drafted by me. Jawaharlal thought that it was not in conformity with the remaining three-fourths of the resolution and with the [election] manifesto… The language is open to two different interpretation: of this there is no doubt. But a satyagrahi can use language which may be interpreted in two different ways” (CWG, LXV, 118-19

Thus a satyagrahi like Gandhi was privileged to use language which was capable of contrary interpretations and was actually deceptive.

Rajagopalachari, the leader of the Congress party in the Madras Assembly, told Erskine, the then Madras Governor, that “there was a real chance to get rid of a civil disobedience mentality for good, and that it would be a thousand pities if the chance was missed” (Gopal, op.cit, 219–emphasis added in ibid, p.101).

Gandhi’s formula of conditional office acceptance as a day of protest was, as Suniti Ghosh observes, “a kind of political tactic, a sop to the anti-imperialist political workers and people who had believed in the Congress leaders’ strident rhetoric about wrecking the constitution” (Ghosh, ibid, p.101). This face-saving device would “enable the would-be Congress ministers to satisfy their own followers without demanding from Provincial Governors specific assurances which they were debarred by the Constitution from giving” (Home (Pol) File F4/16/37; cited in Misra, op.cit, 326-7, in ibid). The Working Committee’s resolution was described by the Congressmen of Bombay as “typical Gandhian move” (Times of India, 3 March, 1937).

The Working Committee met from 5 to 9 July and decided in favour of office acceptance “even though the assurances asked for had not been forthcoming, either in form or in substance” (Ibid, p.101).

This interlude of conditional office acceptance, Ghosh states, was part of the Congress leaders’ double-deal and double-speak. On the one hand, there were secret contacts and secret talks with the raj and promises of compliances with the raj’s dictates, secretly communicated; on the other hand, there were brave resolutions and statements for the consumption of the people breathing firm determination to wreck the “charter of slavery”.

During this interlude, Birla, as usual, played his part. In June, encouraged by Gandhi, Birla went to England as the government’s non-official advisor in respect of Indo-British trade negotiations and met Secretary of State Zetland, Halifax, Lothian and others. On 25 June, Gandhi wrote to him that if Birla felt that his activity helped the “national cause”, “Congress is bound to set its seal of approval on it”.

Gandhi did not fail to compliment Birla for his contribution. On 18 July he wrote to Birla “What you have been doing is good… Good you will be. Good you remain” (Birla, Bapu, II, 373; III, 14-5–emphasis added, in ibid, p.102).

In an article “Congress Ministers” in Harijan dated 17 July, Gandhi wrote that as a result of office acceptance, Englishmen and Indians would “now be thrown together as they never have been before… If the Englishmen or Anglicized Indians can but see the Indian which is the Congress viewpoint, the battle is won by the Congress and complete independence will come to us without shedding a drop of blood… In the prosecution by the Congress of its goal of complete independence, it [office acceptance] is a serious attempt on the one hand to avoid a bloody revolution and on the other to avoid mass civil disobedience on a scale hitherto not attempted” (CWG, LXV, 408–emphasis added. Ibid, p.103). In other words, the contact with Congress ministers would improve the British rulers’ understanding of “the Congressviewpoint” and persuade them to make a gift of “complete independence”, and no further struggle–non-violent or of the bloody type–would be necessary.

It was thus along the road of constitutional cooperation and under the aegis of British imperialism that the Gandhis decided to proceed towards their goal of ‘complete independence’. Ghosh observes that this was the road indicated by the raj to travel along. Senior British officials expected that “Congress would now become the controller of India’s political forces under their aegis”–a domesticated animal harnessed to the constitutional cart of which the British still held the reins” (D.A. Low, “Introduction: The Climatic Years 1917-47” in Low edited Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle 1917-47, p.30 in ibid).

The Congress leaders and the Birlas were anxious that they should attain the goal of self-government “without plunging into catastrophe”. Ghosh observes that there were indeed two roads before India, as pointed out by Irwin in 1929, by Viceroy-designate Linlithgow in 1935 and Secretary of State Zetland in 1937. One was the road of dependence on the British imperialist masters and close collaboration with them, which would lead to self-government within the imperialist framework; the other was the road of anti-imperialist revolution which would lead to freedom outside the imperialist orbit as well as to the elimination of feudalism and comprador capital–the main domestic props of colonial rule. The Congress leadership, which dreaded the revolutionary “catastrophe”, chose the former road. The decision “to avoid a bloody revolution”, even “mass civil disobedience”, was a consummation devoutly wished for by the British imperialists and the Indian big comprador bourgeoisie.

Early in 1937 G.D. Birla wrote to Winston Churchill: “Let me assure you that Mr.Gandhi and others of his way of thinking honestly wish to work the Constitution for the good of the people.”

Churchill, the arch-imperialist replied on 30 April: “The duty of the Indian electorate and Congress is to take up the great task which has been offered them, and show that they can make India a happier country, and at the same time do everything they can to win the confidence of Great Britain, and offer to her gratitude and loyalty…” (Birla, In the shadow of the Mahatma, 230-1–emphasis added. Ibid, pp.103-04).

On 22 July, Birla called on Churchill. On seeing him, Churchill said: “Well, a big experiment has begun” When Birla replied, “Yes. It has begun but it will require all your sympathy and good wishes”. Churchill “assured me of it but all the same said, ‘‘It depends entirely on you… if you can make this experiment a success, you will reach your goal automatically… Play fair and we will play fair” (Birla, Bapu, III, 21-2–emphasis added)

Suniti Kumar Ghosh remarks: “It was indeed ‘a big experiment’. Whatever the rhetoric, the acceptance of office meant that struggle, real or sham, by the Congress against the raj was a thing of the past. There began a period when the Congress leaders would be tested. If they ‘played fair’ according to the rules of the imperialist game, the raj too would ‘play fair’. They would then be trusted with further doses of self-government–‘freedom would broaden down from precedent to precedent’–as Zetland, Lothian, Churchill and others were promising(Birla, Bapu II, 153;III, 6,13, passim in ibid).The prospect was alluring to the comprador big bourgeoisie. Like a true comprador, Birla hoped that “both sides will make adjustments and perhaps it will be realized that there was a lot of good on both sides which was not appreciated so far”. He expected the Britishers to take “a far-sighted view” and “help us to realize our goal” (Bapu, ibid, 56).

“Gandhi had full faith in Birla. In his letter of 25 August 1937 he asked Birla to “do what is in the interest of India irrespective of the opinion of the Congressmen”. He added: “Rest assured that the Congress will have to accept what is for the country’s good” (CWG, LXVI, 71–emphasis added. in ibid)–as conceived by the Birlas” (Ghosh, p.104).

[Concluded]

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