The Himalayan (Mis)Adventure–III

Amit Bhattacharyya

Talks’ but no ‘negotiations’: Earlier appeals from China for negotiations found no echo in the hearts of the Nehrus. But in 1960, Nehru agreed to Chou En-lai’s proposal to meet. The Chinese premier, accompanied by Chen Yi, China’s foreign minister, came to India in April 1960 to negotiate a peaceful settlement. But the hosts were not friendly. Chou En-lai agreed to concede India’s claim in the eastern sector, which meant a large chunk of territory which was inhabited by tribes and parts of which, like the Towang tract were under Tibetan administration. In return, he wanted India to recognize China’s claim to the Aksai Chin area in the Western sector, a ‘desert of white stones’, “17,000 ft. above sea level, where nothing grows and no one lives, lying between the towering ranges of Karakoram and the Kuen Lun”. Across it ran an ancient trade route between Sinkiang and Tibet, which was used by the People’s Republic of china in the 1950s.(Ibid,, pp.26-7, 87). A road connecting the two regions across Aksai Chin was built by china, and when, on the completion of this major engineering marvel, China announced it in 1957, India became aware of it. (Ibid, pp.88-89). Nehru rejected the Chinese proposal and claimed Aksai Chin as India’s inalienable part. The Chinese proposal of ‘reciprocal acceptance of present actualities in both sectors and constitution of a boundary commission’ was summarily rejected. Nehru also refused to agree to Chou’s proposal that both sides should refrain from patrolling all sectors of the boundary in order to avert clashes and “ensure tranquillity on the borders so as to facilitate the discussions”. (Ibid, pp.158-69). The summit meeting thus failed to resolve the problem.

Later, in his convocation address to the Indian School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, in December 1969, K.P.S. Menon, who had been India’s first foreign secretary, said:

“When Chou En-lai came to India in 1960… we missed an opportunity to improve relations. There was a faint hope that a settlement could be reached, under which the Chinese government would recognize the McMahon Line, which no previous Chinese government had recognized, in return for some recognition on our part of Chinese claims in the disputed Aksai Chin… The watershed principle on which we have heavily relied on other sectors of the frontiers is, in the Aksai Chin area, not in our favour. Moreover, it cannot be forgotten that Aksai Chin is of no importance to India, whereas, to China. It is of utmost importance because it is the link between two historically troublesome regions, Tibet and Sinkiang”.(Quoted in Dwijendra Nandi, op.cit, pp.19-20).

India continued to pursue its forward policy. Ghosh quoted Major K. C. Praval of the Indian army: “As part of the forward policy, an Assam Rifles post was set up in June 1962 at…Che Dong…which happened to be a few kilometres north of the map-marked McMahon line but was claimed by India as her territory” (see page in Ghosh. p.21). Kunhi Krishnan quotes Bragadier Dalvi, who wrote: “…we had grave reservations about the wisdom of this policy” (Ghosh, ibid).

The Chinese, on their part, advanced to a position dominating the Indian post. Against the advice of responsible Indian commanders, the Indian government decided to move forward and confront the Chinese militarily. Then, on 12 October, before leaving for Sri Lanka, Nehru announced that the armed forces had been given orders to evict the Chinese from “our territory”. In its issue of 14 October, the Chinese People’s Daily advised Nehru: “Pull back from the brink of the precipice and don’t use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble”. (See Maxwell, op.cit, pp.344-45). The advice was ignored.

S.K. Ghosh refers to the observations of S. Radhakrishnan, the then Indian Rashtrapatiabout this Himalayan adventure: “We had no business to have sent the Army on this mission. We seemed to have gone mad about Thag La [a ridge in the eastern sector north of the McMahon Line, to occupy which the fighting started]. At best, Thag La is a disputed territory. What does Nehru mean by saying ‘I have ordered the Army to throw the Chinese out’? Is this the language to be used in international affairs? Is this the manner in which grave national issues are handled?” (Quoted in D. Nandi, op. cit,pp. 24,63; the source is Major General Niranjan Prasad, The Fall of Towang, New Delhi, p.163. Prasad was the commander of the 4 Division, which was operating in the eastern sector.

The Himalayan Debacle: It is, as Ghosh avers, clear enough that the decision of the Indian ruling classes to go to war with China was a political decision–a decision which was in conflict with military advice. And this political decision invited a rebuff from China under which the Indian army, the Indian government, and Nehru reeled. To put it briefly, between 20 and 24 October, the Chinese forces overran Indian positions, penetrated the NEFA territory occupied by Towang, which was not far from the McMahon Line, halted, and again began diplomatic exchanges. However, Nehru was, as Ghosh states, apt to turn truth on its head and determined not to enter into negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the boundary problem.

Ghosh points out that by then, China had concluded boundary agreements with Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Mongolia–all neighbouring countries except India and the USSR(which, like India, preferred to determine its borders with China unilaterally).

On 17 November, the Chinese army began a second campaign, and their troops reached the borders of Assam, occupied the entire disputed territory of the NEFA, and again halted. The Indian government was seized with panic, almost wrote off Assam as lost, and did not know where the Chinese would halt next time. (Maxwell, op. cit, pp.412-3).

The Chinese troops launched a simultaneous attack next time in the Western sector and wiped out the Indian posts which had been set up on the Aksai Chin area. As Neville Maxwell stated, “the forward policy like Operation Leghorn [code name for India’s military operations to throw the Chinese out from the area around the Thag La ridge], had met with the fate which from the beginning the real soldiers had foreseen”.

(To be concluded)

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Vol 57, No. 52, June 22 - 28, 2025