A Sensational Verdict

I Mallikarjuna Sharma

Quite recently, on 8 April 2025, a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India delivered a historic verdict on gubernatorial powers not only decrying the inordinate delay coupled with inexcusable negligence by the governor of Tamil Nadu in withholding ten bills passed by the TN Legislature and sent to him for the needed gubernatorial assent but also declaring that the said bills would be deemed to have been assented by the Governor. The Bench of Justices and clarified the real powers of the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution and unanimously held that the Tamil Nadu Governor R N Ravi’s withholding of 10 state legislative bills was “illegal” and “erroneous”; it then used its discretionary powers under Article 142 to hold that the bills which were pending assent and reserved for the President were deemed to be assented. 

The ten bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislature that were withheld by Governor R N Ravi, and later deemed assented to by the Supreme Court on April 8, 2025, are primarily focused on shifting administrative control over state universities from the Governor to the state government, particularly regarding the appointment of Vice-Chancellors. Here’s the list of the bills:

1.   Tamil Nadu Fisheries University (Amendment) Bill, 2020–Passed in January 2020 under the AIADMK government, this bill aimed to rename the institution as Tamil Nadu Dr J Jayalalithaa Fisheries University and transfer administrative oversight powers to the state government.

2.   Tamil Nadu Veterinary and Animal Sciences University (Amendment) Bill, 2020–Also passed in January 2020 under the AIADMK regime, this bill sought to transfer powers of inspection and inquiry from the Governor (as Chancellor) to the state government and included provisions for a government nominee in the Vice-Chancellor selection committee.

3.   Tamil Nadu Universities Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2022–Proposed changes to university governance, including Vice-Chancellor appointments 15.

4.   Tamil Nadu Dr Ambedkar Law University (Amendment) Bill, 2022–Sought to shift Vice-Chancellor appointment authority from the Governor to the state 19.

5.   Tamil Nadu Dr M G R Medical University (Amendment) Bill, 2022–Similar to others, aimed at state control over Vice-Chancellor appointments 19.

6.   Tamil Nadu Agricultural University (Amendment) Bill, 2022–Passed in May 2022, this bill amended the university’s statutes to allow the state government to appoint the Vice-Chancellor, reducing the Governor’s authority.

7.   Tamil University (Second Amendment) Bill, 2022–Another bill targeting governance reforms in state universities 15.

8.   Tamil Nadu Universities Laws (Second Amendment) Bill, 2022–Further amendments to university laws to reduce the Governor’s role 15.

9.   Tamil Nadu Fisheries University (Amendment) Bill, 2023–A later amendment reinforcing state control over the university 15.

10.Tamil Nadu Veterinary and Animal Sciences University (Amendment) Bill, 2023–Another amendment to consolidate state authority 15.

These bills were passed between 2020 and 2023 but withheld by the Governor for 2–5 years before the Supreme Court intervened. Most of the bills aimed to transfer powers from the Governor (as Chancellor) to the state government, particularly in appointing Vice-Chancellors. After the Assembly re-passed them in a November 2023 special session, the Governor reserved them for the President, which the Supreme Court later ruled as unconstitutional.

These bills were part of a broader conflict between the Tamil Nadu government and Governor R N Ravi, who had withheld assent to them from January 2020 to April 2023. The Supreme Court’s ruling deemed the Governor’s delay and subsequent reservation of these bills for the President’s consideration as illegal, invoking Article 142 to declare the bills assented to on the date they were re-presented to the Governor after being re-passed by the Assembly on November 18, 2023. This decision stripped the Governor of significant administrative powers over state-run universities, particularly the role of Chancellor, and was seen as a victory for the DMK-led government under Chief Minister M.K. Stalin.

Article 200 runs as follows:

“Article 200, Constitution of India 1950
When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both Houses of the Legislature of the State, it shall be presented to the Governor and the Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President:

‘Provided that the Governor may, as soon as possible after the presentation to him of the Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill together with a message requesting that the House or Houses will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or without amendment and presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom:

‘Provided further that the Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill.”

The phrase ‘as soon as possible’ in the second paragraph above has been taken to mean virtually any indefinite time, but in this writer’s opinion it should mean ‘reasonable time’ only and where no time limit is prescribed in the Act, some reasonable time limits should be indicated by amendments of law. It seems some governmental committees recommended such reasonable time limits to be incorporated in the text of the article, but no central government has so far proceeded to do so through the medium of Parliament and hence all this confusion and extreme delays to the chagrin of the elected representatives and also the general public of the States concerned.
It is also quite obvious in the real-politic of this country, that if the Central Government which appoints and controls the Governors is led by a party different to that of the party heading any State Government, the Governor appointee in that State generally follows the ruling central government party’s lead and prevaricates too much on granting assent to the bills and takes indefinite time for his ‘consideration’ which virtually amounts to a very long period within which perhaps the concerned State Government could itself change or fall down due to so many manipulations and many a faux pas. Also, unlike the President, who is bound by the advice given by his Cabinet, the Governor of a State has autonomous decision-making powers in certain crucial situations, and that can lead to his collusion with the central ruling party government, even to help topple the State Governments. The invidious role of the Governor of the then United Andhra Pradesh in the toppling of the then popular Chief Minister Sri N T Rama Rao and the furious public protests and agitations in that regard which ultimately led to the restoration of the NTR government are still glowing reminders of how Governor can play dubious roles against governments led by persons or parties not favourable to the ruling party at the centre. That was why Sri NT Rama Rao and even before him several experienced political leaders have demanded the abolition of the institution of the Governor itself as it is not conducive to a free democracy in the State. And that demand and that protest have not died down among the opposition and activist circles even to this date.

Be that as it may, the Tamil Nadu Governor was certainly at fault in first dilly dallying on the matters and then after a very long time referring the bills for presidential assent–which virtually means burying those bills down for considerably longer period yet. In this context, it was quite correct on the part of the two-Judge division bench to have passed some guidelines prescribing some definite time limits for the process of assent or reserving the bills for presidential consideration, and then for the presidential assent too, but the Court should have refrained from reading a ‘deemed assent’ from the actions of the Governor in this regard and declaring that all the ten bills are deemed to have been assented by the Governor. This is a sheer encroachment of the executive powers by the Judiciary and totally unwarranted. The Court could have suggested to the Executive and the Parliament to make amendments in law in consistency with its guidelines and also suggestions to the President and the Governor to quickly complete the process of assent to the bills within a narrow time period–say not more than one month–in the instant case and if such suggestions even are not obeyed and implemented by the executive government or the Parliament, then perhaps as a last recourse the Court could proceed to use its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to clear up the mess and close the proceedings. This writer thinks this decision is defective in crucial aspects and direly needs a comprehensive review by a larger bench, preferably a 5- or 7- Judge Full Bench of the Supreme Court.

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Vol 57, No. 47, May 18 - 24, 2025