Much ado for Little Consequence

Mariana Budjeryn

The Biden administration, after a long hesitation, finally allowed Ukraine to use US-supplied ballistic missiles, known as the Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, on Russia’s sovereign territory. Britain and France swiftly followed by lifting restrictions on the use of their Storm Shadow/SCALP air-launched cruise missiles against targets in Russia.

Biden’s decision is perceived as a major shift in US policy. The reason for the turnaround is likely some combination of the deployment of North Korean troops on the Russian side, the mounting Russian counteroffensive in the Kursk region, and the upcoming second Trump presidency, expected to bring US military aid to Ukraine to a grinding halt.

This is not a blank cheque to Ukraine. The use of ATACMS still comes with restrictions—not all of which have been made public.

With Trump’s presidency on the horizon and his declared intention to end the war quickly, each side is jostling to put itself in the best position possible before being summoned to the negotiation table. Hedging for Trump’s presidential win might have been a reason for Ukraine’s Kursk operation in the first place.

Russia, for its part, has not changed its war aims of destroying Ukraine as a sovereign nation—just ask German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin last week. Russia is going to try and manoeuvre into a position in which negotiations, when they come, could only formalise Ukraine’s surrender. Consequently, the next two months will likely be the bloodiest in this war.

Politically, it’s a boost of morale for an embattled Ukraine facing increasingly dark times ahead and another salami slice into Russia’s impunity. Militarily, Ukrainians could certainly use these longer-range fires to hamper the Russian counter-operations in the Kursk region and possibly beyond. ‘The ability to use ATACMS on Russian territory may save Ukrainian lives and impose greater costs on Russia’.

But stocks of ATACMSs, Storm Shadows, and SCALPs supplied to Ukraine are limited, and Kyiv will have to ration and prioritise the expenditure of these scarce and expensive munitions.

Putin has warned that Russia would regard the NATO states’ permission for Ukraine to use their weapons on Russian territory as NATO’s entry into the war. Now that the permission is granted, even if the effects of such use would be limited operationally, political reasons alone might suffice to justify a Russian escalation of the war in Ukraine.

But Russia is already in full escalatory mode in Ukraine. Since August, Russia has been pushing hard and advancing rapidly along the Donbas front. On November 17, it began another campaign against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure with a massive air strike. More such attacks will likely follow in the weeks to come aiming to plunge Ukraine into darkness and cold at the onset of winter and coerce the country into peace on Russian terms.

It is highly doubtful that Russia may resort to “extra” escalation as a specific answer to Biden’s decision, including against a NATO target. Russia’s recent advances in Ukraine, while steady, have also been costly. For Russia to pick a fight with thirty-some NATO states at this point—or any other point, for that matter—would be highly imprudent, although not inconceivable.

No single weapons system or decision has the power to change the course of a war of attrition. Only a shift in the overall balance of human, military, and economic resources might. Ukraine is inherently disadvantaged in this balance vis-à-vis Russia, which makes Ukraine’s continued survival and resistance even more incredible.

[Source:  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]

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Frontier
Vol 57, No. 24, Dec 8 - 14, 2024